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ABSTRACT 
This PhD thesis examines the Gulf monarchies of Bahrain, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates as they strive to transform their political economies away 
from dependency on hydrocarbon revenues into more diverse sectors of 
economic activity.  In particular, the research attempts to forecast the 
monarchies’ chances of achieving the transformation into principally private 
sector-led economies, while maintaining absolute rule and excluding those 
outside the circle of the ruling élites from political power or influence.  The 
central research question guiding the study is ‘Human and National Security in 
Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates – Should Climate Change 
Matter?’  The effects of climate change provide a useful lens through which to 
examine each of the states’ policies and actions as they attempt to cope with 
the physical degradation of an already water and heat-stressed environment, 
coupled with declining oil and gas revenues from the West as a result of 
international climate change agreements. 
 The thesis applies a ten question research framework to each of the entities to 
produce individual case studies for comparison.  The research finds that 
climate change is acknowledged as an issue by each of the states, but is not at 
the top of their list of priorities.  Rather, measures to improve human security 
are aimed at maximising the economic productiveness of each country to make 
up the deficit caused by decreasing hydrocarbon revenues and enable the 
monarchies to maintain the high level of free and subsidised state services they 
currently provide to their populations.  They believe the effective maintenance 
of services directly contributes to political stability which assures the 
continuance of their current system of governance where political power lies 
solely with the rulers and their close advisors.  Essentially, the priority for each 
of the ruling families is not climate change, but regime survival, preferably in its 
current form. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Map 1. The Arabian Peninsula - http://www.sitesatlas.com/Maps/Maps/604r.gif  
1.1. Context 
This thesis considers the impacts and relevance of direct and indirect climate 
change effects on the policies and strategies of the monarchies of Bahrain, 
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).  It focuses on their transformation 
from hydrocarbon dependency into diversified economies and the prospect for 
accompanying political reforms, including the likelihood of a move away from 
absolute monarchy towards popular participatory forms of government.  With its 
emphasis on human and national security, and the relationship between them, 
the effects of climate change will be explored to assess whether they are a 
significant driver of change in their own right, or just another factor to be 
considered and mitigated as the monarchies manage their economic 
diversification.  In parallel the rulers will also have to cope with the attendant 
multiple external pressures that potentially threaten their cultural, religious and 
national identities. 
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The thesis’s contribution to knowledge is an assessment of the monarchies’ 
trajectories towards a sustainable future with assured human and national 
security provision, divorced from reliance on hydrocarbons.  That assessment 
is based upon analysis of each of the monarchies’ national vision statements 
and other official documents in the public domain, augmented and triangulated 
by academic, media, Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) and pressure 
groups’ commentaries.  It also assesses each of the three monarchies’ 
prospects for regime survival, especially as national and regime security are 
often synonymous in the Gulf (Ulrichsen 2012b).  Recognising this contextual 
underpinning, the central proposition of the study is that good economic 
security enables successful delivery of the ruling bargain, which in turn assures 
national security by providing political and social stability.  This stability 
guarantees the current system of governance remains in place and the 
resulting political continuity enables high levels of human security and 
development to be achieved.  As a consequence, there is a feedback 
mechanism between human security and economic security; a safe and secure 
population is much more likely to be economically productive than not.  
However, the direct and indirect effects of climate change could have 
significant potential to affect various aspects of human and national security if 
not addressed effectively. 
The monarchies of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE are well established.  The 
rulers of Abu Dhabi, the al-Nahyans who are also the principal ruling family in 
the UAE, assumed power in the 1760s; the al-Khalifas established their rule in 
Bahrain in the late eighteenth century; and the al-Thani took control of Qatar in 
1868 (Abdulla 2012).  All three families successfully transitioned through 
independence in 1970-71 after the British withdrawal from east of Suez and 
remain in power to this day, with their political economies based principally on 
hydrocarbon revenues.  Babood says Gulf societies remain mainly tribal and 
the ruling families’ basic legitimacy stems from a combination of tribal authority 
and Islamic precepts.  He believes the regimes, empowered by oil wealth, have 
been largely successful in bringing Islam and tribalism under control as 
institutional and ideological supports (2005).  At the heart of the governance 
system of each of the monarchies sits the ruling bargain or social contract, 
where in exchange for no reliance on taxation the governments see no reason 
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to allow citizens to influence national policies (Power 2012).  The population 
effectively gives up its right to political influence in exchange for free or 
subsidised access to a wide range of government funded goods and services.  
Luomi (2012) has previously covered the climate change and energy security 
issues faced by Abu Dhabi and Qatar in detail.  However, since publication of 
her research there have been significant changes in power structures and 
political constructs in the Middle East.  As a result, the Gulf monarchies face 
new challenges.  The Arab Spring has stalled following repression of the Shia 
majority in Bahrain, the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in 
Egypt, the outbreak of civil war in Syria and the emergence of so-called Islamic 
State (ISIS) as a significant destabilising force in the region.  However, Bowen 
(2012) says no-one saw the Arab Spring was likely to be as successful as it 
was and believes the increased prominence of political Islam was the principal 
achievement of the revolutions; the spread of potent political Islam could pose 
a serious if not existential threat to the absolute monarchies if not contained.  
Bowen also says the schism between Sunnis and Shias is likely to throw up the 
greatest problems for future peace and stability (2012).  Arguably this schism is 
as bad as ever in 2016, following the lifting of sanctions against Iran1, which 
has resulted in vociferous competition and rhetoric between Iran and Saudi 
Arabia as they struggle for regional supremacy.  This is compounded by Saudi2 
and Bahraini3 actions against their own Shia populations and the war against 
the Shia Houthis in Yemen, prosecuted by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the 
UAE4; none of these makes a Sunni-Shia rapprochement conceivably likely.   
The rise of ISIS since 2014 also brings concerns for the monarchies, especially 
given reports of its religious extremism, brutality and mass killings in the areas 
it controls5; even al-Qaeda has been attacked by ISIS, much to their chagrin6.  
                                                          
1
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35335078 accessed 7 June 2016. 
2
 http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/07/saudi-arabias-shiite-problem/ accessed 7 June 2016. 
3
 http://shiapost.com/2016/06/02/bahrain-extension-of-salmans-jail-term-political-repression-un-
expert/ accessed 7 June 2016. 
4
 http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/yemen-conflict-saudi-arabia-led-coalition-fighting-alongside-al-qaeda-taiz-
1545406 accessed 6 June 2016. 
5
 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/22546-report-daesh-executed-3590-in-syria-
since-declaring-caliphate  accessed 1 December 2015. 
6
 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/11/middleeast/al-qaeda-isis-bickering/index.html accessed 16 
September 2015. 
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While ISIS is unlikely to find a huge amount of popular support in Bahrain, 
Qatar and the UAE, it is present in some strength in Saudi Arabia where it finds 
natural supporters from amongst adherents of Salafi and Wahhabi ideology7.  
The risk of deliberate expansion of ISIS terrorist cells and attacks into the more 
religiously moderate Gulf States is something that should concern the ruling 
élites, especially as Bahrain8 and the UAE9 have been active participants in 
anti-ISIS air strikes in Syria. 
There have also been less violent but equally problematic changes in the 
region around the oil price and hydrocarbon exports.  Ghafouri believes the 
GCC states were increasingly looking towards Asian markets to sell their 
products and services with reciprocal investment between Chinese and Gulf 
States’ oil-refining and petrochemical industries and upstream oil exploration.  
China saw mutual investments as a tool to create interdependencies and more 
secure oil supplies (2009).  Held and Ulrichsen said the Gulf had become the 
centre of gravity for economic affairs in West Asia and commercial ties with 
South and East Asia had been strengthened (2012a); notably, Asian markets 
were increasingly important for Qatar with long term bilateral agreements for 
gas supply with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan signed in 2011-12 and a 25 
year trade agreement with China initiated in 2009 (Ulrichsen 2012a).  However, 
falling oil prices in 2015-16 have adversely affected the economies of the Gulf 
States10 and led to falling revenues, while the concurrent downturn in the 
Chinese economy11 potentially compounds the wider economic slowdown and 
creates greater pressures on the monarchies’ revenue streams12.  Furthermore, 
the international commitment to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
limit global warming to 1.5-2°C, agreed during the Paris Conference in 
                                                          
7
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/21/saudi-arabia-isis-riyadh-terror-threat accessed 7 
June 2016. 
8
 http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/23797 accessed 7 June 2016. 
9
 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/30/uae-united-arab-emirates-leading-player-
opposition-isis-middle-east accessed 7 June 2016. 
10
 http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21695539-low-oil-price-manageable-
short-term-gulf-states-must-make accessed 7 June 2016. 
11
 https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/mar/01/chinese-manufacturing-decline-sharp-global-
downturn-factory-output-china-uk accessed 6 June 2016. 
12
 However, the Institut Français des Relations Internationales says Gulf States’ oil and gas exports to 
Japan, South Korea, China and India are three times larger than to the US and EU and, despite the 
slowdown, predicts they are set to grow over the next decade.  The Gulf, 9 May 2016, 9:159, p48. 
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December 201513, will require countries to reduce carbon emissions 
significantly.  This will put extra downward pressure on demand for oil and gas 
internationally, thus further reducing potential hydrocarbon revenues for the 
monarchies and placing their ruling bargains in jeopardy. 
With such an array of challenges potentially undermining national and regime 
security, it is probable climate change of itself is not seen as the most pressing 
problem the monarchies currently face.  However, it does provide a useful lens 
through which to look at the three states as they endeavour to execute their 
national visions and other policies and strategies to deliver economically 
diversified and sustainable political economies.  This delivery will take place 
concurrently with the regimes counteracting the challenges described above, 
while dealing with the concomitant risks that globalisation inevitably poses to 
Arab, Islamic and tribal identity, values and culture.  However, to diversify 
successfully the monarchies will have to be more interconnected and 
interdependent, in order to compete successfully in the highly complex 
international twenty-first century business environment. 
1.2. Thesis Focus 
As will be seen in Chapter 3, it is the expectation of the majority of scientific 
opinion and the United Nations (UN) that climate change is an inescapable 
reality which will have severely detrimental physical consequences for the 
planet.  Specifically, the Arabian Gulf area will suffer direct physical effects that 
increase throughout this century, including rising sea levels, reduced air quality, 
increased day and night time temperatures all year round, less frequent 
precipitation, increased desertification and more frequent extreme weather 
events such as storms and heat waves.  Each of these effects, individually, has 
the capacity to affect the human security of the resident populations adversely, 
with commensurate potential reductions of economic productivity in each state 
affected, unless mitigated effectively.  However, the effects will not occur 
individually, but simultaneously, potentially creating a synergy where the 
cumulative consequences will be greater than the sum of the effects of the 
individual parts. 
                                                          
13
 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/apr/22/un-climate-change-signing-ceremony 
accessed 7 June 2016. 
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The indirect effects of climate change will also affect the monarchies, as 
signatories to the 2015 Paris Agreement14 take action to reduce their carbon 
emissions to keep global warming to below 2°C. Some of these indirect effects 
had been seen following the 1997 Kyoto Protocol15, as western industrialised 
nations had already moved to reduce their dependency on oil.  However, the 
Paris Agreement is the first legally binding international agreement and so far 
has been ratified by 115 of the 197 parties to the agreement16.  There is 
therefore significant potential for global demand for hydrocarbons to reduce in 
the coming decades, which could severely inhibit the monarchies’ capacity to 
provide for their citizens in the long term as government revenue streams 
decrease as a result. 
However, as will be seen in the case studies, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE have 
already embarked upon a process of economic transformation as they 
recognise their hydrocarbon reserves are finite resources and that alternative 
sources of revenue must be developed before the economically viable reserves 
are expended.  National visions have been written that lay out the paths for 
transformation from hydrocarbon dependency to diverse economies, built 
around knowledge-based services, tourism, construction and specialist 
industries such as aerospace, aluminium and agro-chemicals.  It will be seen 
that the monarchies face something of dilemma; on the one hand they welcome 
the benefits that economic diversification will bring, but on the other they 
believe such transformation will bring risks to their Arab-Islamic identities, 
culture and values as globalisation exposes their citizens and residents to ideas 
and information that could be in conflict with the intentions and wishes of the 
ruling élites.  For example, as state revenues decrease, the requirement to tax 
the citizenry or require them to pay directly for services will rise and this may 
bring concomitant risks of citizens demanding a greater say in what services 
are provided, and also about how they are ruled and the political and economic 
policy decisions made on their behalf.  Such discussions are inconsistent with 
absolute monarchic rule and would pose a very significant threat to the security 
and longevity of the current regimes.  As the following section on methodology 
                                                          
14
 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_en accessed 30 November 2016. 
15
 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php accessed 30 November 2016. 
16
 http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9485.php accessed 30 November 2016. 
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explains, the implicit assumption behind this research is that regime survival is 
the paramount objective of each of the ruling families. 
Therefore, regime survival is the principal motivation behind the monarchies’ 
policy decisions on all aspects of life within their sovereign territories.  Climate 
change is recognised by each of them as an issue, but is not the most 
important problem they face as they grapple with the contradictions of 
diversifying their political economies, while retaining absolute control and 
preventing their citizens becoming tainted with popular notions of political 
reforms and other incompatible ideas.  However, economic diversification 
strategies cannot be carried out in isolation of the likely effects of climate 
change.  Revenue reductions, as a result of foreign decarbonisation policies, 
are likely to be felt first and certainly before hydrocarbon reserves are 
exhausted.  Diversification underpinned by the cushion of healthy revenues is 
the best they can hope for, but if those revenues are diminishing, the pressure 
to diversify quickly is increased if a shortfall of government income over 
expenditure is not to arrive sooner than anticipated.  Secondly, while the direct 
physical effects are being felt in the region now, their impact on human security 
will be much greater in years to come, which could lead to the population 
becoming less economically productive, putting further pressure on national 
revenues and potentially damaging national security.  If the monarchies are to 
be ready for that time, they should be putting mitigation strategies in place now 
to move critical infrastructure, such as desalination plants and power stations, 
industrial and commercial complexes and domestic housing away from areas 
likely to be affected by rising sea levels or flash floods.  They must also be 
prepared for loss of agriculturally productive land, salination of aquifers and 
other groundwater supplies and loss of biodiversity on land and in the sea.  All 
of this takes foresight, time and money, but the monarchies could be mistaken 
if they believe time is on their side and money will not be an issue.  While there 
are various drivers determining regime policies, it is probable climate change 
will be of increasing importance and therefore should matter to the monarchies. 
1.3. Methodology 
This research is, of necessity, multi-disciplinary and cross-cutting as it does not 
sit comfortably within the individual disciplines of environmental science, 
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strategy and security, politics, or economics.  Furthermore, and according to 
Baabood (2005), political scientists cannot agree on policy theory at state level, 
so a proposed hypothetical governance model has been avoided in favour of 
the reality that each state is subject to differing multiple and complex internal 
and external drivers.  The absolute monarchies in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, 
claiming the sole legitimate right to make decisions on state business (Held 
1995), do not respond to these pressures uniformly by use of commonly 
applied algorithms or decision-making processes, but instead react 
subjectively, dependent on their political and economic aims, rationality and 
self-interest.  Therefore, this research does not start with a hypothesis that the 
direct and indirect effects of climate change will lead to the inevitable collapse 
of the Arabian Gulf monarchies, or that a Western form of representative 
democracy is the only legitimate form of governance in the world in the twenty-
first century.  Rather a critical-realist approach (Robson 2002) has been taken, 
based on pragmatism that recognises causation is subject to contextual forces 
operating in the relatively open and complex systems and social relationships 
pertaining within Gulf societies, albeit characterised by rigid horizontal strata 
based on social hierarchy, and subject to multiple internal and external forces 
over which the hierarchies may exert varying degrees of control.  Much of the 
élites’ policy and decision-making is based on human emotion, survival instinct 
influenced by personal and collective experience, habitual practice, historical 
precedent and pragmatism, often guided by interpretations of Islamic texts, 
culture and values.  The high level of complexity combined with the dynamics 
of the interplay of these factors probably makes it unlikely that for any given 
situation a simple model could be propounded, tested and then repeated.  The 
research is therefore inductive in approach (Bryman 2008) as its findings have 
driven the forecasts relating to the likelihood of success in transforming the 
economies and survival of the monarchies in power.  Although the research 
was conducted with the implicit assumption that regime survival was paramount 
to each of the ruling families, it was not afforded the significance of a 
hypothesis as it was felt to be an inescapable reality. 
The research is founded on the use of primary official documents released into 
the public domain by the monarchies.  The documents forming the spines of 
the case studies are the national vision statements.  The original research 
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design included a programme of élite interviews with Gulf officials based in their 
UK embassies and in the countries concerned, but unfortunately the three 
states were largely uncooperative in this respect, as discussed in more detail 
below.  A qualitative approach was utilised as the research deals principally 
with policy responses to the impacts of climate change that are often rooted in 
human emotion, principle, culture and values which are difficult to quantify in 
any meaningful sense.  As in other supposedly rational choice situations, 
individual factors, emotions and different temperaments are in play; rationality 
is outweighed by passion and behaviours differ from expectation (Victoroff 
2005).  Simple word counts were undertaken early in the process of examining 
the national vision statements, but the results gained were largely inconclusive 
and offered little insight into the intent of the ruling élites.  The results of the 
word counts are contained at Appendix 1. 
At the outset it was decided to compare Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE for a 
variety of reasons.  They are similar in that they are all members of the GCC, 
low-lying littoral states with conservative, authoritarian Sunni monarchies, 
relatively moderate in religious terms, have similar sized populations, achieve 
similar scores in the United Nations Human Development Index, have very high 
dependency on expatriate labour to sustain their economies, and national 
visions aimed at successfully diversifying out of hydrocarbons by 2030.  The 
dissimilarities are also important.  Bahrain is politically very unstable with a Shia 
majority in an almost permanent state of active dissent or worse, very limited oil 
revenues and dependency on the Saudis for regime survival.  Qatar has a 
largely homogeneous, politically apathetic population, is hugely wealthy per 
capita and has massive gas reserves.  The UAE is a federation of seven 
emirates with significant social and economic disparities; it has huge oil 
reserves, an active political opposition and a highly efficient and repressive 
security apparatus.  Of the remaining GCC states, Saudi Arabia was not 
examined because it is so much bigger than its partners17; Kuwait was 
excluded because of the role of its National Assembly in law-making and 
                                                          
17
 http://www.saudinf.com/main/a1.htm accessed 8 June 2016. 
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approval of the state budget18; and Oman was discounted due to its lack of 
hydrocarbon reserves and its apparent political stability19.  
A case study was developed for each of the three entities because each is a 
focus of interest in its own right, requiring detailed examination to produce 
contextual descriptions of the situation in each state and allow predictions 
about likely outcomes to be made.  The countries were subjected to an 
examination of particular issues to identify and compare human and national 
security strategies, draw inferences and predict the most likely outcomes 
(Landman 2006 and Bryman 2008), especially with regard to the 
interdependencies and interrelationship between human and national security, 
and the likelihood of political reform and regime survival.  The case studies 
start with analysis of the vision(s) appropriate to that state to provide a baseline 
of national intent and then move into the ten questions framework described 
below to make an assessment of progress and draw conclusions. 
Prior to the start of primary research a literature review was conducted to 
understand the context and identify the existing body of knowledge and 
perceived gaps.  As a result, the ten subsidiary questions listed below were 
generated to provide the analytical framework for the primary research:  
 Do the monarchies recognise climate change as a pressing issue? 
 Is there evidence of intent to embrace sustainable, alternative 
technologies in the monarchies? 
 Do the monarchies intend to reform their political governance away from 
‘ruling bargains’ towards popular participatory politics? 
 Is there evidence of intent to carry out economic diversification and 
reduce dependency on hydrocarbon revenues? 
 Is there evidence of intent to improve education and skills amongst 
citizens to increase their employability? 
 Is there evidence of intent to reduce dependency on expatriate labour? 
 Is there evidence of intent to guarantee and improve human security? 
 Is national or regime security a cause for concern in the monarchies? 
                                                          
18
 http://kuwaitembassy.us/kuwait/polsys/assembly.html accessed 8 June 2016. 
19
 http://www.mei.edu/content/can-oman%E2%80%99s-stability-outlive-sultan-qaboos accessed 8 
June 2016. 
11 
 
 Are the monarchies taking steps to strengthen their security structures? 
 To what extent will the monarchies collaborate with partners and allies 
in the future? 
1.3.1. Documentary Analysis 
Each of the states has published national visions: ‘Our Vision: From Regional 
Pioneer to Global Contender, The Economic Vision 2030 for Bahrain’ published 
in 2008; ‘Qatar National Vision 2030’ also published in 2008; and ‘UAE Vision 
2021’ published in 2010.  However, the executive summary of ‘The Abu Dhabi 
Economic Vision 2030’ published in 2008 was also analysed, as it 
complements the UAE Vision and extends the Federation’s strategic horizon to 
2030, and because Abu Dhabi is the strongest economy in the UAE since the 
global economic downturn of 2008.  It was decided to focus on the executive 
summary as this is comparable in length and detail to the other three 
documents and therefore a fairer comparison may be made.  The vision 
documents bear all the hallmarks of western business consultancies and were 
almost certainly conceived and written in English for an external audience with 
the intention of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) into each of the 
monarchies.  Each of the documents is a primary source, as are subsequent 
national official policies, strategies and government departmental progress 
reports.  The content analysis of the four visions was necessarily detailed in 
case examination of publicly available government papers and reports was the 
only official source of primary research available.  This was due to concern 
about possible political sensitivities within the establishments of Bahrain, Qatar 
and the UAE about the outcomes of the research; the UAE has previously 
denied entry to foreigners accused of criticising the regimes20&21.  
Importantly, all four vision documents remain extant.  Each of the monarchies 
also has a number of national policies and strategies focused on specific issues 
such as development, education and healthcare, but these have not been 
subjected to content analysis as such detailed plans are outside the scope of 
this research.  However, certain of these have been read to provide 
                                                          
20
 http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/politics/why-london-academic-was-banned-from-uae 
accessed 8 December 2014. 
21
 https://freedomhouse.org/article/uae-restricts-entry-critics-bahrain-regime#.VIXLr9KsWSo accessed 
8 December 2014. 
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background on how the visions were to be executed, or to provide information 
on progress.   The main body of the Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 was 
treated in the same way as these plans and strategies. 
Each of the visions can claim to be strategic given how far into the future they 
look from the time they were published.  However, and of note, none of the 
documents appear to have been revised since publication, at least no later 
versions have been identified during internet searches.  This may be indicative 
of the monarchies holding their nerve and exercising strategic patience, i.e. 
resisting the temptation to make sudden changes in response to unforeseen 
global and regional political or economic events.  If this is the case, the rulers 
are to be applauded for their determination to ignore short term disruptions and 
see their plans through to completion.  Yet, there is also the possibility the 
visions lie unread on shelves as though writing them was the end in itself, 
rather than execution of a strategic plan.  It was hoped élite interview subjects 
would provide evidence of progress, but this was not achievable. 
 Although a qualitative approach was adopted, as previously mentioned a 
simple word count exercise was applied to the visions.  This looked for 
individual key words and pairs of key words derived from the ten research 
questions.  The results table is at Appendix 1.  The subsequent qualitative 
analysis deconstructed the documents to answer the ten research questions, 
concentrating on context with regard to key words and their synonyms, looking 
for both ‘witting and unwitting statements’.  ‘Witting statements’ are those the 
author intends to impart and unwitting is everything else that may be gleaned 
from the document or inferred (Robson 2002:351).  The aim of the content 
analysis was to identify whether there was recognition by the ruling élites that 
change is necessary and a stated intent to deliver.  Implicit in this was the 
requirement to make an assessment of the lengths to which the monarchies 
are prepared to go in order to retain their families’ hold on power.  Another 
purpose of the content analysis was to identify areas of the ten questions 
framework that merited further exploration through élite interviews with officials 
from the monarchies, especially with regard to future policies on hydrocarbon 
dependency, national and human security issues, and the direct and indirect 
impacts of climate change. 
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The analysis of each vision was undertaken in the following sequence.  Firstly, 
it was read through in one session to get a feel for the document.  No notes 
were made as a sense of overview was thought necessary to subsequent 
understanding.  The second step was to conduct a simple word count exercise 
as described above.  Following this, some general impressions were drawn 
about the content and weighting of each document.  The third step involved 
detailed deconstruction of the documents to identify explicit or implicit answers 
to the ten research questions and to draw conclusions.  The final step was to 
produce an overall view of what the vision was actually saying.  Finally, internet 
searches were conducted to find progress reports or other documents relating 
to the execution of the visions.  As a result an assessment of the progress 
towards achievement of each vision has been made.  In the absence of élite 
interviews, reports in academic and professional journals, opposition and 
human rights groups’ publications, NGO reporting and news media were used 
to augment and triangulate official progress reports as described below. 
1.3.2. Élite Interviews 
Letters were written to the London embassies of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE 
on 10 March 2015, asking to interview three officials from each delegation with 
specialist knowledge of politics, economics, environment and climate, and 
national security.  It was requested these interviews be carried out before 
Ramadan started on 18 June 2015.  The letters also asked for access to 
officials based in each country, who were closely involved in environmental and 
climate policy, human security and national security.  It was hoped to conduct 
these interviews in September – October 2015.  The interviews were to be 
semi-structured and based around the findings of the vision analysis and the 
ten questions framework. 
Only the Ambassador of Bahrain replied, but said there was no-one on her staff 
in London qualified to speak on the subject.  She gave two names of officials in 
Bahrain who could be contacted.  Only one replied to my approach and wished 
to be interviewed in the UK.  The official also wanted to remain anonymous and 
selected a very public restaurant for the interview.  It was a wide-ranging 
discussion, although the ten questions were used as a framework.  It was not 
possible to record the interview because of background noise.  Some written 
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notes were made during the course of the discussion, but these were not 
verbatim.  The official did offer that direct quotes could be attributed, but wished 
to clear them on a case-by-case basis.  It turned out this was not necessary as 
the interview provided background briefing to material already gleaned from 
Bahraini government documents and, as expected, was entirely on message 
about the progress being made in Bahrain, which the interviewee described as 
an open and progressive society.   
At the outset it was decided to conduct élite interviews only, because of the 
instinctively secretive nature of the monarchies and the exclusion of the great 
majority of the population from political life or the business of government due 
to the extant ruling bargains; it was felt that there was little to be gained from 
interviewing ordinary citizens about policy and strategy.  Ordinary citizens could 
have been approached by travelling unofficially to the Gulf as a tourist and then 
by spending time trying to meet and persuade individual English-speaking 
citizens to take part in interviews.  Without a mutually trusted intermediary it 
was felt this would have been extremely difficult, as Gulf citizens would be wary 
of giving their personal views on government policies to an unknown westerner. 
It was felt this posed problems for my personal security as there was significant 
scope for official misinterpretation of the purpose of the research, namely it was 
either investigative journalism aimed at criticising the monarchies22 or worse 
still, espionage23.  This latter possibility was compounded by the fact I had 
previously visited each of the countries officially as a senior British military 
intelligence officer.  The decision was therefore made early in designing the 
research methodology that the purpose of the interviews and travel to individual 
states must be completely transparent to, and authorised by, the countries 
concerned.  Authorisation was not forthcoming. 
In September 2015, Gulf-focused groups based in London were approached to 
gather their views, noting as they generally oppose the regimes their ‘evidence’ 
is biased, but nonetheless providing an alternative perspective to the views and 
information contained within official documents and the news media.  After 
lengthy internet searches it was decided to approach Bahrain Watch24 and the 
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 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-32775563 accessed 19 May 2015. 
23
 http://7daysindubai.com/british-plane-spotters-held-spying-charges accessed 31 March 2015. 
24
 https://www.bahrainwatch.org/ accessed 14 September 2015. 
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Emirates Centre for Human Rights25.  Unfortunately no credible Qatari 
opposition organisation could be identified, the closest being a blogger, Khalid 
Al-Hail26, whose blogs are intermittent and lack real coherent messages; it was 
decided to omit Qatari opposition from the research.  As with the Embassies, 
neither Bahrain Watch nor the Emirates Centre for Human Rights replied to 
requests for assistance, despite using my university email address and 
attached ethical clearance, interview information and consent forms.  It is 
difficult to know why they chose not to reply, but as human and national 
security are contentious issues in Bahrain and the Emirates, it is probable 
opposition groups will talk only with those they know, or who have been 
introduced by trusted third parties, for their own safety and security. 
The interview phase of the research therefore yielded only one government 
servant who stuck closely to the official line and would meet only in the UK.  
Without interview material the research had to fall back on contemporaneous 
official documents, with open source publications, websites, articles and news 
media used as a means of triangulation.   
1.3.3. Documents, Articles, Websites, Media Reports 
Aware that élite interviews might not be granted due to sensitivities surrounding 
criticism of the regimes27&28, it was decided to conduct parallel research using 
contemporaneous official documents, articles published in academic and 
professional journals, opposition websites, and news media, using the ten 
research questions as the framework of analysis.  Each of the sources is 
potentially flawed, as official documents may contain an acceptable version of 
the truth and deliberately exclude anything that may contain bad news or 
criticism of government policies; academic and professional journals are often 
secondary sources whose primary research may have been affected by bias or 
misinformation; opposition and human rights groups have a special interest to 
promote; and news reporting can be inaccurate, or deliberately misleading 
where there are hidden agendas in play.  However, it was felt that by combining 
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 http://www.echr.org.uk/ accessed 14 September 2015. 
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 https://khalidalhaill.wordpress.com/ accessed 14 September 2015. 
27
 https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2015/03/18/nyu-professor-denied-entry-uae-where-
university-has-campus accessed 31 March 2015. 
28
 https://storify.com/mattjduffy/uk-academic-denied-entry-to-uae-set-to-deliver-tal accessed 31 
March 2015. 
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a spectrum of sources the advantages should outweigh the disadvantages and 
give a degree of triangulation and verification of the data.  Also, in the absence 
of interviews these sources provided the only means of gaining a view of how 
the monarchies are coping with the implications of climate change for human 
and national security.  From April 2015 multiple sources (see bibliography) 
were checked regularly for items relevant to the ten research questions.  These 
sites were selected because all are in English and available online; they include 
official government websites, a cross section of regional, British and American 
news media, and opposition/human rights regime watchers.  
1.4. Structure 
The structure of the thesis is logical and straightforward.  Following this 
introduction, the Literature Review (Chapter 2) focuses on material covering 
multiple aspects of the political economies of the three monarchies, including 
environmental factors, published mainly in 2010-13, although some exceptions 
fall outside that bracket.  Chapter 3 reviews the climate change science and 
evidence at a global and regional level, taking the majority perspective that 
anthropogenic factors are the main cause of warming; the arguments of climate 
change sceptics were discounted at the outset in favour of this majority view.  
The primary research for the thesis is then organised into case studies for 
Bahrain (Chapter 4), Qatar (Chapter 5) and the UAE (Chapter 6).  Each starts 
with an analysis of the relevant national vision.  As described previously, in the 
UAE case study two complementary visions are analysed, United Arab 
Emirates Vision 2021 and Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030, to cover the same 
timeframe as the visions for Bahrain and Qatar.  The research then moves on 
to other primary sources including publicly accessible official documents and a 
range of other published material.  Regrettably, no primary data was gathered 
from interviews for reasons described above.  Chapter 7 is the final substantive 
chapter and makes comparisons between the monarchies and forecasts likely 
outcomes, including the prospects for regime survival in each state.  A short 
conclusion wraps up the thesis and reiterates the likelihood of success and 
survival of the ruling élites.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Overview 
There is no shortage of literature on the politics and economics of the Arabian 
Gulf monarchies and recently there has been more commentary concerning the 
potential direct and indirect effects of climate change on the states and the 
regimes that rule there.  This review therefore concentrates on recent writings, 
published mainly in the years 2010-2013, to provide a relatively contemporary 
synopsis of current thought on the potential survivability of the ruling families of 
Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE.  The review focuses in the main on a select group 
of writers who represent a cross-section of European and Arab perspectives 
and a range of opinion from highly optimistic to very pessimistic.  Abdulla and 
al-Suwaidi, both Gulf Arabs, are very positive about the regimes’ futures, with 
some minor qualification, but that is probably unsurprising as they are residents 
of the UAE and working in positions where any form of criticism could be seen 
as dissent and liable to sanctions.  Forstenlechner and Rutledge, and to a 
certain extent Ulrichsen, occupy the middle ground and suggest the regimes 
can survive in power if they are prepared to take significant steps towards 
political and economic reform, although they question the ability of the ruling 
families to do that.  Ehteshami is of a similar view, and although based in the 
UK brings an Iranian perspective to the situation.  Luomi is generally critical of 
the regimes’ performance and her writings focus on the effects of climate 
change and the need for sustainable economic diversification.  Davidson, 
probably one of the most vocal Western critics of the Gulf monarchies’ rentier 
governments, predicted most of the regimes in their present form will disappear 
in the 2014-17 timeframe.  Furthermore, he believes ‘traditional monarchy as a 
legitimate regime type in the region is going to reach the end of its lifespan, 
especially as most of the Gulf States are now caught in a pincer movement of 
pressures between unsustainable wealth distribution mechanisms and 
increasingly powerful “super modernising forces” that can no longer be 
controlled or co-opted by political élites’ (2013:vii).  Echoing 1960s concerns 
about communist revolutions in the Far East, he sees the potential for a domino 
effect if one of the apparently stable Gulf monarchies was to fall and says ‘Even 
the wealthiest and most confident of rulers would find their positions, or at least 
their legitimacy, under threat’ (2013:2).  Davidson appeared to believe collapse 
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was inevitable, even without the potential effects of the 2011 Arab Spring, 
although he accepted revolutions in other Arab states could have a catalytic 
effect for political dissent and unrest within the monarchies.  However, by 2016 
the Arab Spring was over and had been replaced by major instability in Libya, a 
grinding civil war in Syria, the establishment of ISIS’s ‘caliphate’ with all its 
extremism in Iraq and Syria, and retrenchment under the old guard in Egypt.  
There is not much left to commend popular uprisings after the heady days of 
2011.  
Writing just after the Arab Spring revolts of 2011, Abdulla (2012) says the 
political strength of the monarchies is accepted by many who do not dispute 
their legitimacy; some even regard them as more powerful than previous 
generations.  The monarchies continue to depend on Islam, tradition, charisma 
and tribalism for legitimacy, but also rely upon hydrocarbon revenues plus 
socio-economic improvements, modern bureaucracies and highly efficient 
security structures to retain power. However, arguably this is not the situation 
for Bahrain where the al-Khalifas remain in power only because of the 
intervention of Saudi and UAE forces during the 2011 Shia rebellion.  Davidson 
believes this greatly damaged the al-Khalifas’ legitimacy, potentially 
irrecoverably (2011).  The danger here is of comparing two opposing 
perspectives rooted in different cultural backgrounds.  For Abdulla political 
legitimacy is vested in the mainstays he describes, whereas Davidson, from a 
Western democratic culture, sees legitimacy as only possible through popular 
consent.  However, in Abdulla’s calculation just the consent of tribal leaders 
and power-brokers is sufficient, rather than the agreement of the majority of the 
people.  The legitimacy of the al-Khalifas, from an Arab standpoint therefore, 
rests upon their ability to wield force, supported by their Sunni brethren in Saudi 
Arabia and the UAE, rather than the consent of the Shia majority who are 
unable to depose them.   
The monarchies go so far as to claim democracy is inconsistent with Arab 
tradition and culture and Islam.  They see Iran and Kuwait as failing 
democracies in the region and they fear that so-called Islamist extremists may 
win any elections (Davidson 2013), such as the Muslim Brotherhood’s success 
in Egypt’s presidential elections in 2012.  Davidson (2013) says the view that 
Islamic culture is inherently undemocratic is convenient for the monarchies, but 
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does not explain the lack of political reform in the Gulf States.  In doing so he 
demonstrates again a Western perception about what constitutes political 
legitimacy and ignores the reality that in traditional tribal cultures the right to 
rule is usually exercised by the person able to gather the greatest strength 
around him.  In forming any view about the potential longevity of the 
monarchies it is essential the platform adopted is culturally sensitive to local 
norms and trends. 
Forstenlechner, Rutledge and Alnuaimi (2012) say there are two dominant 
viewpoints about the prospects for survival of the GCC monarchies: the first is 
the monarchies are supported by tribal, clan and familial allegiances which do 
not doubt legitimacy; the second is the ruling bargain works and, along with 
some adjustments following 2011, has ensured the population is catered for.  
They believe that if the regimes are to survive, which is very possible, they 
need strategies for negotiation and handling dissent, alongside policies for 
education and economic reforms.  Neither of these viewpoints is radical, but 
suggest the status quo is sustainable with some fairly sensible changes to 
ensure the population feels it is being treated well.  Again, this is not a model 
that would sit easily with Western electorates, but it could fit well into the 
traditional, religious and cultural norms of the Gulf.  A combination of 
guaranteed economic well-being, better education to permit economic 
advancement and more freedom of expression could be a highly effective 
substitute for full-blown democracy. 
However, there is a view that the political economy of the Gulf is likely to shift 
decisively toward post-rentier structures of governance.  Held and Ulrichsen 
(2012a) believe changing demographics are stressing redistributive practices, 
but the labour market is incapable of absorbing large numbers of citizens.  
Their standpoint recognises change is necessary, but is more aligned with 
Forstenlechner et al than with Davidson’s almost apocalyptic vision.  
Interestingly, they do not regard the need for greater freedom of expression as 
significant, but see the practical effects of increasing numbers of citizens to 
feed, combined with the relatively poorly educated and unskilled populations of 
the states, as forcing the need to change upon the monarchies.  Certainly, 
economic and social exclusion could lead to political dissent if it became 
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widespread, suggesting it is in the monarchies’ interests to make the reforms 
Forstenlechner and his colleagues identified. 
From the optimist’s perspective, Abdulla believes the monarchies are now 
highly open, modern and globalised entities because of forces of change 
resulting from huge oil wealth.  He says change occurred on a massive scale 
and at significant pace with oil and globalisation causing major socio-economic 
impacts (2012) that turned the Gulf monarchies into modern states instead of 
traditional tribal societies.  Somewhat at odds with some of his comments 
suggesting traditional conservatism has prevailed, he describes how this has 
been replaced by a more modern, urban and affluent society and says 
relatively diversified economies with wide links to global markets give better 
quality of life to burgeoning populations.  Perhaps this is indicative of a dual 
polarity within the monarchies; on the one hand a degree of economic freedom, 
diversification and global connectedness is positively encouraged as a means 
of bringing rewards of wealth to the citizenry, a sort of post-modern rentierism.  
On the other hand real political power stays tightly held in the hands of a clique 
that remains firmly ensconced in the traditional, conservative tribalism of the 
past.  This is not at odds with Forstenlechner, Rutledge and Alnuaimi’s 
proposal, nor with Held and Ulrichsen’s view.  It suggests the future in the Gulf 
is not going to be Western-style democracies, but will actually resemble 
traditional styles of Arab and Islamic governance, with some degree of greater 
political freedom, better education and guaranteed economic well-being for the 
citizens.  The consensus that appears to be forming in the literature is more in 
favour of this outcome than Davidson’s pessimism. 
Underpinning this is the reality that the Gulf monarchies have relied principally 
upon hydrocarbon revenues since the 1970s to sustain their regimes and, 
arguably, keep their citizens politically apathetic; but the oil and gas cannot last 
forever.  According to Reiche, working on 2007 production rates, it was 
estimated in 2010 Qatar had 62.8 years of oil remaining; the UAE had 91.9 
years and Kuwait more than 100 years.  95 percent of fossil fuel reserves in the 
UAE are in Abu Dhabi; Dubai’s oil is expected to run out by 2020 and her gas 
by 2030.  However, 70 percent of Abu Dhabi’s government revenue in 2010 
was from oil and natural gas, while Dubai received only 5 percent of 
government revenue from hydrocarbons, showing it had diversified successfully 
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into other revenue streams.  Meanwhile, Qatar has the highest natural gas 
reserves in the GCC, ranked third in the world.  Of note, six of the seven 
emirates and Bahrain do not benefit as much from hydrocarbons as they did, 
nor anywhere near as much as Qatar and Abu Dhabi (2010).  Bahrain is most 
at risk of economic hardship unless alternative revenue sources can be 
exploited, while Abu Dhabi will have to subsidise the other six emirates to a 
greater or lesser degree if intra-federation discord is not to surface.  While 
Qatar and Abu Dhabi appear to have a cushion of decades, because of their 
reserves, they cannot ignore international climate change agreements leading 
to decarbonisation policies that will reduce their revenues as consumption 
decreases.  Despite the size of their reserves time is pressing.      
So, why does climate change present a problem for the monarchies over and 
above that which demands for political reform might ordinarily bring? According 
to Luomi, the Gulf monarchies have natural unsustainability determined by 
three features: strong rentier systems; persistent authoritarianism; and 
inefficient social contracts.  These characteristics have created an ‘illusion of 
abundance’ leading to wasteful energy and water consumption and disregard 
for environmental sustainability (2012:3).  In essence, short-term decision 
making at national level is being driven by the demands of regime survival, 
irrespective of the longer term implications for economic and environmental 
sustainability.  Therefore, if Luomi’s analysis is correct, the monarchies are 
storing up greater problems for the future by refusing to deal with them as they 
appear.  Davidson sees these problems as inevitable and an existential threat 
to the monarchies, while others see the issue as manageable providing 
sensible action is taken in a timely fashion; whether that need is recognised 
and acted upon is discussed below. 
2.2. Rentierism 
Much is made of the Arabian Gulf monarchies being ‘rentier states’ and in 
many cases this is pejorative. The concept of ‘rentierism’ is based on Marx’s 
1860s notion of a class deriving income from property rents but producing 
22 
 
nothing itself, according to Davidson (2013).  He quotes Hazem Beblawi’s29 
view that a rentier state is one where relatively few people are involved in 
wealth creation, but where the majority are involved in the redistribution of that 
wealth.  Philosophically one could question the application of this definition to 
the Gulf monarchies.  Marxism is predisposed towards despising the landlord 
class, assumed to be exploiting poor workers who cannot afford to buy their 
homes and are forced to rent.  This is not true of the monarchies, although it is 
only the ruling élite involved in the generation of wealth, but that is because of 
an assumed conflation between state and regime; where all natural resources 
are owned by the state, inevitably they are controlled by the monarchy.   
Davidson expands upon this stating it is usual for rulers and their relatives to 
own most of the country’s land and natural resources and it is difficult to 
separate what is owned by the state from what belongs to the ruling family.  As 
with wastage on prestige projects such as airports, airlines and skyscrapers, 
this has become a cause of criticism amongst citizens, especially where the 
ruling clique is accused of being predatory such as in Bahrain.  In 2010, the al-
Khalifas were accused of illegally appropriating one tenth of Bahrain’s scarce 
public land (2013). However, it is also important to recognise it is incumbent 
upon the leadership in traditional tribal society to look after the welfare of the 
tribe.  By redistributing ‘rents’ derived from hydrocarbons the monarchies are 
doing exactly that, although their growing family wealth cannot be denied 
either.   
It is said the Arab monarchies survive by exploiting ‘rent’ revenues from the oil 
industries.  Rents allow the regimes to provide their subjects with substantial 
material benefits without the need for taxation.  Rentierism describes a 
distributive social contract on which the government’s legitimacy is based.  The 
state provides free medical care and education, low income housing and high 
paying public sector jobs, in exchange for the population’s compliance and 
acquiescence (Reiche 2010).  There is an interesting potential anomaly to be 
considered.  Is the revenue obtained from the sale of hydrocarbons rent, or is it 
the just proceeds of sale of a national natural resource and does it make a 
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difference?  It appears from the perspective of assessing regime legitimacy the 
‘rentier’ label can suggest the state is less legitimate than another state that 
relies on more than a single commodity for its revenues.  Perhaps this is 
another occidental viewpoint based on the inherently diverse nature of Western 
economies. 
Luomi seems to suggest there is an inversely negative relationship between 
legitimacy and rentierism.  She believes the rulers allocate a large percentage 
of the external rent to their citizens in exchange for the surrender of a 
significant proportion of their demands for political rights, although she 
acknowledges there is a debate to be had about whether rentier theory is right 
to explain relationships and the capacity for change in the region (2012).  She 
says rentier structures influence economic, political and social outcomes and 
reinforce the position of the ruling élite. As revenues have increased, so the 
monarchs’ power has extended through redistributive practices and control of 
societal relationships by supporting, co-opting and coercing groups and 
individuals.  The rulers have maintained traditional structures and relationships 
within authoritarian frameworks, but tribes have been co-opted and autonomy 
contained as the rulers have maintained strong vertical power linkages.  The 
legitimacy strategy of the rulers sees the extension of the ruler’s network 
across society where all relationships culminate at the top.  However, 
leadership still has to respect the values and moral codes of the local majority, 
especially when dealing with religious issues (2012).  Whether the structures 
are truly rentier or not, it is not necessarily the case they are illegitimate if they 
comply with societal and religious norms prevalent in the region and are 
consented to by the tribal élites.  In effect it is a pragmatic relationship based 
on a reconciliation of power and resource sharing. 
From another writer’s perspective the lack of political liberalisation in the Gulf is 
primarily shaped by the redistributive systems they have.  Power (2012) says 
these weaken demand for political representation because the state, with no 
need for taxation, sees no reason to give citizens influence over national 
policies.  The middle class has effectively been bought off and given up its right 
to political influence in exchange for economic wealth.  For others the incentive 
to work is minimal, unless in government jobs, as the state provides through 
benefits and disbursements.  However, Power (2012) believes the rulers 
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recognise rentierism is not a viable long term model, especially as potentially 
reduced revenues from hydrocarbons inhibit the ability of the state to provide 
for its citizens, threatening the social contract.  The crucial point is not whether 
rentierism is a legitimate form of government if it denies political expression, but 
whether a regime can survive if it fails to provide for its citizens in the way the 
social contract demands.  Citizen acquiescence is based upon the assumption 
of provision of goods and services; failure to provide could lead to economic 
and social hardship, exclusion and then political discontent.  In a bargain both 
parties must honour their side for it to work. 
2.3. Politics 
The ruling bargain so much of the literature criticises is not an oil-era, Arabian 
Gulf construct.  According to Bowen, secular Arab rulers in the 1960s created a 
social contract where the regime would provide for their citizens’ needs in 
return for the people staying out of politics (2012).  That this form of 
governance has survived so long, especially after adaptation to the 
monarchies’ needs, suggests it could be an instinctively ideal political system 
for Arab states whose populations remain traditional and tribal in outlook and 
Islamic in religious tradition, both of which are not inherently in favour of 
Western-style popular democracy.  The breakdown of these contracts in 
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria emphasises the bargain is a two-way street and 
both sides must live up to their obligations, reinforcing the perception the 
monarchies must be alive to the pressures their citizens face and proactive in 
taking measures to alleviate economic and social hardship or exclusion. 
Abdulla believes (2012) a key consequence of the significant flow of oil 
revenues into the Gulf States in the 1970s and 1990s was consolidation of the 
socio-political status quo.  Traditional, conservative forms of governance 
conditioned political relationships and determined how society and business 
worked.  This continues until now where, despite globalised pressures for 
change and modernity, continuity has remained the main driver of ensuring the 
survival of conservative, religious regimes, contrary to predictions of their 
impending demise.  He further declares (2012) that the states are essentially 
benevolent and paternalistic and contends the largely obedient tribal culture is 
unlikely to disappear any time soon, as it is relied upon heavily by the 
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monarchies to preserve political loyalty to the ruling élites.  However, Abdulla is 
a significant academic within the Emirates University, so it would not be in his 
interests to point out potential vulnerabilities within the monarchies, or suggest 
that fundamental political and societal change is imminent.  Essentially, the 
ruling bargain is such that the state provides for a life of leisure in exchange for 
complete political control (Forstenlechner and Rutledge 2011).  This appears to 
suit the majority of the Gulf’s citizens, unless the government fails to deliver its 
part of the bargain.  The key question therefore is whether the monarchies can 
keep ahead of the game and continue to provide for their people, despite 
potentially reducing hydrocarbon revenues, economic downturns, or even a 
more politically aware and demanding population. 
The absence of the need to tax the citizenry, because of the redistributive 
nature of the regimes, leads to a lack of ruler accountability and reinforces the 
political system’s authoritarianism Luomi (2012) believes.  She says the 
monarchies also exhibit Karl’s paradox of plenty30, where oil rents create 
unstable political economies and produce a barrier to change because the 
required reforms are not in the interests of the leaders.  Linked to 
authoritarianism and change resistance, she finds civil society organisations 
have been silenced, co-opted, or simply do not exist; she notes there are few 
environmental NGOs in the GCC states and they are all non-controversial 
(Luomi 2012).  Whether the lack of a Western-style civil society along with 
special interest pressure groups is a bad thing or not, the way Arabs voted in 
their millions for Islamists since 2011 suggests many of them do not share the 
same aspirations for democracy as Western liberals.  They see their best 
choice as religion in the form of political Islam (Bowen 2012).  As seen 
previously, Davidson believes the notion of Islam being anti-democratic is a 
convenient excuse for lack of reforms, but this appears not to be borne-out by 
the results of the polling booth. 
Abdulla believes the prevailing view is there is no real domestic demand for 
political reform in the Gulf States with most people preferring the status quo.  In 
his view the states can postpone democracy as long as they continue to deliver 
in socio-economic terms and in welfare benefits.  He says it is widely believed 
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in the Gulf that democracy is divisive and destabilising, prompting questions 
about the need for change if the system works and prosperity, security and 
stability are maintained (2012).  Perhaps key to this perception is Kuwait where 
democracy appears to have failed due to endless internal squabbling, divisions 
and lack of economic progress.  Additionally, Kuwait has become far more 
socially conservative, sectarian and tribal than in the 1970s. It is said 
parliamentary process has been used to promote vested interests rather than 
national priorities and this has made democracy appear perplexing to other 
Gulf monarchies (Abdulla 2012).  Davidson (2011) also describes Kuwaiti 
politics as a mix of deeply entrenched vested interests and says it is unlikely 
reforms could be achieved in Kuwait without some degree of instability.  This is 
an interesting paradox, as the one GCC country where democracy exists 
alongside monarchy, underpinned by huge hydrocarbon revenues and 
reserves, is unable to use that democracy to good effect.  Potentially the nature 
of tribalism, which is essentially about tribes achieving the best for themselves 
and their kin rather than collaboration, is counter-democratic as a form of 
governance and so any Arab foray into democracy is doomed to failure unless 
tribalism is fatally undermined. 
De Haas (2011) believes the case of the Gulf demonstrates that a lack of 
political freedoms does not lead to large outward migration to more liberal 
countries, as long as the economic benefits and prosperity are perceived to 
outweigh the disadvantages of restrictions on political expression.  Despite 
Davidson and Luomi wishing it were not the case, it appears the citizens of the 
Gulf monarchies are content to be bought-off and gladly trade political freedom 
for guaranteed economic well-being, social welfare and healthcare.  Perhaps it 
is also the case for the majority of the monarchies’ populations that political 
disenfranchisement is a small price to pay to avoid the dysfunctionality of 
Kuwait’s democracy. 
However, according to Lambert most states in the region allow for some form of 
electoral politics, although this is sometimes used to avoid proper 
democratisation, or to keep authoritarian rule secure; any political activity can 
create a space for the formation of political associations, if not parties, and can 
influence decision making.  Kuwait, however effective its democracy is, started 
holding regular elections in 1992, while Oman held a consultative council in 
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1991 in which districts made suggestions for membership.  In 2003 universal 
suffrage was granted to all Omanis, although the Sultan reserves the right to 
approve each representative elected.  Bahraini women won the right to vote 
and run for office in 2002, followed by Kuwaiti women in 2005 (2011).  But, as 
shall be seen later, real power has been retained at the core of the ruling élites 
in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, exemplified perhaps by the fact that these 
countries are in the top fifty in the 2010 Human Development Report, but in the 
2010 Freedom House report are not classified as free states in terms of political 
freedom (Abdulla 2012). 
Ulrichsen brings the traditional tribal and Islamic governance model into the 
sharp relief of the 21st Century, stating that in today’s intensely globalised 
environment, influence is projected through multiple channels and is less reliant 
on territorial size than ever before.  A combination of resource riches and a 
highly centralised decision making process allows ruling élites to operate with 
greater freedom than those countries with participatory democracy, such as 
Kuwait (2012a).  Ulrichsen, as said before, sits close to the middle ground of 
this debate, but his view of the nature of Gulf Arab realpolitik would suggest the 
existing ruling bargain system of government is exactly right for the citizens 
who get their needs catered for and the monarchies who can rule, create 
wealth, exert influence and even become players on the global stage, 
unimpeded by the ‘drag’ of a domestic electorate.  
2.4. Economics 
As discussed previously, redistributive states are vulnerable to weakening of 
the ruling bargain and loss of legitimacy if mechanisms for co-opting support 
and depoliticising society start to break down, according to Kumetat.  He 
believes GCC states have systemic economic problems including bloated 
public and weak private sectors; poor education systems that hinder 
diversification; stratified labour markets; and large numbers of migrant workers.  
He is concerned multiple sources of human insecurity may interact with 
growing resource scarcities and unequal patterns of resource availability, 
especially food and water security (2009).  This destabilisation of human 
security for largely economic reasons could be exactly the catalyst to create 
demands for political reform, if the ruling élites are too slow or ineffective in 
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addressing them.  Furthermore, Ulrichsen says globalisation adds another 
potentially destabilising dimension to interdependencies linking Gulf States to 
the international community.  Increasingly, new relationships avoid state 
structures and controls and constitute both a philosophical and material threat 
to governments.  They are essentially different to earlier interdependencies 
based on hydrocarbon exports that shaped the particular characteristics of the 
redistributive states and connected the Gulf globally (2011).  The monarchies 
must therefore conduct a sophisticated twin-track approach in order to 
reconcile internal economic pressures with external globalising drivers that 
have their economic components outside the control of the ruling élites.  An 
active policy of economic diversification to ensure financial risk is spread 
geographically through a variety of business and industrial sectors would seem 
to provide the best insurance policies for the monarchies to protect their wealth 
from depletion. 
Held and Ulrichsen take this theme further, saying Gulf policy makers are 
aware of ‘the urgency of moving beyond a culture of citizen entitlement’ while 
‘embedding notions of productivity and value creation in the strategies of 
economic diversification’ in order to change the current structures.  This seems 
to be at odds with Davidson’s assessment of the situation, but they concur with 
him that the centrality of the rentier system to the social contract magnifies the 
difficulties for the monarchies that lie ahead, noting the vulnerability of states in 
transition to political challenge and accusations of lack of regime legitimacy 
(2012a: loc 798).  Certainly, without an attitudinal change on the part of their 
citizens there can be no shift in patterns of work and productivity in the way the 
ruling élites desire; the ruling bargain in this instance could be under severe 
threat.  Add to this the fact Gulf States share many of the characteristics of 
Arab Spring countries, such as increasing populations and a youth bulge; high 
unemployment; unbalanced labour markets that cannot absorb the citizenry, 
many of whom are not educated and skilled enough to work; and an 
institutional opposition to meaningful political reform, as in Egypt and Tunisia 
(Held and Ulrichsen 2012b).  This all suggests a necessary realignment of the 
social contract, but raises the question of how it can be achieved other than 
consensually through consultation and political and economic reform, if it is to 
have any chance of success; mere imposition of change as a fait accompli 
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could very possibly lead to some form of open political dissent or even political 
violence. 
Above and beyond amassing money for its own sake, the wealth directly or 
indirectly accrued as a result of oil revenues has enabled the globalisation of 
some Gulf countries and their emergence as relatively significant actors on the 
international political scene.  The impact of this greater role on the world stage 
must be examined in the context of rapid changes in the 21st Century set 
against the fundamental norms and values still prevalent in the region; this 
makes the issue of identity politics in the Gulf a critical variable in any future 
political development (Ehteshami 2013).  With greater interrelatedness and 
complex relationship networks being prevalent, change is ever present even in 
societies where traditional forms of governance remain.  Global forces interact 
with domestic pressures in the Gulf States causing shifts in power 
relationships, which lead to new drivers in economic and foreign policies and 
result in a situation of flux.  Traditional governance concepts and structures 
must coexist alongside newer obligations and demands for reform.  At the 
centre of the global changes impacting the region are the monarchies’ 
hydrocarbon and financial reserves (Held and Ulrichsen 2012a) which, 
depending on the levels held, either cushion the countries where reserves are 
extensive, or exacerbate a worsening situation where reserves are low or 
nearing depletion.  It is these latter countries, arguably deeper in transition than 
their hydrocarbon and financially richer neighbours, which are the most 
vulnerable to political instability and demands for reform. 
The increased sophistication of the regimes that will be necessary in the future 
is already visible, with GCC states demanding a greater voice in world affairs in 
exchange for increased funding of International Monetary Fund (IMF) rescue 
packages in 2008.  There has been a re-alignment of geo-economic global 
power eastwards as the Gulf countries, India and China become more 
economically powerful (Ulrichsen 2012a).  In Qatar and the UAE new foreign 
policies are being developed which project global reach and influence and are 
underpinned by exploitation of domestic resources (Held and Ulrichsen 2012a).  
All of this suggests a willingness on the part of some Gulf monarchies to tie 
themselves into the matrix of international political interdependencies in order 
to improve their chances of regime survival in a modern world.  Admittedly, 
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comparatively higher levels of resources and smaller populations give the 
rulers of Qatar and the UAE greater insulation from domestic social actors and 
economic interests than other GCC states.  Although as has been seen, even 
in Kuwait where ratios are similar, the ruling family is unable to exercise the 
same level of power because of a vocal political class and effective 
parliamentary opposition.  Political power and authority in Qatar and the UAE 
has remained concentrated in a small circle around the senior members of the 
ruling élite (Ulrichsen 2012a). 
Mohamedi, in Kern et al (2010), is optimistic about the future and says all GCC 
countries had managed their economies extremely well over the preceding ten 
years, with unprecedented economic stability giving oil consumers confidence 
and contributing to political stability.  He claims an economic revolution took 
place over that time.  However, Mohamedi is a partner in PFC Energy, a global 
consulting firm specialising in hydrocarbons31.  It would therefore be surprising 
if he did anything other than talk up the economic situation in the Gulf in the two 
years immediately following the economic downturn.   
According to Ghanem and Elfakhani (2011), GCC states still need to relieve the 
financial burden of capital expenditure each of them currently bears.  The 
financial strains on state budgets adversely affect the revenues reserved for the 
ruling families, because if unemployment and rising prices are suffered by the 
general population, but the ruling élite continues to maintain or increase their 
share of state revenues, there could be severe political backlash.  Similarly, if 
the ruling élites step out of the responsibility of running business they could be 
alienated from their natural support base.  They also contend it appears some 
of the ruling élites appear to forego their total control of economic power in 
order to encourage participation of the private sector in wealth creation.  The 
élites are performing a delicate balancing act; they need to be seen to be 
sharing the pain of economic stringency, while remaining engaged in the 
business of commerce and wealth creation, and at the same time divesting 
themselves of the real financial risk of ventures by encouraging the private 
sector to hold that risk. 
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As suggested previously, the trading status quo may not survive far into the 
future as trade focused partnerships with Asian countries offer GCC states 
plausible alternatives to dealing with the more politically interventionist EU and 
US.  China is especially attractive because of its inherent pragmatism and its 
focus on non-intervention and the centrality of state sovereignty.  There are 
thus potentially significant implications for accepted concepts of global 
governance as developing nations join together to counterbalance the 
traditional Western view of what constitutes good governance (Held and 
Ulrichsen 2012a).  Although China signed the Paris Agreement in April 2016 
with 174 other countries32, the fact it does not insist on Western-style 
democratisation or corporate social responsibility policies offers the Gulf States 
the opportunity to maintain high levels of hydrocarbon revenues while leaving 
their governance structures free from criticism.  A shift of focus to the East 
would provide the monarchies with a credible survival strategy and the time to 
carry out political and economic reforms deemed necessary for regime 
sustainability. 
Winder says one of the strategies pursued by the monarchies has been the 
creation of sovereign wealth funds spread over a wide geographic area.  
Despite political concerns within the US, it remains the biggest recipient of 
these and Western financial institutions received over US$40 billion up to 2008, 
which helped greatly during the global economic downturn.  The funds are 
generally opaque with little transparency on investment strategies and control 
tends to be over-centralised.  There is a view the funds could play a greater 
entrepreneurial role in the Gulf, through investing in domestic economies and 
thus reducing the potential of major unemployment as Gulf populations 
increase.  Investments in industries that complement development efforts could 
pay dividends in terms of job creation, while diversifying investments could 
boost returns and kick-start certain sectors of the domestic economy, where 
workers might do more than just menial jobs.  Of course, this requires the 
workforce to be educated and qualified appropriately for the sectors and to 
have the motivation required to work (2010).  That returns to the issue of the 
citizen perspective of entitlement and the need for consensual change to the 
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ruling bargain, if citizens are to be expected to work in real jobs in the private 
sector. 
The Gulf States started to invest in overseas sovereign wealth funds and other 
assets because of the inability of their domestic economies to absorb the 
massive oil revenues they were earning (Bahgat 2012).  This investment led to 
oil exporting countries becoming major creditors globally and to industrialised 
countries specifically.  The large current account surpluses enjoyed by oil 
exporters are in stark contrast to the deficits normally seen in the US and 
Europe.  It can be argued that without oil exporters acting as major creditors to 
the larger international financial institutions, the recession in the West would 
have been much deeper and longer (Bahgat 2012).  The growth of GCC 
sovereign wealth funds is a key indicator of the global power shift taking place 
between emerging markets and the developed world, as described by 
Ulrichsen above.  Gulf sovereign wealth funds are buying into Western 
companies, causing global interconnectedness and greater interdependencies; 
in essence stakeholders now have too much invested to be the cause of 
problems (Winder 2010).  Of course investments can be moved and with closer 
connections to a more politically neutral East it is conceivable the sovereign 
wealth funds’ strategies could be to transfer investments into large Asian 
concerns over time, which could lead to economic problems in the West.  The 
economic downturn in China in 2015 caused some to predict the end of the 
remarkable growth that had been seen there for a number of years, but by the 
end of the first quarter of 2016 optimism had returned33, so the Chinese market 
remains an attractive investment opportunity.  
However, it has not all been good news.  The monarchies accumulated their 
rent in sovereign wealth funds but, as Luomi says, these were also hit by the 
financial downturn of 2008.  The crisis was a reminder of the vulnerability of 
diversification attempts into non-oil sources of rent.  Dubai, believed to be the 
most diversified of the Gulf economies, was the worst hit due to the collapse in 
real estate, tourism, shipping and the global economy in general.  However, its 
future strength may be its low dependence on fossil fuel revenues (2012).  
Without doubt the investment advisors will have learned from the 2008 
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experience and done what others have done and diversified their holdings still 
further.  Although the funds were hit badly, they remained strong enough to bail 
out Western institutions and then recovered relatively quickly as the global 
economy picked up again.  Globalised interconnectedness by its very nature 
prevents insulation from the global effects of bad things that happen to others, 
but the levels of wealth invested in the sovereign funds are so high that a 
catastrophic collapse on a global scale would be the only thing to destroy them.  
However, the challenge for the monarchies is how to use these funds to offset 
the changes that will be effected by a global low carbon era and in the longer 
term by eventual depletion of hydrocarbon reserves across the region. 
2.5. Social and Cultural 
The impacts of globalisation are being felt strongly in the Gulf States.  
According to Held and McGrew (2003:4)  
‘Globalisation denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, 
speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns 
of social interaction.  It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of 
human social organization that links distant communities and expands 
the reach of power relations across the world's major regions and 
continents’.   
 
Ariely (2012) believes globalisation undermines national identity because 
governments cannot control cross-border information flows which dilute cultural 
and national characteristics. He admits his findings are inconclusive due to the 
multi-dimensionality of national identity, but, despite globalisation, it appears 
people can retain their sense of national identity, although their willingness to 
fight for it can be diminished.  Partrick says the Gulf States have a narrow 
conception of national identity; sub-state tribal and sectarian loyalties are 
strong, but loyalty to a larger national entity is lacking.  Gulf Arabs do not 
usually construct their national identity as a result of hostility to a neighbour and 
tribes are still fundamental to the national leadership and construct (2012).  
Hobsbawm suggested globalisation was leading to the ‘astonishing 
cosmopolitisation of great cities in the wealthy countries’ (2008:87) and cited 
Benedict Anderson’s assertion that, as a result of increased labour mobility and 
dual nationalities, a nation-state’s birth certificate had been superseded by the 
passport as the key document in establishing an individual’s national identity.  
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Identity issues concern the monarchies greatly and, as will be seen, significant 
efforts are devoted to maintaining Arab and Islamic traditions, culture and 
values to prevent their dilution. 
 
However, strong national identity does not necessarily imply strong civil society.  
Newell says there is a long history of civil society organisations holding national 
governments to account for their failures to meet climate change commitments.  
Civil society techniques include accessing negotiators, lobbying, 
demonstrations, media releases and acting as oversight bodies to expose non-
compliance (2008), but Davidson says the Gulf monarchies traditionally lack 
civil society organisations, relying on the distribution of largesse derived from 
hydrocarbon rents to stifle the formation of social opposition, rather than 
obvious repression (2013).  It is the tribal nature of the Gulf that effectively 
prevents the development of a coherent civil society which, by its nature, must 
be socially cross-cutting if it is to achieve any degree of political traction.  While 
the absence of a coherent civil society is strange to Western eyes, its absence 
is natural as tribal and clan leaders have responsibility for the tribe’s welfare as 
well as the right to exercise authority over it.  This is the result of tribal 
sociological development rather than monarchist conspiracy to prevent political 
reform. 
 
This traditional, tribal nature of Gulf populations has already been mentioned in 
terms of how it affects governance and citizen expectation through delivery of 
the social contract.  However, a number of pressures are becoming stronger as 
a result of the increased effects of globalisation and the inability of regimes to 
control access to information effectively.  Held and Ulrichsen believe the inter-
generational gap between elderly leaderships and younger, more empowered 
populations is likely to intensify because measures to integrate young people 
into political and economic structures are lacking (2012b).  Yet Abdulla (2012), 
while acknowledging the impact of the new middle class, believes ultimately it 
is the monarchies that shape the future of their states and remain the guardians 
of continuity rather than change in the region.  Whether the monarchies are 
actively shaping the future or not, Held, Ulrichsen and, implicitly, Abdulla 
recognise inherent tensions between the expectations of a modernised youthful 
population and the change resistance of the ruling class.  Whether this 
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manifests as a call for greater access to information and economic prosperity, 
or significant political reform remains to be seen, but it is arguable the former 
will inevitably lead to the latter as expectation will be increased by greater 
knowledge and wealth. 
Ulrichsen (2011) says Gulf polities contain many fissures including ethnic, 
sectarian and tribal, citizens and expatriates, and between different classes of 
citizens.  He believes they heighten regime vulnerability to future politicisation 
and contestation, should resource scarcities develop and persist, leading to 
erosion of political legitimacy and the breakdown of the social contract.  As a 
consequence, reduced social cohesion will jeopardise social networks linking 
many different groups within already highly stratified Gulf societies.  Ulrichsen 
notes internal tensions reduce the ability of states to withstand exogenous 
shock and failure to revise social contracts when times are good means it must 
happen when times are bad.  This in turn increases the chances of violent, 
contested change, rather than an ordered and consensual evolution to a new 
social contract.  Unlike Davidson’s prediction of multiple regime failures, 
Ulrichsen appears to be pointing out the potential for failure without seeing it as 
inevitable, warning the regimes there is still time to act in order to forestall 
political catastrophe and ensure continuance of the ruling bargains.  How much 
time there is will vary from state to state.  In Bahrain, where hydrocarbon 
revenues are all but exhausted there is very little time to waste, while the UAE 
and Qatar could measure their decision horizon in terms of decades, if based 
purely upon revenue streams.  This ignores internal factors such as rising 
populations and exogenous factors, such as possible ISIS interference in the 
near term, and the potential direct and indirect effects of climate change within 
the next twenty to thirty years. 
The population of the Arabian Peninsula rose from eight million in 1950 to 58 
million in 2007.  It is projected to reach 124 million by 2050 due to falling death 
rates and increased numbers of expatriate workers (Ulrichsen 2011).  Rapid 
population growth and increasing unemployment amongst citizens represent 
long-term key challenges to the monarchies, especially as those under 40 
years of age take redistribution of wealth for granted (Ulrichsen 2012b).  
Additionally, demographic shifts due to the youth bulge working its way through 
the population coincide with the necessity to move away from hydrocarbon 
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dependency towards wider economic diversification.  This will require the social 
contract to be redesigned and an implicit shift from ‘perverse incentives’ 
created by rent seeking activities, towards productive notions of work and 
reward (Ulrichsen 2011:85) among the citizens of the Gulf.  However, 
Forstenlechner and Rutledge say even so, the Gulf States cannot diversify and 
develop knowledge-based and innovative competitive economies while relying 
on a third world labour market.  They need to move away from labour-intensive 
work towards a more professionally developed workforce.  Furthermore, they 
will need to re-examine and reframe the social contract especially around 
public sector jobs for citizens.  Quick fixes made as a result of the Arab Spring, 
where new public sector jobs were created to forestall potential discontent over 
unemployment, means there is even more to be reversed or undone (2011).  
Even the UAE and Qatar cannot afford to waste too much time before 
addressing their domestic issues as, even with significant wealth, the amount 
required to be spent domestically to maintain the social contract will increase 
rapidly as the population expands.  A move from reliance on state jobs to a 
more sustainable, productive and economically viable private sector appears to 
be vital to the chances of ensuring the political constructs in the monarchies 
remain largely unchanged.  As discussed above, this will potentially increase 
citizen expectation about their participation in political affairs, especially if they 
have to do serious work to earn money and may even be paying taxes along 
with the true market rate for petrol and state services. 
 Ghanem and Elfakhani identified increasing interest amongst Gulf nationals in 
the economy and financial markets and say it is notable Gulf investors are 
moving from rentierism to entrepreneurship (2011).  Abdulla appears to confirm 
this (2012) and believes there is a new middle class which barely existed in the 
pre-modern phase and is concrete proof of structural change.  Change acts as 
a driver for modernisation, democratisation, social mobility, globalisation and 
entrepreneurial talent, and provides political stability to support economic 
prosperity.  However, he says 80 percent of the Gulf States’ citizenry are now 
salaried government bureaucrats and technocrats, enjoying status and privilege 
while taking job security and prosperity for granted.  He believes these people 
are as politically loyal to the ruling regime as the older tribal class and are 
therefore indispensable to the monarchies’ legitimacy (2012).  This appears at 
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odds with his assertion that the presence of the middle class is a modernising 
force; rather this reinforces the view that an efficient social contract is 
guaranteeing political legitimacy for the rulers, while avoiding the need for 
citizens to become engaged in economically productive work rather than relying 
on public sector jobs.  In effect it is a middle class made up of public servants 
rather than being merchants and entrepreneurs.   
However, the Gulf middle classes believe they are well off, are satisfied with 
the services they receive and exhibit a high sense of national, rather than tribal 
pride.  They tend to associate more closely with their countries than with an 
Arab or Muslim identity.  In particular, the Emirati middle class exhibits the 
greatest satisfaction and social recognition from government employment, 
believing hard work can bring career advancement.  The Bahraini middle class 
is less well satisfied and more concerned about their position than their 
contemporaries in other Gulf States (Abdulla 2012).  In Bahrain this almost 
certainly reflects the dual pressures of the 2011 uprising and continued dissent, 
alongside quickly depleting hydrocarbon rents and reducing standards of living, 
plus increased dependence on Saudi financial assistance.  Bahrain’s need for a 
solution is pressing, as there must be a question as to how long Saudi Arabia 
can afford to prop up the Bahraini regime, given its own internal demographic 
pressures.  The Emirati middle class cited by Abdulla exemplifies the Gulf 
citizens’ view of the value of work and their implicit reluctance to enter the 
private sector, preferring the security of well paid government posts. 
 The Gulf has become a destination of choice for expatriate workers because of 
its rapid economic growth.  In the 1970s expatriates came mainly from the poor 
South Mediterranean region.  This unprecedented migration was triggered by 
an economic boom as a result of significant development programmes within 
the Gulf States, which could not be serviced by indigenous labour (de Haas 
2011).  The expatriate workforce in the UAE grew from 15 percent of the 
population in 1965 to 84 percent in 1975 (Ehteshami 2013).  However, the 
1990-91Gulf War saw the monarchies move away from Arab expatriates to 
workers brought in from Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.  These were seen as 
more docile and reliable and less politically challenging than Arabs, especially 
Palestinians, could be.  After the war, Arab migration to the Gulf increased 
again, but probably never reached the pre-war levels (de Haas 2011).  In 
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Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE the national populations are considerably 
outnumbered by expatriate workers.  Economic activity and industrial 
production would not be sustainable without their presence.  As shall be seen 
this brings other internal pressures to the states including the question of 
political rights, rates of pay and working and living conditions of these foreign 
workers.  
As the need for change and diversification in the Gulf States becomes more 
apparent, it is clear the monarchies are re-evaluating their relationships on a 
global scale and refocusing their connections more to the East and less to their 
traditional Western protectors and clients.  Foley says a common faith connects 
Southeast Asia to the Middle East, comprising of individuals who are members 
of the global Islamic community, even though not from the heart of the Muslim 
world.  Gulf governments have reoriented their economic and strategic interests 
in the 21st Century to find new markets for their hydrocarbons and their capital, 
with higher returns than are achievable in the West.  They also want world-
class education, leisure and medical care at cheaper prices than the West can 
offer (2012).  For their part, Southeast Asian leaders hope the Gulf presence 
will counterbalance China’s growing influence in the region.  Links are not just 
at the élite level, but include networks of ordinary people spanning both 
regions, reflecting connections made through centuries of intellectual exchange 
and travel between Southeast Asian countries and the Middle East (Foley 
2012).  This has implications on a number of levels including the potential 
waning of influence of the US and other Western powers within the region.  
Although this shift in orientation coincides with increased climate change 
concerns that led to the signing of the Paris agreement in April 2016, demand 
for oil and gas in China and the Pacific Asian countries has been increasing.  It 
is therefore possible the reductions in occidental hydrocarbon demand as a 
result of adherence to the Kyoto34 and Paris agreements will be offset by 
increased rents from a much larger market in the orient, which will give the 
monarchies time to adjust their economies and the social contracts with their 
people. 
                                                          
34
 http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php accessed 29 June 2016. 
39 
 
The demand for greater access to and inability of regimes to control the flow of 
information in and out of their countries has already been touched upon.  
Ulrichsen says linkage between territorial size, power and influence for 
sovereign states has eroded as a new global political network has become 
established with greater interconnectivity and interdependencies in 
transnational issues and frameworks.  Following the Arab Spring, the power of 
highly advanced communications tools that had assisted the rise of Qatar and 
the UAE on the world stage became apparent.  A combination of new social 
media and technologically aware young people allowed instantaneous 
transmission of ideas and news at the same time as undermining state control 
of information flows.  It also made governments more vulnerable to the new 
desire for transparency and public accountability (2012a).  Here lies the 
paradox between monarchies wanting to limit the information available to their 
citizens, so as to limit the potential spread of politically reformist ideas, and the 
absolute necessity to be connected into the global information super highway, 
24 hours a day, if the Gulf States are to become global economic players.  It 
will be a severe challenge for the monarchies to see how they can manage this.  
Censorship will not work and will be seen for what it is.  Rather a proactive 
strategy for coping with the information deluge is required to ensure the 
monarchies stay ahead of the game.  However, the governments of 
technologically advanced Western democracies struggle in this area as the flow 
of opinion and perception becomes increasingly influential and powerful.  This 
could be the greatest threat to the regimes. 
2.6. Security 
2.6.1. Human Security 
How the Gulf States approach human security and its interrelationship and 
interdependencies with national security could be critical to perceptions of 
regime legitimacy or even survival, particularly if regime security and national 
security have been conflated to mean the same thing as Ulrichsen believes 
(2012b).  At its most fundamental, an understanding of what constitutes human 
security is perhaps what Giddens (1991) called ‘ontological security’.  By this 
he means the confidence most humans have in the continuity of their self-
identity and the constancy of the surroundings of social and material 
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environments of action.  This appears to be consistent with Alkire’s view that 
the objective of human security therefore is to ‘safeguard the vital core of all 
human lives from critical pervasive threats, in a way that is consistent with long-
term human fulfilment’ (2003:2).  Human security is people-centred not threat 
based and is a condition that is derived from an effective political, economic, 
social, cultural and natural environment, rather than from carrying out a list of 
pre-ordained administrative procedures.  Barnett and Adger quote Alkire, 
saying human security is the situation where people individually and collectively 
have the capacity to mitigate stresses applied to their needs, rights and values 
(2007). 
Gregory, Ingram and Brklacich say individuals and societies are used to 
adapting to a range of environmental and socio-economic stresses.  In many 
areas there is accumulated experience with phenomena such as drought.  To 
reduce vulnerability of food systems to climate change requires identifying 
appropriate adaptation mechanisms while recognising and learning from 
mitigations used currently and in the past by groups whose regular food supply 
is at risk.  It is also necessary to reinforce the capabilities of communities and 
countries to adapt as effectively as possible and identify the most suitable level 
for each strategy to be implemented (2005). 
According to Hanjra and Qureshi, by 2025 three billion people will live in water-
stressed or water-scarce countries.   Scarcity and declining water quality leads 
to: increased competition within and between sectors with water transferred 
from agriculture; increased inequities in access to water perpetuating poverty 
and further widening the inequalities of access to food and water; a potential 
surge in water-borne diseases affecting human health; deterioration of 
freshwater ecosystems critically impacting ecosystem health and services; and 
increased tension over control of water resources leading to potential conflict at 
multiple levels.  Furthermore, reduced rainfall and enhanced vulnerability to 
extremes of weather lead to potentially reduced crop yields, cause short term 
crop failure and decline in long term food production.  The decline in global per 
capita food production threatens future food security and this is exacerbated by 
the resulting constraints they place on human capacity to design mitigations to 
respond to future challenges (2010).   
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Barnett believes it is unlikely there will be conflict between states over 
environmental issues, even in the case of shared water catchments or 
disagreements over GHGs, although he does see the potential for new inter-
state rivalries as a result of changes in the political economy of energy. He 
sees the greatest scope for conflict with environmental issues as a major factor 
within single states, rather than between states.  The political and economic 
strength of the state concerned will be critical, with strong states, characterised 
by effective bureaucracies and legitimate control of force, less prone to internal 
conflicts.  Wealth allows for the creation and maintenance of institutions to 
provide stability and resilience; weak states or those undergoing transition are 
relatively more prone to the possibility of violent internal conflict (2001). 
Burroughs concurs with Barnett, predicting weather induced price rises could 
be a factor in causing social unrest, but noting other political and social factors, 
likely to be greater contributors to discontent, will also have to be present.  
However, he points out that prolonged extreme weather events have the effect 
of disrupting agriculture, which together with increasing populations could 
cause food shortages unless there is timely government intervention to manage 
agricultural policy and markets (2007).  Given the absolute nature of the 
monarchies in Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, they will be completely responsible 
for initiating policies designed to mitigate the political, social, economic and 
physical effects of climate change on the human security of their respective 
populations, while endeavouring to ensure illegal inward migration is prevented.  
Their national visions and development strategies will be instrumental in 
deciding the way forward to meet the challenge over the next twenty to thirty 
years.  How these challenges are met will be critical to the maintenance of 
human security which in turn will contribute to the level of national security each 
state achieves. 
2.6.2. Internal Security and ISIS 
The security paradigm in the Gulf changed markedly with the appearance of 
ISIS. There is now a significant question for dissidents in the monarchies: why 
would you oppose the current system if its collapse gives way to a violent 
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extreme fundamentalist Islamic government? If the dissidents are Shia the 
question is even more apposite35. 
According to Cockburn the Gulf Sunni monarchies joined the US in air attacks 
on ISIS in Syria because they felt it posed a greater threat to their survival and 
the political status quo than anything since the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  
However, he said the coalition’s political weakness was plain to see as Saudis, 
Emiratis and Turks were as hostile to Assad’s government, Syrian Kurds and 
other groups fighting ISIS as they were to ISIS itself.  He claims the original 
sponsors of ISIS and other Sunni jihadist movements in Iraq and Syria were the 
Gulf monarchies and Turkey.  Saudi and Qatari aid was primarily financial, 
usually through private donations, which enabled the takeover of Sunni 
provinces in northern Iraq and Saudi policy was driven by fear of jihadists 
operating within the Kingdom and a desire to use them against Shia powers 
abroad.  Cockburn claims an implicit intention behind American insistence that 
Saudis, the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain take part or assist in the air strikes in Syria 
was to break their connection with the jihadis there (2015).  However, while 
Burke believes ISIS has received funds from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE 
in the past, he says there is no proof the monarchies have condoned private 
giving and says Western intelligence organisations believe such donations are 
now negligible in ISIS’s total income (2015).  Cockburn (2015) contends that 
Sunni powers including Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE have different agendas to 
the Americans and destroying ISIS is not their top priority.  He says the Sunni 
monarchies may not like ISIS, which threatens the political status quo, but are 
pleased ISIS creates more problems for the Shia than it does for them. 
According to Bowen, following the 2003 invasion of Iraq the Shia increased 
their strength across the Arab world to the consternation of Sunni rulers.  After 
the First World War, the British in Iraq preferred to deal with the Sunni élite 
minority rather than the majority Shia population.  The Shia gained power in 
Iraq through the American organised elections post-invasion in 2003, switching 
the regional balance of power out of the hands of the Americans’ Sunni friends 
in the Gulf into the hands of Shia Iran, which was implacably hostile to them.  
Shia resurgence worries the Sunni dynasties as it changes the region’s 
                                                          
35
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-34954233 accessed 30 November 2015. 
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sectarian balance and threatens traditional Sunni dominance.  King Abdullah II 
of Jordan has spoken of the dangers of a ‘Shia Crescent’ and subsequently 
suggested that the schism between Sunni and Shia runs from Beirut to 
Bombay, saying it has the potential to cause catastrophe.  Bowen believes the 
Sunni-Shia schism is already causing the next major problem for the region and 
thinks Saudi Arabia could be the focus, either because of continued sectarian 
tensions in Bahrain, Iranian intentions, or internal sectarian problems in the 
Kingdom (2012). 
Stern and Berger agree ISIS is spreading sectarian and ethnic conflict in the 
Gulf, with Yemen vulnerable to exploitation and Gulf jihadist organisations 
switching allegiance from al-Qaeda to ISIS.  They claim ISIS has established a 
new wilayat or province in Saudi Arabia and cite Hassan Abbas, an expert on 
jihadi movements, who believes ISIS is deliberately trying to start a Sunni/Shia 
war to bring about the end of days that are central to their ideology; Abbas has 
said ISIS is exploiting apocalyptic expectations fully which is why it is so 
important a caliphate is established.  Stern and Berger agree, describing ISIS 
as a millenarian group which aims to return Islam to an imaginary ideal of 
original purity while creating a worldwide caliphate.  They also quote King 
Abdulla of Jordan who believes the war against ISIS is a generational conflict, 
but as threatening as it is to the West, more than anything else he says it is an 
existential threat to Sunni Islam (2015). 
Whatever the monarchies’ relationship with ISIS, it is clear it remains largely 
focussed on Iraq, Syria and to a lesser extent Libya, as it seeks to preserve its 
initial gains and protect the so-called caliphate.  Rather, it is the case that the 
Arabian Gulf lies at the heart of a region that is inherently unstable for a variety 
of political, social and religious reasons and so there is always the chance of 
some spill-over into the three monarchies.  However, to suggest that they are 
vulnerable to an all out attack by a single transnational Islamist organisation 
with the aim of overthrowing the state is fanciful, especially as their populations 
would be unlikely to support extremists who are confessionally opposed to 
them in the case of Bahrain’s Shia, or who would remove the comforts and 
economic security they are accustomed to in the case of the citizens of Qatar 
and the UAE. 
44 
 
2.6.3. National and Regime Security 
As seen above, Ulrichsen believes regime security and national security are 
often conflated in the Gulf States to mean the same thing (2012b).  As they 
appear to be indivisible from the rulers’ perspectives they are covered together 
in this review.  According to Ehteshami, the question of long-term sustainability 
is central to the monarchies’ security concerns, specifically: citizen 
employment; expatriate dependency; inefficient use of resources and factors of 
production; uncontrolled growth of the public sector; reliance on hydrocarbon 
revenues to support huge pay rises; and lack of transparency and 
accountability.  He says this raises questions about ‘the resilience of 
monarchical government in the Arab world and the Gulf monarchies’ ability to 
manage the necessary transition from ruling to reigning’.  He says securitisation 
can cause retrenchment at a time when monarchies should be exercising 
flexibility and responsiveness (2013:257).  This is the conflation of regime and 
national security to the point of indivisibility. 
There are also traditional risk factors for the Gulf States according to Russell, 
e.g. population growth, unemployment, social movements and urbanisation.  
Market pressures, like reduced demand and a requirement that oil producers 
should pay part of the costs of Western decarbonisation, could drive down 
revenues and thus reduce the regimes’ abilities to mitigate these traditional 
risks.  If states cannot maintain the levels of subsidy then the rentier system of 
governance will fail, as domestic populations would no longer be willingly co-
opted (2009). 
Unfortunately, there are no international networks working on collaborative 
solutions to energy shortages, but rather a tendency to seek gains nationally, 
even if this harms the interests of other nations, including partners, say Toke 
and Vezirgianniden.  Renewable energy is a threat to the revenues of the 
hydrocarbon exporters and thus a threat to their energy and economic security; 
differences in understanding between national energy security requirements 
and energy policies therefore have an effect on international negotiations 
(2013).  Where energy and economic security are threatened a country’s 
national security must also be at risk, even more so if, as Ulrichsen contends, 
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regime security is conflated with national security and based upon a ruling 
bargain of the sort found in the Gulf monarchies.     
Sowers et al say climate change acts as a threat multiplier for vulnerable 
countries and populations in general (2011).  They are referring to human, 
energy, water and food security, as opposed to national security, but it can be 
legitimately argued that without those four elements being in place national 
security could be said not to exist in any meaningful way, unless through the 
imposition of draconian security structures.  King and Gulledge note many 
politically volatile areas such as the Middle East are already experiencing 
climate changes in temperature and precipitation that could exacerbate 
extreme weather events or droughts, and could worsen historical and current 
levels of internal conflict, competition for scarce resources and income 
inequalities within oil producing nations (2013). 
From Ulrichsen’s perspective it can be argued Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE are 
states in transition as they move from hydrocarbon dependency towards more 
diversified economies.  He believes states in transition are vulnerable to sub-
state contestation and outbreaks of political violence and notes the conduct of 
foreign and security affairs in oil monarchies is restricted to a small element of 
the ruling élite, hence national security really meaning regime security (2012b).  
Held and Ulrichsen say transitional states also have a heightened vulnerability 
to exogenous shocks and this is increased in the Gulf monarchies by ‘the 
historical length and institutional breadth’ of their reliance on hydrocarbon rents 
(2012b: loc 9027).  Ulrichsen believes redistributive states are vulnerable to 
regime collapse if the means of co-opting support and depoliticising society, i.e. 
revenue streams, are removed (2009).  This makes it all the more important the 
Gulf States recognise the dangers their legitimacy faces and work towards 
mitigation strategies. 
Iran is a focus of Chinese attention as it has large oil reserves and could be an 
ally against US influence in the region.  The relationship is symbiotic, like 
China’s with the monarchies, as Iran needs a powerful ally to develop its 
economy, especially its oil industry, and wants to improve its diplomatic and 
military status in the region.  In the medium term Iran and China share common 
aims in the economic and geopolitical spheres (Ghafouri 2009:86).  China’s 
46 
 
close economic and political affiliations with the GCC states show another 
aspect of this relationship as the monarchies may have seen engagement with 
China as a useful way of moderating Iranian intentions and ambitions in the 
region, without relying on US support which only antagonises the Iranians.  
Turner says China has been a net importer of oil since 1993 but has other 
concerns in the region too.  It sends workers to the Gulf which reduces 
domestic employment pressure and earns foreign exchange.  However, China 
has its own Muslim population demanding secession in Xinxiang region, so 
does not want to get caught up in religion, nor be seen supporting Shia Iran 
against its mainly Sunni neighbours in the Gulf.  China has successfully 
avoided showing preference to either Saudi Arabia or Iran and has avoided 
contesting US presence in the region openly, preferring regional stability to 
guarantee its oil and other economic interests remain undamaged.  In sum, 
China’s foreign policy in the Gulf has been characterised by promoting peaceful 
coexistence, self-determination of political systems and no external 
intervention.  Russia also prefers stability, but sees the interconnectedness of 
Middle Eastern problems and the possibility of them spreading to its own 
Muslim population it does not want aggravated.  Russia cannot afford to be 
seen as hostile to Islam, as it regards Islamic extremism as a security threat not 
only on its borders but also right in the centre of Moscow (2012). 
 2.7. Bahrain 
Bahrain has marginal oil supplies, occasionally high unemployment and is 
relatively poor by Gulf standards.  Economic diversification started towards the 
end of the 1970s against the backdrop of political strife between the majority 
Shia, around 70 percent of the population, and the ruling Sunnis.  The al-
Khalifas introduced a constitution in 1973 to legitimise their rule and held 
elections for the National Assembly in December 1973.  However, it was 
dissolved in August 1975 because of challenges it presented to the ruling élite’s 
authority, especially its rejection of a plan for special powers to arrest those 
believed to hold views considered to be a threat to the state.  The constitution 
was suspended at the same time (Power 2012).   
In 1992, after economic pressures caused by falling oil prices and a population 
rise of 3.5 percent per annum, around three hundred prominent Sunni and Shia 
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Bahrainis petitioned for the reinstatement of the 1973 parliament and release of 
political prisoners.  An advisory council was set up as a political gesture to limit 
discussion, but several activists were also detained.  This caused further 
disaffection leading to the so-called ‘Bahraini Intifada’ in December 1994, 
mostly concentrated in Shia villages but with support from leftist Sunnis.  It was 
heavily suppressed and three Shia clerics were deported resulting in mass 
demonstrations.  Detentions and releases of Shia clerics followed but demands 
were unresolved and several leaders were rearrested.  Violent unrest increased 
and in June 1996 the regime claimed to have uncovered a coup backed by a 
Bahraini offshoot of Iranian Hezbollah.  There followed the imposition of 
draconian state security laws leading to detention without trial.  Forty activists 
are believed to have died or disappeared before 1999 when Sheikh Issa died 
and was succeeded by his son Sheikh Hamad bin Issa al-Khalifa (Kinninmont 
2011).  
In November 2000 now-titled King Hamad initiated political reforms; a National 
Charter was created which was supposed to form the basis of a new political 
system, but it was vague on the National Assembly’s role.  The National 
Charter went to referendum on 14-15 February 2001. Ninety percent of the 
eligible electorate voted, with 98.4 percent of voters in favour of the proposed 
changes.  The King had said the elected Majlis al-Nuwab would be the sole 
legislative body, but the new framework created a second, appointed, 
legislative chamber, the Majlis al-Shura; the President of this body had the 
casting vote if there was deadlock between the two Majlis.  The opposition saw 
this as an attempt to prevent an effective, elected legislative chamber being 
established.  They said the King had reneged on his promise about status of 
the Majlis al-Nuwab and regarded this as implementation of the ruling élite’s 
agenda against the majority of Bahraini society.  Importantly, the 2002 
constitution also reaffirmed and safeguarded the perpetuity of the role of the al-
Khalifas as the hereditary royal family (Ehteshami 2013).  The February 2002 
implementation showed the elected Nuwab was a pale shadow of the 1973 
parliament, especially as in the event of a disagreement the appointed al-Shura 
would have the final say.  The King also reserved certain powers for himself 
including full control of the government and the right to dismiss parliament 
(Power 2012). 
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The 2002 municipal elections were conducted on the basis of universal 
suffrage, but no women were elected despite 52 percent of the electorate being 
female.  The elections were a major victory for the Islamists principally from the 
Shia al-Wefaq National Islamic Society.  However, the municipalities have no 
political role; they are responsible only for the provision of social services to the 
communities they represent (Ehteshami 2013).  Al-Wefaq an umbrella 
organisation for Shia groups, headed by Sheikh Ali Salman, presses for better 
Shia housing, fights against discrimination and corruption, and calls for more 
powers for elected members of parliament.  It works with Sunni members of 
parliament on morality issues such as restricting the sale of alcohol and is 
particularly concerned with naturalisation of foreign Sunnis in order to change 
the Sunni/Shia balance in Bahrain (Kinninmont 2011).  Al-Wefaq boycotted the 
2002 parliamentary elections because of changes in the legislative system they 
said undermined the legitimacy of the electoral process.  Also, constituency 
boundaries had been gerrymandered to ensure the influence and effect of Shia 
and other opposition voters were minimised.  In some constituencies there 
were only 500 voters while others numbered over 10,000.  Where political 
reforms were made, they were done in such a way as to ensure no changes to 
existing social and political structures could be enacted and so the new 
National Assembly elected in 2002 was to all intents and purposes politically 
ineffective (Ehteshami 2013). 
Al-Wefaq took part in the 2006 parliamentary elections, but Sunni groups and 
independents took the majority of the seats.  On this occasion voter turnout 
was 72 percent which gave the poll its required legitimacy.  The Shia continued 
to suffer discrimination in employment opportunities in key government 
institutions such as the judiciary, defence and the Ministry of Interior.  The 2010 
elections were different as al-Wefaq and its close ally Haq called for another 
electoral boycott, but its leaders were arrested on terrorism charges.  Arrests of 
other political dissidents were also made and some websites closed down, but 
campaigning went ahead and the election was well contested with al-Wefaq 
taking part so as not to leave a political space to be exploited by others.  They 
won eighteen seats, but 22 were won by a combination of seventeen pro-
government independents, the Muslim Brotherhood and salafists, which gave 
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the government the majority it required.  Turnout was around 65 percent so the 
election was again legitimised (Ehteshami 2013). 
Power says the al-Khalifa’s style of government, almost directed democracy, 
has three main characteristics: manipulation of the electoral system, 
harassment of opponents and restricting civil society activity.  As well as 
gerrymandering, one of the most contentious issues, the government has 
granted citizenship to Jordanian, Yemeni, Iraqi, Syrian and Saudi nationals in 
an attempt to increase the number of Sunnis within the electorate; an estimated 
65-100,000 naturalisations in 2000-2010 according to the Shia opposition 
(Power 2012).  Kinninmont says the Prime Minister (the King’s uncle) is 
credited with much of the success in developing Bahrain’s economy, but is 
regarded as an impediment to political reform.  The Crown Prince (the King’s 
son) is Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Bahrain’s forces, Chairman of the 
Economic Development Board, a relative reformist and also probably involved 
in a power struggle with the Prime Minister.  After the Arab Spring it is thought 
the regime’s hard-line element increased its power and influence.  Yet, it could 
be argued Bahrain is closer to reform than some other Gulf States in that it 
permitted political societies, but definitely not parties, to form in 2006.  
However, they have to be licensed and the law restricts their activities, so not 
all political groups have registered (2011).  With the need to move towards a 
post-oil economy becoming ever more pressing, the need to separate and 
simplify the state-business relationship in Bahrain is at the centre of the 
reshaping of the state-society relationship and the processes that underpin 
Bahrain’s rentierism (Held and Ulrichsen 2012a).     
Bahrain is perceived to be the centre of the Arabian Peninsula’s sectarian 
disenfranchisement.  The Shia majority are believed by the rulers to have close 
links with Iran, while the Sunni al-Khalifas have obvious strong links to Saudi 
Arabia.  Although the strength of the links between the Shia and Iran is 
questionable, Saudi Arabia believes it has to act on the premise that they are 
close given Iranian historical claims, rhetoric and clerical linkages (Mabon 
2012).  Sectarian fault-lines in Bahrain, which is already facing a future without 
oil and gas income post 2025, complicates state-society relations and sharpens 
the contest for access to resources and services (Kumetat 2009).  In the past 
social tensions were ameliorated by redistribution of oil revenues, but as these 
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have diminished so tensions have resurfaced.  The reduction in oil rents has 
also made the al-Khalifas more economically dependent on the Saudis and 
there are concerns about Iran’s geopolitical intentions in the Gulf and a Saudi 
desire to prevent Iran from gaining a foothold in Bahrain.  The Saudis see the 
stability of the al-Khalifa regime as vital and believe an empowered Shia in 
Bahrain would lead to increasing demands for political power amongst the Shia 
in the east of their Kingdom (Mabon 2012). 
The presence of Islamists is also not helping the process of reform in the region 
as ruling regimes play on popular fear of these movements.  However, 
Islamists benefit from political liberalisation in Bahrain as they also conduct 
extra-parliamentary activity such as providing support and welfare services to 
the poorer areas.  Islamists provide the main opposition as secular groups are 
often overlooked because their messaging has to be subtle to avoid 
government accusations they are opposed to the state itself.  The Islamists are 
not demanding a republic, rather a constitutional monarchy in Bahrain and 
could play a key role in the development of parliamentary institutions (Power 
2012). 
Meanwhile, the security services have targeted human rights groups and in 
2004 the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights was abolished after a series of 
critical reports.  Journalists have been arrested and international organisations 
prevented from operating there.  Reports of intimidation and severe 
harassment of the opposition were rife in the 2006 and 2010 elections.  There 
are suggestions King Hamad is a genuine reformer, but must placate more 
conservative elements in the Royal Family, especially the Prime Minister.  
Hamad is probably also under pressure from the Saudis who supply Bahrain 
with 140,000 barrels of oil per day and do not relish the prospect of an 
increased Shia political presence there.  Bahrain appears to be in a cycle of 
repression which peaks during election campaigns and eases off while 
parliament is sitting.  The opposition is fragmented and the King has 
successfully exploited the gaps between his opponents (Power 2012). 
To summarise, the situation in Bahrain is that of a monarchy that has almost 
depleted its hydrocarbon reserves, is not yet sufficiently economically 
diversified to sustain its ruling bargain, is dependent on Saudi generosity for 
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survival, and is faced by a majority population that is confessionally and 
increasingly politically opposed to the ruling family.  The monarchy stays in 
power through severe repression ordered by the hardliners in the regime, who 
are in the ascendency, and enforced by its highly effective security forces.  
Without the guarantee of GCC support Bahrain’s monarchy might well have 
gone under already.  The challenge for King Hamad now is to find a 
consensual way forward to achieve political stability, while maintaining regime 
security and the ruling family’s hold on power.  These are almost certainly 
mutually exclusive aims unless serious political reform is agreed and enacted.  
2.8. Qatar 
Following British withdrawal from the region, Saudi Arabia became Qatar’s de 
facto guarantor and also the lead in the region for foreign policy.  The 1979 
Iranian revolution and the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88 focused Qatari minds on the 
security of the regional oil supply routes and so a close relationship with the 
Saudis and the rest of the GCC was the most pragmatic strategy.  However, 
autonomy and regime security remained the central pillars of the ruling élite’s 
objectives (Wright 2012).  The notion of Qatari autonomy developed as 
exemplified by Qatar’s 1991 decision to refer its territorial disagreements with 
Bahrain to the International Court of Justice rather than Saudi mediation.  This 
reflected Crown Prince Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani’s new approach to 
foreign policy which saw the international rule of law and the UN as critical.  He 
sought an independent country that conducted its foreign affairs under the 
aegis of internationally agreed legal frameworks.  Hamad took power from his 
father in a bloodless coup in June 1995 and survived a counter-coup in 
February 1996 (Wright 2012). 
Qatar saw generational change and élite-led reforms being the way ahead, 
according to Ehteshami, but Qatar’s social makeup has helped the reform 
process rather than hindered it.  Sheikh Hamad’s coup followed calls for 
greater political freedoms in a petition from 52 prominent Qataris.  They asked 
for elections, a wider role in legislation for the Advisory Council, set up in 1970, 
freedom of expression in the media and clarity on citizenship laws.  In March 
1999 the first national poll for the 29-member Central Municipal Council (CMC) 
was held attracting a turnout of 80 percent.  In April 2003 a draft constitution 
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was put to the electorate with 97 percent voting in favour.  As in Bahrain, the 
constitution enshrined the perpetual hereditary role of the monarchy, in this 
case the al-Thanis.  It also created a unicameral legislature (the Qatari 
Consultative Council) composed of thirty elected and fifteen appointed 
members which would have greater powers than Bahrain’s National Assembly.  
Elections to the legislature were planned for 2004, but then delayed until 2007.  
Meanwhile elections to the CMC that covers the whole of Qatar were held 
again in 2003, 2007 and 2011.  In 2008, when elections for the Consultative 
Council had still not been held, it was announced that they would take place in 
2010, but these were again delayed until late 2013.  Ehteshami believes 
Bahrain’s experience in 2011 encouraged the al-Thanis to take positive steps 
towards more open and liberal government, noting reforms were driven top-
down as there was little pressure from the citizens to do anything.  He says this 
is prudent activity to prevent external pressure and control the speed and 
process of change.  Essentially, the élite wished to increase its political 
legitimacy without jeopardising its traditional power-base, at the same time as it 
improved and strengthened its regional and international standing (2013).  
Subsequently, Sheikh Hamad abdicated in favour of his son Crown Prince 
Tamim in June 2013 and put the Consultative Council elections on hold36 with 
no indication as to when they might be rescheduled. 
The US claims political changes in the Gulf are the result of external factors 
and pressures, says Lambert, but this is not the case in Qatar where reforms 
started before 9/11 and were driven by Sheikh Hamad and his political élite.   
Similarly there were no domestic threats to the regime that triggered reforms, 
but it is arguable the reforms themselves open up the regime to regional and 
domestic opposition unnecessarily.  There are suggestions other Gulf States 
tried to persuade the Sheikh not to adopt a constitution for fear of the effect it 
would have on traditional forms of governance (2011) and probably because 
the other states feared some sort of domino effect. 
Lambert believes the reforms were initiated because it was the right thing to do 
at the time and because greater public participation would be required in the 
future. The Qatari regime made a conscious decision to adopt the political and 
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electoral norms widespread outside the Arabian Gulf including universal 
suffrage for all citizens alike.  The regime has done this to bolster the external 
legitimacy of the regime and the state and to increase Qatar’s international 
image, even at the expense of possibly angering traditionalists at home. She 
quotes a member of the Royal Family who said ‘people come to the defence of 
“good” states’ (2011).  It is certainly true that if the current rentier system fails to 
fulfil the ruling bargain to the expectation and satisfaction of the citizenry, a 
proactive political reform agenda could take the sting out of the tail when it 
becomes necessary for ordinary Qataris to do proper jobs to earn a living. 
However, Lambert believes it is questionable whether Qatari élites fully support 
the new norms they claim to be committed to, especially as they appear not to 
be above ‘non-norm-consistent behaviour’ to ensure their reforms are carried 
through (2011).  This does not seem counter-intuitive to having a positive 
reform agenda, as sometimes it is necessary to do some engineering and exert 
positive control to ensure that the best outcome is achieved.  Why would Qatar 
want a parliament that is as obstructionist as that of Kuwait?  Without doubt, 
Qatar’s reformist agenda makes it look progressive and modern and raises its 
kudos with the international community, thereby increasing its potential security 
support in difficult times. 
Wright says Qatar developed a view of its role in the world, especially as 
having a proactive global role as a mediator in international disputes.  The aim 
was to have complete freedom of action in order to pursue an independent 
foreign policy.  Qatar’s unique international position is down to it holding the 
world’s third largest reserves of natural gas and the fact it is the leading global 
producer and exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and Gas to Liquid (GTL) 
fuels.  It saw that position as the means of achieving its place on the global 
stage and to guarantee its security by entering into a strategic relationship with 
the US, including hosting the forward headquarters of US Central Command.  
Meanwhile, Qatar’s relationship with Tehran is based upon pragmatism as its 
economic strength is founded upon the North Field/South Pars natural gas field 
it shares with Iran.  Qatar and Iran’s mutual economic interests in this field have 
developed progressively since the mid-1980s and Qatar’s willingness to deal 
with Tehran is at odds with the other GCC states.  Linked to this, Qatar’s 
energy policy is based on the principles of supply and demand with contracts 
54 
 
going to the most lucrative markets.  Therefore Qatar is building a network of 
stakeholders who rely on Qatar for their energy needs and thus also building its 
security guarantee network, although these guarantors may be influence and 
diplomacy stakeholders rather than possessors of hard military power.  
Although not directly linked with Qatar’s foreign policy, it does provide a 
supplemental strand to their foreign engagement and security agenda.  Qatar is 
looking at increasing gas supplies to the UK and Europe, East Asia and to 
other GCC partners such as the UAE and Oman.  Qatar therefore has greater 
importance in energy security terms at both the regional and international levels 
and creates wider influence and has diversified its security relationships 
through the creation of a wide range of stakeholders, who are part of a matrix 
of foreign powers having a vested interest in Qatar’s security (2012).  
Qatar also attempts to exert soft power indirectly, Wright believes, for example 
by allowing al-Jazeera to operate from its territory on the basis of freedom of 
speech and editorial independence.  However, while it increases Qatar’s 
standing, al-Jazeera is not linked directly to Qatari diplomatic objectives in the 
region or with its main strategic partner, the US.  Al-Jazeera can therefore 
hamper Qatari desired foreign policy outcomes through its independence 
(2012).  This should be regarded as one of the strengths of the regime in that, 
unlike other countries in the region, they are prepared to host a news channel 
that exercises freedom of speech, is controversial and even inconvenient or 
obstructive at times.  However, it is difficult to gauge how much independence 
there really is, given that continued operation of the station from Qatari soil 
must depend on official agreement.  Davidson (2013) reports suspicions about 
the regime’s manipulation of the network to repair relationships and its use as a 
political tool.  Certainly it appears the closure of al-Jazeera’s Egyptian channel 
was politically directed as part of Qatar’s December 2014 rapprochement with 
President al-Sisi of Egypt and the return of Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini 
ambassadors to Qatar, following earlier political disagreement over Qatar’s 
perceived support for the Muslim Brotherhood37. 
Qatar is in a very different position to Bahrain having: no internal threat to 
regime security; no real demand for political reform; a sustainable long-term 
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economy built on significant gas reserves and its position as the leading 
producer and exporter of LNG and GTL fuels; a secure monarchy; and a 
complex network of international relationships which guarantee its external 
security.  Furthermore, Qatar’s monarchy appears to understand the 
importance of promoting and executing a reform agenda and has the political 
time and space to carry it out.  Short of a ‘Black Swan’38 event it is difficult to 
see Qatar succumbing to political revolution any time soon. 
2.9. The UAE 
Al-Suwaidi writes that Abu Dhabi, as the largest and richest emirate, became 
the natural leader of the new UAE in 1971.  The other six emirates39 saw it was 
in their interests to join as Abu Dhabi was providing the majority of the federal 
budget and a good proportion of those of the individual states.  Al-Suwaidi 
claims the absence of a democratically elected government has not resulted in 
a despotic regime and that legitimacy rests on the explicit and implicit consent 
of the citizens, with universal acceptance of the social contract implied.  He 
argues the UAE combines different elements essential for political legitimacy:  
rentier status, where there is a social contract between the rulers and the ruled, 
augmented by social openness, a tolerant version of Islam, widespread 
modernisation and exposure to regional and international influences.  In this 
way the UAE has preserved its traditional heritage and Islamic character, but 
has modernised in parallel (2011).  Al-Suwaidi is the Director General of the 
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) and therefore unlikely to see the 
UAE as anything other than a model Gulf State.   
An opposing view is taken by Luomi who says rentierism in Abu Dhabi has 
created a system founded on: high dependency on hydrocarbons and other 
external revenues for economic stability; growing population; ineffective 
management of human capital; high natural resource consumption; weak 
environmental credentials; and domestic energy and water crises, all of which 
will be exacerbated by climate change impacts.  She says Abu Dhabi’s ability to 
adapt depends on maintained levels of global demand for oil or diversification 
into new economic sectors and sources of external rent (2009).  It is potentially 
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here where the Chinese, South East and Pacific Asian markets could provide 
the safety net the Gulf States need as they increase their demand for 
hydrocarbons and take up the slack caused by Western decarbonisation 
policies. 
However, there are other issues too.  Large numbers of disenfranchised and 
disempowered nationals exist in the poor northern emirates according to Held 
and Ulrichsen (2012b), while Luomi says energy shortages are an issue for the 
poorer emirates, but also for Abu Dhabi.  It is deeply tied in to a federal rentier 
bargain with the other emirates, excluding Dubai, which depend on Abu Dhabi 
for infrastructure development and key natural resources.  Duplication of official 
bodies has caused problems within the energy sector as each emirate retains 
sovereignty over its natural resources and fiscal policy.  The existence of 
multiple agencies in charge of environmental governance has led to 
deficiencies and tensions in policy-making and coordination (2012).  Therefore, 
while Abu Dhabi leads on policy within the Federation there are potential 
schisms centred on economic and political exclusion that could be worsened by 
economic hardship, or exploited by those with political agendas contrary to the 
ruling families’ view of how the UAE should be governed. 
However, Abdulla says there is little demand for political reform in the UAE so 
the government does not take democratisation seriously.  In fact the younger 
generation of Gulf monarchs feels secure enough to ignore any moves towards 
democratisation (2012).  Furthermore, Abu Dhabi’s rulers enjoy very high 
regime autonomy due to large fiscal surpluses and a small population which 
has been bought off and does not demand a say in policy.  It has one of the 
lowest levels of formal democracy and highest levels of regime stability in the 
region (Hertog and Luciani 2012).  Therefore the status quo, underpinned by 
enormous hydrocarbon wealth, appears to be holding up well, as in Qatar, 
although the UAE is not characterised by the same level of homogeneity 
comprised as it is of seven different emirates, each of which has its own ruling 
family, loyalty structures and challenges. 
Certainly, the UAE has focused on economic development without 
commensurate political reform, and even Abdulla admits its Federal National 
Council is the weakest legislature in the Gulf.  However, for most Gulf States it 
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is the UAE and not Kuwait that is the preferred model of governance, showing 
that the economic benefits of modernisation and globalisation trump the 
attractions of political reform (2012).  Ehteshami says the UAE has sought to 
become a major regional hub for service industries, financiers, architects, 
education and tourism, and also to fill knowledge economy niches in the 
Information Technology, health and environmental sectors.  The UAE has also 
tried to move into Biotech and renewable energies as a major player, with the 
Dubai Biotech and Research Park as part of that plan (2013), and has 
attempted further diversification through privatisation of some utilities 
companies (Ghanem and Elfakhani 2011).  While political reform may be 
lacking, this economic strategy appears to show the ruling élite is well aware of 
the need to diversify the basis of the economy before hydrocarbon rents are 
outstripped by burgeoning populations, or eventually cease, although resource 
depletion is potentially 80-90 years away. 
However, according to Davidson, the need for a roadmap of political reform in 
the UAE is all the more pressing after the Arab Spring.  Amongst the pressures 
he identifies at play are an increasing indigenous population, increasing 
urbanisation, increased female economic participation, reduced numbers of 
large extended families, and old informal connections being placed under 
greater strain.  If, as a result, citizens find it increasingly difficult to access the 
traditional forms of legal and political governance, something will need to take 
its place if stability and order are to be maintained.  Economic disparity 
between the Emirates exacerbates these pressures and so perhaps it is no 
coincidence that many of those who signed a 2011 petition calling for political 
reform, and two of those subsequently arrested, were members of the largest 
Ra’s al-Khaimah tribe (2011).  Whether the Arab Spring was a factor is open to 
question as those revolts were against secular governments outside the Gulf.  
In Bahrain the 2011 revolution may have been inspired by events in Tunisia, 
but probably owed more to decades of brutal sectarian repression of the 
majority of the population than the causes of revolution in North Africa and 
Syria.  However, Davidson (2011) does cite the twin challenges of changing 
demographics and disparities in access to wealth between the seven members 
of the Federation as potential causes of political discontent, and these must be 
taken seriously by the rulers.  
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It is also argued that there is a greater need for transparency within the UAE’s 
governing structures as a few men effectively control the country’s natural 
resources, its economic wealth and, of course, its future economic prosperity.  
The majority of investments, which are technically controlled by the Abu Dhabi 
Investments Council, are thought to be under the full control of the ruler, one of 
his half-brothers, and a long serving French banker (Davidson 2009).  There is 
a growing sense these men should submit to greater scrutiny from their 
domestic population.  This demand for greater transparency is further 
reinforced by the UAE’s ever greater penetration of the financial institutions and 
major corporations of other countries and the strongly held view the UAE 
should submit to more thorough external scrutiny and investigation (Davidson 
2011).  Essentially, the wealth of the state is held by the ruling family which 
begs the questions: do the citizens recognise and are they content with this 
state of affairs, are the ruling family and the state acknowledged as 
synonymous, and are regime security and national security the same thing in 
the minds of the rulers? 
Forstenlechner, Rutledge and Alnuaimi are generally upbeat about the UAE’s 
future.  They say the changes most economists and social scientists consider 
to be essential, whether they hail from the ‘pejorative and deterministic “rentier-
state” school’, or from less dogmatic standpoints, include the need for 
education reforms; greater financial accountability; transparency about wealth 
preservation strategies; assisting the poorer Emirates with economic 
diversification; and transformation of the labour market.  They believe Islamist 
opponents cannot be regarded as realistic alternatives as they are likely to 
reverse progress especially in education, religious tolerance, attitudes to 
women and such things as the knowledge-based economy.  In essence they 
consider the structure appears as strong and popular now as it was before the 
Arab Spring (2012:64).  This optimism may be well founded, but the necessary 
changes are fundamental in character and it is difficult to see how they could 
be achieved without opening the door to demands for commensurate political 
reform, to which the rulers are not prepared to accede.  To suggest reforms in 
education and transparency of economic governance can be enacted in 
isolation of wider political reforms seems somewhat naïve. 
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The UAE sits between Bahrain and Qatar in the spectrum of potential 
instability, although it is probably considerably closer to the latter than the 
former.  While the UAE does not have the ongoing sectarian conflict Bahrain 
endures, it is also not as homogeneous as Qatar and there has been political 
discontent emanating from the poorer Emirates.  Where the UAE is very similar 
to Qatar is in the hydrocarbon revenue earning potential it has, which could last 
for another 80-90 years and provide the breathing space the UAE needs to 
diversify its economy and strengthen its political and economic sustainability.  
Western-style democracy in the UAE is not necessarily inevitable, but some 
form of political liberalisation may well be necessary if the ruling families are to 
retain their grip on power after economic transformation is achieved. 
2.10. The Effects of Climate Change 
This section looks at implications of climate change agreements on the Arabian 
Gulf monarchies.  Chapter 3 examines climate change on a global and regional 
scale and considers the direct and indirect consequences for the Gulf in much 
greater detail.  However, it is of note that relatively little is written about the 
political, national security and socio-economic ramifications for the Gulf States, 
apart from by Luomi, as most papers focused on the region are written from a 
scientific or agricultural perspective.  However, Chapter 3 will look at such 
effects as water scarcity, food security and migration as well as the physical 
effects including increased temperatures, rising sea levels and loss of bio-
diversity. 
From the outset it is necessary to recognise that the Gulf regimes’ hold on 
power depends largely on hydrocarbon revenues and the commensurate global 
demand for oil and gas, according to Luomi.  She suggests prevailing natural 
resource consumption patterns have placed unprecedented stress on the Gulf’s 
fragile desert environment, which are likely to intensify if the projected effects of 
climate change come about (2012). 
At the turn of the millennium the G7 countries40 earned 70 percent more 
income from oil taxes than OPEC countries earned from their exports and it 
was thought a combination of reduced demand, reduced price and reduced 
market rent would lead to reduced oil revenues. OPEC countries therefore 
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believed that policies brought about by adherence to the Kyoto Protocol in 
developed countries e.g. the imposition of carbon taxes, would reduce the 
revenues they received from oil and therefore they should be compensated for 
their losses (Barnett and Dessai 2002).  If OPEC countries were compensated, 
the developed world would effectively be subsidising the rentier states, thus 
maintaining absolute monarchies at the possible expense of political reforms. 
Article 4.8 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is 
explicit about the requirement for developed countries to meet the needs and 
concerns of states whose incomes are highly dependent on revenues 
generated from production, processing and export of hydrocarbons and 
associated energy-intensive products.  Fundamentally, Article 4.8 was the price 
that had to be paid to win OPEC’s support for the Convention (Barnett and 
Dessai 2002).  To overturn this principle could be problematical as it was built 
in to the UNFCCC at the outset by the OPEC countries.  Any attempt to declare 
the principle invalid could leave the developed Western nations open to claims 
that, having damaged the environment through their heavy industries and 
rampant consumerism, they are leaving it to the developing world to pick up the 
bill by reducing their revenue earning capacity and thus potential for 
development. 
Barnett and Dessai say while Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol specifically 
requires developed countries to take action to minimise the adverse effects of 
climate change legislation on developing countries, neither this Article nor 
Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC specifically mentions monetary compensation.  
Furthermore, it is questionable whether compensation exists as a general 
principle of international law.  Were monetary compensation to be seriously 
considered it would be impossible to work out how much income the OPEC 
countries would have lost, because it is not known how the hydrocarbon market 
would have worked if Kyoto had not been in being.  Of note, in addition to 
compensation, the OPEC countries also wanted investment to help exporting 
countries diversify their economies away from high dependency on 
hydrocarbon exports (2002).  Some six years after Barnett and Dessai were 
writing, the issue of monetary compensation had still not been resolved, but 
was overtaken by events as the 2008 global economic downturn took hold and 
the Gulf States, in particular, found themselves bankrolling a much damaged 
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Western economic system.  This could be said to have subverted the moral 
strength of the OPEC claim, once it became known how strong were the 
significant sovereign wealth funds at least some and arguably the most vocal of 
them possess.   
Saudi Arabia deliberately aimed to slow down climate change negotiations to 
secure the role of oil in the global energy economy and generally opposed all 
attempts to move away from fossil fuels says Luomi41.  However, the potentially 
negative effects of international mitigation measures on the demand and price 
of fuel and oil are less important for a country like Bahrain which has limited 
reserves.  Indeed Bahrain could arguably benefit from the advancement of the 
broader climate negotiations agenda than from ensuring there is a 
compensation mechanism for any future loss of revenue.  Conversely, Abu 
Dhabi and Kuwait, with their significant reserves, depend more crucially on the 
status of oil and gas in the global energy economy, although the UAE, led by 
Abu Dhabi, was the first to step forward with a more balanced agenda.  In the 
largest Gulf oil exporting monarchies global energy transition is seen as a 
greater threat to stability than climate change itself and the imminent shift away 
from hydrocarbons requires oil-dependent rentier states to speed up their 
domestic economic diversification (2012).  This in itself provides an interesting 
context to the climate change debate in the Gulf as the rulers see the indirect 
effects of climate change, leading to loss of rents, as much more pressing than 
the direct physical effects which could include loss of territory and increased air 
and sea temperatures.  This may be because of the timescale involved, as the 
indirect effects are likely to be felt first. 
Qatar became the first GCC country to establish a climate change agenda that 
does not necessarily and automatically follow the Saudi position which is 
founded upon obstructionism (Ulrichsen 2012a).  Meanwhile, Abu Dhabi’s 
leadership has devised some of the most innovative domestic approaches and 
proactive responses to environmental stability and climate change in the region 
to date.  Abu Dhabi faces the same pressures as other Gulf States including 
high population and resource demand growth and has the additional pressures 
                                                          
41
 Of note Saudi Arabia has signed the Paris Agreement of April 2016, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-7-
d&chapter=27&lang=en  accessed 29 June 2016. 
62 
 
of leading the UAE (Luomi 2012).  Abu Dhabi’s long term economic strategy 
relies extensively on a combination of overseas investments and 
industrialisation in the energy-intensive and hydrocarbon sectors.  It has 
arguably been the most successful in the Gulf at making the most of the 
opportunities presented by the rise of climate change on the international 
agenda, having taken a proactive domestic approach rather than becoming 
overly concerned with the effects of falling oil and gas revenues (Luomi 2009).  
Abu Dhabi is therefore arguably at the forefront of climate change mitigation in 
the region. 
2.11. Implications 
Within the literature there is general consensus that some political, economic 
and societal reform within the monarchies is necessary if they are to survive the 
move out of hydrocarbon dependency into more diverse political economies.  
Davidson is the most pessimistic about the chances of success, closely 
followed by Luomi, while the remainder see change is possible given sufficient 
vision and motivation at the top.  What appears very unlikely is that this change 
will produce anything similar to Western-style democracies.  Instead it is more 
likely there will be an evolution of traditional governance that will seek to protect 
the current power bases, while concurrently accepting modernising influences 
and allowing more political freedom for the populations, who will have to play a 
significant role in wealth creation in the future and maybe pay taxes. 
Rentierism is not necessarily a bad thing if it is economically sustainable and 
both sides agree to the social contract it requires.  Certainly the strength of 
some sovereign wealth funds will provide cushions against the potential 
reduction in hydrocarbon revenues.  Rentierism appears to be a good fit for 
Middle Eastern societies who seem to have little appetite for Western-style 
democracy, preferring when they have voted in recent years to install forms of 
political Islam which are arguably inherently undemocratic.  Perhaps the 
example of Kuwait’s democracy, frustrated by self interest at every turn, has 
convinced many it is a political system they wish to avoid.  What is clear is 
increasing exposure to a globalised world by new middle class Gulf Arabs, 
outside of the ruling cliques, could lead to demands for greater access to 
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information and transparency regarding the systems of governance that rule 
and regulate their lives. 
The economies of the monarchies are accused of being bloated, stagnant and 
overly dependent on hydrocarbon revenues.  These economies could well be 
under threat within a matter of a few years if global demand for hydrocarbons 
decreases in line with Kyoto and Paris targets.  The Asian market for oil and 
gas could provide the capacity to take up the slack created by Western moves 
away from carbon, but this is by no means guaranteed.  Insufficiently diversified 
economies will suffer if their revenues are reduced and this could impact 
directly on ruling bargains, perhaps causing real threats to human security if 
accessibility to food is limited through rapidly increasing prices due to 
shortages.  At this point the economies and the social contracts that underpin 
them become unsustainable.  The general view is that this is not inevitable if 
the rulers take steps to improve the skills, education and training of their 
burgeoning populations and diversify into knowledge-based, innovative 
services.  However, most authors agree that will require a change of culture 
amongst the indigenous populations from one of entitlement, to an expectation 
of doing real work, for real money, which may take a generation to achieve. 
Bahrain is the monarchy most at risk because its hydrocarbon reserves are 
essentially exhausted and because it is in a state of almost permanent 
insurrection as a result of the political and economic marginalisation of its Shia 
majority.  This ongoing internal security crisis has necessitated active support 
from Saudi and Emirati allies, with the insufficiently restructured economy being 
supported by Saudi money.  Meanwhile, Qatar has hydrocarbon riches for 
years ahead and benefits from widespread political apathy at home; reform in 
Qatar is driven top down and the population appears content with the ruling 
bargain as it is.  The UAE has similar hydrocarbon wealth, but is not as 
homogeneous as Qatar.  Political discontent emanates from the smaller 
emirates who are jealous of Abu Dhabi’s wealth and power and feel similarly 
about Dubai.  If Bahrain is most at risk, the UAE comes second but has the 
advantage of being able to buy-off dissenters with government jobs and other 
benefits.  Qatar seems least at risk. 
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There are, however, two wild cards.  The first is the presence of huge numbers 
of migrant workers whose numbers dwarf the indigenous populations.  Often 
these workers are at the bottom end of the human security ladder with low 
wages, poor food and accommodation and no access to political or legal rights.  
They suffer worst in downturns and this has manifested as serious discontent in 
the past.  If the rentier system starts to atrophy because of international climate 
change agreements, the migrants could be the first to react violently which 
would cause significant problems for the monarchies’ security forces.  Secondly 
there are the direct effects of climate change which are already being felt.  
These will be dealt with in the next chapter, but as an example increased day 
and night time temperatures will increase demands for desalinated water and 
air-conditioning, which will further stress domestic power supplies already close 
to or in deficit. 
The monarchies therefore face a complex problem as direct and indirect effects 
of climate change appear with adverse results on their political economies.  
Even in Qatar and the UAE hydrocarbon resources are finite and become more 
difficult and expensive to extract as levels deplete.  Globalisation and the 
freedom of access to information and knowledge compounds these issues as 
expectation amongst the indigenous and migrant populations increase, 
potentially leading to demands for greater access to the political and economic 
levers of power.  The results of global compliance with the Kyoto and Paris 
agreements could start to affect the monarchies within a few short years while 
the physical effects of climate change, already being seen in the Gulf, will 
inexorably increase until the end of this century with potential consequences for 
sovereignty, human security and political legitimacy unless effective mitigation 
strategies are in place. 
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3. CLIMATE CHANGE - Impacts and Implications 
3.1. The Global Level 
Climate change is a high profile issue and there is general consensus it exists 
and anthropogenic causation lies at the root of it, alongside natural and cyclical 
climate variability.  There is little doubt climate change is having adverse effects 
upon the planet and the Royal Society42 says climate change will affect the 
severity and frequency of extreme weather;  climate change mitigation and 
societal adaptation to climate change will be necessary in parallel, if the 
exposure and vulnerability of people is to be reduced in future.  Barnett (2001) 
says it is a truism of contemporary climate change science that the faster the 
rate of change the less time there is to adapt and the more dangerous the 
impacts of climate change are likely to be.  Burroughs (2007:ix) concurs and 
says ‘the subject of climate change has grown from just one of a number of 
pressing environmental issues to being seen as comparable with terrorism and 
nuclear proliferation as one of the greatest threats to humankind’.  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2013 ‘Summary for 
Policymakers’ says warming of the climate system is unequivocal and many of 
the changes observed since the 1950s are unprecedented over millennia.  The 
atmosphere and oceans have warmed, snow and ice have diminished, sea 
levels have risen and concentrations of GHGs have increased.  The report 
says, with medium confidence, the period 1983-2012 was likely43  the warmest 
period of the last 1400 years.  However, noting sceptics’ criticisms that the 
years 1998-2012 show less warming than might have been expected, the IPCC 
agrees that in addition to robust multi-decadal warming, global mean surface 
temperature exhibits substantial decadal and inter-annual variability.  The IPCC 
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 ‘Resilience to Extreme Weather - Executive Summary’, The Royal Society, London, November 2014. 
43 The degree of certainty in each key finding of the assessment is based on the type, amount, quality, 
and consistency of evidence (e.g. data, mechanistic understanding, theory, models, expert judgment) 
and the degree of agreement. The summary terms to describe evidence are: limited, medium, or robust; 
and agreement: low, medium, or high.  Confidence in the validity of a finding synthesizes the evaluation 
of evidence and agreement. Levels of confidence include five qualifiers: very low, low, medium, high, 
and very high.  The likelihood, or probability, of some well-defined outcome having occurred or 
occurring in the future can be described quantitatively through the following terms: virtually certain, 
99–100% probability; extremely likely, 95–100%; very likely, 90–100%; likely, 66–100%; more likely than 
not, >50–100%; about as likely as not, 33–66%; unlikely, 0–33%; very unlikely, 0–10%; extremely 
unlikely, 0–5%; and exceptionally unlikely, 0–1%. Unless otherwise indicated, findings assigned a 
likelihood term are associated with high or very high confidence. 
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states that due to natural variability, trends based on short-term records are 
sensitive to beginning and end dates and do not generally reflect long-term 
trends (2013:SPM-3).  The IPCC says while warming does not follow a 
consistent upward trend it is nevertheless a reality. 
The IPCC has high confidence that some decades during the so-called 
‘Medieval Climate Anomaly’ (950-1250 AD) were as warm in some regions as 
in the late twentieth century, but these regional warm periods did not occur as 
coherently across regions as the warming in the late twentieth century has 
done.  They state it is virtually certain the troposphere has warmed globally 
since the middle of last century.  They claim with medium confidence that 
precipitation, averaged over global land areas, has changed since 1951 and 
with high confidence that it has increased in mid-latitude areas of the northern 
hemisphere, although with less confidence about other latitudes.  Changes in 
many extreme weather and climate events have been observed since about 
1950 and it is likely the frequency of heat waves has increased in large parts of 
Europe, Asia and Australia.  It is also likely there are more land regions where 
the number of heavy precipitation events has increased rather than decreased.  
Furthermore, on a global scale, ocean warming is largest near the surface and 
the upper 75 metres warmed by 0.11°C in the same period (2013:SPM-4).  It is 
very likely that regions of high salinity where evaporation dominates have 
become more saline, while regions of low salinity where precipitation dominates 
have become fresher since the 1950s.  Regional trends in ocean salinity give 
medium confidence that evaporation and precipitation over the oceans have 
also changed (2013:SPM-5).  Other changes in the global water cycle in 
response to warming over the 21st Century will not be uniform.  The contrast in 
precipitation between wet and dry regions and between wet and dry seasons 
will increase, although there may be regional exceptions.  In many mid-latitude 
and sub-tropical dry regions, such as the Arabian Peninsula, mean precipitation 
will likely decrease (IPCC 2013:SPM-16). 
The report continues with high confidence that over the last two decades the 
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets have been losing mass, glaciers have 
continued to shrink almost world-wide and Arctic sea ice and northern 
hemisphere spring snow cover have continued to decrease in extent.  The 
average value of ice loss from the Greenland ice sheet has very likely 
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substantially increased from 34 gigatons (Gt) per year in the period 1992-2001, 
to 215 Gt per year in 2002-2011.  One hundred Gt of ice loss per year is 
equivalent to about 0.28 millimetres rise in global mean sea level per year.  The 
average rate of loss on the Antarctic ice sheet has increased from 30 Gt per 
year in 1992-2001 to 147 Gt per year in 2002-11 (IPCC 2013:SPM-5).  There is 
also very high confidence northern hemisphere snow cover has decreased 
since the mid-twentieth century and high confidence permafrost temperatures 
have increased in most regions since the early 1980s.  Observed warming was 
up to 3°C in parts of Northern Alaska (early 1980s to mid-2000s) and up to 2°C 
in parts of the Russian European North (1971-2010).  The IPCC says there are 
multiple lines of evidence to support very substantial Arctic warming since the 
middle of the last century and over the period 1901-2010 global mean sea level 
rose by 190 millimetres with the fastest rate being 3.2 millimetres per year in 
1993-2010 (2013:SPM-6). 
The Summary for Policymakers says atmospheric concentrations of Carbon 
Dioxide (CO2), Methane (CH4) and Nitrous Oxide (N2O) have increased to 
levels unprecedented in the last 800,000 years.  CO2 emissions have increased 
by 40 percent since pre-industrial times, primarily from fossil fuel emissions and 
secondarily from net land use change emissions.  The oceans are estimated to 
have absorbed about 30 percent of the emitted anthropogenic CO2, causing 
ocean acidification, and the IPCC says all atmospheric concentrations have 
increased since 1750 due to human activity (2013:SPM-7), although this is 
hotly contested by climate change sceptics.  However, the great majority of 
scientific opinion lies with the IPCC. 
Meanwhile, the IPCC says with high confidence that annual CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuel combustion and cement production were 8.3 Gt of Carbon (GtC) 
averaged over the years 2002-2011 and 9.5 GtC in 2011, 54 percent above the 
1990 level.  Annual net CO2 emissions from anthropogenic land use change 
are estimated at 0.9 GtC on average in 2002-2011, while from 1750 to 2011 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon from fossil fuels, cement production, 
deforestation and other land use has released 545 GtC into the atmosphere.  
Of this, the IPCC reports 240 GtC of CO2 emissions have remained in the 
atmosphere, while 155 GtC have been absorbed by the oceans and 150 GtC 
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has accumulated in natural terrestrial ecosystems such as residual land sink 
(2013:SPM-7 & SPM-8). 
The Summary for Policymakers says GHGs continue to accumulate in the 
atmosphere and radiative forcing, used to measure energy flux caused by a 
driver in the form of watts per square metre (Wm-2), has been shown to be 43 
percent higher in 2011 than in 2005.  The IPCC says this is due to 
anthropogenic factors including continued growth of most GHG concentrations 
and improved estimates of aerosols in the atmosphere.  The IPCC believes it is 
clear human influence on the climate is evident from the increasing GHG 
levels, positive radiative forcing, observed warming and understanding of the 
climate system.  They say human influence has also been detected in the 
warming of the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water 
cycle, in reductions in snow and ice, in global mean sea level rise and in 
changes in some climate extremes.  It says evidence for human involvement 
has grown since its last major report (4th Assessment Report in 2007) and it is 
extremely likely44 human influence has been the dominant cause of the 
observed warming since the mid-twentieth century (2013:SPM-9 to SPM-12). 
In reporting climate model projections the IPCC made certain forecasts of how 
the climate would change in decades to come, stating continued emissions of 
GHGs will cause further warming and changes in all components of the climate 
system.  They estimate the global mean surface temperature change for the 
period 2016-2035 relative to 1986-2005 will likely be in the range of 0.3°-0.7°C, 
assuming no major volcanic eruptions or secular changes in total solar 
irradiance.  Relative to natural internal variability, near-term increases in 
seasonal mean and annual mean temperatures are expected to be larger in the 
tropics and sub-tropics (e.g. around the Arabian Gulf area) than in the mid-
latitudes.  It is virtually certain there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold 
temperature extremes over most land areas on daily and seasonal timescales 
as global mean temperatures increase.  It is very likely heat waves will occur 
with a higher frequency and duration, but occasional cold winter extremes will 
continue to occur (2013:SPM-14 & SPM-15). 
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 95-100 per cent chance in IPCC scale of likelihood. 
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The strongest ocean warming is projected for the surface in the tropical and 
northern hemisphere sub-tropical regions.  Based on models that most closely 
reproduce the climatological mean state and 1979-2012 trend of the Arctic sea 
ice extent, a nearly ice free Arctic Ocean in September each year before mid-
century is likely45.  Global mean sea level will continue to rise during the 21st 
Century and the rate of rise will very likely exceed that observed during 1971-
2010 due to increased ocean warming and increased loss of mass from 
glaciers and ice sheets.  Depending on which model is used, the global mean 
sea level rise for 2081-2100 relative to 1986-2005 will likely be in the range of 
260-980 millimetres with a worst case rise of 8-16 millimetres per year over that 
time.  Sea level rises will not be uniform and about 70 percent of coastlines 
world-wide are projected to experience sea level change within 20 percent of 
the global mean.  It is virtually certain the global sea level rise will continue 
beyond 2100 (IPCC 2013:SPM-16 to SPM-20). 
3.1.1. Migration as a Consequence? 
Along with the immediate physical effects of climate change such as rising sea 
levels flooding coastal areas and increased temperatures and reduced rainfall 
causing wider desertification, one of the oft cited second order consequences is 
the potential for mass migration to escape the physical effects.  However, 
according to Lilleør and Van Den Broeck there is a lack of empirical evidence 
and rigorous research about the likelihood and potential effects of 
environmental migration.  Despite predictions of up to 200 million 
environmental refugees by 2050, they say ‘the debate has been flawed by 
vague terminology, lack of empirical evidence and absence of links to 
theoretical models of migration’.  They contend the two main drivers of 
migration, as stated in economic literature, are income differentials between the 
point of origin and the intended destination, and income variability at the point 
of origin (2011:S70).  Potential migrants make an assessment of how much 
their family’s income fluctuates in their present location and whether migrating 
would make them financially better off.  If moving does not necessarily lead to 
greater economic benefit it is pointless to do so, unless of course some other 
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 Nearly ice free is when the sea ice extent is less than one million square kilometres (10
6
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2
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least five consecutive years. 
70 
 
driver comes into play, such as the need to avoid life threatening situations.  
However, economics alone does not explain migration either. 
The typical migrant from a less developed country (LDC) is often skilled and 
migrates to places where those skills are economically more valuable in terms 
of potential earnings.  A lack of skills acts as a barrier to migration, both 
internally and internationally.  Migrants can be deterred by the costs of 
migration and resettling, unless there is already a large migrant and support 
network in place in the destination.  Potential migrants can also be put off by 
physical distance, cultural differences, strict immigration controls, local exit 
barriers preventing migrants from leaving, shortage of land in the destination 
and opposition of the indigenous society to certain groups (Lilleør and Van Den 
Broeck 2011).  It is therefore clear the decision to become a migrant can be 
multi-stranded and complex, unless life is threatened in the present location. 
Lilleør and Van Den Broeck suggest that while there is an assumption that 
climate change and variability could act as positive effects on migration drivers, 
stimulating increased migration flows, they reiterate there is a lack of empirical 
evidence this is the case.  They say studies do show reduced rainfall leads to 
increased migration, both internal and trans-border, but internal migration is the 
much greater part.  There seems to be no evidence pointing towards future 
mass migration; a strong effect of climate change or variability on a migration 
driver does not automatically produce a strong effect on migration.  Even if 
migration does increase it is most likely to be internal and also produce 
migrants who intend to return home in due course (2011).  Similarly, Black et al 
note debates on climate change seem to view environmental migration as a 
problem or a threat, but despite some strong predictions, including one of 50 
million environmental refugees by 2020, the evidence base is thin and there is 
an absence of frameworks for testing hypotheses on climate change and 
migration linkages (2011).  They believe assertions, apparently based on 
commonsense analysis that rising sea levels or increased land degradation will 
force human migration, do not tell the whole story.  In fact climate or 
environmental change is merely one of a series of factors that can prompt 
migration, or directly or indirectly impact on other factors.  Generally, there are 
multiple factors that lie behind a decision to migrate, so it will be rare that 
environmental migrants will be specifically identifiable (2011).   
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Essentially, there are five drivers of migration: economic, e.g. opportunities for 
employment or better pay elsewhere; political, including security and safety, 
laws on land ownership, or forced relocation policies; demographic, e.g. the 
size and structure of populations, rates of morbidity and mortality; social, such 
as familial and cultural practices; and environmental pressures like exposure to 
hazards or access to ecosystem services.  These drivers rarely act in isolation 
and it is the interrelationship between drivers and the varying weight of 
emphasis of each that determines whether migration is triggered or not, the 
scale of movement and whether it is internal or cross-border migration (Black et 
al 2011).  Prime examples of the drivers in action can be seen in Syria where 
the civil war has caused mass international migration because of the significant 
danger to life, while repetitive droughts in Sub-Saharan Africa tend to lead to 
smaller, more local moves from rural to urban areas.  This is presumably 
because the people aim to return home when the drought is over. 
Findlay says immobility or very short distance migration are the norm and 
agrees there is no evidence-based research to support the notion 
environmental change is leading to mass migration from the global south to the 
global north.  He goes further and refutes the suggestion that environmental 
change will result in mass migration from many parts of the majority world to 
the wealthier countries in the decades ahead.  Instead, he believes the most 
likely effect of climate change over the next 50 years will be to ‘amplify and 
modify’ pre-existing migration channels and this will shape the pattern of 
migration selected by those affected.  The movement will often be by only one 
member of the household, in the first instance at least (2011).  However, this 
could suggest the pattern of migrant worker employment in the Gulf from 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia could be strengthened as climate 
change affects those places, but is likely to be limited to the workers only and 
not their families.  This potential for migration will depend on continued demand 
for expatriate labour in the Gulf and in increasing numbers. 
These views are reinforced by de Haas who says that where environmental 
stresses have undermined traditional subsistence-based livelihoods, there 
tends to be internal migration to urban centres rather than international 
migration, as the hungry and desperate usually lack the social, economic and 
human wherewithal necessary to undertake long migration journeys.  He 
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believes climate change could lead to increased external migration from 
climate-stressed rural areas, but it is most likely to be mainly of a relatively 
short distance and internal in character.  It is not plausible that climate change 
will lead to a massive displacement of populations, since people whose 
livelihoods have been critically damaged by environmental change will 
generally lack the resources to migrate internationally (2011).  De Haas 
reinforces this point, noting climate change effects, such as over-use of water 
resources due to excessive pumping and lack of government policies to 
promote water saving irrigation techniques, will marginalise rural agrarian 
livelihoods.  This will lead to limited internal moves, but not international, 
migration because those affected will not have the capability or capacity to 
carry out such journeys (2011). 
The Foresight Report takes a slightly different view stating environmental 
change will affect migration now and in the future through its influence on a 
range of economic, social and political drivers which themselves affect 
migration.  However, the report says the range and complexity of the 
interactions between these drivers means it will rarely be possible to distinguish 
individuals for whom environmental factors are the sole driver.  Powerful 
economic, political and social drivers mean migration is likely to continue 
regardless of environmental change, although that may affect people’s 
livelihoods prompting a traditional response to migrate.  Environmental change 
could also expose people to greater natural hazards and migration may be the 
only mitigation for this, e.g. for the 17 million people displaced globally by 
natural hazards in 2009 and the 42 million in 2010 (2011).  Putting aside 
natural disasters and hazards that leave people no choice but to move if they 
are to survive, this all begs the question as to whether there really is such a 
thing as an environmental migrant, or whether it is the case all migration hinges 
on social and economic factors which are the principal reasons for moving, 
even if they are exacerbated by the climate.  Foresight acknowledges 
estimates of numbers of environmental migrants are methodologically unsound 
because migration is the product of multiple causes and environmental change 
cannot be separated out.  They also ignore the human capacity to adapt to 
climate or environmental change and other barriers that are in place.  However, 
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the report does conclude some migration in the context of global environmental 
change is inevitable in the future, even if its nature is uncertain (2011). 
From this it is clear migration is the product of a range of drivers which combine 
to form pressure on individuals, groups and communities to migrate.  This 
migration is unlikely to be triggered by one single driver unless there is a 
concomitant threat to human survival by remaining in place.  It is clear people 
will move if the land becomes untenable for climate reasons, but in most cases 
migration will be over short distances and often accompanied by a desire to 
return home if and when things improve.  Coastal flooding and increased 
desertification will force people to move, but if people are able to remain in their 
homes, make a living and bring up their families, it is more likely they will stay 
put.  Increased numbers of migrant workers may leave families behind in 
climate-stressed regions of the world, but their migration will be economically-
based and ultimately temporary as they will intend to return to their homes.  
Widespread migration as a result of climate change therefore appears unlikely. 
3.2. The Regional Level 
In this section the direct and indirect consequences of climate change in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region will be examined in more detail, 
before looking in the next section at how these effects impact on the Gulf and 
Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE in particular.  In terms of the monarchies it is 
difficult to find first order climate change predictions for them specifically, 
because data is collected and interpreted on a more geographically widespread 
basis, i.e. for the whole of the MENA region.   
Charney (1975), commenting that the albedo or heat reflective qualities are 
much higher in dry, sandy or rocky soil  than where ground is covered with 
vegetation, observed that while heat is reflected upwards from a desert there is 
a feedback mechanism that causes the air to descend, reduce the relative 
humidity and enhance its own dryness.  According to Burroughs (2007) there is 
consensus that there is a drying of the northern sub-tropics between 10 
degrees and 30 degrees North which is where most of the Arabian Peninsula 
lies.  While the Saudi Arabian desert reflects as much as 40 percent of the 
incident solar radiation it receives, increasing desertification and desiccation 
leads to a reduction in vegetation which reduces the amount of water vapour 
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released into the atmosphere by the process of evapotranspiration.  This will 
increase the albedo of the terrain, altering the radiative properties of the air and 
reducing the possibility of cloud formation (Burroughs 2007).  Once turned to 
desert, exposed soil or sand is at high risk of becoming dust in the atmosphere, 
especially during the dry season or droughts.  There is the potential for 
increased dust storms as a projected increase in temperatures will probably 
lead to greater soil erosion and more frequent and intense wind storms.  The 
fine particles of dust kicked up will contribute to air pollution and negative 
health impacts (Elasha 2010:17).  Burroughs says there is some question over 
whether desertification can be reversed or whether increased albedo resulting 
from removal of vegetation leads to permanent desert.  Studies have shown 
vegetation does regenerate after rain and 20 percent more rain falls when land 
is covered in vegetation, but when the land is severely desiccated there is little 
chance of cloud formation to create that rain.  It is now recognised 
desertification is a complex process where climatic change rather than human 
activity, such as over-grazing or inappropriate farming methods, is to blame.  
The fact remains though that the increasing size of the world’s deserts, due to 
drought, leads to increased long-range atmospheric dust transport which 
modifies the Earth’s radiative properties and water cycle leading to potentially 
global consequences (2007). 
According to Harmeling and Eckstein, until 2012 the Arabian Peninsula was not 
regarded as particularly susceptible to the impacts of climate change and 
Middle East countries featured in low ranking positions on the Climate Risk 
Index.  However it is now thought slow onset effects of climate change will 
threaten the region.  An expected decrease in precipitation, along with a 
projected temperature increase, threatens to worsen the already high level of 
desertification, increasing the lack of arable land and water resources.  Gulf 
countries rely on imports of up to 90 percent to feed their rapidly growing 
populations, plus they possess the lowest renewable water supplies per capita 
in the world, while still having an extremely high consumption rate.  
Additionally, rising sea levels threaten the low lying coastal areas of places 
such as the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar who have concentrated much of their 
industry in these zones and on man-made islands.  However, it is difficult to 
assess the indirect impacts of deteriorating food and water security with 
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sufficient reliability within the data that provide the basis for the Climate Risk 
Index.  The appearance of Oman in 2007 and 2010, Yemen in 2008 and Saudi 
Arabia in 2009 in the ‘DOWN 10’ list of the Climate Risk Index (which lists the 
ten most affected countries of the year) as a result of severe floods, indicates 
an increased and accelerating relevance of climate change for the whole region 
(2013). 
While Syria’s Arab nationalist autocracy is fundamentally different to the Gulf 
monarchies, it is useful to look at Femia and Werrells’ (2011) contention that a 
significant number of social, economic, environmental and climatic changes 
have eroded the social contract between Assad’s government and the Syrian 
people, strengthened the opposition cause and reduced Assad’s legitimacy.  
Due to drought causing crop failures and loss of up to 85 percent of livestock in 
the northeast of the country, 1.3 million people were affected and over 800,000 
lost their entire livelihoods.  Estimates suggest about one million people were 
made extremely ‘food insecure’ and many more driven into extreme poverty, 
perhaps 2-3 million.  This resulted in 50,000 families migrating to the cities in 
2010.  Femia and Werrell (2011) cite the regime’s mismanagement and neglect 
of Syria’s natural resources which have led to water shortages and greater 
desertification.  Farmers facing climate and human-induced water shortages 
turned to the aquifers, causing groundwater levels to plummet in many parts of 
the country and raising significant concerns about the quality of the remaining 
groundwater.  Over-grazing and increasing population have compounded the 
desertification process, meaning farmers and herders have to move to areas 
that remain fertile, starve or demand change.  These movements have caused 
tensions within the economically depressed cities where poor competed with 
poor for scarce employment and also access to water.  Femia and Werrell 
(2011) conclude by saying the continuing instability makes it difficult to study 
the degree to which rural displacement has contributed to the civil war in Syria.  
They argue that available evidence suggests the influence of the phenomenon 
may not be insignificant.  While the social structures of Syria before the civil war 
were significantly different and the population and landmass much greater than 
Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, the lessons of poor governance, mismanagement 
and neglect of natural resources still apply.  As coastal areas are endangered 
by rising sea levels and groundwater becomes salinated at the same time, 
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there could well be resulting severe social and economic effects that could 
contribute to demands for political reform, unless the rulers are proactive in 
planning for and adapting to the effects of climate change within their own 
countries. 
3.2.1. Water Scarcity   
The Middle East region, along with Southwest Asia and the Mediterranean 
littoral, is regarded as a water-stressed area, i.e. where run-off is less than 
1000 cubic metres per capita per annum.  In 1995 nearly 1400 million people 
globally lived in water-stressed areas and, depending on the climate change 
model used combined with different population assumptions, this is expected to 
increase by a further 670 – 2761 million people worldwide by 2050 (Arnell 
2004; Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes 2013).  The economic and social costs of 
increasing water-stress are likely to outweigh the economic and social benefits 
of other people ceasing to be water-stressed, as will happen in some areas, 
although it is accepted this needs further investigation (Arnell 2004).  Even 
without climate change the Arabian Peninsula will suffer increased water-stress 
as its population increases.  In 1995, 29.4 million people were suffering and by 
2025 it is predicted this will have risen to somewhere between 90.7 and 131.8 
million people.  By 2050 this could have risen further to between 146.9 and 
308.7 million (Arnell 2004).  Once climate change predictions are added to 
population predictions it is estimated up to eighteen million extra people will 
have moved into water-stress in 2025, rising to a possible further maximum of 
23 million in 2055.  However, climate change also brings relief in other parts of 
the Arabian Peninsula with increased run-off meaning up to 125 million may 
cease to be water-stressed in 2025, rising to a possible 305 million moving out 
of water-stress in 2055 (Arnell 2004).  Arnell acknowledges (2004) that the 
accuracy of these predictions is difficult to verify as climate change models 
were few at the time and run-off estimates were based on simulation and not 
observation.  Similarly, population predictions were based on assumptions 
about fertility, mortality and migration rates, while sensitivity analysis was 
carried out by simply increasing or decreasing the population by 10 per cent 
consistently across the globe.  Future water management will also have a 
significant influence on the effects of water scarcity and will be dependent on 
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future prosperity and attitudes towards environmental management and 
protection. 
The combination of a stressed water resource, arid to semi-arid climate and 
rapid population growth substantially increases the vulnerability of the region to 
future climate change according to IPCC Special Report on Emissions 
Scenario (SRES) A2, which assumes business as normal, i.e. no mitigation for 
climate change is enacted.  Simulation is difficult due to high inter-annual 
variability, the topography including mountains, inland seas and a slight cooling 
trend in recent decades (Evans 2009).  However, models show the Arabian 
Gulf, like the Red Sea, warming considerably more than other water bodies 
such as the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea (Evans 2009).  
Additionally, water scarcity threatens food security by reducing agricultural 
productivity and hinders economic and human health development.  It can lead 
to additional environmental stress and increase tension within and between 
nations sharing water resources (Elasha 2010). 
According to Frederiksen (2009:80), ‘the Arab countries have the least 
renewable water supply per capita of any region in the world’.  Sowers et al 
agree saying climate change and increasing populations will seriously affect 
accessibility to water in the region, while acceleration in the hydrological cycle 
will make droughts longer and rainfall events more variable and intense leading 
to probabilities of increased flooding and desertification.  The Middle East is 
already suffering from deteriorating water quality, rising sea levels, 
demographic growth, over-extraction of groundwater aquifers and their 
contamination, salination of agricultural land and urban water shortages.  They 
believe this has caused some policy reforms and adaptive measures to be 
enacted, although done under conditions of crisis management rather than 
prior planning (2011). 
As an example, Sowers et al say that unless there is significant investment in 
Egypt to counter rising sea levels of one metre, approximately six million 
people, or 10 percent of the population, will be affected with 10-12 percent of 
the agricultural land in the Nile Delta lost to inundation.  Even if this flooding is 
avoided there will be a change in the freshwater/saline interface which will 
make some land, currently fertile, increasingly difficult to cultivate.  Climate 
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change interacting with ongoing coastal erosion will also affect Egypt’s cities 
adversely.  Egypt is the most vulnerable of all MENA states to sea level 
changes, closely followed by the UAE and Qatar (2011).  All of this points to the 
possibility of triggering internal and external migration and the potential for 
subsequent displacement of populations not directly affected by the flooding in 
the first instance. 
Sowers et al recognise worsening drought conditions are forcing countries in 
the MENA region, including the Arabian Peninsula, to consider costly efforts to 
counter the effects of climate change.  However, most countries have 
continued to emphasise large scale technical responses to increase water 
supply from other sources, rather than trying to implement water conservation.  
They identify the need to engage societal actors in climate change adaptation, 
especially concerning the role of civil society and the effects of population 
growth, and say a primary challenge remains convincing political leaderships of 
the urgent need to prioritise adaptation methods (2011).  Community based 
environmental organisations are tolerated on the understanding they focus on a 
narrow range of issues, but when they expand that focus to include demands 
for rights, reforms or accountability, they run up against the law and explicit 
coercion designed to contain civil society more broadly (Sowers et al 2011).  In 
countries where the ruling bargain underpins the whole political legitimacy and 
system, it is not in the regimes’ interest, or part of the deal, to have their 
decisions questioned by quasi-political parties or civil society organisations in 
general.  Yet, here is an instance where climate change impacts directly on 
human security, through accessibility to water, which is intrinsically linked to 
national security and, therefore, regime survival. 
The impacts of climate change will be mixed for the MENA region with 
increased precipitation for some and less rainfall for others.  There will be 
increased temperatures and bigger deserts.  Sea levels will rise and coastal 
areas will be inundated including agricultural land, industrial areas and housing, 
all of which could prompt population movements to safer areas which may, in 
turn, lead to competition for resources, conflict and displacement of those 
already there.  The example of Syria’s drought and mismanagement of 
resources shows what could happen and may have been a factor contributing 
to the current civil war.  The need for positive action by the governments of the 
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MENA region to mitigate the potential consequences of climate change is clear.  
That may necessitate some political reform including the creation and 
empowerment of civil society organisations, maybe even new political parties.   
3.3. The Arabian Gulf 
3.3.1. Water, Temperatures and GHGs 
The Arabian Gulf countries are likely to witness strong direct and indirect 
impacts of climate change in the coming decades, which will impose additional 
stress on already fragile political systems and intensify the need to diversify 
their technology and industry and search for renewable sources of energy 
(Kumetat 2009).  The IPCC AR4 report predicted an overall temperature 
increase in the Middle East of around 1.4°C by the middle of the 21st Century, 
rising to 4°C towards the end of the century.  It was also predicted the 
southernmost portion of the region would experience a small increase in 
precipitation due to the northerly move of the Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone 
(ITCZ), but across the Middle East it is expected there will be a reduction of 
over 170,000 square kilometres of rain-fed agricultural land by the end of the 
century, with an associated reduction in grazing land as well (Evans 2009).  
Narrowing down to the Arabian Gulf, this means that by 2045-2055 the UAE 
could be receiving over 15 millimetres more precipitation per annum than in 
2000-2010, while Bahrain and Qatar could receive 5-15 millimetres more.  By 
2090-2100 all three countries could be getting more than 30 millimetres more 
rainfall than in 2000-2010.  However, these tiny increases in precipitation are 
very unlikely to alleviate the increased water scarcity that will be brought about 
by other environmental factors and the increased size of populations.  Even 
with the northwards move of the ITCZ, precipitation totals will still be below the 
200 millimetres of rain considered to be the annual minimum for rain-fed 
agriculture in the region (Evans 2009). 
Lelieveld et al say climate models consistently predict an overall drying of the 
region with impacts on rivers, downstream water resources and food 
production.  Areas of agricultural and grazing land may decrease as may 
overall crop yields, along with an increased risk of vegetation fires and other air 
pollution aggravating environmental stress.  This leads to concerns about the 
societal and environmental effects of climate change, especially as the region 
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is diverse and fractious.  Water scarcity is a major issue as demand will 
continue to increase due to population growth and economic development.  It 
could be the first region in the world to run out of fresh water, as climate 
change may also intensify heat waves with additional consequences for human 
health, energy use and economic activity (2012).  The Gulf currently has over 
300 days a year where rainfall is less than one millimetre a day, effectively 
nothing; this may decrease by up to ten days a year, but increased rainfall 
projected for the Gulf is insignificant overall (Lelieveld et al 2012).  The ground 
water availability on the basis of cubic metres available per person, per annum, 
was estimated in 2000 at 299 for the UAE, 111 for Qatar and 132 for Bahrain.  
The same estimation carried out for the year 2025 saw this fall to 164 cubic 
metres for the UAE, 75 for Qatar and 81.8 for Bahrain.  Sowers et al say a 
situation of water stress exists when there is less than 500 cubic metres, per 
person, per annum (half of Arnell and Lloyd-Hughes’ threshold) but the figures 
for the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain do not include water that is derived from 
desalination or from imports (2011). 
In the Gulf the increasing use of hydrocarbons for industry, motor vehicles, air-
conditioning and desalination is producing CO2 and other pollution contributing 
to environmental and climate change.  Energy use for air-conditioning will grow 
in parallel with water deficits; this will further stress energy production, because 
of increasing demands for energy to run desalination plants, which will compete 
with domestic requirements for power.  Fresh water will also be competed for 
across and between the domestic and industrial sectors (Lelieveld et al 2012). 
According to Lelieveld et al, models showing increased precipitation around the 
Arabian Gulf region must be used with caution because of the large temporal 
variability of rainfall and the inherent limitations of both global and regional 
climate models to simulate the hydrological cycle.  The Gulf currently 
experiences three to four months of tropical nights per annum, i.e. where the 
minimum night time temperature is greater than 25°C.  It is predicted that this 
will increase gradually to more than six months per annum.  However, the Gulf 
is not likely to see an increase in the number of hot days, i.e. greater than 
35°C, but as hot and humid conditions already prevail here the overall heat 
stress can be very large.  Tropical nights also tend to exacerbate the effects of 
day time heat stress, so an increase in tropical nights is a major cause of 
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concern and will lead to increased energy demands to support air-conditioning 
and refrigerators (2012). 
There will be increasing hot extremes by up to 5-6°C by the end of the century.  
The extremely high temperatures, e.g. 47°C in Riyadh and 51°C in Kuwait City 
that have occurred albeit infrequently in the recent past are expected to 
become the norm by 2070-2099.  The coolest summers in the years 2070-2099 
could be warmer than the hottest summers of 1961-1990.  This change in 
climate will have major negative consequences for humans and ecosystems as 
a result of heat stress and water shortages.  Population growth and economic 
development may aggravate the situation still further.  Air quality is expected to 
become poorer as emissions in the region increase, affecting ozone and 
particulate pollution leading to excess mortality and morbidity.  Summer heat-
waves will produce the most casualties, with excess mortality greatest amongst 
the sick, elderly, children and the general urban population.  There will be 
undetermined synergistic effects between air pollution and water scarcity, and 
vector-borne parasitic and viral diseases spreading into the region must also be 
considered with the potential spread of mosquitoes and ticks (Lelieveld et al 
2012).  Additionally, concern has been expressed by environmentalists at the 
rapid urbanisation of Bahrain, Qatar and parts of the UAE, with increasingly 
grandiose projects and ever-taller buildings.  This will result in localised effects 
of increased temperatures and reduced wind speeds and visibility within the 
cities, due to petrochemical fumes and particulates released into the 
atmosphere (Burroughs 2007). 
3.3.2. Sea Levels   
Sea level rises could result in loss of productivity, salt water intrusion, loss of 
valuable biodiversity in wetlands, salination of groundwater aquifers and 
population migration.  Bahrain will potentially lose fifteen kilometres of its 
coastline, which is almost 11 percent of its land mass, due to a sea level rise of 
50 centimetres if no action is taken for protection.  In the wider Gulf area 
underground water salinity will increase, more land degradation will occur and 
biodiversity on land and in the Gulf will be affected.  A half metre rise in sea 
level is at the lower end of the scenarios modelled and would also place the 
low-lying areas of Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE at risk (Elasha 2010). 
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Kumetat is more pessimistic and says there is a projected sea level rise of 
between 90 and 880 millimetres by the end of the 21st Century and demand 
from rapidly urbanising and industrialising populations will have outstripped 
supply from fossil water and local aquifers.  Currently more than half the 
freshwater used originates from desalination or wastewater treatment.  
Desalination plants have adverse environmental effects such as releasing 
gases, hot brine, treatment chemicals and other trace elements.  In 1990 
Bahrain acquired 54 percent of its water from desalination, while Qatar relied 
on desalination for 98 percent and the UAE for 63 percent of their freshwater.  
By 2005 these figures had risen to Bahrain 92 percent, Qatar 99 percent and 
the UAE 85 percent.  Kumetat also says sea level rises could threaten up to 15 
kilometres of Bahrain’s coastline and endanger man-made and reclaimed 
islands and buildings in the UAE and says this will cause further stress on 
socio-economic and demographic fault lines in the region.  Furthermore, while 
increased wadi flooding is not a concern, locally contained floods might still 
occur, particularly if oceanic changes lead to more frequent and intensive 
storms in the coastal regions (2009). 
Similarly, Janardhan (2007) reported an interview conducted with Mohammed 
Raouf, a senior environment researcher then at the Gulf Research Centre, 
Dubai.  He said Gulf States are in a difficult position as they depend upon fossil 
fuels, but these are the major source of CO2 emissions.  Raouf noted the pace 
of development in the monarchies was high, but the lack of arable land and 
water resources prevent the development of carbon sinks, such as forests and 
green areas, and forecast higher sea levels would lead to the disappearance of 
the man-made islands.  Raouf also said while the Gulf will likely be spared 
extreme events such as tsunamis, sea level rises will be dangerous as 
biodiversity on land and at sea will be affected and destroyed.  Another 
interviewee told Janardhan rising sea levels will also affect the desalination 
plants as their efficiency will be reduced by the increased salinity of the sea 
water, just as rising temperatures are making the demand for fresh water 
greater.  Janardhan also highlighted the resulting coastal erosion, noting this 
affects Dubai at the rate of 50 metres every two years, and said half a million 
tons of sand had been poured along the shore in 2006 to try to stem the 
erosion.  The outlook for the physical effects of climate change is therefore not 
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a good one and suggests that unless mitigation is taken seriously there is the 
real potential for serious changes to the environmental integrity of the Gulf 
States. 
3.3.3. Migration  
Migration was discussed in general earlier and the IPCC has highlighted 
internal and cross-border migration as a potential response to climate induced 
stress, noting the possible severe impacts of migration such as escalating 
conflicts, pressure on natural resources and loss of biodiversity.  Certainly, 
where political instability exists, climate change could act as a threat multiplier 
aggravating water scarcity and tensions within and between nations sharing 
hydrological resources, geography and political boundaries.  At national level 
there is no real external competition for water resources for Bahrain, Qatar and 
the UAE, but increased in-migration would place extra stress on domestic 
supplies, especially if aquifers have been polluted, while expensive and energy-
intensive desalination plants become the only real source of freshwater (Elasha 
2010). Of note, Russell (2009) believes more socially relaxed Bahrain, Qatar 
and the UAE could be preferred destinations for migrants or refugees, rather 
than stricter Saudi Arabia which might only attract Muslim religious refugees.  
While it is recognised there are many drivers that cause migration, its effects on 
receiving countries must be factored in if it does occur.  While immigration 
controls can prevent migrants arriving by legal means, the porosity of the 
monarchies’ land borders and coastlines means illegal immigration is a real 
challenge from neighbouring poor and climate-stressed countries in MENA, the 
Horn of Africa and the Makran Coast.  With Qatar and the UAE especially 
attractive because of their wealth, the increased pressure on freshwater and 
food supplies could have significant consequences for wider human security. 
3.3.4. Vulnerabilities, Lifestyles and Mitigations  
The GCC region falls into the high category for vulnerability to the effects of 
climate change.  Reiche cites Janardhan on two major and immediate 
consequences of climate change, population growth, rapid urbanisation and 
wasteful consumption for the Gulf States.  Firstly, rising sea levels will severely 
affect coastlines and marine life and could impact desalination plants that are 
the main source of freshwater in the region.  Secondly, rising temperatures will 
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mean increasing water demand.  With falling freshwater levels and increasing 
salinity in seawater, which affects the efficiency of desalination plants, water 
scarcity becomes a very serious and worrying prospect.  Desalination plants 
are costly to use as they consume large amounts of fuel with related damage to 
the environment.  Using renewables such as wind or solar to power the 
desalination process could be a viable alternative to the fuel and environmental 
costs (2010).  Linked to rising temperatures the greatest potential negative 
aspects of climate change for the monarchies are resource scarcity and 
insecurity, particularly with regard to water, food and energy.  Energy demand 
will increase as the requirement for more air-conditioning and desalination 
increases, but this will not be as critical as water and food security as, apart 
from Bahrain, the energy requirement could be met in the last resort by 
domestic oil and gas reserves (Luomi 2012).  Luomi identifies pressing 
environmental issues for the GCC states including: increasing water scarcity; 
land degradation and desertification as a result of population growth and 
urbanisation, overgrazing and the intensification and expansion of agriculture; 
marine biodiversity constantly endangered by oil spillages, human settlements 
in coastal areas and seawater desalination; air pollution because of high CO2 
emissions per capita; and solid waste management problems due to population 
growth, high consumption patterns and very limited recycling.  Energy, water 
and food-related unsustainabilities are not the only visible downsides in the 
Gulf States, but arguably they could pose the greatest challenge to the 
business as usual model and ultimately to regime survival (2012).  
Without doubt, the level of oil and gas revenues for GCC countries has enabled 
exceptional, accelerated development in all aspects of life.  However, the scale 
of oil and gas production and use has also led to severe environmental 
problems.  Traditional and emerging environmental threats are all interlinked: 
desertification leads to loss of biodiversity; livestock increase and overgrazing 
contributes to desertification; waste dumping releases methane which adds to 
global warming, which in turn leads to desertification, water scarcity and other 
ecological disasters.  If sea levels rise man-made islands will disappear; 
Bahrain will lose up to 15 kilometres of coastline; underground water salinity 
will increase; more land degradation will occur in the region; biodiversity on the 
land and in the Gulf will be affected.  Yet these ecological impacts are small 
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compared to other parts of the globe that will suffer catastrophic disasters from 
hurricanes and tsunamis, but the social and economic impact will be severe as 
many workers will lose their jobs in agriculture, fishing, and some oil-related 
industries because of a world shift to renewable energy and reducing 
hydrocarbon revenues as a result (Raouf 2008).  This latter effect will 
fundamentally threaten the whole rentier system and political legitimacy of the 
ruling families. 
Most of the Gulf monarchies’ populations do not think about the environmental 
consequences of their lifestyles and everyday choices, due to poverty, lack of 
education, different cultural backgrounds, lack of financial, infrastructure and 
legal incentives to curb consumption, waste and pollution, and lifestyles that 
emphasise Western-style consumerism and materialism (Luomi 2012).  Per 
capita, the GCC states are amongst the top contributors to pollution in the 
world.  On a global scale all the GCC countries fall within the top 25 producers 
of CO2 emissions, with the UAE and Kuwait leading, according to the UN’s 
Statistics Division in 2007 and the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool used by the 
World Resources Institute in 2009 (Reiche 2010).  Projections show carbon 
emissions will grow in Abu Dhabi by 85 percent in the next decade compared to 
a 2009 baseline.  A more economically optimistic growth scenario will see 
emissions more than double.  Increasing taxes will have little impact on energy 
consumption as it does not increase awareness of scarcity.  Increasing user 
costs to approach the market value will raise awareness and enable a more 
efficient and effective allocation of energy to those who assign the highest 
value to it.  Even modest behavioural change by consumers can have major 
impacts on their carbon footprints, while a liberalisation of utility prices can 
have a significant impact in reducing emission levels.  These policies would 
have a direct impact through the price elasticity of demand and an indirect 
effect through changes in behaviour.  Complementary policies would help, such 
as education and awareness programmes, bonuses for efficient practices and 
good behaviour, or alternative initiatives (Smeets and Bayer 2012). 
Pollution threats to the UAE come from Abu Dhabi’s large scale desalination 
dependency which stems from policies that encourage high consumption 
accompanied by adverse effects on the marine environment.  There is also 
associated over-pumping of remaining groundwater aquifers, high production 
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costs and high energy consumption leading to high emissions.  Other energy 
could be used such as cleaner fossil fuel-based products, nuclear or 
renewables.  Simulations show improvements would have a significant impact 
on overall emissions as the desalination sector is such a substantial consumer 
of energy.  Renewables or cleaner energy could also be applied to other 
industrial sectors, although modelling shows a 59 percent efficiency gain is 
required in order to control emissions at their current levels (Smeets and Bayer 
2012).  The first renewable energy policy in the region in January 2009 called 
for 7 percent of Abu Dhabi’s energy to come from renewables by 2020.  The 
energy crisis in the Gulf emphasises the need for diversification of the energy 
portfolio, in particular power generation, to enhance a switch towards less 
energy intensive technologies.  The UAE’s energy crisis is caused primarily by 
excess demand for gas due to sharp increases in demand for electricity and 
desalinated water over the last 20-30 years; alternative energy is a rational 
choice (Smeets and Bayer 2012). 
The UAE is one of the wealthiest countries in the world, but the environmental 
footprint per capita also ranks among the highest in the world.  Abu Dhabi has 
a particularly poor track record on environmental issues especially GHG 
emissions and sustainable water management.  High emissions are driven by 
high energy intensity in the industrial sector and abundant residential 
consumption of energy commodities.  Unsustainable water policy is driven by 
climatological conditions combined with very high consumption levels.  Abu 
Dhabi is dependent on seawater desalination at a large scale which is energy 
intensive and makes another contribution to the carbon footprint (Smeets and 
Bayer 2012).  Several Gulf countries and individual emirates face energy 
shortages due to very high gas consumption.  Pollution from heavy industry 
and large scale desalination has adverse effects on the local environment and 
threatens the health of citizens.  Improvements will depend on reductions in 
energy consumption which will require significant changes in behaviour as both 
the population and economic growth are expected to remain high for the next 
decade.  Exploiting renewable energy sources could be significant in sustaining 
the position Gulf countries play in global energy policies (Smeets and Bayer 
2012).  Low energy prices imposed by government controls help explain high 
energy consumption and thus high emissions as consumers have a mindset 
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that fails to recognise the scarcity of energy and water.  The access to low cost 
energy for citizens is an essential ingredient of the social contract between the 
Gulf States’ governments and their citizens.  Modifications to this arrangement 
are therefore a very sensitive topic in the public discourse (Smeets and Bayer 
2012).  The efforts of the Gulf States to rebrand themselves as world leaders in 
renewables and alternative energy research stand in direct contradiction to 
their environmentally unsustainable policies for development and their 
obstructionist position in climate change negotiations.  The GCC states have an 
enormous vested interest in attempting to steer and shape international 
negotiations on energy policies because of their rentier state status.  There is a 
considerable inherent tension in trying to portray the states as responsible 
actors in global energy governance, while at the same time they attempt to 
minimise the threats caused to their domestic interests by international 
pressure on climate change issues (Ulrichsen 2010). 
The effects of climate change in the Gulf could also have second order 
consequences for countries that are geographically distant from the region.  
There is the potential for pressure on water-short riparian countries (i.e. living 
alongside rivers) from wealthy foreign non-riparian states wishing to acquire 
land and water resources needed to produce food for their domestic 
consumption.  Land is often leased or bought in poor riparian countries that 
already have insufficient water to meet their own domestic needs (Frederiksen 
2009).  Millions of hectares of land have already been acquired with associated 
risks of social, economic and political destabilisation of the host countries.  
Examples are Kuwait leasing land in Cambodia, and Saudi Arabia raising 
US$100 million of cereals in Ethiopia whilst the World Food Programme was 
implementing a food campaign for that country at a cost of US$116 million.  
Cash-rich governments are moving to secure food for themselves while offering 
little expertise or trade in return; some indigenous farmers have been forced off 
their land and have ended up in urban slums (Frederiksen 2009).  
Unsurprisingly, this could create favourable conditions for rebellion in host 
countries and cause disruption over a long period which could seriously 
destabilise the food security the cash-rich countries want to guarantee.  This 
could then lead to civil unrest in the monarchies if there are resultant food 
shortages.  Madagascar’s citizens overthrew its government in 2009 when they 
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tried to do such a deal, showing that such arrangements risk provoking 
instability in already climate-stressed regions, especially if the water supply is 
decreasing as a result of climate change and an increasing population 
(Frederiksen 2009).  This raises the spectre of the potential for instability within 
the monarchies if food security cannot be guaranteed and suggests that if the 
monarchies wish to outsource their food production, they must find countries 
with sufficient water and agricultural capacity to meet their demand, although 
that will inevitably come at increased cost in terms of transport and refrigeration 
etc. 
In the domestic agricultural sector there is the potential for a move away from 
crops with a relatively high amount of water per unit of value-added, to higher 
value crops like fruit and vegetables in combination with upgraded greenhouse 
and irrigation systems, but this will result in a necessary rise in the import 
quotas of staples for the population, such as wheat.  In 2009 the UAE imported 
80 percent of consumables, but with its currency pegged to the US dollar 
suffered when the dollar was weak, which led to price rises for imported food.  
Such rises in basic food prices hit low income groups such as the already 
under-privileged expatriate blue-collar workers forming the majority of the 
inhabitants of the small Gulf States.  This can lead to major unrest if food 
becomes unaffordable as such a high proportion of income has to be spent on 
it.  Therefore, states negotiated food and water security strategic partnerships 
with countries in Africa and South East Asia.  Billions of dollars are invested in 
the agricultural sectors of countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, Burma, Vietnam, 
Uganda, Ukraine and Brazil (Kumetat 2009).  A prime example is that of Saudi 
Arabia which has always been dependent on food imports and is developing 
strategic partnerships with Sudan, Ethiopia, Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Mozambique and Ukraine, amongst others, in order to achieve its food security 
requirements.  In a food security initiative announced by the King, an 
investment fund worth US$800 million was created to support private Saudi 
investment overseas as part of a policy designed to utilise resources in cash-
poor/land-rich countries to grow food for the Kingdom and provide a strategic 
reserve for times of hardship.  This has awakened fears of a quasi-colonial 
attempt to take control of land, especially in poorer countries that already have 
to import food, and the prospect of political tensions with indigenous peoples.  
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However, Saudi Arabia claims the relationship will be mutually beneficial as 
some of the food will go to local people and the aim of the programme is to 
produce food for the world not just the Kingdom (Lippman 2010).  It is important 
this supposed altruism of solving a global food shortage is not overplayed; it is 
clear Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, recognising the competition for food 
between countries is already underway and will become more intense, have 
moved early to exploit their immense wealth to secure land rights overseas.  
While this gives the Gulf States increased food security in theory, it does not 
guarantee there will be acquiescence in the producing countries, as in the case 
of Madagascar above, especially if their populations are experiencing food 
shortages; the likelihood of violent conflict cannot be discounted. 
However, some progress has been made as the UAE and Qatar have taken 
their reputations on environmental issues and turned them around making them 
strengths rather than liabilities.  Their initiatives aim to not only remedy past 
actions, but also to promote research into cleaner sources of energy and other 
environmental issues.  The environment has been used to enhance the ruling 
élites’ image.  For example the Qatar Environment and Energy Institute is 
directly overseen by the wife of Qatar’s former ruler, Sheikha Mozah.  The 
Environmental Agency of Abu Dhabi is strongly linked to the Crown Prince, as 
is carbon neutral Masdar City, built by the Abu Dhabi Future Energy Company, 
a subsidiary of the Mubadala Development Company which is also owned by 
the Crown Prince.  Masdar aims for a development that will allow 1500 
renewable energy and other internationally environmentally related companies 
to locate themselves in Abu Dhabi or have their corporate headquarters there.  
Amongst other things they will focus on carbon capture technologies with the 
hope of exporting to nearby countries (Davidson 2013).  
Qatar’s al-Shaheen Oilfield Gas Recovery and Utilisation Project became the 
first Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to be registered in the Gulf in May 
2007.  However, official and public opinion in the GCC views environmental 
and climate security dimensions as secondary when compared to the main task 
of maintaining intact their major source of revenue (Ulrichsen 2011).  The key 
energy security concern for the Gulf States apart from the duration of their 
domestic reserves and their availability for domestic use is the stability of 
international demand and price stability of fossil fuels (Luomi 2012). 
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Sustainable and secure energy supplies have been a central concern of 
international politics since the first shocks in the 1970s.  From around 2003 
increasing oil prices led to a significant increase in the global importance of 
energy security as countries realised the need to integrate energy policies with 
climate change mitigation.  In consequence energy security and climate change 
have become inseparable issues, intimately intertwined with foreign policy; the 
price of oil is the greatest external instability factor in the six GCC economies 
(Luomi 2012). 
3.4. The Kyoto Effect 
On the international stage, those Gulf monarchies that have large reserves of 
oil, i.e. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar, face potentially negative 
consequences from a global shift to lower carbon emissions as already 
discussed.  The aim of international climate change policies to drastically 
reduce GHG emissions requires a shift away from oil and natural gas, which 
are the main exploitable natural resources available, the principal exports and 
key internal stability resources for the ruling élites.  The monarchies’ 
environmental sustainability is eroding fast, but this is the symptom not the 
source of the problem (Luomi 2012).  Russell agrees a sudden drop in demand 
or a sustained drop in price will negatively affect the Gulf States’ abilities to 
continue their environmental adaptation and mitigation efforts (2009).  It is 
assumed that by the time climate change effects are felt in the next decades, 
hydrocarbon rents could be on the decline for the GCC states due to depletion 
of their reserves or a move way from fossil fuels by their current customers 
(Kumetat 2009).  However, this does not recognise the increasing hydrocarbon 
trade taking place with Asian countries who could easily take up any slack 
demand, caused by Western moves towards cleaner technologies, and thus 
maintain rents.  However, the uncertainties of international trading 
interdependencies would suggest there is a potentially strong nexus between 
environmental sustainability, internal stability and the maintenance of regime 
and national security, which could be seriously threatened by international 
climate change agreements, unless the monarchies take the necessary 
mitigation measures before their revenues are seriously affected.   
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Barnett and Dessai say it was thought a carbon tax would be the only way to 
reduce emissions to the levels in the timeframe demanded by the Kyoto 
Protocol and this tax would raise the cost of oil and associated products in 
developed countries and so reduce demand.  In theory if tax is used in this way 
it increases the ‘rent’ governments in energy importing countries have in the oil 
market and effectively transfers wealth from producers to consumers.  Perhaps 
understandably the OPEC countries were opposed to any significant reductions 
in revenues and demanded mitigation measures, but also demanded progress 
on such negotiations should take place at the same rate as another Article 4.8 
clause which looks at the effect of mitigating the effects of climate change on 
such places as small island developing states (SIDS) and LDCs.  The effect of 
this has been that OPEC has also obstructed the adaptation needs of all 
developing countries including those prone to natural disasters, drought, 
desertification and fragile ecosystems etc.  Most of the countries of the 
G77/China fall into this category, but they support OPEC’s stance with the 
direct consequence that they lose potential funding and technology to assist 
with adaptation (2002).  While this support for the much richer OPEC countries 
may seem counterintuitive, it perhaps reflects a more fundamental issue than 
climate change i.e. the political polarisation that exists between the developed 
world and the developing.  The latter feel excluded from wealth and resources 
and see OPEC’s stance as a means of making the former pay more than 
otherwise would be the case.   
All the GCC countries ratified the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) between 1994 and 1996, and Qatar and the UAE ratified 
the Kyoto Protocol in 2005 with Bahrain ratifying the Protocol the following 
year.  All the GCC member states have created administrative capacities 
dealing with climate change issues, e.g. the Public Commission for the 
Protection of Marine Resources, Environment and Wildlife in Bahrain, the 
Supreme National Council for the Environment and Natural Reserves in Qatar 
and the Federal Environment Agency and the Ministry of Environment and 
Water Resources in the UAE.  However, they often suffer from weak capacity 
and low levels of influence on domestic policy (Reiche 2010). 
Ulrichsen believes the political economies of the oil monarchies render them 
vulnerable to any shifts in demand for, or perceptions of, fossil fuels.  In a 
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climate-stressed world, where alternative and renewable forms of energy 
assume greater importance, it is therefore in their interests to take proactive 
steps to shape the regulatory forms of global energy governance that emerge 
(2010).  Unfortunately, their stance has been regressive and obstructionist, 
almost denial of the need for a change of policies, rather than progressive and 
proactive by taking the opportunity to lead the way in the development of 
alternative and renewable sources of clean energy.  Ulrichsen confirms this 
stating that with the exception of Oman, the GCC states developed a reputation 
for obstructionism at successive rounds of climate change negotiations.  They 
focus on what they see as the negative economic aspects of a climate-changed 
world, rather than focusing on the impacts of climate change itself.  Within the 
Gulf States, low public awareness of adaptation and mitigation strategies is 
underpinned by political and institutional policies that support the unsustainable 
and environmentally destructive use of their natural resources (Ulrichsen 2010).  
This opposition has generally been led by the Saudi delegation to the 
UNFCCC. 
3.5. Climate as Threat 
The effects of climate change could cause massive destabilisation to the fragile 
economies and states of North and East Africa leading potentially to violent 
conflict and mass migration.  For example, in Egypt a possible increase in 
average temperature of 3-4°C would raise sea levels by one metre and 
displace up to six million people (Kumetat 2009).  However, Lewis (2013) says 
few climate security scenarios have been developed to date, but all those 
included in her research come to very similar conclusions despite the 
differences and variations of conditions in each country, differing regional 
effects of climate change and responses to those effects.  She contends 
scenario planning is used to study the implications of a range of plausible 
futures, without assigning probabilities or being overly constrained by 
uncertainty.  Thus they can be used as a decision support tool or as a means of 
understanding interdependencies, causes and effects.  She believes isolating 
climate change from other changes or events is impossible and probably not 
very valuable for policy makers, stating climate security scenarios are unusual 
because they combine natural and social science inputs to reach conclusions 
(2013).  However, it is worth noting that, like many other modelling and 
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simulation tools, a climate security model can only be as good as the 
assumptions that underpin it and the quality of the data entered.  Care must be 
taken to critically analyse any results obtained and to test them for effects of 
bias at the input stage. 
Climate change is regarded as a threat multiplier in the West, and the Middle 
East is considered to be one of the regions in the world most vulnerable to 
climate change.  The Gulf monarchies’ vulnerability is a result of their already 
hot, desert-like climate and their concentration of population and infrastructure 
in low-lying coastal areas (Luomi 2012).  Furthermore, many analysts believe 
climate change will ‘trigger, amplify or perpetuate’ humanitarian crises, 
displacement, extremism and violent conflict in the same regions where most 
peace-building takes place (Matthew 2013:1).  South Asia, the Middle East and 
Sub-Saharan Africa are more vulnerable to the impacts of climate change than 
other parts of the world because of geographical location, poverty, poor 
infrastructure and inadequate or under-developed governance.  These regions 
face the possibility of increased frequency of extreme weather events such as 
drought, floods, storms and heat waves (Matthew 2013).  These are, of course, 
the inherently unstable places on the planet  which suggests that while climate 
change is a contributing factor, there are also many other pre-existing issues 
which are the main cause of instability, similar to the root causes  theory 
proposed in terrorism literature46&47.  This implies climate change will not help 
an already poor situation, but begs the question as to whether, of itself, it would 
cause a situation to become unstable. 
Matthew believes isolating climate change as a driver of violent conflict or other 
instability effects is not straightforward, but it is likely it plays some role, 
although he says there is a lack of empirical evidence in academic literature to 
prove this (2013).  Meanwhile, Lewis’s review shows common key threats 
across almost all the scenarios she examined.  These include food security, 
access to water and weather related disasters, which in turn affect economic 
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prosperity, migration and energy security, which in combination increase the 
potential for violent conflict (2013).  This analysis suggests an inevitability not 
borne out by other research where places suffering the same combination of 
factors do not descend into violent disorder.  This also mirrors the root causes 
of terrorism debate where identical factors do not necessarily determine 
identical human responses occur. 
Unsustainable agricultural production has resulted in the over-exploitation of 
fossil water on the Arabian Peninsula and depletion of the aquifers.  The 
unilateral draining of shared aquifers could become a source of friction or 
conflict as water scarcity increases.  States that follow a policy of overseas land 
acquisition and agricultural investment, in order to grow their own food, raise 
issues of internal security and sovereignty for Pakistan, Sudan, Egypt and other 
recipient nations.  The attempts to acquire foreign farmland have reshaped the 
GCC states’ international relations policies and also placed them in competition 
for farmland acquisition with China (Ulrichsen 2011). 
3.6. The IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) 2014  
The IPCC states (IPCC 2014) in the Summary for Policymakers that the AR5 
report draws on a substantially larger knowledge-base than has hitherto been 
the case.  Examining relevant scientific, technical and socio-economic 
literature, the IPCC report is more focused on risk than previous reports and 
this can be used to support decision-making in the context of climate change 
and associated issues.  However, the IPCC acknowledges risks and benefits 
may be assessed differently by individual people and societies based on their 
cultural diversity and differing values.  This therefore means international 
agreements on climate change mitigation, such as the Paris agreement, may 
run counter to perceived community or national interests and values in different 
parts of the world.  What is also interesting is that in the description of 
adaptation measures being proposed for each region in the Summary, the 
Middle East/Arabian Peninsula does not get a specific mention.  Africa and 
Asia each have their own chapters in the main report, but the Middle East, 
arguably the geographical, religious and cultural bridge between the two, does 
not sit comfortably in either.  A word search using the terms ‘Middle East’, 
‘Arabian Gulf’ and ‘Arabian Peninsula’ in AR5 Chapter 22, Africa, found only 
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two mentions, both of the Middle East, in the references.  A similar search 
conducted in AR5 Chapter 24, Asia, found only one mention of the Middle East 
in terms of the effects of rising food prices on the urban poor in 2007-8.  
Similarly, only one mention of the UAE was found in this chapter to do with 
avoidance of heat stress amongst outdoor workers and there were no specific 
mentions of Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and Kuwait.  Saudi Arabia achieved only 
two mentions, one in the context of malarial mosquitoes and the other in the 
references.  Rulers and peoples in the Gulf could therefore be forgiven for 
believing they have been largely ignored, while at the same time being targeted 
by internationally agreed decarbonisation policies that will remove their 
hydrocarbon incomes and could fatally undermine the existing ruling bargains.  
While specific findings for the Gulf area are not included, Chapter 21, the 
Regional Context, says West Asia will very likely see an increase in hot days 
with a decrease in cool days more likely than not.  There is a projected likely 
increase in warm nights and a decrease in cool nights, with heat waves and 
warm spells being projected as likely more frequent and longer.  There has 
been an observed increase in heavy precipitation events, but there is an 
inconsistent signal about the future patterns of precipitation, dryness and 
drought.  The Working Group (WG) II Summary for Policymakers notes that in 
presently dry regions drought frequency will likely increase by the end of the 
21st Century and raw water quality will be reduced with risks to the safety of 
drinking water.  They assess with very high confidence that sea level rises will 
lead to submergence, coastal flooding and erosion exacerbated by population 
growth, economic development and urbanisation.  There is also very high 
confidence that heat stress, extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, 
landslides, air pollution, drought and water scarcity will pose risks in urban 
areas for people, assets, economies and ecosystems.  In the already heat-
stressed, low-lying Gulf States, suffering rapid population growth and 
urbanisation, these effects could combine synergistically to overwhelm systems 
of health, welfare and security, creating real problems for the ruling élites as 
their ability to maintain the social contract is eroded by falling oil revenues as a 
result of decarbonisation policies. 
In terms of human security, the Summary says climate change is predicted to 
increase population displacement, but there is low confidence in quantitative 
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projections of changes in mobility due to its complex multi-causal nature.  It 
states that climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflict by 
amplifying well-documented drivers such as poverty and economic shocks.  
Furthermore, there is medium evidence and medium agreement that the 
impacts of climate change on the critical infrastructure and territorial integrity of 
many states are expected to influence national security policies; for example 
rising sea levels which threaten coastlines and shared resources such as 
freshwater and pelagic fish stocks could increase the risk of violent conflict 
between states or communities.  Finally the Summary sees climate change as 
the cause of a reduction in economic growth, which in turn makes poverty 
reduction difficult and reduces food security for the poorest in society.  This 
plays back into the root causes of conflict described above, where increasing 
marginalisation of a segment of the population leads them to resort to violence 
in protest or as a solution. 
Chapter 12 of the WG II report deals with Human Security specifically, which it 
regards as a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is 
protected and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity.  
However, it does not state whose measure of dignity is used as the yardstick, 
ignoring perhaps that cultural diversity can lead to varied perceptions of what 
entails dignity.  However, Chapter 12 says there is high agreement and robust 
evidence that human security will be progressively threatened as the climate 
changes, as a result of the interaction of multiple factors which will combine to 
undermine livelihoods, compromise culture and identity, force migration and 
change the ability of states to provide the conditions necessary for human 
security.  The report says the evidence about the effect of climate change and 
variability on violence is itself contested.  It says there is little evidence about 
direct causality, but the root causes factors combined with climate effects 
become more relevant in increasing the potential for violent conflict.  Poor 
adaptation and mitigation strategies can increase the risk of violence and 
people living in already active conflict zones are particularly vulnerable to 
climate change.  Climate change will therefore pose new challenges to affected 
states in terms of national security and the policies that underpin it, especially 
where infrastructure, territorial integrity and resources are placed under stress. 
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Chapter 12 also states that because of the many and complex links between 
climate change and human security, and the research uncertainties that 
surround the linkages between biophysical effects and social science, highly 
confident statements about the influence of climate change on human security 
are not possible.  However, there is good evidence about many of the discrete 
links in the chain of causality.  Nonetheless, it concludes more interdisciplinary 
research is required because the security of the state directly impinges on 
human security and because it reflects how the state protects its citizens. FAQ 
12.1 is worth quoting directly as an excellent synopsis (Chap 12:24):  
“What are the principal threats to human security from climate change?  
Climate change threatens human security because it undermines 
livelihoods, compromises culture and individual identity, increases 
migration that people would rather have avoided, and because it can 
undermine the ability of states to provide the conditions necessary for 
human security.  Changes in climate may influence some or all of the 
factors at the same time.  Situations of acute insecurity such as famine, 
conflict and socio-political instability almost always emerge from the 
interaction of multiple factors.  For many populations that are already 
socially marginalised, resource dependent and have limited capital 
assets, human security will be progressively undermined as the climate 
changes.”   
The 6th Assessment Report is awaited following the election of the new bureau 
of 34 members in October 201548. 
On a very positive note, at the December 2015 Paris Conference of Parties 
(COP21), 195 countries adopted the first universal, legally binding global 
climate deal49.  The agreement set out a global action plan to avoid dangerous 
climate change by limiting global warming to well below 2°C, preferably to 
1.5°C, as well as ensuring global emissions peak as soon as possible and then 
reduce rapidly thereafter.  The agreement was signed on 22 April 2016 by 175 
countries at the UN Headquarters in New York50, including Bahrain, Qatar and 
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the United Arab Emirates.  Saudi Arabia is the only GCC state not to sign the 
agreement51 which comes into force in 2020. 
3.7. So What? 
As stated above, the Middle East is already suffering from deteriorating water 
quality, rising sea levels, demographic growth, over-extraction of groundwater 
aquifers and their contamination, salination of agricultural land and urban water 
shortages.  Some policy reforms and adaptation have been carried out, 
although under conditions of crisis management rather than prior planning.  As 
water stress and scarcity increase, climate change will impact directly on 
human security and this is intrinsically linked to national security and, therefore, 
regime survival.  Furthermore, in an effort to secure food supplies the Gulf 
States are entering into arrangements with other countries to gain exclusive 
access to the produce of their land.  However, this potentially creates conflict in 
the poorer host countries which could prevent the guaranteed supply of food 
the Gulf States require.  This again undermines the human security of their 
populations, especially the most marginalised, and could lead to the potential 
for violent conflict at home. 
The ruling élites’ prior continued reluctance to move away from hydrocarbon 
dependency has eased and economic diversification into non-hydrocarbons is 
becoming their top priority, albeit to maintain their rentierist regimes.  The 
monarchies may well feel their concerns for the future have been largely 
ignored by the international community, while at the same time they are being 
targeted by decarbonisation policies that will fatally undermine their regimes if 
alternative revenue streams are not exploited.  This could lead to non-
cooperation between the rulers and the West, despite the Paris agreement, as 
they turn towards hydrocarbon markets in Asia to make up any revenue 
shortfalls before sustainable economic diversification is achieved.   
The monarchies therefore face two distinct threats: the direct physical effects of 
climate change on their countries and the second order consequences of the 
physical effects of climate change in the wider region and globally; and the 
potential reduction in hydrocarbon revenues as a result of internationally 
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agreed decarbonisation policies, with the concomitant effect that will have on 
their individual ruling bargains.  The ruling élites therefore require a twin track 
approach to mitigate these threats in the short, medium and long terms.  As the 
physical effects of climate change are being felt in the region now they must 
move quickly to ensure their water, food and energy supplies are sustainable 
for the future to ensure human and national security.  They must also take 
steps to ensure their means of production, other economic activity, agriculture 
and domestic housing are safe from the risk of inundation.  This will require a 
cross-cutting strategy within each state.  It must also be linked to the activities 
of their regional neighbours, to ensure coherence of mitigation strategies and 
the avoidance of misunderstanding as each state attempts to secure its 
sources of supply.  Perhaps more challenging is the second track which will 
require political, economic and social reform.  This will enable the monarchies 
to move away from dependency on hydrocarbon revenues and diversify into 
wider economic activity, involving more of the indigenous population, probably 
in return for more political freedom and access to information.  It is worth noting 
the coincidence of the forecast worst effects of climate change and the 
exhaustion of even Qatar and the UAE’s hydrocarbon reserves in the last 
quarter of the 21st Century.  To have both occurring simultaneously increases 
the demand for early action to create sustainable long-term mitigation 
strategies.  This does not necessarily mean an end to rentierism or the 
monarchies, but probably requires a mix of traditional governance along with 
more transparent and accessible policy-making.  
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4.  BAHRAIN – A Case Study 
 
 
Map 2. Bahrain - http://media.web.britannica.com/eb-media/84/62384-004-E4CF98E4.jpg  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Bahrain was once Dilmun, a major Bronze Age trading hub between 
Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley.  Around 2000 BCE the Indus Valley 
civilization collapsed causing a parallel decline in Dilmun.  Subsequently, little 
is recorded until the archipelago’s inhabitants converted to Islam in the 7th 
Century.   Bahrain was then ruled by Islamic caliphates based in Damascus 
and Baghdad, Persians, Omanis and the Portuguese from 1521 until 1782, 
when the Persians took control for a year before being expelled by the Bani 
Utbah tribe, led by the al-Khalifas who rule Bahrain today (Katzman 2015a; 
Teeple 2002). 
 
During Persian rule, Bahrain was Iran’s fourteenth province.  This still causes 
the Bahrainis anxiety over Iran’s intentions and adversely affects the 
relationship between the Sunni élites and their Shia majority, due to concerns 
about Shia loyalty as they seek religious guidance from Iraqi and Iranian clerics 
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(Kinninmont 2011).  The al-Khalifas’ legitimacy as rulers is disputed as the Shia 
consider they are the true owners of Bahrain.  The Shia are closely linked with 
their co-religionists in eastern Saudi Arabia and both populations are suspected 
by their rulers of supporting Iran.  However, ethnic divisions between Arabs and 
Persians probably outweigh the confessional commonality that exists between 
Iranians and the Saudi and Bahraini Shia (Mabon 2012).   
In 1830 the al-Khalifas signed a treaty establishing Bahrain as a protectorate of 
Britain which dominated the Gulf until 1971. This protected Bahrain from 
external threats, but also prevented it from recapturing land once held on the 
Qatari peninsula (Kinninmont 2011; Teeple 2002).  Just before independence, 
Bahrain’s ruler agreed to lease the former British military facilities to the US 
Navy, effectively changing one protector for another, although the external 
threat had reduced as Iran gave up its claim to Bahrain during the 
independence process (Kinninmont 2011).  In 1970 a UN survey determined 
Bahrain’s inhabitants did not want union with Iran and this was endorsed by UN 
Security Council Resolution 278 and ratified by Iran’s parliament. Nine Gulf 
emirates entered negotiations to form a federation, but Bahrain and Qatar 
decided on independence, which Bahrain declared on 15 August 1971.  The 
USA opened an Embassy immediately afterwards. The seven remaining 
emirates subsequently formed the UAE (Katzman 2015a). 
 
Following its 1979 revolution, Iran restated its claim to Bahrain and accused 
Bahrain’s rulers of abusing its Shia citizens.  Demonstrations and protests 
followed until 1981 when 73 members of the Iranian Front for the Liberation of 
Bahrain were arrested.  Consequently, political opposition was muted for much 
of the 1980s, although émigré opposition groups coalesced around the Bahrain 
Islamic Freedom Movement in Damascus, Tehran and London (Kinninmont 
2011). 
From the 1990s tensions arose around differences in access to resources and 
employment.  Economic deprivation and government discrimination against the 
Shia form the basis for recurrent periods of unrest until today.  Economic 
decline, inequality of oil wealth distribution and a marginalised Shia population 
also concerns the Saudis lest the discontent should spread to their Eastern 
province, accounting for the very high level of support the al-Saud give the al-
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Khalifas and their determination the al-Khalifas should survive at any cost 
(Ulrichsen 2011).  This was amply demonstrated during the 2011 Arab Spring 
risings, which led to the deployment of Saudi and UAE forces into Bahrain 
under PENINSULA SHIELD52. 
Noting national and regime security are habitually conflated by the monarchies, 
the proposition is that good economic security assures national security by 
providing political and social stability through successful delivery of the ruling 
bargain.  This guarantees the future survival of the current governance system 
and the consequent political continuity enables high levels of human security 
and development to be achieved.  There is a resulting feedback loop between 
human security and economic security; a safe and secure population is much 
more likely to be economically productive than not.   
However, Bahrain’s challenges are real: very rapid depletion of its hydrocarbon 
reserves with significant loss of government revenue; direct and indirect effects 
of climate change; and constant political discord emanating from its 
marginalised majority.  Government policies designed to promote sustainable 
economic diversification, strong human security, an engaged civil society, and 
protection of the environment for future generations would indicate the 
monarchy understands its predicament.  Perhaps recognising the seriousness 
of its situation, and coincident with the global economic downturn, Bahrain’s 
vision was published in 2008.  This describes the Kingdom’s strategy for 
dealing with the multiple challenges it faces and is an ideal baseline from which 
to assess Bahrain’s economic transformation, its approach to climate change 
and its appetite for political reform.       
4.2. Bahrain Economic Vision 2030 (BEV2030) 
4.2.1. Word Counts 
A word count exercise was carried out before detailed examination of BEV2030 
to identify obvious areas of emphasis and omission in the document; full results 
are at Appendix 1.  Unsurprisingly, ‘economic’ is by far the most common word, 
achieving 44 mentions not including the footers.    The next highest score at 18 
is ‘environment’, but only five of these refer to the natural environment, the 
majority concern the business or economic environments.  Next at 17 is 
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‘education’, but this is not linked to the word ‘skills’, although ‘skills’ is the 
highest of the single digit counts with nine.  ‘Oil’ appears 15 times and is linked 
with ‘revenues’ on six occasions, while ‘national’ achieves twelve counts but is 
not linked to ‘security’ at any point.  ‘Sustainability’ occurs ten times and 
‘sustainable’ six, but is not linked at any point with ‘technology’ which is 
mentioned only once.  ‘Climate change’ is not mentioned at all, with each word 
scoring only one and three counts respectively; the same is true of ‘human 
development’ with each word scoring three and four counts respectively.   
‘Political reform’ is mentioned once, but there is no mention of ‘national 
security’ or ‘human security’.   
The word count suggests the document is mainly concerned with the economy, 
business and education.  References to climate change are completely absent 
as are mentions of human security and national security.  This could mean all 
three topics are out of scope for the Vision, or the terms do not translate 
directly from Arabic.  While the word count gives indications of the document’s 
emphasis it does not give much more.   
4.2.2. The Background 
BEV2030 is well written and bears the hallmark of a major consultancy’s 
expertise.  It is short at only 22 pages, excluding cover, photo page and closing 
exhortation.  It is concise and easy to read in straightforward language, 
containing many ‘buzzwords’ that would be familiar to those who have attended 
leadership, business and management courses in the West.  The photographs 
of the King, the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince leave the reader in no 
doubt they are reading the rulers’ explicit intent for the future of Bahrain.  With 
this imprimatur the provenance and authority of the document is 
unquestionable. 
The preamble says the Vision had input from a variety of external contributors, 
so it should not suffer accusations of introspection.  It describes how the Vision 
extends to government and society as well as the economy, while being 
founded on the principles of sustainability, competitiveness and fairness.  This 
is significant as it explicitly highlights the importance of sustainability at the 
outset, which is critical to the guaranteed longevity of the Kingdom’s political 
economy.  The ability to compete globally is also fundamental to Bahrain’s 
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economic success, so it is unsurprising ‘competitiveness’ should be on a par 
with ‘sustainability’.  However, it also implies, through using ‘fairness’ in the 
same sentence as ‘society’, that all sectors of the population will be treated 
equally.  However, this is not the general experience of the Shia, especially 
since 2011, due to lack of political reform, their economic marginalisation and 
harsh repression by Bahraini security services.  It continues that collaboration 
will take place across the spectrum of national life to achieve the Vision’s 
aspirations through a whole of government approach.  However, it cites the 
participants as the legislative body, which is essentially toothless, civil society, 
which is severely restricted in its permitted activities, and the private sector 
which is attempting to take up slack caused by reduction of hydrocarbon 
revenues.  So, while the preamble appears to be a worthy statement of intent, it 
actually ignores the reality for many outside the circle of the ruling élite. 
There follows a quasi mission statement explicitly talking of Bahrain’s intent to 
move away from oil dependency towards a more diversified and productive 
economy, driven by the private sector and able to compete globally.  Yet, this 
says the economy will be shaped by the government, suggesting that 
centralised, directed economic development may be the only reform allowable.  
It further states the aspiration to create a broad middle-class with a good 
standard of living and high wages, made possible by increased productivity.  
This is noteworthy as it will require the workforce to be educated and trained 
sufficiently to take on these new jobs, as well as having the desire to do 
economically productive work in the private sector.  Given that around 70 
percent of Bahrain’s population is Shia, it is implicit they must be well 
represented within the new middle-class if that is to be achieved.  However, 
experience since the 2011 uprising, and Saudi interest in ensuring a Shia 
power-base does not appear close to their Eastern border, suggests the 
creation of this new middle-class is still some way off.  This section concludes 
that the principles of sustainability, competitiveness and fairness apply to the 
government and society, ensuring every citizen can live a secure and 
meaningful life and achieve their potential.  In 2008 this was an explicit 
declaration of the intent to guarantee and improve levels of human security, 
although this appears to have stalled as a result of the Arab Spring uprisings. 
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Resurgent oil prices were critical to Bahrain’s economic improvement in the five 
years before 2008, according to the introduction, along with FDI flows that 
increased by 550 percent in 2003-6.  It is claimed this improved living 
standards, with adult life expectancy up from 68 to 75 years and infant mortality 
down from 23 to fewer than ten deaths per thousand.  The introduction 
declares the aim of achieving a fairer and more prosperous society through 
increased global competitiveness, resulting in higher levels of employment and 
wages and a safe and secure environment; yet another indication of serious 
intent to improve Bahrain’s human security.   
4.2.3. The Aim of BEV2030 
This is reinforced by the Vision’s declaration that the ultimate aim is to at least 
double the disposable income of every Bahraini family in real terms by 2030.  
However, there is no mention of political or social reform, or the need for 
climate change mitigation; all effort appears to be focused on perpetuating the 
current political model based on the social contract between the monarchy and 
its citizens. Admittedly it is implied that the benefits of redistributive practices 
will give way to higher earnings as a result of productive work in the private 
sector, albeit a sector that appears destined to be under some form of 
government direction.  Arguably this is a continuation of rentierism with 
government funding provided by third parties, in exchange for official 
permission to trade and a supply of citizens prepared to carry out productive 
work.  This is reiterated in the final paragraph exhorting the private sector and 
civil society to work with government to enable better living standards through 
higher productivity and wages.  The inference is that the government intends 
very much to remain in control of the national economy. 
4.2.4. The National Context 
BEV2030’s section on the need for coordinated reforms is split into the 
national, regional and global contexts.  The national reforms focus on improving 
education and skills and the creation of well paid private sector jobs for citizens.  
It recognises that many Bahrainis with university degrees are unable to find 
work appropriate to their level of education.  However, there is also recognition 
that many citizens lack the qualifications necessary to do the medium to high 
wage jobs that already exist, or are being created in the private sector, because 
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the education system does not provide citizens with the skills and knowledge 
needed to do these jobs.  Noting the solution has been to provide well-paid 
public sector jobs funded by hydrocarbon revenues, it accepts the public sector 
is too big and unsustainable, given declining oil reserves will lead to revenue 
reductions.  The national section concludes the only sustainable way forward is 
through transformation of the economy, driven by a dynamic private sector 
engaged in high net-worth activities, providing attractive employment to its 
citizens.   
Implicitly, quality jobs currently done by expatriates will in future be done by 
Bahrainis, leading to a reduction in dependency on foreign labour.  What is 
notable by omission from the reform agenda is any mention of political or social 
reform.  Apparently the government assumes the economy can be transformed 
in isolation of other aspects of societal activity.  Perhaps the élite hopes the 
ruling bargain will be sustained by the availability of better jobs and wages in 
the private sector.  However, this ignores the possibility that widespread better 
education may well lead to demands for greater political involvement in the 
state’s affairs, calls for more transparency regarding the nation’s economic 
activities, and the creation of a civil society unwilling to be directed by the 
monarchy.  A different issue not addressed is the cultural change necessary to 
persuade people traditionally occupying under-employed public sector posts to 
transfer into private sector appointments, where they will have to work for their 
money.  Rejection of this change could cause failure of the economic reforms.   
Finally, there is no suggestion how this will be achieved in practice, although 
earlier parts of BEV2030 suggested it will be centrally directed through the 
cross-cutting National Strategy.  However, such a document appears to be 
unavailable through internet searches, but the Bahrain Economic Development 
Board53 (BEDB), chaired by the Crown Prince, appears to have a significant 
role to play.  According to its website, the BEDB is a ‘dynamic public agency 
with overall responsibility for attracting inward investment into Bahrain and 
supporting initiatives that help enhance the investment climate in the country’.  
Again this supports the notion that transformation is focused on the economy to 
the exclusion of other areas of public life and reflects the centrally directed 
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nature of that economic transformation.  Further examination of the BEDB 
website led to the Bahrain National Economic Strategy54, but as the name 
suggests this is focused totally on the economy and is more of a public 
relations briefing than a plan of how the Vision will be executed. 
4.2.5. The Regional Context 
The section on the regional context driving Bahraini reforms gives an optimistic 
impression of the Kingdom.  Under the heading ‘An exceedingly favourable 
business environment’ there is a statement about the advantageous taxation 
system that exists for those wishing to do business in Bahrain, or to base their 
businesses there.  However, there is nothing about how this might change in 
the future as oil revenues decline and the state demands more in taxation in 
order to provide the services its population requires.  This inconvenient 
possibility is ignored throughout the Vision.  The next heading ‘A progressive 
stable government’ emphasises strong rule of law and stability, and claims 
Bahrain is inclusive, cohesive and supports ambitious programmes aimed at 
economic and social change through enacted political reforms.  It talks about a 
commitment to democracy and openness that has preserved the all-of-one-
family spirit.  This was patently untrue at the time the Vision was written, given 
the long history of stifled democracy, and has become worse with the 
subsequent repression of the Shia since 2011.  The final heading in this section 
‘An ambitious multicultural society’ extols the welcome awaiting foreigners 
wishing to do business in Bahrain and describes its population as diverse and 
living and working together peacefully.  Again, this is another piece of wishful 
thinking unsupported by the facts of history.  This part concludes reforms need 
to be accelerated to capitalise on opportunities, despite not having previously 
identified what these reforms may be. 
4.2.6. The Global Context 
The Vision’s global context begins significantly by stating reliance on cheap 
expatriate labour to provide a competitive edge is unsustainable, because other 
parts of the world manufacture the same products more cheaply.  This 
indicates the move of employment away from expatriates to citizens, although 
there is no suggestion roles will be the same.  Instead, it appears the aim is to 
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reappraise Bahrain’s place in the global value chain and replace manufacturing 
with higher yield productivity, perhaps financial services, which would be more 
palatable work for citizens to do.  BEV2030 recognises Bahrain must increase 
its levels of innovation and productiveness if it is to compete globally.  Logically 
it concludes this will require the workforce to be equipped with the right skills to 
achieve improvements, which is an important recognition of the requirement to 
prepare its citizens to diversify into other areas of revenue generation, in order 
to sustain the Kingdom’s economic viability on the global stage. 
4.2.7. Guiding Principles 
The Vision’s next section describes its guiding principles: Sustainability, 
Competitiveness and Fairness.  It claims these have been derived from 
consultation with the whole of society, informed by internationally recognised 
best practice, which has confirmed the three principles are correct and must be 
weighted equally in effort.  ‘Sustainability’ recognises the government’s 
redistributive practices are not viable in the longer term and the private sector 
must take on the burden of creating wealth for the nation.  In future the 
government will stick to a stable, financially sustainable model and will invest in 
the Kingdom’s human capital through education and training, particularly in the 
applied sciences.  It concludes innovation and entrepreneurial skills will be vital 
to economic sustainability, but the environment must also be protected at all 
costs, along with the long term well-being of the population and the nation’s 
cultural heritage.  This is, arguably, the most important and ‘visionary’ part of 
the document so far.  It identifies the need to move away from a rentier political 
economy; the need to diversify the economy to create wealth; the need to 
educate and train the population to do the jobs required in the future; the 
requirement that human security must be assured; and the importance of 
preserving the quality of the environment in which everyone must live.  While it 
is long on intentions and has no detail how they will be achieved, it is a worthy 
aspiration to have as one of the three guiding principles.  Some of this carries 
over into the ‘Competitiveness’ section, where constantly increasing 
productivity with appropriately skilled and educated workers is firmly in the 
forefront.  Having said in the global context low-skilled expatriates will be 
reduced in numbers, this section identifies the continuing need for expatriates 
who have skills lacking amongst the population, although it is fair to assume 
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this should be a temporary solution until citizens have reached the required 
skills levels.  The explicit aim is to make Bahrain the location of choice for 
business by providing good public services, infrastructure and living conditions, 
again reinforcing the commitment to modernise and diversify the state.  The 
last principle, ‘Fairness’, is the one most open to scepticism.  It starts by stating 
the need for a broad base of prosperity and the transparency of all 
transactions, including private and public activities and land sales.  It 
emphasises the role of government in providing the legal and regulatory 
framework, preventing corruption and ensuring laws are enforced justly.  It 
further declares all must be treated equally in law and in accordance with 
international human rights, with equal access to health, education and welfare 
services provided by the state.  These are laudable statements, probably 
designed for external consumption, but again not borne out by the Shias’ 
experience.  
4.2.8. Aspirations 
4.2.8.1. Economy  
BEV2030’s final section is concerned with establishing aspirations for the 
economy, government and society.  At first glance each of these ‘dimensions’ is 
given equal weight, although society is the longest and the last substantive part 
of the document.  The economy dimension is founded on three interrelated 
aspirations: growth through increased productivity and skills; diversification into 
existing potentially high-value sectors; and longer-term transformation focused 
on seizing opportunities.  The first aspiration, productivity and skills, describes 
an intention to shift from low-wage expatriates to high-wage Bahrainis who 
have become employees of choice for high-value companies.  The Vision 
specifically identifies the success of the financial sector, in terms of productivity 
and salaries, as the benchmark for all other sectors to follow.  Importantly, the 
government has four actions it must carry out to enable this: leadership through 
improved governance and management of state-owned companies; provision 
of incentives to promote private sector activity; deregulation of Bahrain’s 
domestic markets to allow in examples of innovation and best practice; and 
attracting FDI into Bahrain as a financial driver.  The aim is to create better jobs 
for Bahraini citizens through sustainable economic growth, leading to a bigger 
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middle class with a better quality of life.  It claims economic growth will be 
distributed fairly and the government will monitor this to ensure all segments of 
society benefit.  Immigration and employment laws will be reformed to enable 
fairer access to jobs for citizens supported through lifelong training.  The 
success of this aspiration will be measured through increased GDP, FDI, 
productivity, citizen employment levels and the number of citizens engaged in 
medium to high-paid jobs.  There is certainly much evidence here of an 
intention to diversify the economy, improve education and skills among 
Bahrainis and move away from expatriate labour.  Again, there is recognition of 
the need to create a fairer society with a larger middle-class and generally 
better standards of living.  All of these support the notion of improved human 
security for Bahraini nationals.  However, if the bulk of national revenue is to be 
created through the private sector, it follows rentierism may have to cease as 
the national governance model; what is lacking is any detail of future taxation 
arrangements needed to ensure the government can supply the education, 
health and other services a modern functioning state requires. 
The second aspiration for the economy concerns diversification into high-value 
sectors, already covered in some detail by the first aspiration.  However, of 
particular note is the stated intent to strengthen the non-oil GDP sector, 
principally through a move into the financial services sector regarded as 
Bahrain’s future economic priority.  The reduction of dependence on oil will be 
based upon attracting FDI and developing tourism, business services, 
manufacturing and logistics, as well as financial services, to create a strong 
diversified and globally competitive economy.  Success will be measured in 
terms of increased GDP and employment levels in high-potential sectors.  It is 
encouraging the ruling élite publicly acknowledges a move from oil dependency 
is required, but it is arguable this is the result of force majeure and would not 
have occurred had hydrocarbon reserves been plentiful.  However, to its credit 
the government is pointing towards sectors it wishes to expand and, according 
to its website, the BEDB will be working to encourage training and FDI. 
The final economy aspiration is focused on taking opportunities as they arise, 
specifically in the knowledge-based sector and by increasing the productivity of 
high-value goods and services.  Success depends upon a partnership between 
government and the private sector, where the former will be responsible for 
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creating the right economic and regulatory conditions to allow growth of 
indigenous and foreign companies, encourage entrepreneurial activity and 
innovation, and help companies get innovative products to global markets.  
Again, success will be confirmed by increased GDP and employment levels.  
Essentially, this aspiration is an extension of the first two and is concerned with 
diversification, productivity and jobs.  Implicitly it reinforces the intention to 
move away from oil dependency and increase the numbers of highly paid jobs 
for citizens.  However, although all three aspirations show coherence running 
through the whole dimension, there is a lack of strategic detail about how the 
aspirations are to be achieved.  This may be a cultural issue as perhaps the 
King, Prime Minister and Crown Prince see no obligation to explain to their 
citizens how it would be enacted, or it may be that when the Vision was 
published the strategies were still being formulated.   
Certainly the National Economic Strategy referred to above expected a range 
of strategies to be in-place by 2014.  This appears to have started well.  In 
2011 the BEDB published its annual report (BEDB 2011) announcing the start 
of the second National Economic Strategy 2011-2014 and including an 
operations review.  This confirmed that the National Higher Education Strategy 
had been published in 2010; an Agenda for Schools, with associated literacy 
and numeracy strategies, a Healthcare Agenda and a Housing Strategy were 
all published in 2011.  It also listed the various legal and governance reforms 
relating to business, the economy, investment and other regulations achieved 
by the end of the first National Economic Strategy in 2011.  Unfortunately, the 
BEDB has not published a strategic report since 201155, so there is no official 
recognition of progress since then.  However, the national labour fund, 
Tamkeen, has published its strategy for 2015-2017. This has specific aims of 
strengthening the economy, boosting labour efficiency and increasing 
employability of citizens through training and education.  Tamkeen’s target is 
the private sector and Bahraini individuals, but not the public sector, social 
societies or NGOs (Tamkeen 2015-2017).  This is consistent with the 
government’s intention to move the emphasis from public to private sector jobs.   
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4.2.8.2. Government 
The second dimension is about efficient and effective government and has five 
interdependent aspirations.  The Vision recognises the need to look forward 
and create high quality national policies across the spectrum of modern state 
activity, including the environment, security and social justice, as well as the 
economy, health and education.  Out-sourcing of some government activities 
and public-private partnerships was forecast, as was the need to ensure 
privatisation was conducted within an effective regulatory framework including 
rigorous supervision after the event.  Higher rankings within the World Bank’s 
league tables for efficiency and accountability would demonstrate success.  
This is all laudable and unsurprising, reflecting a recognition by the monarchy 
that modernisation of the state was required if Bahrain was to have the role it 
desired in an increasingly globalised world.  Seeking the approval of the World 
Bank is a public expression of the commitment to do better. 
The second aspiration is a strong indicator of the desire to move away from 
rentierism, as it focuses on increasing government efficiency through 
restructuring and reducing public sector employment.  It highlights the need to 
remove inefficiency and duplication while increasing productivity through the 
delivery of high quality services.  It aimed to improve human resources 
management, strengthen governance, improve transparency and introduce 
performance related pay for public sector employees.  Again, the World Bank’s 
ranking of the reformed public sector would be a measure of success as would 
the proportion of GDP spent on it.  This tells Bahrainis the days of redistributive 
practice are over and citizens should expect to work hard in the private and 
public sectors and be rewarded according to their performance.  This will 
require a significant cultural shift for those who have grown up with an 
expectation of almost unconditional entitlement. 
A predictable, transparent and fair regulatory system promoting economic 
growth is the third aspiration for government.  This is further recognition that if 
Bahrain wants to be a global trader it must offer the same legal protections and 
freedoms available elsewhere in the international markets, especially 
competition law.  BEV2030 recognises fairness and openness are necessary to 
attract FDI, as are consistency of regulation, improved enforcement and 
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consequence management, zero-tolerance of corruption and favouritism, and 
how quickly the legal process can resolve disputes.  The World Bank’s 
approval is again the desired benchmark.  This is unsurprising and the logic is 
infallible.  If Bahrain is to have a credible economic future it must operate in a 
way consistent with international norms.  The legal reforms, detailed in the 
BEDB operations review (BEDB 2011), demonstrate the government’s 
commitment to this. 
The fourth aspiration is another statement of intent to move away from an oil-
based rentier political economy, although it could be argued there is no choice 
as hydrocarbon reserves are close to depletion.  The recognition of the need 
for a sustainable financial model effectively underpins the whole of BEV2030, 
but is explicitly stated here.  Most interestingly it identifies the need to remove 
subsidies on water, gasoline, electricity and food from all but the most needy, to 
reduce government costs and overconsumption.  Here the bulk of the 
population is being given notice they will have to pay for what they use at a 
market rate.  Yet there is no mention of taxes, perhaps because it says oil 
revenues will be used to benefit future generations through provision of 
education, healthcare and a better living and working environment.  The 
measure of success will be government expenditures balanced by government 
revenues, something rarely achieved in developed countries, but it omits to 
suggest taxation could be a vital source of government revenue, if Bahrain 
does not want to become dependent on borrowing. 
The government dimension’s final aspiration is that Bahrain should be linked to 
the global economy by world-class information technology by 2030, using 
public and private sector money to build and run the infrastructure.  This will 
improve effective transport links, ensure access to electricity, water and gas, 
and provide logistics and telecommunications services, all at competitive 
prices.  Improved land use planning processes and increased private sector 
participation in major infrastructure projects will be vital.  Success will be 
gauged by Bahrain’s position in the World Economic Forum’s infrastructure 
ranking.  This aspiration is also unsurprising and logical.  What is notable about 
all five aspirations seen together is the explicit recognition that reform of 
governance structures is required, involving a move from hydrocarbon 
dependency, a reduction in the public sector with an associated increase in 
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efficiency, deregulation where it will ease the flow of business, but with 
appropriate supervisory processes in place, and a modernisation of the 
systems, infrastructure and processes of the state.  Obviously the need for 
guaranteed access to water, electricity and gas is critical for Bahrain’s national 
and human security, as are food supplies although that is not mentioned.  What 
is glaringly omitted is any suggestion reforms will be accompanied by greater 
political freedom or participation for the bulk of the population; this is potentially 
the Vision’s Achilles heel, especially if income, purchase or corporation taxes 
are necessary to sustain the government’s future income, and could lead to 
political discontent founded on the spirit of ‘no taxation without 
representation’56. 
4.2.8.3. Society 
The Vision’s third and final dimension is a just, thriving society and has five 
aspirations.  The first is Bahrain has high standards of social assistance placing 
all citizens on an equal footing; this implies Shia and Sunni alike.  Explicitly it 
describes a future where meritocracy rules and there is equal opportunity for all 
Bahrainis.  Specific focus is placed upon ensuring the most needy have the 
housing support and subsidies they need, and the education system brings out 
the full potential of talented youth, while encouraging private philanthropy and 
other charitable support.  Success will be measured by the number of 
households earning above the national minimum income.  Thus it appears in 
2008 there was a genuine intention to create a fairer and more inclusive 
society, while improving educational and living standards.  However, the reality 
is far from the Vision for the ordinary Shia, especially after 2011. 
Access to quality healthcare for all Bahraini nationals and residents is the 
second aspiration.  This is notable as the first explicit mention of non-national 
residents benefiting from other than improved access to Bahrain’s markets and 
wider economy.  It foresees a mix of private and public healthcare facilities 
offering choice, recognised as meeting high quality international standards, and 
becoming a sustainable regional centre of modern medical practice.  Noting the 
dual pressures of a growing and aging population, it describes how government 
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will promote healthy lifestyles, provide easy access to healthcare, ensure 
oversight through a regulator, attract and retain high-calibre healthcare 
professionals, and nurture best practice.  Success will be demonstrated 
through life expectancy and performance indicators laid down by the regulator.  
This is entirely consistent with what is expected of a modern developed state 
and reflects a key aspect of improved human security through reducing the 
potential for premature death or morbidity.  Its accessibility by residents as well 
as citizens shows a realisation that the health of expatriate workers is vital to 
Bahrain’s economic success and security, and may also reflect a natural desire 
to prevent disease spreading from unhealthy migrant workers to citizens.  While 
it does not reiterate that low-skilled expatriates will be significantly reduced in 
favour of fewer, highly educated migrants filling Bahraini shortfalls, it is 
probable the government expects the healthcare burden of residents to reduce 
over the years until 2030.  Whatever the motivation, it is a positive aspiration in 
support of both national and human security objectives. 
The intention of creating a first class education system is the third aspiration 
and recognises the need to educate and train citizens to be the leaders, 
entrepreneurs and employees of the future.  Education appropriate to the 
Kingdom’s and individuals’ future needs will be available to all citizens based 
on ability and merit, and achieved by a strategy focused on universities, 
schools and vocational training.  This will concentrate on developing teachers, 
providing high quality training in relevant applied and advanced skills, setting 
standards and oversight mechanisms, and encouraging research and 
development (R&D) in universities, creating the foundation for a knowledge-
based economy.  Independent assessments of educational establishments, 
achievement of international standards, and exam results will be used to 
assess progress.  Raising citizens’ education and skills is a consistent theme 
throughout BEV2030, confirming acceptance that without major improvement 
Bahrain will be unable to diversify and compete successfully in such areas as 
financial services and knowledge-based industries. 
The fourth aspiration is one of the least detailed in BEV2030, but is arguably 
critical to its success as it deals with safety and security.  This lack of detail 
probably reflects a degree of uncertainty as to how the future would develop, 
given prior unrest and security concerns since the 1994 ‘Bahrain Intifada’.  Or it 
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is indicative of a culture of secrecy concerning security in the Kingdom; most 
likely it is a combination of both.  Predictably it states the intention to establish 
an integrated security strategy.  This will counter all risks, threats, crime and 
vulnerabilities through technology, modern police services and community 
policing, plus an increased awareness of the need for crime prevention.  This 
conveys the very strong impression that security is solely the government’s 
business and not for public discussion.  The heavy-handed response in 2011 
and subsequent harsh repression of Shia communities certainly reinforce the 
view little modernisation has taken place within the security services and 
sophistication is lacking at the highest levels when dealing with a discontented 
majority.  Nearly eight years after BEV2030’s publication it is difficult to see any 
sign of political reform that will remove the root causes of grievance stemming 
from perceived political, economic and social marginalisation.  Arguably the 
failure to understand the importance of getting this right could undermine the 
entire Vision, by creating conditions where revolt permanently simmers below 
the surface and deters foreign investors from crossing Bahrain’s shores. 
The Social dimension’s final aspiration aims to ensure a sustainable and 
attractive living environment for all citizens and residents.  A sceptic could say 
this is the ideal way to conclude BEV2030 as it focuses on climate change 
mitigation and environmental sustainability, while being positive, uplifting and 
demonstrably aimed at making Bahrain a better place in which to live.  All of 
this is good strategic messaging at the international level.   Stressing the rich 
and ancient culture of Bahrain, BEV2030 says this will be delivered through: 
conservation of natural spaces; implementation of energy efficiency measures; 
and directing investment towards technologies that reduce carbon emissions, 
minimise pollution and provide sustainable energy.  This is all highly 
commendable in terms of the international climate change agenda and is the 
first and only recognition within BEV2030 that investment in alternative energy 
technologies will be required to achieve environmental protection and mitigate 
further climate change effects, which already threaten 15 kilometres of 
coastline.  These measures will deliver a greater number of attractive public 
areas; provide modern sporting and cultural facilities; enforce laws on cultural 
preservation; make archaeological and Islamic sites a greater part of the 
cultural landscape; and encourage future generations to understand more 
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about the heritage and culture of Bahrain.  This all suggests the Bahrain of the 
future will be a better place to live, but also implicitly reinforces the notion of 
Bahraini nationhood through concentration on culture, history and heritage.  
This emphasis on national identity could be seen as promoting pride in the 
Kingdom and creating an all-of-one-family spirit among the population, Shia 
and Sunni alike.  However, any mention of political reform is notable by its 
absence, leaving the perception that the rulers appear to believe society can be 
kept happy and quiet by providing a pleasant environment in which to live and 
work.  This probably reflects a traditional rentier view of governance where 
population contentment is maintained through redistributive practices, but is 
naïve in expecting that with a history of severe social unrest the majority Shia 
will be placated by a few parks, gyms and museums.   It is claimed success will 
be measured through Bahrain’s ranking in the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 
Liveability Index and also by levels of air and water pollution around the 
Kingdom.  More likely, success will be calculated by the international 
community’s impression of social cohesion, stability and adherence to the rule 
of law by both the people and the security forces. 
4.2.9. Achieving the Vision 
Understandably, analysis of BEV2030 identifies priority for reform lies almost 
exclusively within the economic sector.  Sustainability and competitiveness are 
regarded as vital to the long-term viability of Bahrain within the global economy, 
but there are repeated inferences that the monarchy intends to retain its strong 
grip on the country and direct the future economic reforms, mainly through the 
BEDB.  Despite fairness being a guiding principle, there is little sign in the 
Vision of an intention to conduct future political or social reform, while there is 
strong external evidence life has got worse for the Shia who continue to 
experience marginalisation in the political, social and economic spheres of life.   
In pursuing economic reform to the apparent exclusion of many other areas, 
there is a stated intention to reduce the number of low-skilled expatriate 
workers and increase the number of Bahrainis employed in good private sector 
jobs.  However, the move of citizens from a bloated and unsustainable public 
sector into productive work will require an improved strategy for education and 
skills; this is a constant and important theme throughout the document.  
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Similarly, human security is a real concern for the rulers who intend to improve 
it significantly, but national security is not discussed substantively.  Experience 
over the last twenty years shows the Shia do not get a good deal on either.     
It is clear the monarchy recognises redistributive practices cannot continue and 
a move away from oil dependency is vital, but vestiges of a rentierist mindset 
appear to persist, albeit with the private sector taking up the funding gap.  
Innovation, entrepreneurship and environmental protection are key 
characteristics of the future economy, with diversification into financial services 
and knowledge-based industries leading the way.  As part of this 
transformation, subsidies will be removed from all but the neediest, healthcare 
will be improved and climate change mitigation and alternative technologies will 
be adopted.  However, the prospect of taxes to pay for future government 
services is not mentioned.  Perhaps it is hoped FDI, the residue of oil revenues, 
and income from sovereign wealth funds will pay for these, but the long-term 
sustainability of that arrangement may be questionable. Nor is international 
collaboration mentioned in any way, although it is assumed Bahrain will remain 
an integral part of the GCC.   
Without doubt BEV2030 is well crafted and demonstrates awareness at the 
very highest levels that change is necessary.  It is debatable whether this 
change would be considered if Bahrain had levels of hydrocarbon reserves like 
Qatar or the UAE, but, facing the unsustainability of Bahrain’s political 
economy, the monarchy has taken a bold step in defining a realistic vision 
through its guiding principles, dimensions and aspirations.  The next stage is to 
examine whether the strategies supporting the Vision are being executed 
effectively.  
4.3. Evidence of Transformation 
4.3.1. The Significance of Climate Change 
There appears to be little published in the public domain by the Government of 
Bahrain about its climate change concerns and challenges, or its mitigation 
strategies.  Having failed to obtain cooperation in my research from the 
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government57, or to discover any significant national policy documents or other 
official commentary during internet searches, I approached the Tyndall Centre 
for Climate Change Research at the University of East Anglia for assistance.  
The Tyndall Centre is a leading authority on climate change effects.  
Unfortunately they suffer from the same limitations in trying to obtain insight 
into official policy on climate change in Bahrain and commented that ‘this 
region is not known for openness and transparency’58.  A search of the 
Kingdom’s official website on climate change issues59 revealed large amounts 
of data for many places, but nothing on Bahrain.  A climate change conference 
held at the Arabian Gulf University in May 201560 included mention of the 
Government Action Plan for 2015-1861, but while this has an environmental 
perspective, it is far more concerned with economic development and 
diversification issues.  The plan does not appear to be available in the public 
domain, although a synopsis is available from the Citizens for Bahrain 
website62, which appears to be an official or officially condoned outlet. This 
confirmed the chances of finding a single, major official policy document 
describing Bahrain’s climate change mitigation plans were unlikely, although 
there are some very limited references to climate change in other documents. 
According to the BEDB, climate change challenges and volatility of agricultural 
supply and prices make food security a high priority in Bahrain’s development 
agenda (BEDB 2014a).   Arable land and fisheries degradation has reduced the 
capacity for local production, while global climate change and natural disasters 
have prompted many food exporters to consider export bans to guarantee local 
supply. This makes importing food more difficult due to growth in the global 
population increasing competition and could lead to changes in agricultural 
production trends as local and regional markets sensibly try to establish self-
sufficiency.  Water and land scarcity account for the limited capacity of 
Bahrain’s agricultural sector, which also suffers from low productivity (BEDB 
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2014a).  With insufficient land and water resources Bahrain is unable to 
produce enough food for its growing population, so faces a major problem if 
climate change is as bad as some models predict, especially in terms of 
territorial loss and because  productivity is lower than it should be.  It will 
therefore need to look overseas to guarantee its food supplies 
As seen above, one of the predicted global climate change effects is increased 
extreme weather events.  At the end of November 2015 Bahrain suffered 
chronic flooding, so the government now plans to invest in rain drainage 
networks and has earmarked US$21.9 million to tackle rain drainage problems 
in 55 locations across the country.  A similar initiative already underway in 55 
other locations was due to be completed in April 2016, with work at 45 of those 
already finished63.  The irony is that in water-stressed Bahrain most of the 
floodwater was wasted as there is currently no artificial means of capturing and 
storing it and future projects appear concerned only with drainage rather than 
water conservation. 
4.3.2. Sustainability and Alternative Technologies 
As part of any climate change mitigation strategy some move towards the use 
of alternative technologies to enable sustainable development of the economy 
could be reasonably expected.  The King Hamad Prize for Agricultural 
Development has a US$212,200 budget to improve shortcomings, support 
private sector agricultural growth, and encourage R&D. Governorates will 
compete to establish modern irrigation systems and technology intensive 
planting projects. The National Initiative has also allocated US$79,600 for R&D 
and extended funding to the Arabian Gulf University to produce animal feed 
from locally available agricultural remains. Other R&D by the private sector 
includes hydroponics systems, vertical farming and water preservation.  
Currently, only 0.52 percent of agricultural GDP is allocated to R&D (BEDB 
2014a).  Food and water security are significant components of the wider 
human security agenda and the initiatives described here demonstrate a 
willingness to embrace new technologies in agriculture and use water and land 
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resources to produce food more effectively.  It is interesting it is recognised that 
public money is needed to energise a programme that might otherwise be 
unattractive to the private sector, because of the time taken to yield worthwhile 
returns.  This demonstrates a willingness to work with the private sector and 
maybe to hand the programme over to them.  Whether that will be cost free, 
with the government renouncing its supervisory role completely remains to be 
seen, but with human security as a vital part of national security it would be 
logical for the government to retain some oversight to ensure programme 
success and continued improvement.   
In May 2015 plans were announced to increase the adoption of renewable 
energy in Bahrain as an alternative to traditional power sources and the 
Electricity and Water Authority had been directed to conduct studies64.  There 
was also a proposal to establish a National Renewable Energy Regulatory 
Authority which would be independent from the Ministry of Energy and pave the 
way for investment in solar power and wind farms.  Bahrain already has  a 
renewable energy project with a solar power plant producing five megawatts 
(5MW) of electricity near Manama65 and work on another project to produce 
5MW of electricity using both solar and wind power was due to commence in 
mid-2015.  The government’s planned energy expenditure for 2015 and 2016 
was US$2.25 billion.  Despite the public announcement of the new body and 
the new project there is little visible evidence of any progress being made; a 
search on the Electricity and Water Authority website66 gave information on 
only one project from 2011. 
4.3.3. Political Reform 
The most significant political reform for Bahrain would be a change from the 
ruling bargain to a diversified and private sector dependent political economy 
with greater popular political participation.  Taleb and Treverton (2015) describe 
Bahrain as an extremely fragile state mainly because of its repressed Shia 
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majority, but a rapprochement between the two sides seems highly unlikely in 
the foreseeable future.    
However, the BEDB is encouraged; it says growth in Bahrain’s economy has 
become increasingly reliant on the private sector.  In marked contrast to 2012, 
when the public sector expanded by 12.1 percent, it now accounts for a modest 
proportion of overall growth, namely 2.1 percent in 2013 and 2.8 percent in 
2014 (BEDB 2015a).  The implication is that the private sector is overhauling 
the public sector as the wealth creator, which could lead to structural reform 
and a move away from rentierism to a tax based economy, where citizens pay 
more for services as their earnings increase.  However, there is no evidence 
that decisions on political reform or taxes are imminent. 
Katzman, writing for the US Congressional Research Service in December 
2015 (2015b), said some believe a political settlement between the ruling élite 
and the Shia remains possible, but cautioned about Saudi agreement to 
concessions to the Shia in the light of the mid-2015 nuclear agreement with 
Iran which they opposed.  However, Katzman said it could be argued current 
conditions favour a settlement, because the opposition and government appear 
to realise neither side can win, but he noted that hard-line Bahraini Sunnis 
would continue to urge the Monarchy not to give concessions and to continue 
with the suppression of dissent.  His words regarding the Saudis proved to be 
prophetic, as their execution of a prominent Shia cleric in the first week of 2016 
led to the present diplomatic rift between Iran and the Gulf Arabs; this will be 
discussed later.  As a result the likelihood of any political concessions soon 
appears remote.   
4.3.4. Economic Diversification 
As seen from BEV2030, economic diversification is the government’s main 
priority in its drive for sustainable economic security to underpin its national and 
human security agendas.  BEDB (2013) says growth in Bahrain’s economy has 
been driven by four main sectors: manufacturing; finance; telecommunications 
and transport; and personal and social services.  Manufacturing achieved 
average growth of 6.5 percent in 2000-12, and peaked at 16 percent in 2005. It 
provided 18 percent of GDP growth and led the process of economic 
diversification in Bahrain.  It is one of the largest employers of citizens.  
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Financial institutions exploited the availability of skilled citizens and government 
liberalisation with annual growth in the financial sector in 2000-12 of 7 percent.  
Similarly, transport and telecommunications emerged as one of the most 
dynamic sectors mainly due to privatisation and liberalisation initiatives. Its 
share of GDP increased from 4 percent in 2000 to 7 percent in 2012.  Although 
the pace of growth subsequently slowed, the sector was still responsible for 9 
percent of GDP growth in 2012.  The social and personal services sector had 
the highest average annual growth in 2000-12 at 14.3 percent.  Importantly, this 
successful diversification happened in parallel to a significant decline in the 
hydrocarbon share of GDP (43.6 to 19 percent in 2000-12).  The sector had a 
negative contribution in 2012, mainly due to maintenance in the Abu Sa’afah oil 
field.  BEDB’s assessment is full of optimism and while it may be driven by the 
pragmatism of declining hydrocarbon revenues, it does reflect a genuine desire 
to diversify and liberalise in an attempt to maintain a sustainable national 
economic model.  Bahrain's strong financial infrastructure is seen as the 
backbone of the national economy and is said to have made Bahrain a pivotal 
centre, by transforming it into a regional67 financial hub.  Certainly the figures 
support the notion that Bahrain’s newly diversified economy is doing well and 
this improved economic security has positive human and national security 
consequences for the Kingdom.     
The December 2014 Bahrain Economic Quarterly (BEQ) said the global 
backdrop had become more challenging.  It forecast oil markets were likely to 
be characterised by volatility and said ‘this underscores the importance of the 
ongoing efforts toward economic diversification’ (BEDB 2014b).  This was 
prescient as by the beginning of 2016 oil prices had slumped to their lowest 
since the Second World War according to some commentators68.  The 
implications are mixed for Bahrain’s economy.  The volatility of the oil price 
means the government cannot guarantee its hydrocarbon income streams, but 
as its reserves reduce this becomes less crucial as it has diversified into other 
sectors as seen above.  However, it must continue to look for other sustainable 
sources of government revenue if rentierism is to continue as the basis of its 
political economy.  
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The same BEQ forecast significant strength in regional tourism and investment, 
with regional governments redoubling their economic diversification efforts.   It 
was predicted this would continue to create new opportunities for Bahrain-
based companies (BEDB 2014b).  The BEDB saw the regional economic 
situation as highly beneficial to Bahrain’s economy, especially in supporting its 
own diversification efforts through parallel diversification in other GCC states.  
This confidence appears to have been well placed, as although the oil price 
remained lower than expected for longer than expected, December 2015’s 
BEQ reported that growth across the GCC was still being led by the non-oil 
sector, with states running significant infrastructure programmes, such as Qatar 
and the UAE, having the greatest non-oil momentum.  Growth had reduced 
over 2015 and was forecast to shrink further over 2016, but a net increase is 
expected nonetheless (BEDB 2015b).  . 
In 2014 all parts of the non-oil sector had a significant increase in growth. This 
was very obvious in the Construction sector, which quadrupled growth over two 
quarters making it the fastest growing sector of the economy. This reflected the 
activation of a large infrastructure project pipeline worth more than US$22 
billion. Hotels and Restaurants, which had consistently been the fastest-
growing sector, experienced a shallow trajectory but nonetheless posted robust 
growth of 7.4 percent. The only other sector to grow significantly faster than the 
non-oil economy taken as a whole was Social and Personal Services, mainly 
composed of private health care and education. This sector, with its significant 
human security aspects, has emerged as one of the most dynamic in Bahrain.  
By contrast, public sector growth remained moderate and was in line with 
aspirations to put the private sector at the forefront (BEDB 2014b).  All of this is 
good evidence of sustainable economic development in the non-oil sector and 
a positive demonstration of diversification into a wide range of business areas.  
Also,  rather than being transfixed by a single focus such as financial services, 
which may seem an easy option, the government appears to have recognised it 
cannot put all its economic eggs in one basket. 
However, BEDB reported that hydrocarbons had performed strongly in 2014 
and both the onshore Bahrain (Awali) field and the offshore Abu Sa’afah saw 
sustained output gains. Production from the Bahrain field rose from 48,758 
barrels per day (b/d) to 49,187 b/d over two quarters, and Bahrain’s share of 
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Abu Sa’afah’s output rose from 158,278 b/d to 160,385 b/d in the same period 
(BEDB 2014b).  Abu Sa’afah is a Saudi oilfield, but the Saudis share its 
production with Bahrain (Katzman 2015a).  That oil revenue is obviously very 
welcome to Bahrain, both in financially underpinning its economic 
diversification policies and also providing economic stability to a monarchy that 
otherwise might have toppled, were it not for Saudi and UAE support.  
Nevertheless, this should not be interpreted as Bahrain clinging to its 
hydrocarbon past; the weight of evidence, especially in BEQ December 2014, 
shows the government is clearly focused on serious economic diversification 
and understands the need to establish a sustainable economic model, if only 
for national security reasons. 
In March 2015, economic confidence throughout the GCC was assessed as 
holding up well with key indicators pointing to very good results.  Bahrain, as 
the self-proclaimed most regionally integrated GCC economy, saw this as 
advantageous as most of its businesses continued to grow, creating new 
opportunities and supporting the offshore banking sector. Regional tourism 
looked good and Bahrain was well-positioned to benefit from an increase in 
Saudi visitors.  There were also indications that regional investors were turning 
to Bahrain’s property market for good deals (BEDB 2015a).  This upbeat 
synopsis of the GCC’s economic effects on Bahrain is indicative of the 
Kingdom’s view of its own centrality in GCC economic activity, but also appears 
to prove that it is becoming more of a financial hub in the Gulf, which is 
reflected in the economic aspirations of BEV2030.   
Necessarily, sustainable economic diversification has to go much wider than 
the large national and foreign corporations based in Bahrain.  Support to small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) comes through the government’s Tamkeen 
labour fund, which finances and guarantees loans from commercial and Islamic 
banks. Tamkeen guarantees 50% of the value of SME loans. Total loans 
disbursed by the end of 2012 amounted to around US$17.2 million for 4,764 
enterprises. An additional US$132.6 million was allocated to further extend the 
Tamkeen guarantee scheme. Tamkeen also funded start-ups as part of its 
support scheme, including pre-seed grants and feasibility and incubation 
support (BEDB 2013).  The SME start-up programme has developed with loans 
available and support from initiatives such as the Bahrain Business Incubator 
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Centre, which provides start-ups with a full spectrum of consultancy services69.  
Other new initiatives were also underway as Tamkeen signed agreements with 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank and Bahrain Development Bank to expand low 
financing options and the number of incubators as part of its support 
programme. The expanded SME support infrastructure, along with strategic 
refocusing by key national support institutions, aimed to put more local 
companies on a growth trajectory (BEDB 2015a).  This is a critical path as it 
spreads and embeds diversification across the economic spectrum and also 
provides a range of potential employment at a variety of skills and educational 
levels to citizens, deepening their involvement in the economic health of the 
country.  
In early 2015, BEDB continued its optimism.  Significant activity was underway 
in a range of infrastructure projects funded by the Gulf Development Fund and 
other sources, including private investors and government-related entities. 
Even though the infrastructure projects would result in an influx of foreign 
labour, as well as increased revenues, it was assessed to have a pronounced 
multiplier effect across the rest of the economy by boosting investor and 
consumer confidence and creating more credit opportunities for the financial 
sector (BEDB 2015a).  There is significant evidence of economic diversification 
across the spectrum of business, from large infrastructure projects to SMEs, 
which reinforces the importance of Bahrain’s move away from hydrocarbon 
dependency towards an economically secure future.  However, the necessity 
for foreign labour to work on infrastructure projects is seen as a disadvantage, 
to be balanced against the positive aspects of economic growth the projects will 
generate.  Expatriate labour therefore appears to be a necessary evil discussed 
later. 
The effects of diversification were also felt on the Bahrain stock market which 
continued to rise because of limited exposure to hydrocarbon price fluctuations.  
Bahrain Bourse emerged as one of the region’s resilient stock markets, when 
other regional bourses experienced far greater volatility. Although there was a 
significant slowdown in early 2015, it remained as one of only two GCC 
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exchanges (along with Saudi Arabia’s Tadawul) to have posted positive growth 
in the first quarter.  The investment sector led the Bahrain All-Share Index in 
2014, growing by 29.4 percent, outpacing the commercial banks sector which 
had led the way in 2013. It was followed by the Services and Hotels & Tourism 
sectors which gained 14.9 percent and 12.4 percent respectively (BEDB 
2015a).  This again demonstrates that greater economic stability has been 
achieved because of a reduced reliance on oil revenues.  This should lead to 
more assured political stability as the population is not adversely affected by 
major falls in the price of oil like those experienced at the turn of 2015-16, 
which in turn gives greater human and national security.  The inescapable 
interdependencies of a healthy economy, political stability and human and 
national security are therefore writ large.   
Although in December 2015 BEDB acknowledged historically low oil prices had 
adversely affected growth in the GCC, Bahrain was still forecasting real GDP 
growth of 3.2 percent for 2015, although down on 2014’s figure of 4.5 percent.  
This is expected to stabilise with estimates for 2016 and 2017 showing 3.2 and 
3 percent respectively.  There was also a significant change in the forecast 
balance of the Bahrain economy; in 2014 non-hydrocarbon growth was 1.63 
percent higher than its hydrocarbon equivalent, but in 2015-17 this is forecast 
as being between seven and eight times more (BEDB 2015b).  BEDB also said 
performance of GCC economies had been very stable in the closing months of 
2015.  Despite signs of a more conservative fiscal approach, estimates of 
economic activity continued to point to expansion. BEDB claims this provides a 
favourable backdrop for ‘Bahrain’s highly regionally integrated economy’, with 
visitor flows likely to remain robust and continued investor interest in real estate 
and infrastructure projects, due to the relative value of Bahrain’s market (BEDB 
2015b).   
However, in May 2016 it was claimed Bahrain’s economy was now the most 
vulnerable in the Gulf due to the recent drop in oil prices.  It was estimated 
Bahrain would have a deficit in 2015 of US$5.3 billion rising to US$7.9 billion in 
2016.  The government had undertaken cost-cutting and subsidy reduction and 
imposed a 60 percent rise in the price of petrol in January 2016, the first rise for 
33 years.  There had also been government restructuring including 
rationalisation of ministries, although multibillion dollar projects to upgrade the 
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energy infrastructure and large real estate schemes continued as planned70.  
Yet, despite current low oil prices, the overall picture suggests Bahrain’s 
proactive policy of diversifying from hydrocarbons is continuing successfully 
and enabling a potentially improved economic situation in the monarchy.  
Whether this would have happened so quickly without the depletion of 
Bahrain’s oil reserves is moot, but the fact remains Bahrain is moving towards 
a future sustainable economic model, albeit with Saudi support at present.  
Whether the current rentier system is survivable is still very questionable and 
will depend on how the government finesses the issue of taxation to take up the 
economic burden left by the reduction in hydrocarbon revenues.  As seen 
previously there are very little signs of political reform any time soon. 
4.3.5. Education and Skills for Citizens 
As BEV2030 stresses, appropriately educating and training Bahrain’s citizens is 
critical to the development of a vibrant and diversified private sector-based 
economy.  According to the 2010 Census, Bahrain’s population was fairly 
young with 42 percent under the age of 20 and just 4.1 percent over 65. The 
dependency ratio, commonly used to compare the size of the working age 
population to the ‘dependent’ population, decreased during 2001-10, as more 
young people entered the potential workforce.  The non-Bahraini population 
was overwhelmingly in the working-age category with 88 percent aged between 
20 and 64 in 2010 and characterized by a low dependency ratio. Non-Bahraini 
males outnumber females by 2.6:1. This reflects the significant number of low 
wage expatriate workers who are mainly employed in labour-intensive sectors 
such as retail and construction (BEDB 2013).  It also reflects Bahrain’s shortfall 
of citizens willing or capable of doing labour-intensive jobs, which will have to 
be rectified if expatriate dependency is to be reduced. 
The Bahraini workforce participation rate stood at 58.4 percent in 2010 (BEDB 
2013). This is relatively low compared to developed countries e.g. the USA, 
where the participation rate for the age group of 20–64 stood at 78.7 percent in 
the same year. According to BEDB the lower participation rate is largely 
reflective of a significant, albeit diminishing, gender differential in participation 
among Bahrainis, with participation by Bahraini women just over half that of 
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men. However, female participation rates have been rising and to suggest lack 
of participation in work is entirely due to lack of female workers may be 
tenuous.  Total civilian employment in the Kingdom more than doubled during 
2002-13, but as expatriate employment outpaced citizen employment, Bahraini 
share of total employment fell from 34 to 23 percent. By sector, over one-third 
of civilian Bahraini employment was in government, with retail and 
manufacturing being the next largest employers. While the public sector 
continues to account for a large share of overall Bahraini employment, it is 
markedly lower than in other GCC states. Among migrants, 63 percent are 
employed in construction, retail, or domestic work, again the labour-intensive 
and more manual or menial sectors.   
It was inevitable the dependency ratio would reduce, given the large youth 
bulge moving into the working population.  The challenge for the government is 
to provide sufficient work its young citizens are prepared to do.  The reduction 
in the dependency ratio amongst migrant workers probably reflects a deliberate 
policy to prevent low or no-skill workers from bringing their dependants into 
Bahrain; but key questions are whether citizens would really want to do 
migrants’ jobs; and could the government afford large numbers of unemployed 
nationals if they will not take on the labour-intensive work?  It is unlikely the 
public sector will be able to increase and soak up excess labour, given the 
declining relative value of the hydrocarbon industries which are still the main 
source of government revenue.  The closing of the gender gap in the workforce 
may reflect greater citizen participation in work, but it will almost certainly be 
work confined to non-manual sectors.  In other sectors Bahrainis may be 
excluded because they lack skills, or the willingness to do what a job entails.  
Realistically there are not enough Bahrainis to do all the jobs that need doing, 
so dependency on expatriates will continue even if full-employment is achieved 
among nationals. 
Bahrain was the first Gulf State to introduce formal education in 1919 and in 
1928 girls’ schools were established to provide equal access opportunities 
(BEDB 2013). Currently, education is compulsory for all students until 15 years 
of age in both public and private institutions. More than 265 primary and 
secondary schools operate in the Kingdom, including 65 private schools with 
curricula from the UK, US, France, India and Pakistan. Bahrain also has 
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sixteen public and private universities.  The sector has experienced significant 
growth, expanding 205 percent in 2000-12 and its GDP contribution rose 
almost threefold to US$1.2 billion. Growth in private education has outpaced 
state education over the same period; state education increased by 130 
percent, but private education grew 5.5 times faster, mainly due to the 
establishment of private universities and institutions.  Women are the clear 
majority of teachers, with an average of 65 percent employment in education in 
2001-10.  Teacher numbers grew 74 percent during the same period, with the 
majority employed in state institutions; approximately 80 percent of state school 
teachers are Bahrainis, but in private schools the share of nationals is less than 
20% (BEDB 2013). 
The growth in both state and private education sectors is vital for Bahrain’s 
future, to ensure citizens are sufficiently skilled and educated to take on work in 
a diversified economy with less expatriate workers.  With education compulsory 
for all until the age of 15 it appears a good basis of literacy and numeracy 
should be present in the national population.  In fact literacy rates in Bahrain 
are relatively high by international standards and have increased in recent 
years. The most common measure of literacy is the percentage of population 
above 15 years who can read and write. According to the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) the literacy rate in Bahrain increased from 86.5 
percent in 2001 to 91.9 percent in 2010 (BEDB 2013).   In 2014/15, 33,398 
Bahrainis were enrolled in higher education institutions71, but in 2013/14 only 
about one seventh of that number (4685) achieved Bachelors’ degrees or 
above.  Unfortunately those statistics do not show how many are citizens, but 
they confirm that women exceed men in each category and substantially in 
Bachelors’ and Masters’ degrees72. It therefore appears degree level education 
for nationals is unusual and the majority of higher education facilities reside 
within the private sector and are mainly run and staffed by non-Bahrainis, 
suggesting insufficient numbers of Bahrainis are able to teach at that level.  
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To improve employability and efficiency and cater to the needs of the job 
market, reforms were introduced in the education sector in 2001-12. These 
included a teacher training programme, a new polytechnic college for technical 
and vocational training, an improved secondary vocational programme, and a 
quality assurance initiative. New support and accountability systems were 
introduced to measure school performance and national numeracy and literacy 
strategies were implemented.  According to the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014, Bahrain’s global educational 
ranking had improved to 48th compared to 56th in 2008 (BEDB 2013).  Bahrain 
is making progress in educating its population and 29.8 percent of young 
people are entering tertiary education, comparing favourably with the UK’s 
2013 figure of around 40 percent73.  However, as seen above the majority are 
not taking Bachelors’ degrees or equivalent courses, but where they are, 
increasing the numbers of Bahraini graduates can only be good for the 
Kingdom’s economic diversification, sustainable development and reduction of 
individuals’ dependency on the state for life support. 
As part of its 2012 ‘Skills for the 21st Century’ campaign, Bahrain’s Higher 
Education Council (HEC) held workshops led by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology and the UK’s Queen Margaret University focused on how to embed 
entrepreneurship and stimulate innovation by improving university curriculums.  
Higher education institutes had independently recognised the importance of 
entrepreneurial education; it was added to the University of Bahrain’s strategy 
in 2009 and the Royal University for Women entered into an agreement with 
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization to build a training 
centre offering entrepreneurship courses and general business incubation to 
new companies (BEDB 2013).  During Global Entrepreneurship Week in 
Manama in November 2014, the Industry and Commerce Minister affirmed that 
entrepreneurship is critical to any economy and said BEV2030 sees a crucial 
role for the private sector to drive growth and productivity; entrepreneurial 
activity and a dynamic private sector are key strands of Bahrain’s national 
economic strategy74.  This commitment to developing entrepreneurship is 
demonstrated through the establishment of such bodies as the Bahrain Institute 
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of Entrepreneurship and Technology (BIET).  BIET’s ‘key objective is to provide 
innovative training techniques, competent faculty support, consultancy, and 
quality teaching that will maintain steady economic growth and strengthen [the] 
Kingdom's vision of 2030’75.  This further reinforces the Bahraini government’s 
commitment to economic diversification through the development of 
entrepreneurial skills among its nationals and sits well alongside the financial 
and incubation support offered to SMEs as mentioned above.  
Tamkeen also supports entrepreneurship through a programme providing 
entrepreneurial skills to secondary school students who are placed in groups 
and asked to develop their own company.  Institutions cooperating with 
Tamkeen assist with initiatives that aim to foster an entrepreneurial culture 
among citizens by providing the skills needed to create and sustain a business. 
Partners include the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the Supreme Council 
for Women, the Bahrain Development Bank and private institutions (BEDB 
2013).  This is a superb initiative as it starts early and aims to develop the 
entrepreneurial spirit of students still at school which will help the aspiration to 
create a diversified and sustainable economy. 
Bahrain is therefore making significant efforts to educate its citizens, from 
ensuring basic levels of literacy and numeracy through to developing a culture 
of higher education.  Admittedly the numbers of students taking degree level 
courses is still low, but the fact that nearly 30 percent of students choose to 
remain in education beyond secondary school is a good sign for the future.  
The initiative to develop entrepreneurial and business skills alongside more 
traditional subjects is also indicative of a forward looking agenda, and catching 
students at secondary school will help to embed a culture of private sector work 
early and counteract the sense of entitlement to public sector work, or that the 
private sector is of less value.  All of this contributes positively to future 
economic security and thus improves human and national security.   
4.3.6. Expatriate Dependency 
As seen in the previous section, migrants occupy jobs in almost every sector of 
the economy, including government, mainly because of a lack of indigenous 
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skills, capacity or willingness to do labour-intensive work.  Agriculture and 
fisheries are estimated to have employed around 6,950 workers in 2013, mainly 
in the private sector and 94 percent of that was low wage expatriate labour.  
Presumably the reason the great majority of agricultural and fisheries workers 
are not Bahrainis is because the work is too arduous or dirty for citizens to 
consider it worthy of them.  While this reflects the situation across the Gulf in 
similar manual industries, it could have an adverse effect on food production 
and thus human security should expatriates find better work outside Bahrain. 
According to the Ministry of Labour, job creation in Bahrain accelerated 
markedly towards the end of 2014. While Bahraini employment grew by 2.5 
percent year-on-year, the growth of expatriate labour saw an even faster 
increase of 3.2 percent as a result of several labour-intensive infrastructure 
projects launched in the second half of the year.  The private sector is driving 
growth in the Kingdom’s labour market, accounting for 90 percent of the 
increase in total employment, reflecting the significant pick-up in activity in the 
non-oil economy over the preceding twelve months.  The official unemployment 
rate was 3.8 percent at the end of 2014, a significant improvement on 4.8 
percent a year earlier (BEDB 2015a).  So, the number of Bahrainis entering 
work is increasing, unemployment is down and the private sector is leading the 
way in growth, but care must be taken about drawing conclusions based on 
comparative percentages for indigenous and migrant workers as there are 
more migrants than Bahrainis76.  However, the greater the number of Bahrainis 
in paid employment, the less the support burden placed on the Kingdom by 
unproductive citizens and their families.  
In the healthcare sector, a key objective of reforms has been to improve the 
quality of the human capital available to the health facilities.  The Royal College 
of Surgeons – Medical University of Bahrain was established in 2004 to provide 
world-class training for future doctors and nurses. The College of Health 
Sciences is increasing its training capacity for nurses which in 2013 was 300 
students per year.  Nursing has the greatest potential to create citizens’ jobs 
due to the high number of expatriate workers in the field; Bahrainis employed in 
nursing stood at 50 percent in 2009, compared to 80 percent for physicians.  
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This could be indicative of a real difference between the genders when it 
comes to employment, if women are under-represented in the workforce and 
Bahraini men see nursing as beneath them.  Although growth in the number of 
healthcare practitioners has mirrored the increase in population, Bahrain 
continues to lag behind advanced economies in terms of physician to 
population ratios. In 2010 Bahrain had 1.4 doctors per 1,000 people, compared 
to the OECD average of 2.8 (BEDB 2013).  The explicit intent to reduce 
dependency on expatriate workers in healthcare theoretically offers skilled 
professional employment for men and women within an important and valued 
sector.  However, whether the work is considered of sufficient value to be taken 
up by Bahraini citizens, or whether there are enough people with the right 
education to undertake the training remains to be seen.  In human security 
terms, Bahrain would be better served by having a significant proportion of 
these posts occupied by its nationals to guarantee an acceptable level of 
dedicated healthcare provision and to place its citizens in productive and well-
paid employment. 
SMEs provide around 77 percent of jobs in Bahrain’s private sector, but only 13 
percent of these are held by Bahrainis. This shows the relative dominance of 
labour-intensive activities in the SME space where companies contain costs by 
recruiting low-cost expatriates. 29 percent of SME jobs in 2012 were in the 
construction sector followed by trade (26 percent) and other services (18 
percent).  The proportion of citizens tends to be more significant in larger 
companies, but whereas 39 percent of the workforce of large private 
companies is Bahraini, the corresponding share for medium-sized companies is 
28 percent and for small companies 24 percent. By contrast, the proportion of 
Bahrainis employed in micro enterprises is significantly lower at 9 percent.  
Most Bahraini employees are concentrated in service activities, particularly 
trade and finance (BEDB 2013).  Despite the relatively greater proportion of 
nationals employed in the larger companies, well over 50 percent of all 
employees in all private sector concerns are expatriates.  Again, it appears to 
be because the majority of jobs are in labour-intensive activities, almost 
suggesting that such employment is too menial or too physically demanding for 
most Bahrainis to consider doing. 
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The growing pipeline of infrastructure projects along with generally favourable 
non-oil growth has provided a benign setting for job creation. As has been 
seen, private sector employment has continued to increase at a healthy pace. 
According to the BEQ for December 2015 (BEDB 2015b) official indicators for 
mid-2015 showed total employment in the Kingdom had enjoyed an annual 
increase of 6.5 percent. However, the average wages of Bahrainis increased by 
3.5 percent in the private sector and 5.1 percent in the public sector which 
could act as a disincentive to private sector employment, although relative pay 
rates are not given.  Consistent with positive momentum in job creation, overall 
unemployment had declined to its lowest level in several years.  This is good 
news on two fronts.  It shows Bahrain’s economy is healthy and there is 
sustainable economic and development activity taking place.  It also means 
more Bahrainis are employed in the private sector which reduces the 
dependency on the state for either public sector jobs or unemployment and 
other benefits.  All of this is good in human and national security terms and 
makes transforming Bahrain from rentier state to economically productive 
economy more achievable, providing the political will exists.   
4.3.7. Human Security Measures 
As described in Chapter 2, human security is multi-dimensional and 
encompasses food, water, health, public safety and even education as an 
enabler of future potential.  Bahrain’s approach to human security appears 
strong when viewed statistically through the yardstick of the Human 
Development Index (HDI)77.  In 2012 Bahrain’s HDI score was 0.796, in the 
high human development category, positioning the country 48th of 187 
countries and territories.  This is above the average of 0.758 for countries in the 
high human development group and well above the average of 0.652 for Arab 
States, where the closest countries in rank and population size are Qatar and 
the UAE, ranked 36th and 41st respectively (UNDP 2013a).    
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Bahrain’s 2013 HDI value increased to 0.815, now in the very high human 
development category, positioning it 44th of 187 countries and territories.  This 
is below the average of 0.890 for countries in the very high human 
development group, but again well above the average of 0.682 for Arab States, 
where the countries closest to Bahrain in rank and population size remain 
Qatar and the UAE, which were ranked 31st and 40th respectively (UNDP 
2014a).  So, in 2013 Bahrain’s HDI increased sufficiently to take it into the 
lower part of the very high human development category, while Qatar and the 
UAE also improved their rankings commensurately. 
By 2014, Bahrain’s HDI score had reached 0.824, still in the very high human 
development category, and 45th of 188 countries and territories.  This is still 
below the average of 0.896 for countries in the very high human development 
group, but above the average of 0.686 for Arab States, where the countries 
closest to Bahrain in rank and population size are still Qatar and the UAE, 
which are ranked 32nd and 41st (UNDP 2015a).  In 2014 Bahrain maintained its 
approximate ranking in the World, although it improved its HDI value.  Notably it 
maintained its position relative to Qatar and the UAE which both also dropped 
back one position in the global rankings.  On the three measures laid down by 
UNDP, Bahrain is still improving and is significantly better than the Arab States 
average, although the inclusion of Iraq, Syria and Libya must have a 
detrimental effect on that average value. 
According to BEDB, Bahrain faces unique food security challenges because of 
resource-related factors that limit production, including land and water scarcity 
and climate conditions, combined with a growing population and increasing 
urbanization that magnifies demand.  Bahrain has good food affordability, 
mainly because of low percentage spending on food relative to total household 
expenditure, as well as its universal subsidy program which stabilises the 
prices of essential foods. All social classes benefit from this subsidy, but low 
income households spend a much larger proportion of income on food and 
remain vulnerable to price changes of non-subsidised items.  Bahrain has 
sought to control prices through low agricultural tariffs and broad-based funding 
for smallholders.  It achieves a food supply of 2,829 kcal per capita per day, 
significantly above the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation’s (FAO) 
recommended average of 2,300 kcal. Although agricultural production remains 
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constrained by social, climatic, and geographic realities, Bahrain has secured 
imports through strategic trading links with surplus food producers and 
established an effective delivery and distribution infrastructure. Food safety is 
widely monitored to ensure the implementation of stringent standards, but the 
absence of large-scale food storage facilities may become an issue in the long 
term, should the need arise to increase shelf life (BEDB 2014a).  So there are 
significant food security challenges facing Bahrain and the gap in the market 
must be filled.  It also shows the importance of food subsidies, especially for 
poorer families, coupled with price controls and low agricultural tariffs designed 
to keep food cheap while making farming a sustainable livelihood.  As seen 
previously, the Gulf States are moving to secure supplies of food from 
overseas, but this strategy has severe human and national security implications 
if the supply fails. There is also recognition that storage and shelf-life is an 
issue and food safety must be continuously monitored.  All of this indicates an 
active food security policy designed to benefit the whole population, thus 
raising the level of human security within Bahrain.  However, its critical 
weakness is the lack of domestic production capacity coupled with dependency 
on overseas sources that can be disrupted by indigenous or geopolitical 
events. 
BEDB says expenditure by income segment suggests the lowest 73 percent of 
the population, in terms of household income, spend a higher proportion of their 
money on food products, at an average of 28 percent. This makes these people 
more vulnerable to food price shocks because they have less ability to maintain 
a nourishing diet if prices of food or other essentials rise. For these categories, 
the share of income spent on food is equivalent to that of food insecure 
countries like Niger (BEDB 2014a).  It is surprising that BEDB is admitting that 
nearly three quarters of its population is theoretically on a par in food security 
terms with a central African nation, although subsidies and tariffs currently 
mitigate that. To make this comparison publicly shows a level of real concern 
within government circles about the extent of possible food insecurity that 
exists.  As around 70 percent of the population is Shia it is fair to assume they 
are the most affected, potentially leading to further political disaffection. 
Food subsidies stood at US$137.6 million in 2012, a 461 percent increase 
since 2004. Universal subsidies are probably unsustainable given the growing 
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population and heavy reliance on oil revenues for government income. The 
launch of an initiative to refocus subsidies towards low income households is 
essential to ensure they remain a source of social safety without compromising 
the food security of high income households, where food spending is below 22 
percent (BEDB 2014a).  The potential financial problems that Bahrain faces as 
oil revenues fade out are obvious for all to see.  The fact subsidies are spread 
across the entire population means even the richest benefit.  The conundrum 
for the government is how to remove subsidies from the well-off, whose food 
prices will then increase, while maintaining the subsidies for low income groups 
who need assistance to buy good and nutritious food.  The government’s desire 
to maintain the rentier system is obvious, but it also appears to recognise it is 
unsustainable in its current form.  Whether the wealthy 27 percent will be happy 
with that is questionable, especially as they almost certainly wield some 
influence, as mostly they will be Sunni and have access to individuals within 
regime circles.  
Encouragingly, most of Bahrain’s domestic agricultural production goes to the 
local market, while a negligible amount, mainly seasonal fruits and vegetables, 
is exported.  Bahrain has eighteen main trading partners for food items 
supplying 84 percent of imported food products. Saudi Arabia and Australia are 
the main suppliers, followed by India, the UAE and the USA.  Most trading 
partners are politically stable, have clear legal property rights, and rank in the 
upper half of indexed countries for availability, so are unlikely to experience 
export disruptions in the event of shocks (BEDB 2014a).  The government is 
therefore following a sophisticated human security agenda by ensuring its food 
supplies are sourced from wealthy and politically stable countries, whose own 
food supplies appear to be assured, and are therefore less likely to stop food 
exports than other, less stable countries might be in times of crisis.  However, 
that does not preclude those suppliers suffering exogenous shock, or the 
supply routes becoming untenable because of geopolitical events.  Such a high 
level of food dependency on external sources is a critical vulnerability in 
Bahrain’s human and national security architecture. 
Another factor impacting food availability is agricultural R&D, which is vital to 
Bahrain with its inherent climate and resource challenges, which will only get 
worse as climate change effects adversely impact the region. Bahrain achieved 
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important milestones in promoting agricultural R&D with the establishment of 
the National Initiative for the Development of Agriculture. This is an 
independent body led by the King’s wife and tasked with supporting 
implementation of the National Agricultural Strategy. The aim is to enhance 
agricultural industry and promote its contribution to economic, social and 
environmental welfare.  The initiative aspires to modernise agriculture through 
use of technologies, a sound regulatory framework, training to enhance 
productivity and promoting awareness of agricultural issues. These are long-
term initiatives to influence local production and make the country less 
vulnerable to future supply shocks (BEDB 2014a).  The intent to ‘future-proof’ 
the sector is clear and is particularly significant as it involves the potential for 
new and emerging technologies to enhance agricultural production in an era of 
climate change.  Meanwhile the involvement of the King’s wife indicates the 
probable involvement of some élite women in high level policy making around 
human security issues.   
In order to achieve any progress in food security, it is vital for Bahrain to 
improve its water security or introduce farming methods that recycle water, to 
improve local food production. Bahrain faces rising challenges in water 
preservation, while local climate conditions require consumption of exorbitant 
amounts of water to grow crops, in addition to ever increasing population 
demand. Water consumption increased by 57 percent in 2003-13 alongside a 
population increase of around 86 percent. Domestic water consumption grew 
slowly, but commercial and industrial consumption grew at 200 percent and 
112 percent respectively in the same period. Projected economic growth will 
prompt similar increases in the next decade, with high potential to increase 
water stress in a country increasingly dependent on distilled water production. 
Groundwater depletion is also evident with a 34 percent decline in production in 
2003-13; its contribution to local consumption contracted by 63 percent in the 
same period.  Currently, Bahrain’s developed infrastructure supplies the whole 
population with potable water (BEDB 2014a).  The links between climate, food 
security and water supplies are inescapable and there is a pressing need for 
Bahrain to find more efficient ways of preserving existing supplies, while 
recycling and producing fresh water.  Without effective water security 
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measures, alternative technologies to increase food output, such as those 
involving vertical hydroponic agricultural production, will not be feasible. 
Public healthcare services are provided free of charge to all Bahrainis and are 
heavily subsidised for expatriates through Ministry of Health hospitals, 
maternity units and primary healthcare centres. Non-Bahrainis employed in 
corporations with more than 50 employees are covered under a mandatory 
health insurance scheme. Private healthcare has become an increasingly 
important sector in the Kingdom and today there are twenty private hospitals78.  
The healthcare sector had strong growth in 2006-12 due to expansion of both 
public and private healthcare facilities; further growth is expected from a 
comprehensive healthcare reform agenda.  The development of Bahrain’s 
healthcare sector over the past three decades is reflected in the steady 
improvement in key indicators, especially life expectancy as shown by the HDI.  
Positive progress is demonstrated by the 50 percent increase in the number of 
hospital beds per 1,000 people upon completion of the King Hamad General 
Hospital (BEDB 2013).  Healthcare and thus human security has improved, but 
it is difficult to get more recent information concerning Bahrain’s healthcare 
system as the government’s own website is dated79 and contains little 
information from after 2012.  Whether this is for security reasons, bureaucratic 
inefficiency, or because little development activity has taken place is difficult to 
assess.  Of note, the key source for this, the Bahrain Economic Yearbook, has 
not been updated since 201380. 
4.3.8. National and Regime Security 
If official information is difficult to glean in other areas, it is virtually impossible 
in the area of national security.  A search of the government website81 using the 
term ‘security’ reveals two items on food security, but little more of interest.  In 
keeping with the lack of transparency that exists in the region concerning 
national security issues generally, gaining a credible insider’s view of Bahrain’s 
                                                          
78
 http://yp.theemiratesnetwork.com/browse/hospitals_and_medical_centers-private/bahrain/-/-page-
number-/ accessed 21 January 2016. 
79
 http://www.bahrain.com/en/bi/key-investment-sectors/Pages/Healthcare.aspx#.VqC55pqLSt8 
accessed 21 January 2016. 
80
 http://www.bahrainedb.com/en/resources/Pages/document%20library.aspx#.VrBv2NKLSt8 accessed 
2 February 2016. 
81
 http://www.bahrain.com/en/search/pages/Results.aspx?k=security#.VqC915qLSt- accessed 21 
January 2016. 
141 
 
national security concerns is most difficult to achieve as nothing is published for 
public consumption. 
Bahrain follows a strategy of engaging with a variety of significant partners to 
assure its national security interests are protected.  The Defence Cooperation 
Agreement signed with the USA in 1991 and Bahrain’s subsequent designation 
as a “major non-NATO ally” is a very good example of its success at this.  
According to Katzman (2015a) there are routinely around 7,000 US military 
personnel stationed in Bahrain and the US has attempted to exert pressure on 
Bahrain and persuade it to limit its use of force against protesters.  The US has 
also held back some arms from Bahrain that could be used against its people, 
implemented wider limitations on arms sales and reduced financial assistance 
to its military.  However, Bahrain appears to play its ally well and the political 
opposition claims the US prefers to understate the government’s human rights 
abuses in the interests of their bilateral security relationship.  That relationship 
is active and mutually beneficial, as exemplified by Bahrain’s participation in 
US-led air strikes against IS in Syria82.     
One of Bahrain’s primary foreign policy concerns remains Iran’s historic claim 
to its territory, perhaps exacerbated by the recent nuclear agreement, 
rehabilitation of Iran into the international community and lifting of sanctions. 
Bahraini leaders have, with some support from the US and others, blamed Iran 
for providing material support to the opposition in Bahrain. Furthermore, 
Bahrain has supported Saudi and Emirati criticism of Iran for its support of Shia 
movements and governments in the region. Bahrain also supported Saudi 
Arabia’s drive to increase the GCC’s political unity and generally defers to the 
Saudis and other GCC states over political crises in the region e.g. Libya and 
Yemen.  However, and unlike Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, Bahrain has 
not backed any opposition groups in the Syria conflict (Katzman 2015a).  
Arguably Bahrain is pursuing a very sophisticated security strategy here.  
Through exploitation of their foreign policy relationships and concerns they are 
simultaneously deferring to the US over the use of force at home, while 
maintaining an American defensive umbrella over them.  Arms sales 
restrictions may be inconvenient, but not critical when the global superpower 
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bases itself on your territory.  The Bahrainis are also playing on their concerns 
vis-à-vis the threat from Iran which ties them closely into the USA’s 
containment strategy and also reinforces links with the GCC states.  So, the 
Bahrainis have achieved a multi-layered security structure that protects them 
from external aggression, but also, as seen in 2011, provides them with internal 
security guarantees under PENINSULA SHIELD83 too.  
After the announcement of the deal in April 2015 where Iran agreed to curtail its 
nuclear program significantly in return for sanctions being lifted, President 
Obama hosted a GCC summit at Camp David with the aim of reassuring GCC 
states and discussing ways of reinforcing the US’s security relationships with 
those countries84.  For Bahrain, which fears Iran’s territorial claims and 
suspects Iranian interference in their domestic affairs, this will have provided 
welcome reassurance, as it will to the other GCC states given Iran is regarded 
as the main regional threat.  The USA will also have wished to make it clear to 
Iran and Israel that they are not disengaging from the Gulf region just because 
this deal is being struck, as both are capable of acting as wild-cards if they felt 
US interest had waned.  However, the Saudis undermined any sense of 
rapprochement and strengthened anti-Iranian sentiment within the Gulf by 
precipitating violent demonstrations in Iran following the execution of prominent 
Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr in Saudi Arabia on 2 January 201685.  After attacks on 
the Saudi Embassy in Tehran, Saudi Arabia broke off diplomatic relations with 
Iran and was swiftly followed by Bahrain86, the UAE and other Sunni states.  
Whether Bahrain had a real option is debatable, but tying herself to her major 
regional benefactor will have done Bahrain’s national security no harm 
politically and economically.  However, Iran appears to have had the last laugh 
as it was announced on 16 January 2016 that she had achieved IAEA 
conditions87 and sanctions were lifted allowing Iran to export her significant oil 
reserves once again, in competition with the Gulf Arabs who were already 
suffering record low oil prices.  
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Bahrain has reinforced its links with allies by taking part in limited military 
operations as with its airstrikes in Syria.  Bahrain has also agreed to continue 
its military presence in Saudi-led Operation DECISIVE STORM against Shia 
Houthi rebels in Yemen, at the request of the Saudi and Yemeni governments.  
The Bahrainis claim they are doing this to prevent a regional power, 
presumably Iran, from turning an Arab country into a satellite state88.  The 
Washington Post89 disputes that the civil war in Yemen is sectarian in nature 
and says Houthi Shia are as different to Iranian and Iraqi Shia as they are to 
Sunnis.  It alleges the Houthi are described as Shia proxies by Saudi Arabia 
and Israel alike, because both wish to cast Iran as the villain in this for their 
own geopolitical reasons.  Arguably, Bahrain can do little but assist their Saudi 
benefactors, as the al-Khalifas remain in power only because of Saudi and 
Emirati support.  However, it almost certainly suits Bahrain’s monarchy to see 
the hand of Iran in the Yemen crisis, as it allows them to justify repression 
against elements of their own Shia population, claiming Iran has mobilised 
them to undermine the Sunni regime in Bahrain. 
In early November 2015, the regional security conference organised annually in 
Bahrain by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, the Manama 
Dialogue, was concerned about events in the Middle-East.  Reportedly the 
region is yet to come to terms with what are seen as the unwelcome 
consequences of the 2003 invasion of Iraq which severely disrupted local 
power politics.  Iraq’s Shia-led government is seen by many Sunni Gulf Arabs 
as Iran’s proxy and it is believed the subsequent marginalisation of Iraq's 
Sunnis gave rise to the violent jihadist group ISIS.  Bahrain’s national security 
has not remained untouched and it recently announced it had identified 70 of its 
citizens fighting with ISIS and another 24 individuals have been charged with 
trying to establish an ISIS cell in Bahrain90.   
In terms of internal security, according to Katzman (2015a), some experts have 
expressed pessimism about the possibility of a political settlement in Bahrain, 
suspecting the Shia rebellion might be evolving into a much more organised 
insurgency. One hard-line group, the 14 February Youth Coalition, claims to be 
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inspired by the protests in Egypt; the government has declared it a terrorist 
organisation aiming to overthrow the state.  The Youth Coalition’s claim of 
responsibility for an explosion in the Financial Harbour district in April 2013 
gives credence to the government’s assertion.  In September 2013, fifty Shia 
were sentenced to up to fifteen years in jail for alleged involvement in the 
organisation. Other violent opposition groups that have claimed responsibility 
for terrorist attacks in Bahrain include the Sayara al-Ashtar (Ashtar Brigades)91, 
the Popular Resistance Brigades which openly affiliates with the Youth 
Coalition and the Sayara al-Mukhtar (Mukhtar Brigades). 
Unsurprisingly perhaps, with the emergence of violent terrorist groups, the 
manufacture, storage, and use of explosives against Bahraini security forces 
appears to be increasing. The government discovered bomb-making materials 
in several locations and claims to have uncovered an arms warehouse used by 
oppositionists. In October 2013 nine Bahraini Shia linked to bomb-making 
facilities were convicted and jailed, and in December 2013 a ship bound from 
Iraq was seized, allegedly carrying Iranian weaponry and bomb-making 
material for the Bahrain opposition.  The government claims the bombings 
show the opposition intends to overthrow the state by any means; meanwhile 
the main opposition political societies insist they have no connection to violent 
underground groups (Katzman 2015a), but efforts to distance themselves and 
avoid the attentions of Bahrain’s security apparatus will probably be in vain.   
Violent extremists are present in Bahrain and have posed a security threat, 
despite repression by the Bahraini security forces.  Despite some low-level 
political reforms, discontent among some of the Shia remains strong and deep-
rooted, further suggesting the monarchy’s survival could be in danger unless 
continuously supported by powerful allies.  The sudden appearance of ISIS on 
the regional stage in mid-2014, along with its virulent anti-Shia ideology, may 
have made the overthrow of the Sunni monarchy in Bahrain a less appealing 
proposition to Bahrain’s Shia.  The risk is that the collapse of the al-Khalifa 
monarchy could open the door to a branch of ISIS and the atrocities against 
Shia that would inevitably ensue.  There is also probably suspicion in Shia 
minds that if the al-Khalifas’ position became untenable the Saudis would 
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switch sponsorship to ISIS, who share their anti-Shia views, in the mistaken 
belief they could control a part of the caliphate that was contiguous with Saudi 
Arabia. 
However, terrorist planning and operations seem to continue.  One example is 
a terrorist plot by a militant cell supposedly trained in Iraq which was foiled in 
early 2015 according to the government.  It said the arrested individuals were 
suspected of terrorism as part of Saraya al-Ashtar.  In late 2014 the group 
allegedly sent recruits to Iraq to receive military training from the ‘Hezbollah 
Brigades’92.  This is politically convenient for the monarchy as it suggests a 
nexus between Shia inside and outside Bahrain, and any form of Hezbollah is 
seen as being closely tied to Iran, implicating the Iranians in sponsorship of 
terrorism in Bahrain.  
Towards the end of 2015, the Interior Minister outlined the incidents Bahrain 
had witnessed since 2011. He said Bahrain continues to face foreign 
interference and organised terrorism; he described the seizure of military-grade 
shipments from Iran, including weapons and explosives, and ongoing anti-
Bahrain propaganda by Iranian-backed media organisations.  He said:  
‘I am deeply concerned about how to protect our youth, both from extremism 
and political violence, and from crime in general, including the use of drugs.  
Extremism is a growing threat to all of us - not just young people. Whether it 
is religious extremism, which hijacks our faith for political goals – or 
ideological extremism, which aims to overturn the established political order, 
there is no doubt that extremism is the root of today’s terrorism’93.  
The Interior Minister’s comments represent an unequivocal statement of the 
Bahraini government’s intent to maintain and strengthen its security apparatus.  
Conflating external aggression with alleged foreign support for dissidents, 
domestic opposition groups and terrorism, alongside countering organised 
crime, is an ideal way of ensuring the security forces have the authority and 
powers they need to conduct a full-spectrum security clampdown on any form 
of civilian non-compliance.  Effectively this gives the security forces carte 
blanche to arrest and detain whoever they wish.   
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4.3.9. Reinforcing Security Structures 
Having suggested Bahrain is strengthening its security forces and powers, the 
Kingdom publishes very little about its security operations, so it is difficult to 
gain a view of whether force levels have been increased or deployments 
altered, especially since the events of 2011 caused such a major security 
surge.  However, what is clear is that repression continues to be the major 
security tool used by the authorities to maintain their hold on power and 
minimise vocal dissent or active opposition.  Some specific examples 
demonstrate this very clearly. 
In June 2015 Sheikh Ali Salman, the leader of the main Bahraini Shia 
opposition group, al-Wefaq, was jailed for four years for inciting hatred, 
promoting disobedience and insulting public institutions.  Al-Wefaq has 
accused the Sunni-led government of aggravating the country's crisis with 
Salman’s sentencing94 and demanded his release95. This was reported 
objectively in the Qatar-based Gulf Times which has a record of open reporting 
of human rights violations in other Arab states, generally supporting what it 
sees as the oppressed, probably to the great annoyance of Bahrain’s rulers 
and perhaps reflecting the periodically fractious relationship between Qatar and 
Bahrain over the years96,97,98.  On 30 May 2016 the Sheikh’s sentence was 
extended by an appeal court to nine years causing al-Wefaq to warn of the 
potential for a still worse political crisis99 in the country.  This was subsequently 
followed by a government suspension of al-Wefaq to ‘safeguard the security of 
the kingdom’ on 14 June100 & 101 and al-Wefaq’s spiritual leader, Sheikh Isa 
Qassim, being stripped of his Bahraini nationality on 20 June following 
accusations of collusion with foreign enemies, presumably Iran, and promoting 
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sectarianism and violence102.  It appears Bahrain’s government is intent on 
inflaming103 rather than defusing an already restless and fragile situation. 
In September 2015 a report by Americans for Democracy & Human Rights in 
Bahrain (ADHRB) claimed the government of Bahrain was committed to 
dismantling its opposition, exemplified by al-Wefaq Secretary-General Ali 
Salman’s prison term detailed above, plus al-Wahdawi leader Fadhel Abbas’ 
sentence of five years detention and the re-arrest of National Democratic 
Action Society (Wa’ad) Secretary-General Ebrahim Sharif only weeks after his 
early release from a sentence for allegedly inciting the overthrow of the 
government, violence, hatred and sectarianism104.  It claims suppression of the 
cross-sectarian opposition aims to prevent the Shia from working with Sunni 
oppositionists to reduce the marginalisation of the majority. ADHRB cites 
negative media reporting, destruction of Shia heritage sites and economic and 
political disenfranchisement105 as evidence of the government’s campaign of 
oppression.  ADHRB’s reporting is widely corroborated through other human 
rights sources and the regional and international news media. 
In late November 2015 photographer Sayed Ahmed al-Mousawi was sentenced 
to ten years in prison and had his nationality revoked, along with 12 others, 
after reporting a series of demonstrations in early 2014. Security forces 
detained Al-Mousawi for over a year without trial or official charges, accused 
him of being a part of a terrorist cell and subjected him to torture. Bahrain then 
tried al-Mousawi under its anti-terrorism legislation. A judge later accused him 
and his brother of membership in a terrorist cell, which al-Mousawi denied.  
ADHRB says Bahrain’s continued arrest of journalists and photographers for 
exposing human rights violations reflects a systematic campaign by the 
authorities to quell freedom of expression and the press. Bahrain is ranked 163 
out of 180 in the 2015 World Press Freedom Index according to Reporters 
Without Borders. In 2014, a court convicted another renowned photojournalist, 
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Ahmed al-Humaidan to 10 years in prison under similar charges. ADHRB says 
Bahrain has revoked the citizenship of more than 130 individuals since 2012106.   
Following the murder of two French journalists in Mali in 2013, the UN 
proclaimed 2 November the ‘International Day to End Impunity for Crimes 
Against Journalists’. The day is dedicated to all press who have suffered 
violence and condemns the imprisonment, torture, and murder of journalists. In 
2015, the Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), ADHRB and Bahrain 
Institute for Rights and Democracy (BIRD) marked the day, expressing severe 
concern over Bahrain’s repression of freedom of speech by commentators 
using both traditional and social media.  They accused the government of 
criminalising freedom of expression through systematic prosecution of 
journalists and bloggers; they noted the 2015 Freedom House annual report 
rated Bahrain “Not Free” and ambiguities in Bahraini law allow journalists to be 
detained for criticising the King or Islam, or threatening national security.  They 
claimed at that time the Bahraini authorities held at least ten journalists and 
photographers on such charges107.  Again, there is sufficient contemporaneous 
reporting to back-up the claims of the human rights lobby and strongly support 
the view that freedom of political expression by the opposition in Bahrain is 
severely limited.  
This is by no means an exhaustive list, but clearly shows the Bahraini 
government is engaged in an active campaign to silence the spectrum of 
opposition it faces.  Furthermore, the government is not averse to using torture 
and other non-judicial methods to achieve its aims.  These examples of clear 
repression of critics of the regime serve only to aggravate the mainly Shia 
opposition and prevent any chance of a meaningful dialogue or a political 
agreement any time soon.  This makes BEV2030’s claims of Bahrain as one 
nation look hollow, if not disingenuous.  
4.3.10. International Collaboration 
Bahrain maintains close links with many partners to achieve its national goals, 
but, while it hosted a climate change conference at the Arabian Gulf University 
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in May 2015, where regional and especially GCC cooperation on climate 
change was on the agenda108, no obvious collaboration on specific climate 
change issues has been discovered.  Of course, Bahrain openly nurtures 
relationships designed to protect its national security.  For example, in February 
2015 it was announced Bahrain was lending military support to Jordan to help 
combat ISIS, as part of the Gulf Kingdom’s commitment to ‘the efforts of the 
International Coalition to eradicate terrorism’.  News reporting said the decision 
was in line with bilateral ties between the two countries and the ‘solid brotherly 
ties of kinship and solidarity bonding the two kingdoms throughout history’109.  
In October 2015, the Minister of Foreign Affairs reiterated Bahrain’s readiness 
to cooperate with all efforts aimed at eliminating the threat of terrorism, as he 
received the US Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter 
ISIL (ISIS) on a visit to the Kingdom. The US Envoy praised Bahrain’s role in 
the fight against terrorism and its efforts to prevent money reaching ISIS.  He 
emphasised the close Bahraini-US relations and the level of progress and 
development they are undergoing110.   
A curious web of collaborative relationships is highlighted through a targeted 
digital attack on members of the Al-Wefaq political society living outside 
Bahrain in October 2015, although there appears no direct evidence this was 
an official state attack111.  However, Wikileaks published a searchable 
database following a cyber attack against ‘Hacking Team’, an Italian spyware 
company, showing over a million emails which were leaked from the company’s 
servers. More than 1300 emails mention Bahrain and reveal how its 
government obtained Hacking Team’s Remote Control System (RCS) in 2014 .  
A Dubai-based IT company, MidworldPro, acted as an intermediary between 
Bahrain’s Ministry of Interior (MOI) and Hacking Team.  MidworldPro paid 
Hacking Team US$227,650 for a one-year pilot of RCS to be tested by the 
MOI’s Cyber Crime Department. The emails also reveal that an Israeli 
surveillance company, NICE Systems, was acting as another intermediary 
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between Hacking Team and Bahrain’s National Security Apparatus and the 
Bahrain Defence Force112.  So it appears Italians, Israelis, Emiratis and 
Bahrainis were all working together to hack into the emails of Bahraini 
nationals, although this is not publicly avowed and could cause the monarchy 
problems with loyalists because of Israeli involvement.  
Less suspiciously, in November 2015 the UK Foreign Secretary was present at 
the start of construction of HMS Juffair at Mina Salman Port in Bahrain.  The 
establishment is being developed for Royal Navy deployments in the Gulf to 
support the security of allies in the region113.  Similarly, Bahrain says the very 
strong relationship between it and Saudi Arabia demonstrates a firm resolve to 
strengthen ties ‘for the best interest of the two brotherly countries and their 
peoples... based on cooperation, friendship and joint destiny’114.  This does not 
suggest any major political reform or change of Shia circumstances can be 
expected soon.   
So, it appears Bahrain is executing a sophisticated strategy of tying itself into 
ever-closer, multiple collaborative agreements, all of which makes their national 
security very much stronger.  It also has the added bonus of making their 
collaborators appear to condone repression against their effectively 
marginalised majority, despite the public protestations of senior American and 
British politicians.  Current events in the Middle-East make a change of tack by 
their allies unlikely. 
 4.4. Reflections on Bahrain 
It is probably fair to say that climate change is not seen by the al-Khalifas as 
their most pressing problem.  Despite the threat of losing fifteen kilometres of 
coastline due to rising sea levels and other first order consequences such as 
increased temperatures, more extreme weather, poor air quality, vector-borne 
diseases and increased mortality and morbidity, most of those effects will not 
become severe until 2050-2100.  That timescale may seem short strategically, 
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but when placed in the context of the significant development Bahrain has seen 
in the last 45 years, since independence in 1971, it must seem there is ample 
time to deal with the projected climate change effects once other, more 
pressing problems have been resolved.  Those problems are two-fold: firstly, 
the hydrocarbon revenue dependency era is effectively at an end for Bahrain, 
even with Saudi handouts from Abu Sa’afah; secondly, the majority of 
Bahrain’s citizens are Shia who are politically, socially and economically 
marginalised, disaffected with the ruling Sunni minority, and require more 
sophisticated handling than mere repression if there is not to be a sustained 
and determined backlash that topples the monarchy.  Both problems have 
direct consequences for human, national and regime security in Bahrain. 
To be fair, and as seen earlier, BEV2030 identified the need to change from a 
rentier political economy; the necessity of economic diversification to create 
wealth; the importance of educating and training citizens to do the jobs required 
in the future; the requirement that human security must be assured; and that 
preserving the quality of the environment in which everyone must live and work 
is essential.  However, there is little doubt the direct relationship between 
economic and national security focuses the monarchy’s mind more than 
anything else.  A rentier state with a highly effective security apparatus is very 
expensive to maintain. 
The demise of oil revenues makes the Kingdom’s economic security and 
sustainability precarious and directly affects the monarchy’s ability to maintain 
its status as a rentier government.  Its challenge is to diversify the economy to 
provide globally profitable productive activities across a wide range of sectors.  
To do this the government must attract FDI and domestic investment and make 
Bahrain a place people choose to do business.  However, businesses need 
educated and skilled workers, with a desire to perform productive work.  If the 
public sector is to shrink those workers must be Bahraini citizens, not 
expatriates, but citizens’ work culture may not be compatible with private sector 
expectations.  As government revenue from oil falls, so it must be replaced 
from other sources.  Taxation seems the obvious solution, but that would 
almost certainly require commensurate popular political participation; at present 
that seems unlikely as it is at odds with the principle of rentier government.  
However, without tax revenues replacing oil revenues, it is difficult to see how 
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public services will be maintained; the sustainability of rentierism is very 
doubtful once citizens have to pay tax or the market rate for goods and services 
that are currently free or highly subsidised. 
The Shia problem is historical, emotive and probably beyond the monarchy to 
resolve, given the intractability of hard-line Sunni establishments in Bahrain and 
neighbouring Saudi Arabia.  Despite much reporting about oppression and 
human rights violations, Bahrain’s diplomatic skill at making itself regionally 
indispensible makes Shia marginalisation and repression something countries 
like the US and UK appear willing to tolerate privately, while making occasional, 
critical statements for public consumption.  However, national or regime 
security enforced by authoritarianism can only endure so long as the state is 
strong enough to maintain the pressure; maintenance of that strength depends 
on good economic security. 
So, Bahrain is a paradox.  The government recognises the interdependencies 
of preserving the environment and cultural heritage, alongside all aspects of 
human security.  BEV2030 and subsequent development agendas continue to 
stress the importance of education, healthcare and food and water security, all 
of which directly contribute to the human security of the nation.  A population 
enjoying high levels of human security is more likely to be economically 
productive and politically stable; the resulting economic security and stability is 
essential for the maintenance of effective national security.  The government 
appears to understand all of those linkages and professes to be working to 
make them stronger in each area for all of its citizens.  Yet, it arrests critics, it 
abuses human rights, and it increases the political, social and economic 
marginalisation of the Shia; in Bahrain and other places these are the root 
causes of insurrection.  The outcome for Bahrain’s monarchy is uncertain; it 
can survive in its current form as long as it has support from its Saudi and 
Emirati allies, but a sustainable future must lie in a strong economy, political 
reform and an accommodation with the Shia that allows all citizens to share the 
future prosperity of the Kingdom.  That is much more pressing than climate 
change. 
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5. QATAR – A Case Study 
 
Map 3. Qatar - http://media.maps.com/magellan/Images/qatarrap.gif  
5.1. Introduction  
Qatar occupies the small peninsula bordering Saudi Arabia and the UAE that 
extends north into the Arabian Gulf.  It has been continuously but sparsely 
inhabited since prehistoric times.  As Islam became established and expanded, 
Qatar became subject to Islamic caliphates and then was later ruled by a 
number of local and foreign dynasties, before falling under the control of the al-
Thani tribe in the 19th century. The al-Thani sought British patronage in 1867 
following a conflict with Bahrain over territory which saw Doha almost 
destroyed.  However, subsequently the Emir invited Ottoman forces to 
establish a garrison there which remained in place from 1871 to 1913.  Then in 
1916, in exchange for protection, Qatar signed a treaty with the UK which took 
control of Qatar’s foreign policy until the latter’s independence in 1971115&116.  
The territorial dispute with Bahrain, which included sporadic skirmishes and 
attempts at mediation by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, continued until an 
International Court of Justice ruling on 16 March 2001 that gave pragmatic 
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concessions to both sides117&118.  However, minor incidents have continued 
between the two countries to the present, mainly involving arrests of Bahraini 
fishing vessels considered to be illegally operating in Qatar’s territorial 
waters119&120.  Interestingly, and unlike other Gulf States, Qatar maintains 
generally cordial relations with Iran and is often thought to have used this to 
counterbalance Saudi influence within the GCC arena.  However, the tension 
between Iran and the GCC since the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr by 
Saudi Arabia in January 2016 has made Qatar’s position somewhat 
uncomfortable121.   
Politically, Qatar is stable and most changes are initiated from the top.  Lambert 
(2011) writes that the new Qatari constitution was approved by referendum on 
23 April 2003 with 98 percent of voters in favour.  It replaced the appointed 
Advisory Council with a Consultative Council consisting of 45 members, 30 of 
whom were directly elected.  The constitution guaranteed the rights of women 
to vote and stand for office.  The Consultative Council can pass laws subject to 
the Emir’s approval, question ministers and approve state budgets.  The 
constitution became law in 2004.  However, elections are yet to take place as 
the Advisory Council was extended for a further three years the day before the 
abdication of Sheikh Hamad in favour of his son Sheikh Tamim122 in June 
2013.  Lambert says there are suggestions Qatar is keen to avoid the political 
obstructionism that characterises Kuwait’s parliamentary process and that 
Qatar’s ruling élite wants to have all permitted political reforms in law before the 
Consultative Council is permitted to stand up (2011). 
Noting national and regime security are habitually conflated by the Gulf 
monarchies, the proposition remains that good economic security assures 
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national security by providing political and social stability through successful 
delivery of the ruling bargain.  This guarantees the future survival of the current 
governance system and the consequent political continuity enables high levels 
of human security and development to be achieved.  There is a resulting 
feedback loop between human security and economic security; a safe and 
secure population is much more likely to be economically productive than not.  
As has previously been remarked, the citizens of Qatar appear to be politically 
apathetic and most change is driven top-down.  Reflecting this, and as part of 
its national development reform agenda, Qatar’s vision was published by the 
government in 2008, coincident with the start of the global economic downturn 
and the publication of similar policies in Bahrain and the UAE; it provides the 
ideal aspirational baseline from which to gauge Qatar’s success in achieving its 
development goals. 
5.2. Qatar National Vision 2030 (QNV2030) 
5.2.1. Word Counts 
QNV2030 is a national vision produced by the General Secretariat for 
Development Planning (GSDP), so it is unsurprising the key word with the 
highest count at 67 is ‘development’, especially as the four pillars of the Vision 
are Human, Social, Economic and Environmental Development.  The next 
highest scoring word is ‘economic’ with 51 counts, followed by ‘national’ with a 
score of 30, although sixteen refer to the ‘National Vision’ itself.  
‘Environmental’ scores 24 counts, but all of these refer to the natural 
environment as do the seventeen counts for the word ‘environment’.  Grouping 
these two scores together gives 41 mentions about the natural world.  The only 
other words achieving double digit counts are ‘international’ with seventeen, 
‘education’ twelve and ‘citizens’, ‘expatriate’ and ‘human’ all achieving scores of 
eleven.  In the count of paired words ‘human development’ is well ahead with 
seven, ‘expatriate workers’ scores three, ‘climate change’ two and ‘national 
security’ one.  From this simple analysis there is little to surprise, as QNV2030 
concerns development and the economy will be a significant part of this.  The 
natural environment and climate change, when grouped together, score highly, 
but the environment is one of the four developmental pillars of the Vision so this 
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should be expected.  Most notable by their absence are specific mentions of 
reforms, whether economic or political. 
5.2.2. The Context 
The Vision runs to 36 pages excluding the cover and publisher’s information.  
Like BEV2030 it is well written in straightforward language and benefits from a 
concise, logical flow.  After a single read at one sitting, one is left with the 
impression of a sophisticated and forward looking vision that puts sustainable 
development alongside the desire to protect the environment and look after the 
population.   
The foreword by the Heir Apparent, who subsequently replaced his father on 
abdication in June 2013, declares monarchic intent and is the authority for the 
Vision.    It recognises the need to balance current requirements with the 
interests of future generations and describes a society in which there is 
economic and social justice and where man and the environment co-exist in 
harmony, all underpinned by strong Islamic and family values.  It identifies the 
need for investment in infrastructure, diversification, dynamism, transparency 
and accountability, and concludes by exhorting all sections of society to play 
their part in achieving the national destiny.  The foreword is exactly what one 
would expect from a future ruler introducing his country’s national vision until 
2030. 
The main body of QNV2030 starts with a quote from the Emir about the 
importance of comprehensive development and sets the tone for the document.  
This is followed by an introductory piece claiming political progress has been 
made through the ratification and subsequent enactment of the constitution in 
2005.  It says despite political, economic and social changes, the family 
remains at the centre of Qatari society as the country, led by the Emir, 
develops its capacity and takes on a key role in the international community.  
Implicit in this statement is the centrality of the monarchy to the future success 
of the nation.  The introduction concludes by saying the aim is to transform 
Qatar into an advanced, sustainable nation, where all of its people enjoy a 
perpetually high standard of living. 
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5.2.3. Challenges 
The Vision moves on to discuss challenges, but specifically not threats.  The 
first of these challenges is the inherent tension between greater freedoms and 
choice that inevitably accompany social and economic progress, and the deep-
rooted traditional social values cherished by society.  It says other societies 
have achieved this balance successfully, but the implied message is that 
culture, traditions and especially governance are not giving way to modernity 
any time soon.   
The second challenge identifies the need to balance the interests of the current 
population with those of future generations.  It specifically counsels against 
inept use of hydrocarbon revenues yielding low returns, wasteful prestige 
projects and overly aggressive economic development plans that over-stress 
the economy and damage the environment.  These concerns are indicative of 
sound financial prudence and the desire to ensure current incomes are 
preserved for the benefit of future generations.  This probably suggests further 
investment in new industries, capabilities and sovereign wealth funds.  
Potentially, such investments could support the continuance of a form of the 
ruling bargain if done wisely. 
The next challenge highlights the need for managed growth rather than 
uncontrolled expansion.  It identifies the potential of reduced public service 
efficiency, low productivity and late delivery of projects, environmental damage, 
and population disparities leading to social tensions. QNV2030 declares the 
need for control and for development to be sustainable.  This is clearly linked to 
the second challenge, but again shows the rulers’ caution in approaching 
Qatar’s modernisation.  Centralised control exercised by the monarchy is 
implicitly vital, as in Bahrain. 
The future dependency on expatriate or migrant labour is the fourth challenge.  
The Vision says Qatar is experiencing high population growth due to major 
urban development and investment projects, and increasing government 
expenditure.  This has led to a sharp rise in the ratio of expatriates to locals and 
a very large rise in the number of unskilled migrant workers.  QNV2030 
explains Qatar must weigh the risk to national identity against the economic 
benefits derived from these expatriates; Qatar must determine the expatriate 
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skills required and the broad range of costs associated with recruiting them.  
The inference is that Qatar aims to reduce numbers of unskilled or low-skilled 
migrant workers and ensure those who work there in the future are thoroughly 
vetted for suitability.  It is likely the eventual aim is for high-skill jobs to be done 
by Qataris, reducing the need for expatriate labour still further. 
The final challenge concerns harmonising competing demands between 
economic growth, social development and environmental management.  The 
Vision recognises environmental damage may be inevitable as a result of some 
economic projects and the hydrocarbon and other heavy industries, but says 
mitigation through advanced technologies must be emplaced to improve the 
environment and compensate for damage elsewhere.  It says Qatar has 
already signed up to international environmental protection agreements on 
industry and intends to abide by these.  Thus the monarchy explicitly 
recognises the need to mitigate environmental damage and this explains why 
environmental development is one of the four pillars of the Vision.  The 
challenge is widened into a regional issue and recognises the Gulf is one 
ecological system; it says it will be necessary for Qatar to encourage and work 
with all Gulf States to preserve the environment.  This very strong message 
recognises climate change is real and something must be done to prevent 
further degradation in the interests of Qatar’s future.  It also specifically 
demonstrates Qatar’s intention to collaborate with allies and partners in the 
future. 
5.2.4. Guiding Principles 
The next part of QNV2030 is about meeting these challenges by combining the 
Guiding Principles of the Permanent Constitution with Royal direction and wide 
consultation.  Sheikha Mozah, the Emir’s wife, has a role alongside the Emir 
and the Heir Apparent and while this prominent and public involvement of a 
woman in Gulf State politics is highly unusual, it reflects the part played by 
Qatar’s leaders in promoting some reform including political rights for women.  
Citing Qatar as a society that promotes justice, benevolence and equality, the 
Vision says the guiding principles protect personal and public freedoms, 
promote religious values and traditions, and guarantee security, stability and 
equal opportunities, thus reinforcing the need to retain the fundamental 
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characteristics of traditional Qatari life.  QNV2030 then turns to look at its four 
pillars of Human, Social, Economic and Environmental Development in detail. 
5.2.5. Four Pillars of Wisdom 
5.2.5.1. Human Development 
The Human Development pillar explains hydrocarbon revenues are limited as 
resources are depleting; therefore a sustainable future will require Qataris to 
adapt to a new international, knowledge-based, competitive system.  Citizens 
will be prepared for this through improved education and healthcare and by 
adopting a meaningful role in the workforce.  It acknowledges there will be 
need of qualified expatriates in all fields, reinforcing the intention to change the 
nature and size of the migrant workforce.  Qataris will be educated and trained 
to take part in increasingly complex technical tasks requiring analytical and 
critical skills, plus creativity and innovation.  However, this modernisation will be 
tempered by the promotion of social cohesion through national values; 
undoubtedly this is designed to help the ruling élite maintain its grip on the 
transformation process.  Encouragingly, there is also the intention to engage 
actively with other nations, which perhaps reflects Qatar’s worldview and its 
aspirations for a substantial role on the global stage.  This is reaffirmed 
subsequently by the stated aim of becoming an active centre for scientific 
research and intellectual activity, signalling an aspiration others will invest in, or 
relocate to Qatar for these purposes.  Aligned closely is the goal of creating a 
world-class healthcare system accessible to the entire population, presumably 
including expatriate workers.  QNV2030 sees a clear relationship between 
educational attainment, personal and public health and the aspiration that 
Qataris will become productive workers.  However, there is again recognition of 
the indispensability of expatriates to make up the skills shortfall created by 
transformation to a larger, diversified, technologically sophisticated economy.  
There will be recruitment and retention incentives and expatriates’ rights and 
safety will be protected.  As well as economic necessity, this reflects an 
intention to assure human security at the higher end of the spectrum, through 
education and healthcare and guaranteed rights for all residents.  There are 
three key components to this pillar.   
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 ‘An Educated Population’ builds on matching the needs of the labour market, 
but also talks of matching opportunities to individual aspirations and abilities 
and providing life-long learning opportunities.  This will be achieved through a 
variety of learning techniques designed to enable a positive contribution to 
society, underpinned by reinforcement of Qatari moral, ethical, cultural, 
traditional and, implicitly, religious values.  Innovation and creativity will be 
promoted and citizens’ sense of belonging will be reinforced while they are 
encouraged to take part in sporting and cultural activities.  Qataris will also 
work with international partners on scientific research, cultural and intellectual 
activities, but while educational institutions will have some latitude, their 
activities will be centrally directed.  There is, therefore, an inherent tension 
within the education component as modernisation and broader, advanced 
education could lead to the spread of ideas contrary to those of the leadership.  
The rulers obviously want to control the process of modernisation through 
reinforcement of traditional religious and cultural values; how successful they 
can be at limiting the spread of ideas in an increasingly interdependent, 
globalised and digitised world remains to be seen.  Physical barriers placed on 
electronic communications will almost certainly deter potential international 
partners from collaborating with Qatari entities.  The monarchy will have to 
resolve this contradiction. 
The health component is not contentious, reflecting the expected norm in any 
modern developed state.  Two points are of note: firstly, the aim of creating a 
national workforce capable of delivering healthcare; this will require Qataris to 
train in the full spectrum of medical roles from porters, auxiliaries and orderlies, 
through nurses and paramedics to doctors and consultants.  Persuading 
citizens to take jobs at the lesser end of the scale will require a significant 
culture change, unless they remain the domain of low-skilled expatriates who 
do jobs Qataris will not.  The second point is a reference to the principle of 
partnership in bearing the costs of healthcare.  It is clear the government does 
not see itself funding healthcare alone.  This suggests that in the absence of 
national taxation, citizens and private sector institutions will have to bear the 
costs of health insurance for themselves and their employees.  This would 
neatly transfer current government costs into the private sector and avoid the 
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unpleasantness of imposing income tax upon the citizenry, thereby maintaining 
an illusion of the government providing for its people. 
The third component concerns ‘A Capable and Motivated Workforce’.  This 
could be one of the most challenging areas, given notions of entitlement to 
public sector jobs some citizens hold.  It focuses on professional and 
management roles in business, health and education, along with individually 
tailored high quality training.  Women are specifically targeted for increased 
opportunities and vocational support.  This could be seen as an implicit aim to 
segregate women into lower paid, ‘vocational’ roles like lesser healthcare jobs, 
while men take more senior managerial and professionally qualified roles.  
While QNV2030 does not state that as policy, it would conform to traditional 
and cultural views of the role of women prevalent in Gulf societies.  The final 
element of this section concerns targeted recruitment of expatriates with the 
right skills, protection of their rights and safety, and the retention of the most 
talented of them.  There will be gaps at the lower end of the labour market if 
low-skilled expatriates are reduced in numbers. Perhaps Qatari women are 
thought to be the natural candidates to fill these roles, although the most menial 
and dirty jobs will almost certainly continue to be done by unskilled migrants. 
5.2.5.2. Social Development 
‘Social Development’, the second pillar, is intrinsically linked to ‘Human 
Development’ through interdependencies and interactions that naturally occur 
between the two pillars.  This pillar talks of nurturing citizens to ensure they can 
live effectively in a modern world while retaining traditional values and 
lifestyles.  It also says women will assume a more important role in society 
through participation in economic and political decision-making; this would 
appear to place women in higher value roles than the human development 
pillar might have suggested.  The pillar’s description reaffirms the importance of 
Qatar’s Arab and Islamic identity at the core of national life, but declares its 
determination to promote tolerance and understanding of other cultures, no 
doubt as part of ensuring Qatar is seen as a welcoming place for international 
business.  It continues with an assurance that basic needs will be provided for 
and equal opportunities for all citizens will be guaranteed.  It concludes by 
declaring Qatar will live up to its international obligations and play a role on the 
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regional and international stage in promoting peace and security, again 
reaffirming Qatar’s view of its place in the world.  The term ‘political reform’ is 
never used in QNV2030 and there is no suggestion of political change as part 
of social development, or a recognition that increased economic activity or 
interaction with foreigners by its citizens may lead to a demand for such.  The 
emphasis remains on preserving Qatar’s traditional way of life, which appears 
to mean traditional governance structures too. 
The Social Development pillar is based on outcomes in three sectors.  The first 
of these, ‘Social Care and Protection’, is covered with a pithy statement about 
maintaining moral and religious values, family unity and humanitarian ideals.  
Civil rights, valuing individuals’ contributions and having enough money for 
health and dignity are covered in a second sentence.  These are laudable 
human security aims, but again the priority appears to be the maintenance of 
the status quo in terms of societal order and traditional governance, without 
admitting to the possibility that some political reform may be necessary. 
The outcomes for ‘A Sound Social Structure’ are in five bullets supporting a 
statement advocating effective public institutions and a strong and active civil 
society.  The first bullet says Qatar’s national heritage will be preserved while 
Arab and Islamic values and identity are enhanced, but it is obvious civil society 
activity will be regulated along traditional lines rather than allowing the 
presence of active political parties.  The remaining bullets emphasise the need 
for high quality services; maintenance of the rule of law, justice and equality; 
the future role of women in economic and political decision-making; and the 
need for tolerance and cooperation at national and international level.  Quite 
how women will play such a part in national life or how increased contact, 
cooperation and openness at the international level will be achieved without 
modernisation or adjustment of the traditional governance model remains 
unanswered.  It would seem inescapable that those engaged in such activity 
will demand greater empowerment and authority, unless they are already part 
of the established ruling élite.  If this is the case, there will be no greater role in 
national decision-making for any outside that circle. 
The pillar’s final set of outcomes are concerned with ‘International 
Cooperation’.  This is bland and unsurprising, although it does demonstrate 
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Qatar’s global aspirations.  It wants increased regional collaboration through 
the GCC, the Arab League and the Organisation of Islamic Conference.  It aims 
to promote international peace and security through cultural exchanges, the 
promotion of co-existence between nations and cultures, and using political, 
developmental and humanitarian tools.  It makes no mention of the UNFCCC or 
the Kyoto Protocols, but it is fair to assume Qatar takes its international 
obligations seriously in the climate change arena.  During Sheikh Hamad’s 
reign Qatar took on a greater international and regional role through mediation 
and active military support; it continues to be involved in Libya123, Gaza124 and 
the ISIS insurgency125, although in this latter intervention there is a degree of 
confusion over the role of the Qatari state as opposed to the independent 
actions of some wealthy Qatari individuals126. 
The second pillar is an interesting mix of human security, human development 
and national security and interests, demonstrating Qatar’s rulers are serious 
about raising its profile and position in international affairs, and strengthening 
and improving Qatari civil society.  However, the omission of any suggestion of 
political authority being devolved outside the circle of the ruling élite, even if 
wholesale political reform remains anathema to the monarchy, indicates a 
certain naïveté or wishful thinking about the future.  It is true reforms in Qatar 
have so far been driven from the top down, but it would seem very likely any 
greater exposure of citizens to the wider world will promote a desire for political 
and social change. 
5.2.5.3. Economic Development 
‘Economic Development’ is the third pillar of QNV2030 and focuses on 
preservation of wealth for the future, careful management of remaining 
hydrocarbon reserves, and economic diversification.  The pillar’s introduction 
identifies the role hydrocarbon revenues will play in ensuring a sustainable 
future through providing the means to invest in infrastructure, build public 
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services, transform Qatar’s citizens into productive workers, and support 
development of innovation and entrepreneurial skills.  The aim is to make Qatar 
a regional hub for knowledge and high-value services.  It is acknowledged the 
private sector must be enabled to participate; this will be achieved by 
entrepreneurial education and training for individuals and providing financial 
and other support to SMEs.  Interestingly, it is claimed the political and 
organisational climate has already been improved to support business, but 
more needs to be done to improve competitiveness and attract investment if 
success is to be achieved in an increasingly globalised business environment.  
Another challenge identified is the need to control and balance economic 
growth to avoid inflationary pressures, or to risk overstressing public services 
which could lead to a breakdown of social cohesion.  QNV2030 says the 
solution will be foresight, economic management and institutional agility.  There 
is a suggestion free market dynamics will be constrained by centralised 
direction.  The introduction concludes by saying the best way ahead lies in 
open, flexible markets alongside affordable social protection and strong 
financial reserves.  The compatibility of these aims will almost certainly 
determine the success of Qatar’s economic diversification and sustainability, 
especially if foreign investors believe too much government control is imposed 
upon markets. 
‘Economic Development’ is also supported by a series of outcomes.  ‘Sound 
Economic Management’ outcomes are similar to those espoused by developed 
nations, the IMF and the World Bank.  They include sustainable growth for 
current and future generations; financial stability, low inflation, sound policies 
and a secure financial system; an attractive business environment for investors 
and technology; structures that permit fair competition in a globalised market; 
and trading and financial cooperation with international partners.  These 
outcomes demonstrate Qatar’s rulers appreciate the urgency of diversifying 
their economy and reinforce the perception that Qatar sees international 
collaboration as vital for its future sustainability. 
The second batch of outcomes concerns ‘Responsible Exploitation of Oil and 
Gas’ and starts by acknowledging the requirement to establish balance 
between production levels and maintaining reserves, and between economic 
diversification and resource depletion rates.  With about a century’s worth of 
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gas reserves at current production rates, it is nonetheless reassuring to see 
Qatar’s rulers are already pushing ahead with policies designed to maximise 
the life of those reserves and remove their dependency on hydrocarbon 
incomes.  However, the importance of oil and gas is not underplayed, as the 
Vision is clear the sector contributes to technological innovations and the 
development of human and economic resources.  It also sees the role of gas as 
critical in the provision of clean energy to Qatar and the world and identifies the 
centrality of hydrocarbon reserves to Qatar’s national security and its 
sustainable development.  Qatar appears to be content to acknowledge it still 
has huge economic potential as a hydrocarbon producer and is not shy about 
pointing out the benefits derived by Qatar and other nations, while pushing on 
with wider economic diversification. 
The final outcomes for this pillar are grouped under ‘Suitable Economic 
Diversification’.  It explicitly states the intention to reduce hydrocarbon 
dependency in parallel with economic diversification and private sector 
enhancement to enable effective competition.  This will be achieved through 
the competitive advantage the hydrocarbon sector provides to expand other 
industries and services.  It is not clear how much Western decarbonisation 
policies and reductions in demand were driving diversification, but previous 
statements about international obligations and organisations suggest they were 
motivational factors for early change.  The Vision says it will determine where it 
can make a difference and develop its human and technological capacity to 
meet the needs of those economic activities.  The aim is to establish a 
knowledge-based innovative economy, with entrepreneurship, educational 
excellence, modern, highly efficient infrastructure, effective public services and 
transparent and accountable governance.  Here is the first suggestion of 
political reform to accompany the major economic and social changes the 
Vision describes.  Quite how transparent and accountable to whom the 
government will be is not stated, nor whether it is the whole government or just 
the part dealing with the economy.  Yet, here is an acknowledgement that if 
Qatar is to compete on a level playing field its governance practices must be 
more transparent than has hitherto been the case.  Again, it is hard to assess 
whether the rulers understand this could be the thin end of the wedge; once 
people realise they have greater access to the processes of government they 
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could demand more, perhaps even delegation of powers to sections of civil 
society outside the ruling circle.  
5.2.5.4. Environmental Development 
‘Environmental Development’ is the final pillar and appears to have Sheikha 
Mozah, the second wife of the Emir at the time, as its key proponent.  The 
pillar’s introduction reflects her opening words and stresses the environment 
was given by God and if humans respect and care for the environment it will 
repay them.  It continues with a pragmatic view of likely climate change effects 
on Qatar’s territory, including reduced freshwater supplies, pollution, 
environmental degradation and rising sea levels affecting coastal urban 
development, alongside the reality of the depletion of Qatar’s hydrocarbon 
reserves, albeit not for many decades.  It asserts mitigation of these challenges 
will require coordination of effort and mobilisation of capabilities.  Here is 
compelling evidence of the recognition at the highest level that Qatar has to act 
early to offset expected and potential physical climate change impacts.  With 
this level of commitment well in advance of the most severe effects being felt, 
there is a good chance Qatar can take the necessary steps to put effective 
mitigation measures in place. 
‘Environmental Development’ has only one set of outcomes: achieving ‘A 
Balance between Development Needs and Protecting the Environment’, 
covering the air, land and water environments and biodiversity.  The title 
explicitly recognises other development must take place to make Qatar 
sustainable, which is important, but acknowledges the environmental impact of 
this development has to be considered fully.  This almost certainly reflects the 
underlying tenet of Sheikha Mozah’s message that the environment is given by 
God; this can be logically extended towards an implicit message that its 
protection is therefore an Islamic duty.  Given the Vision’s stress on preserving 
Qatar’s religious, cultural and traditional heritage this is unsurprising, especially 
as the outcomes require an educated population that identifies the value of 
preserving Qatar’s natural heritage and that of its neighbours.  QNV2030 says 
there will be responsive and agile legal environmental protections designed to 
meet developing challenges.  Environmental institutions will raise public 
awareness and encourage environmentally friendly technologies, while also 
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conducting research and employing environmental planning tools.  This will 
create a comprehensive sustainable urban development plan based on valid 
policies.  Regional cooperation will assist in mitigating the effects of pollution 
resulting from development elsewhere and will develop a significant role in 
assessing the impact of climate change on the Gulf States and mitigating its 
effects.  Qatar says it will also work with the wider international community to 
mitigate the effects of climate change outside the region.  It is therefore clear 
climate change is seen as a real challenge by the ruling élite and they are 
developing domestic, regional and global perspectives to mitigate its effects on 
Qatar and also be seen acting responsibly on the international stage. 
5.2.6. Achieving the Vision 
The final part of QNV2030 is ‘Achieving the Vision’ which describes the 
intention for GSDP to develop a national strategy.  This was to articulate and 
prioritise goals, along with timelines, stakeholders and performance standards 
and be drafted after consultation with civil society, the private sector and 
government ministries.  It would provide a medium-term framework of 
coordinated programmes and projects.  The Vision says achievement of its 
aspirations is a national responsibility and recognises greater capacity across 
all sectors is needed, as are transparency, partnerships, an energetic business 
environment and more involvement for civil society; there is no mention of 
political reform.  In March 2011, the Qatar National Development Strategy 
2011-2016127 was released under the signature of the Heir Apparent.  Detailed 
analysis of the Strategy is outside the scope of this research, but a general 
inspection reveals a 270 page comprehensive and detailed planning document, 
complete with many supporting figures, tables and statistics, and lists of those 
responsible at each level for delivery.  ‘Developing modern public sector 
institutions’ is at chapter seven, but again there is no mention of political 
reform; rather it appears centralised control is at the heart of delivering 
QNV2030, with no plans to change that. 
QNV2030 is all about development and it appears the four pillars are afforded 
equal status.  Within this there are several key themes, the most significant 
being the centrality of the monarchy in directing development.  This reflects 
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their determination to maintain their grip on control and reluctance to 
countenance any serious political liberalisation or reform.  The position of the 
al-Thani monarchy, enshrined in the constitution, is central to Qatar’s traditional 
governance model.  Elements of the Vision indicate they aim to perpetuate the 
ruling bargain, even when hydrocarbon ‘rents’ cease to be the country’s main 
source of income and the private sector has taken the lead in revenue 
generation.  This position would be strengthened by the absence of meaningful 
popular political engagement, outside of voting for the Central Municipal 
Council, which has no national role, and infrequent consultation of an 
essentially compliant and non-political civil society.  However, the challenge for 
the al-Thanis may be how to control the influence of new ideas when more 
citizens are involved in globalised economic activity.  If wider economic 
participation is really the aim, it would seem inevitable that calls for greater 
political engagement or freedom would arise.  If more Qataris engage with 
foreigners, especially non-Muslims from the West, it is inevitable notions of 
democracy and freedom of speech will spread.  Would the monarchy try to 
control news media and the internet?  The hypocrisy of hosting al-Jazeera, 
while limiting information for internal consumption, would be obvious to 
potential investors, who may choose to keep their money and technology off 
Qatar’s shores.  The Vision’s aim is to develop in a way consistent with Qatar’s 
Arab and Islamic identity and to maintain traditional, cultural and family values 
at the centre of Qatari life.  This will help to preserve Qatari national identity 
and maintain support for continuance of traditional governance. However, the 
Vision recognises it will be hard to achieve that while embracing the globalised, 
knowledge-based enterprise of the future. 
Another significant factor is the Vision’s emphasis on sustainability through 
preserving wealth and resources for future generations.  This is most evident in 
the aspiration to diversify the economy into high-value sectors, even when 
decades of exploitable hydrocarbon reserves remain.   The emphasis on 
education, training and healthcare to prepare citizens for this, and the 
importance assigned to ensuring development is balanced by environmental 
protection  is further evidence.  Yet, there are key omissions here, as QNV2030 
contains no specific mention of water or food as part of its human security 
agenda.  It is probable improved education, healthcare and guaranteed 
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protection of rights implies these aspects, but their absence is surprising given 
Qatar’s water-stressed climate.  However, official acceptance that climate 
change is real and mitigation must start now is a clear indication QNV2030 is 
really looking generations ahead and this has major implications for Qatar far 
beyond 2030.   
The aspiration to diversify Qatar’s economy through knowledge, innovation, 
entrepreneurial skill and world-class infrastructure, in harmony with 
environmental development is praiseworthy.  Whether citizens can make the 
cultural shift to the required work ethic remains to be seen and will determine 
whether Qatar’s aspiration to reduce numbers of low-skilled expatriate workers 
is achieved.  The same will be true of citizens’ abilities to take on high-skilled 
posts in the coming years, reducing expatriate dependency still further.  The 
expectations of Qatari women in the workplace may be critical; it remains to be 
seen in what numbers and at what level they find employment.  Successfully 
‘Qatarising’ the workforce would support the preservation of national identity 
and reduce external and un-Islamic influences. 
International collaboration is a strong theme in QNV2030.  Qatar is determined 
to have a role on the world stage far in excess of what its size would naturally 
suggest.  However, it is very wealthy, at the heart of the Gulf, and works hard to 
promote its worldview and national interests; it is the only GCC state that has 
amicable relations with Iran128, it hosts Headquarters US Central Command 
and also al-Jazeera.  Qatar recognises the inevitability of globalisation and 
knows it must be engaged economically to remain sustainable, but it also sees 
engagement on climate change and other environmental issues, both regionally 
and wider, as non-discretionary.  Linked to Qatar’s self-image as a world player 
is recognition that its national security guarantees are significantly enhanced 
through political, economic, environmental and security partnerships with a 
wide range of partners, some of whom are not well-disposed to each other.   
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5.3. Evidence of Transformation 
5.3.1. The Significance of Climate Change 
At the UN Climate Change Conference in Durban in 2011 (COP 17) it was 
announced that Qatar had won the bid to host COP 18 in November 2012129, 
making it the first climate change conference to be held in the Middle East130. 
The bid was won despite Qatar being a major hydrocarbon exporter with one of 
the world's highest per capita emission levels. However, the Qatari government 
had already committed to emission cuts and had invested significantly in 
supporting the development of low carbon technologies.  The UN also took into 
account that Qatar had stated an intention to support developing countries and 
small island states to adapt to climate change effects such as flooding and 
drought131.  The principal objective of COP 18 was to work towards a universal 
and legally binding climate change agreement to be adopted by 2015 and 
covering all countries by 2020, and also to find ways to accelerate efforts 
before 2020, beyond the existing pledges, to curb emissions and keep global 
warming below 2°C132 & 133.  COP 18 was regarded as a success and resulted 
in the ‘Doha Climate Gateway’134 which extended the life of the Kyoto Protocol 
and set the conditions for the achievement of the Paris 2015 agreement at 
COP 21, as well as enhancing Qatar’s reputation as a Gulf State with serious 
green credentials. 
In May 2015 Qatar hosted the 35th meeting of GCC environmental affairs 
representatives.  The meeting discussed cooperation with the UN Environment 
Programme for West Asia, the Regional Organisation for Protection of Marine 
Environment, the World Bank, Turkey, Jordan and Morocco.  It also discussed 
establishing the GCC Environmental Monitoring Centre and developments 
regarding UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, the Vienna Convention for Protection of 
the Ozone Layer, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
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Ozone Layer135.    Qatar’s public commitment to environmental protection and 
its willingness to collaborate internationally were clearly demonstrated by 
hosting such a high profile meeting and are consistent with the environmental 
emphasis within QNV 2030. 
In June 2015 it was announced Qatari company Amlak had signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Qatar General Electricity and Water 
Corporation (Kahramaa) under the National Programme for Conservation and 
Energy Efficiency (Tarsheed).  The agreement strengthens cooperation in 
preserving natural resources, especially conservation and efficient use of water 
and electricity.  Kahramaa says it has implemented conservation, energy and 
efficiency measures through initiatives including renewable energy 
technology136.  While energy and water conservation were not explicitly 
mentioned in QNV2030, the existence of Tarsheed shows the government’s 
commitment to ensuring human security and environmental considerations are 
harmonised to minimise climate change effects and to conserve energy. 
According to GSDP (2012a), Qatar’s development has been unprecedented; its 
rapid economic growth, urban spread, use of natural resources and exceptional 
population growth have caused environmental stress. It says Qatar’s future 
development will be compatible with sustainable development by ensuring 
effective environmental policies and regulations, the best technology, strong 
environmental institutions and advocacy to change behaviours.  This appears 
to be the space in which civil society will be allowed to operate freely as 
environmental protection is high on the monarchy’s list of priorities, so politically 
uncontroversial. 
Like Bahrain, Qatar has already suffered extreme weather in the form of 
flooding which prompted an inquiry into poor construction standards. In 
November 2015 more than a year's worth of rain fell in a few hours.  Hamad 
International Airport terminal suffered water ingress after 80 millimetres of rain 
fell in the area and many of the capital's streets were flooded, closing schools 
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and shops137.  Other structural damage was reported leading to threats of 
prosecution of construction companies not meeting building standards.  An 
event of this sort raises issues for the government extending beyond climate 
change mitigation.  Much of its diversification is dependent on real estate 
development, so shoddy building standards exposed by increasingly frequent 
extreme weather will cause severe reputational damage to the country’s 
aspiration to be seen as progressive and technologically advanced.  
Interestingly, reporting always mentions the 2022 World Cup and expatriate 
labour in the same reports, both of which are sensitive issues for Qatar 
because of allegations of corruption and human rights abuses respectively.   
5.3.2. Sustainability and Alternative Technologies 
The Qatar Green Building Council (QGBC) launched the Qatar Green Directory 
in April 2015 at the inaugural Qatar Green Building Conference, with more than 
500 delegates from Qatar and around the world taking part.  The directory is 
part of the commitment to deliver sustainability goals set out in QNV2030 by 
raising awareness and promoting best practices in Qatar’s green building 
sector138.  Qatar’s commitment to sustainability and the environment is highly 
visible and it appeared to be providing regional leadership by hosting an 
international conference on cutting edge design and technology.  The linking of 
the QGBC initiative with QNV2030 emphasises the importance placed at 
national level on the environment and the centrality of the government in driving 
the campaign forward. 
RasGas139, a Qatari company launched by Qatar Petroleum and ExxonMobil in 
2001, has initiated a series of projects aimed at reducing GHG emissions 
through new technologies. Qatar claims to be continually striving to be a leader 
in conducting operational activities with minimum environmental impact.  The 
projects are an integrated programme which will eventually reduce CO2 
emissions by up to 2.5 million tonnes per year, roughly the equivalent 
emissions of 500,000 cars.  RasGas is also working on the evolving role of 
LNG as a fuel across many industries that currently consume hydrocarbons 
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and says LNG usage significantly reduces CO2 emissions by up to 20 percent 
and SO2 by up to 100 percent, when compared against marine diesel or petrol.  
RasGas is an active member of the International Gas Union, a leading 
organisation in the promotion of natural gas and LNG use globally140.  The 
desire to protect the environment by promoting LNG is admirable and Qatar is 
a strong advocate.  However, this is not just altruism as Qatar holds the third 
largest reserves of natural gas in the world with ninety years-worth at current 
exploitation levels.  It is also the world’s leading producer of LNG, so 
championing a switch is very good for Qatar’s revenue stream.   
GSDP reports other initiatives to reduce carbon emissions including legislation, 
investment in cleaner technologies, and improvements in industrial processes.  
As part of the National Flaring and Venting Reduction Project, formal reporting 
and voluntary reduction targets were introduced.  Furthermore, complementary 
research is taking place on new carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology 
in partnership between Imperial College, London, and the Qatar Science and 
Technology Park (GSDP 2012a).  Qatar appears serious about climate change 
mitigation and the need to reduce carbon in the atmosphere; also about 
establishing its credentials as a technological leader in the field.  Such a 
reputation for innovation would assist its diversification effort by attracting like-
minded investors and businesses to the country. 
Meanwhile, Qatar’s air quality management project (GSDP 2012a) aims to 
increase regulatory compliance on air quality.  Air quality management uses an 
integrated network of monitoring stations, validation exercises, enhanced 
modelling, and regional cooperation on cross-border concerns.  Increased 
dialogue and sharing of data, including with national stakeholders and other 
GCC states support these activities.  It is hoped the national air quality 
management project will reduce air pollution, high asthma rates and other 
respiratory illnesses; research is underway to examine the relationship between 
air pollution and respiratory diseases.  The project links QNV2030’s human 
security and environmental protection strands with clear recognition of cause 
and effect between increased pollution associated with climate change and 
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increased mortality and morbidity, especially in vulnerable segments of the 
population.     
Qatar is taking other steps in sustainability through monitoring its land and 
marine designated reserves to avoid increasing numbers of threatened 
species. Qatar acknowledges threats to marine biodiversity are largely of 
human origin, so environmental sustainability relies on designating protected 
areas, impact assessments, effective regulation of sustainable fishing, and 
rehabilitation projects.  A new National Biodiversity Database enables 
identification of species and areas in greatest need of protection and 
rehabilitation, which leads to new, targeted protection and conservation laws.  
According to GSDP a national policy is being developed for sustainable 
resource use in all new projects influencing the marine environment and the 
sustainability agenda is being pursued in other areas too.  A solid waste 
management plan is focused on recycling practices, including for hazardous 
waste, and waste reduction (GSDP 2012a).  Here Qatar is making a very 
strong connection between sustainability and environmental protection, seeing 
the two as indivisible.  With this principle at the core of national development, 
Qatar could emerge as the leader of the sustainable development movement in 
the region, which fully supports the monarchy’s aspiration for Qatar’s place in 
the world. 
Reinforcing its reputation for supporting technological innovation, Qatar hosted 
the World Robot Olympiad during 6-8 November 2015141.  Around 2,000 young 
delegates from 48 countries attended the event.  It was considered a great 
success and showed interesting new technologies142.  Qatar wishes to be seen 
as innovative and progressive and hosting events such as this enable it to 
maintain visibility with potential international investors and partners who have 
an interest in developing sustainable alternative technologies.  That is good for 
economic diversification too. 
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5.3.3. Political Reform 
Qatar’s National Strategy 2011-16 declares all hydrocarbon reserves are state 
property, so the government is obliged to maximise revenues gained from their 
exploitation.  It says the state will endeavour to collect all the ‘rents embodied in 
the mineral assets it owns’, while reassuring private investors they will achieve 
their required return on investment, acknowledging some flexibility in the 
framework will be required (GSDP 2011:7).  This would suggest no intention to 
change the political governance of Qatar any time soon, rather a determination 
to perpetuate the status quo for as long as possible, perhaps with some minor 
modifications.  The Strategy says while the state aims to eliminate sources of 
risk within its control, it must not dilute incentives for the private sector to 
participate. However, where hydrocarbon rents have to be shared with private 
investors the government will aim to achieve material compensation through 
such things as new technology, infrastructure, knowledge and skills.  Therefore, 
the maintenance of rents, in cash or in kind, remains a government priority and 
if income levels and public services are maintained there will be no political 
reason to change Qatar’s governance. 
In June 2013 it was reported Qatar’s promised legislative elections may not 
happen until 2016, as Sheikh Hamad had decided to extend the existing 
Advisory Council’s term for another three years143.  Its term had already been 
extended in 2010 until 2013 on the constitutional basis it was in the public’s 
best interest.  Sheikh Hamad had promised elections would happen in 2013 
during his inaugural speech at the Consultative Council in November 2011144.  
The 2016 elections were subsequently delayed to 2019145, although Central 
Municipal Council (CMC) elections were held in May 2015146.  As seen 
previously the CMC has no real role at the national level and could be seen as 
an empty gesture towards democracy.  The Emir’s reluctance to permit 
Consultative Council elections indicates very strongly he has no intention of 
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ceding any legislative authority to an elected body.  Political reform therefore 
remains a very distant prospect.  
Lambert says suggestions some previous reforms were triggered by population 
growth, better education, greater sophistication and demands from below for 
political change are not supported by the evidence.  Qatar’s population growth 
is comparatively modest and the youth bulge is the lowest in the region with 
39.3 percent under the age of 24.  There was no evidence at that time that the 
pressure for reform was bottom up given top down implementation, no 
contested female election victory (although two women were elected in the 
2015 CMC election) and general apathy by Qatari voters, with Qatari 
academics believing political consciousness is low (2011).  This all appears to 
support the assumption Qatari citizens are content with their version of the 
ruling bargain, although this contentment could be the result of ignorance or 
political apathy.  The apparent lack of coherent opposition in or outside Qatar 
would suggest there is little popular desire to change things, although 
government failure to provide free or highly subsidised services and plenty of 
well-paid public sector jobs would undoubtedly alter that. 
Perhaps an anomaly in all this is al-Jazeera, which is encouraging Qatari youth 
to get involved in regional political and social dialogue. It targets people aged 
eighteen and above and aims to have a presence on social media platforms 
and in forums and conferences where young people from different Arab 
countries and political and intellectual affiliations can work towards building a 
better future (GSDP 2012b).  GSDP’s commentary indicates al-Jazeera’s 
activity is officially permitted; so, domestic politics may be off limits, but 
participating in the political affairs of other countries in the region, no doubt in 
support of the Qatari government’s world view, is definitely acceptable and 
encouraged.  It would interesting to know if the government has completed a 
risk assessment on the danger of politicising its youth to comment on other 
Arab states’ affairs and the chances of that politicisation being turned against 
the monarchy and Qatar’s system of governance.   
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5.3.4. Economic Diversification 
According to Ehteshami (2013), Qatar has linked its wealth to domestic 
development and is aiming for a knowledge-based economy by partnering with 
international educational institutions, while encouraging tourism, banking and 
industrial sector growth.  In Forbes’ 2015 list of the richest countries per capita, 
Qatar was placed first and the UAE sixth147 mainly because of their 
hydrocarbon revenues.  However, Australia could threaten Qatar’s primacy in 
LNG148 as it could become a big producer with over 70-80 million tonnes of gas 
a year, which could change the Asia-Pacific equation as countries there could 
become dependent on sources of production within their region (Kern et al 
2010:8).  That would have a very significant impact on Qatar’s revenues, 
especially as Asia-Pacific has been the fastest growing market for oil and gas, 
despite the current economic slowdown. 
Qatar’s National Strategy 2011-16 recognises a diversified economy is 
inherently more stable, offers more opportunities and is less vulnerable to 
commodity price fluctuations than an economy dependent on one principal 
output.  It acknowledged entrepreneurship and innovation must be learned and 
embedded in education and culture, and supported through progressive 
policies and regulations.  It agreed the private sector would need strengthening 
through support and incentives, while artificial constraints should be removed.  
It said Qatar’s efforts to diversify to an economy where productivity and 
innovation underpin prosperity requires fundamental policy shifts to alter 
incentives for its citizens; Qatar must transform itself into a high-wage private 
sector economy (GSDP 2011).  This drive towards diversification includes the 
strong recognition citizens must go out to work and the incentives for doing 
such work must be developed.  In parallel there will have to be a cultural shift 
away from the notion of entitlement that many Qataris feel, although that could 
lead to demands for a greater political voice. 
By 2020, it is planned Qatar will have more than 8,500km of highways, 200 
new bridges and 30 new tunnels.  Qatar has allocated 95 percent of its 
infrastructure investments to road transport, adding to existing and recently 
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completed transport facilities including Hamad International Airport and Hamad 
Port.  An expressway will eventually link Doha to all the major centres and 
preparations are being made to link Qatar to the GCC rail network149, although 
that was put on hold in March 2016 as a response to the economic slowdown 
caused by low oil prices150.  Qatar is cushioned from the full impact of low oil 
prices but is looking for economies151, although major tenders for the al-
Shaheen offshore oil extraction facility are expected in the second half of 2016 
with completion due in mid-2020 at a value of US$500 million152.  This surge in 
construction projects shows Qatar’s commitment to modernisation and 
diversification as it creates the infrastructure necessary to support the 
businesses it hopes to attract.     
GSDP says Qatar is also taking steps to create an enabling environment by 
encouraging investment and providing opportunities for the private sector. Laws 
and regulations affecting banking, customs, commerce, FDI and majority 
foreign ownership have been liberalised.  Entrepreneurship and innovation are 
being encouraged in schools, colleges and research centres; ‘Enterprise Qatar’ 
has been established to offer a range of services to prospective entrepreneurs.  
The Qatar Development Bank has introduced new products and services, 
including credit and export guarantees, insurance products and incubation 
services for start-ups. An Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
strategy is being implemented to support the establishment of ICT focused 
businesses and the Qatar Science and Technology Park is working with private 
sector partners on cutting-edge R&D initiatives, particularly around green 
technology. The Qatar National Research Fund is helping create a national 
research culture and a National Research and Development Strategy has been 
established to align research initiatives with QNV2030’s goals and objectives 
(GSDP 2012a).  This demonstrates serious commitment and effort to ensure 
diversification is fully supported in every way possible.  The Qatari desire to be 
seen as innovative and entrepreneurial is very powerful and undoubtedly 
designed to lure FDI and foreign businesses to the Emirate. 
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The Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (MDP&S) estimates 
continued robust expansion in Qatar’s non-hydrocarbon activities is expected in 
2015–16, bolstered by production from the Barzan Gas Project153.  
Hydrocarbon output will expand by a modest 0.3 percent as gas production 
from Barzan offsets the expected decline in oil output, but this growth will 
diminish in 2016 as oil production continues to decline at a higher rate.  By 
2015 the non-hydrocarbon sector is expected to account for more than half of 
GDP, rising further in 2016.  Financial services, real estate, transport and 
communications, and business services will all benefit from the large 
infrastructure projects and property development.  Demand for services from 
the trade and hospitality sector was also predicted to pick up in line with 
forecast population growth and rising numbers of visitors to the country. 
Government services are expected to expand in keeping with population and 
economic growth in the wider non-hydrocarbon economy (MDP&S 2014). 
Subsequent MDP&S forecasts predicted Barzan would add around 21 percent 
to pipeline gas production and strong growth in the non-hydrocarbon sector 
would be supported by capital spending on infrastructure and by relatively 
strong population growth.  In 2016 and 2017 real growth is expected to ease154 
to 6.6 and 6.0 percent respectively, still very high performance in the prevailing 
global economic climate, although this was subsequently revised downwards 
when 2015’s GDP forecast was halved to 3.7 percent by MDP&S as a result of 
the global economic downturn155.  Financial, real estate, transport, 
communications and business services will benefit from infrastructure projects, 
while trade and hospitality expect strong growth from regional clients.  Barzan’s 
output will support an increase in production of refined products, fertilisers and 
petrochemicals; greater demand for cement and metals for construction and 
infrastructure is expected to sustain other manufacturing activities.   Finally, a 
new condensates refinery, Laffan 2, is set to come on stream in the fourth 
quarter of 2016 and is expected to stimulate vigorous manufacturing growth in 
2017. Laffan 2 will produce jet fuel and gas oil to be sold domestically and will 
export diesel and other products to Asian markets (MDP&S 2015). 
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There can be little doubt Qatar’s commitment and drive to diversify its economy 
and break into the non-hydrocarbons sector at a regional and international level 
is very serious.  Their ability to achieve this is based on two key characteristics 
not available to their neighbours in Bahrain: vast hydrocarbon reserves giving a 
guaranteed revenue stream; and political stability as a result of a largely 
homogeneous156 and politically apathetic national population.  The citizens 
have a vested interested in safety, stability and enrichment and are therefore 
an ideal people for the monarchy to rule.  However, it is open to question 
whether acquiescence, derived from a sense of entitlement inflated by the 
ruling bargain, would survive a new policy requiring the majority of citizens to 
work gainfully in the private sector. 
5.3.5. Education and Skills for Citizens 
According to GSDP, public service employment is so entrenched in family 
traditions most Qatari youth seldom give serious consideration to other options 
(GSDP 2012b). Seventy percent of young Qataris who responded to a Ministry 
of Economy and Commerce survey said they wanted to take up public sector 
employment after graduation.  However, 55 percent also want to run their own 
businesses with retail and food, construction and financial services being the 
preferred sectors.  A new law on establishing commercial companies has 
removed the minimum capital previously required for setting up limited liability 
companies157 making it an easier process for aspiring entrepreneurs.  Although 
there seems to be some contradiction in the percentages, it is clear a safe job 
in the public sector immediately after graduation is the preferred option for 
young Qataris.  However, it is encouraging many of them see the potential for 
private sector enterprise as well, although most who replied in the affirmative 
see themselves as the owner of the company rather than a private sector 
employee.   
GSDP says the aim of Qatar’s education and training system is to prepare 
young people for success in an increasingly complex world.  It enables social 
and economic transformation while giving young Qataris intellectual and 
practical development to achieve their potential. The desire is to motivate 
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Qataris to use their knowledge and skills in the interests of society by 
encouraging analytical and critical thinking, creativity and innovation (2012b).  
Whether the monarchy has understood the potential implications of having a 
more analytical, critical and pioneering citizenry could be questioned, as such 
personal development must inevitably lead to questions about the political role 
of society in Qatar and the how the ruling élite reserves decision-making 
powers for itself.   
However, this may not be a pressing issue.  GSDP reports that although it is 
necessary to build human capital for a more productive, skilled and motivated 
workforce, many Qataris who wish to pursue tertiary education are not qualified 
to enter university so require foundation courses to prepare them.  The 
foundation courses suffer high dropout rates and among those who start 
degree courses some do not complete them.  Some graduates who pass then 
cannot get jobs because they have inappropriate qualifications, so it is 
recognised good career advice is required for young people choosing courses 
at secondary school, entering tertiary education and joining the workforce for 
the first time. This is made more important by new and more rigorous standards 
for public sector employment and many private sector career opportunities.  As 
if to acknowledge the potential drawback of increasing Qatar’s human capacity, 
GSDP says the development of a greater global role will challenge Qatari 
society’s resilience as well as its values and identity. It recognises the likelihood 
of impacts on the perspectives of individuals, especially the young, as well as 
families and communities (GSDP 2012b).  This is perhaps a warning to 
government that the population cannot be educated and enlightened without a 
commensurate increase in their curiosity about how Qatar is governed.  This 
echoes comments in QNV2030 about the need to preserve Qatari, Arab and 
Islamic traditions and values to ensure society remains stable. 
There have been tangible improvements in education over the last twenty 
years; there is now universal elementary schooling and literacy rates for the 15-
24 age groups are nearly 100 percent. However, GSDP acknowledges the 
quality of education up to secondary level does not meet international 
standards, especially in maths and science.  It also notes the need to 
concentrate on soft skills to improve employment potential and says enrolment 
in tertiary education could be much higher, especially among men.  At tertiary 
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level GSDP claims improvements to Qatar University and the establishment of 
Education City universities have significantly increased opportunities and 
choice for Qatari youth.  It says almost all programmes are internationally 
accredited and are designed to equip and prepare graduates to operate in a 
knowledge-based economy. However it admits there is much scope for 
improvement in participation and performance (GSDP 2012b).  As with other 
areas of Qatar’s development agenda, the government’s serious commitment 
to education and training is not in doubt.  What remains doubtful is the capacity 
or willingness of the majority of the indigenous population, especially men, to 
take part in the educational process.  This may be a prime example of the 
culture of entitlement, reinforced by the government’s rentier practices, actually 
subverting the government’s long-term policy aims and objectives. 
Qatar is proud of its links with overseas educational institutions.  GSDP states 
that in 2011 the Qatar National Research Fund awarded 58 research grants 
worth US$53 million to scientists at four Qatar Foundation universities: Texas 
A&M University-Qatar; Weill Cornell Medical College-Qatar; Carnegie Mellon 
University-Qatar; and Virginia Commonwealth University-Qatar.  This is part of 
a programme to encourage young Qataris to become accomplished 
researchers.  In parallel the Qatar Science and Technology Park aims to 
promote private sector research, technological development and 
commercialisation by engaging with international partners to encourage 
technology production and investment in innovative R&D and increase 
education and employment opportunities for young people (GSDP 2012a & 
2012b).  This expansion into R&D combined with greater collaboration with 
international partners does much to raise Qatar’s profile outside the region, 
while assisting the diversification and wider development agenda within the 
country.  However, it still requires the population to step up and play its part in 
achieving the Vision. 
The government recognises not everyone has the capacity to work at the 
cutting-edge and realises student motivation is essential to success in 
education, training and at work.  As part of this, GSDP says best practices for 
teaching languages, maths and science are being adopted, along with extra 
support for low achievers.  The delta between what education produces and 
what the economy needs is being addressed and attendance on more relevant 
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courses is being encouraged.  Also, technical and vocational education and 
training are provided as alternative pathways for young people for whom 
universities are not the right learning environment (2012a).  Again this is 
innovative on the part of the government, but relies on the less capable citizens 
wanting to take up technical trades or vocational work in the private sector.  
Some may feel it is beneath them.  This may suggest some form of compulsion 
will be required; that could be counter-productive and lead to a backlash 
against the monarchy 
As part of its workforce strategy, the government is reforming labour legislation 
and introducing opportunities for life-long development in the hope of raising 
the number of Qataris in work.  Furthermore, an initiative to encourage citizens 
to participate in private sector work is being established, including 
entrepreneurship opportunities for youth and women, and changing established 
attitudes to women’s employment (GSDP 2012a).  This combination of 
measures is interesting as it signals some change is possible.  The reform of 
legislation is easily portrayed as making Qatar an easier place to do business 
and benefitting the nation’s economic well-being.  Suggesting traditional 
conservative views on the place of women in work can be altered must allow 
the possibility that other long-held beliefs about the role of women in society as 
a whole, or the value of the family as an indivisible unit can be challenged.  It 
may also cause resentment amongst the most conservative elements of society 
who are perhaps most fearful of modernity.  The monarchy may find it difficult 
to reconcile or even promote some changes to traditional life without opening a 
wider societal and political debate. 
However, the ratio of Qatari women employed in the private sector rose more 
than six times in 12 years, from 2.1 percent in 2001 to 14.7 percent in 2013.  
Conversely, their ratio in public sector jobs decreased from 89.1 percent in 
2001 to 68.2 percent in 2013.  MDP&S’s ‘Report on Qatar’s National Human 
Development 2015’ said the increased representation of Qatari women in the 
private sector is part of the government’s Qatarisation policy158.  Whatever the 
potential for starting societal debate, the fact is Qatari women are working.  
However, the available statistics give no indication of whether the overall 
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number of women in employment has increased, or whether a large number of 
working women have transferred from government service to the private sector.     
5.3.6. Expatriate Dependency 
With the rapid expansion of the economy the demand for migrant workers has 
increased commensurately and the number of citizens in the workforce has 
declined significantly. GSDP says there are fewer new Qatari entrants to the 
workforce annually than the economy needs.  Qatar saw heavy investment in 
infrastructure during 2000-2010 and ‘multiple megaprojects’ required a major 
influx of mainly young migrant workers.  More than a million people were added 
to the population during 2004-2010 when Qatar grew from 0.7 to 1.7 million 
people.  As a result Qatari youth is a minority in the total population, the 
education system and the workforce.  GSDP acknowledged this required 
citizens to adapt to the rapid modernisation taking place in a traditionally 
conservative culture and to changing demographic dynamics, saying this called 
for intercultural understanding and tolerance, as well as intergenerational 
dialogue (GSDP 2012b).  Here is the basic paradox of Qatari society; the 
economy and its development cannot function without the presence of huge 
numbers of expatriates, but the migrants bring the threat of cultural dilution and 
modernisation that may be at odds with the traditions and heritage the Vision 
seeks to preserve at the core of Qatari society.  This population imbalance 
could be the greatest threat to the monarchy’s longevity, especially if the 
treatment of migrant labour falls short of internationally recognised norms and 
expectations.  For example, rights groups have criticised some Qatari 
companies for not paying workers on time, or not paying them at all.  Aware of 
the attention surrounding the 2022 World Cup, the government says it aims to 
introduce reforms and compel companies to pay workers via direct bank 
transfers159.   
The government is touchy about adverse reporting concerning its migrant 
workers and has arrested journalists attempting to expose poor living 
conditions.  The BBC’s Middle East business correspondent and his three-man 
team were held for almost two days in May 2015 and their phones, cameras 
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and equipment confiscated.  A team from West German Broadcasting 
investigating the circumstances of migrant workers was arrested in March 
2015.  Qatar has been widely criticised in the press for its handling of expatriate 
labourers, many of whom work on World Cup construction projects, and rights 
groups allege many workers are housed in poor and often unsanitary 
conditions160.  Qatar is incapable of hosting the World Cup without employing 
significant numbers of migrant workers, but despite this dependency the 
workers appear to be subjected to abuse by their employers, about which the 
Qatari government is hugely and understandably sensitive. 
MDP&S’s report on Human Development 2015 covered the sponsorship and 
exit rules for migrant workers. It reminded readers that the existing ‘kafala’ 
system161 was due to be replaced with an easier and better arrangement. The 
report also identified the need for better regulation for domestic workers, as a 
wide range of rights abuses were not infrequent.  Domestic workers were 
excluded from the 2004 Labour Law and had no access to the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs to make complaints and seek redress of grievance.  
The report quotes UN estimates showing Qatar has the highest share of foreign 
population relative to total population in the world.  Non-Qataris account for 
about 87 percent of the total population.  It says most non-Qataris are 
expatriate workers ‘whose very presence indicates the significant contribution 
they make to economic growth and to national development’162.  Demand for 
skilled expatriates is increasing, so Qatar says it is creating incentives through 
improved working and living conditions, including the provision of appropriate 
schooling. The government is also reviewing recruitment and retention policies, 
including its sponsorship system (GSDP 2012a). With non-Qataris making up 
87 percent of the population it is difficult to see a future where Qataris exist in 
sufficient numbers to do all the jobs that need doing; Qatar is not sustainable in 
its current form without foreigners to do the work.  The disparity in treatment 
between skilled and non-skilled migrants can only increase as the government 
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tries to attract those necessary to build and sustain its knowledge-based 
economy.  Yet, Qatar cannot do without the unskilled labour either, so further 
reform like that proposed for domestic workers could become necessary if 
Qatar is forced to attract even unskilled workers.  Cynically, Qatar could be 
hoping economic necessity will continue to force workers from the sub-
continent and South-East Asia to accept the poor pay and conditions it offers 
them. 
5.3.7. Human Security Measures 
As seen previously, human security is multi-dimensional and encompasses 
food, water, health, public safety and education.  Qatar’s approach to human 
security appears very strong when viewed statistically through the lens of the 
Human Development Index (HDI)163.  In 2012 Qatar’s HDI score was 0.834, in 
the very high human development category, positioning the country 36th of 187 
countries and territories.  This is below the average of 0.905 for countries in the 
very high human development group, but significantly above the average of 
0.652 for Arab States, where the closest countries in rank and population size 
are the UAE and Bahrain, ranked 41st and 48th respectively (UNDP 2013b).    
Qatar’s 2013 HDI value increased to 0.851, still in the very high human 
development category, placing it 31st of 187 countries and territories.  This is 
below the average of 0.890 for countries in the very high human development 
group, but again well above the average of 0.682 for Arab States, where the 
countries closest to Qatar in rank and population size remain the UAE and 
Bahrain, which were ranked 40th and 44th (UNDP 2014b).   
By 2014, Qatar’s HDI score had reached 0.850, still in the very high human 
development category and 32nd of 188 countries and territories.  This is still 
below the average of 0.896 for countries in the very high human development 
group, but above the average of 0.686 for Arab States, where the countries 
closest to Qatar in rank and population size are still the UAE and Bahrain, 
ranked 41st and 45th (UNDP 2015b).  In 2014 Qatar maintained its approximate 
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ranking in the World, despite a very slight reduction on the previous year in its 
HDI value.  Notably it maintained its position relative to Bahrain and the UAE 
which both also dropped back one position in the global rankings.  On the three 
measures laid down by UNDP, Qatar is doing well and is significantly better 
than the Arab States average, although the inclusion of Iraq, Syria and Libya 
must have a detrimental effect on that average value. 
MDP&S data showed the population totalled over 2.412 million in October 
2015, up 8.8 percent compared to the previous year164.  During 1980-2014, 
Qatar’s life expectancy at birth increased by 5.6 years, mean years of schooling 
increased by 4.7 years and expected years of schooling increased by 1.9 
years.  Qatar’s GNI per capita decreased by about 14.6 percent during the 
same period (UNDP 2015b) despite the huge gas reserves they hold and 
exploit.  However, GSDP recognises (2012a) Qatar will not be able to improve 
its HDI score significantly, relative to other countries, without major educational 
improvements, as nationals will not play a significant role in developing Qatar 
without attaining the necessary educational qualifications and associated skills.  
It says Qatar continues to prioritise human development and is investing 
heavily in social sectors, to achieve the highest global standards in health and 
education, and so its people can participate fully in social, economic and 
political life nationally, regionally and internationally.  This is an interesting 
official line given the apparent political apathy of the population and the 
continued absence of elections for the Consultative Council.     
The government is engaged in more realistic development, such as potentially 
future-proofing electricity and water supplies, exemplifying the government’s 
desire to reduce dependency on oil and gas for electricity generation.  A 
US$608 million contract to build reservoirs, pumping stations and infrastructure 
as part of a Kahramaa project has been awarded165.  This is a key contribution 
to the human security agenda as energy consumption will increase as 
temperatures rise with climate change.  Qatar is already water-stressed, a 
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position that will not be improved by increased temperatures, less precipitation 
events and a growing population.    
GSDP reports a campaign for public awareness to reduce water use, 
emphasising the importance of civic responsibilities for natural resources, the 
need for water-saving technology and sustainability.  A management plan is 
being established to monitor groundwater, conserve fresh water aquifers and 
eliminate excess water usage.  Effective management of water resources is a 
declared national priority to meet basic future needs.  Recycled water and 
treated sewage effluent are the only water sources in surplus and will play a 
larger role in non-potable uses (GSDP 2012a).  This may well be one of the 
social sectors the government is investing in heavily.  Placing responsibility for 
protection of natural resources and sustainability on the population may be 
seen as a way of engaging them in Qatar’s development without delegating any 
political authority to them.  Whatever the motivation, the logic of such a 
campaign is obvious given the water scarcity Qatar suffers.   
According to Abrahams, linking solar energy, seawater desalination and 
agricultural development to improve food and water security will make Qatar a 
leader in sustainable agriculture in arid states.  The reliance on food imports for 
90 percent of its needs is a potential human security challenge, so the Qatar 
National Food Security Programme (QNFSP) takes a holistic approach to food 
security through expansion of four related sectors including: renewable energy; 
desalination and water management; agricultural production; and food 
processing and transport (2013).  Food security is critical for the al-Thani’s 
continued hold on power, as however politically apathetic the population might 
be, discontent over food scarcity and the inevitable accompanying food-cost 
inflation could rapidly lead to active and violent protest.  As it is always the 
socially and economically marginalised section of a population that suffers first, 
this discontent could manifest quickly among unskilled migrant workers who 
have little vested interest in the al-Thanis or Qatar. 
The Qatari Farms Development Programme envisages modernised irrigation, 
improved practices and expansion of greenhouses. The government is also 
raising awareness and increasing levels of education and engagement on such 
things as food supply and diversity, nutrition, lifestyle and overall sustainable 
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food consumption patterns.  QNFSP aims to increase production sustainably 
while preserving ecosystems and using environmentally appropriate 
technologies and practices.  It aims to secure availability and safety of food 
supplies through an increase in domestic production, which will reduce price 
and quality variability and overall dependence on imports (Abrahams 2013).  
The desire to reduce dependency on food imports is understandable and 
logical, but its achievability may be questionable.  According to the FAO, 
Qatar’s land area is 1.161 million hectares (11,610 km2), but only 17,610 
hectares were cultivated in 2013, equivalent to 1.5 percent.  Similarly, in 2014 
only eight in every thousand people were economically active in agriculture i.e. 
0.8 percent166.  With such low percentages involved it is difficult to see how a 
significant improvement in domestic production could be achieved as the 
population rapidly increases beyond the 2.5 million mark.  As with migrant 
workers, Qatar is inescapably dependent on very significant food imports to 
remain sustainable. 
GSDP says substantial investments in healthcare and vaccination have 
reduced childhood mortality rates and the levels of most communicable 
diseases.  Interventions are being targeted at young people before they acquire 
unhealthy habits and lifestyles, to improve their chances of good health later in 
life.  The National Development Strategy 2011–2016 incorporates the National 
Health Strategy and indentifies the need to change behavioural patterns 
through strong prevention and robust primary care. GSDP recognises that 
establishing healthy behaviours during childhood and youth will contribute to 
achieving higher human development (2012b).  This is entirely consistent with 
improving human security, recognising the health of the population is 
intrinsically tied up with its potential economic productivity and also reduces the 
burden an unhealthy population places on healthcare services.  Good public 
health also contributes to Qatar’s image as a progressive place in which to do 
business and so has economic security advantages too.  
Qatar’s National Health Strategy describes fundamental reforms across the 
whole of healthcare.  The paradigm is being shifted from hospital-based care to 
a full spectrum of care including improved primary and community-based 
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services.  The focus of healthcare is increasingly shifting to prevention and 
early intervention for serious disease and illness.  Affordable health services 
through partnerships in meeting costs are being established as are budget 
strengthening, private health insurance, transparent management of capital 
expenditures, and improved health infrastructure planning (GSDP 2012a).  Five 
new hospitals will open in 2016 as part of a major expansion of healthcare 
facilities, including three hospitals for single workers in the Industrial Area, 
Mesaieed Industrial City and Ras Laffan, a communicable diseases hospital 
and new health centres and other services.  It is claimed the National Health 
Strategy 2011-2016 has completed 71 percent of 37 projects and a second 
strategy will be launched in early 2017167.  This is of particular relevance to 
economic diversification as the inference is that the hospitals for single workers 
are primarily for expatriates as so few Qataris are classified as economically 
productive168 by the UN.  Skilled workers will not be attracted to work in Qatar 
unless they are certain they can have access to good healthcare among other 
services. 
5.3.8. National and Regime Security 
In common with other states in the region, it is very difficult to gain insight into 
Qatar’s national security aims, objectives or strategy because of their 
preoccupation with secrecy.  However, some of its actions are indicative of a 
sophisticated approach that aims to tie in multiple partners to a collaborative 
network.  For example, Ulrichsen believes Qatar’s natural gas exploitation has 
geostrategic implications.  It exports to leading industrialised and emerging 
countries, including the US, UK, South Korea, Japan and China, as well as the 
UAE, thus increasing its network of relationships and building 
interdependencies with powerful partners who have a vested interest in Qatar’s 
national security (2011).  When this is combined with Qatar’s increasing 
prominence in regional affairs and its financial investments and interests in 
highly developed countries, it is evident that a complex matrix of bilateral 
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relationships exists that could be called upon for support should Qatar feel it 
faces an exogenous threat. 
Although there is apparent widespread political apathy in Qatar, there are 
isolated incidences of what the government regards as dissent being punished.  
In October 2015, UN human rights experts called for the release of Qatari poet 
Mohammed al-Ajami, on the second anniversary of his sentencing. Al-Ajami is 
serving fifteen years in prison in Doha for the contents of his poetry. The UN 
has expressed concern that his arrest and detention may have been ‘solely 
related to the peaceful exercise of his right to freedom of opinion and 
expression’ and ‘the peaceful exercise of his fundamental human rights’. There 
were also concerns the criminal process did not meet all the judicial 
requirements of a fair trial.  ADHRB followed up the UN statement claiming 
human rights violations in Qatar go beyond migrant rights abuses and include 
criminalisation of free speech and artistic expression169.  In November 2015, 
Amnesty International followed up the case saying it ‘considers Mohammed al-
Ajami a prisoner of conscience, held solely for peacefully exercising his right to 
freedom of expression’. Amnesty called for his immediate and unconditional 
release and for his conviction to be quashed170.  He remains in jail.   
The government obviously has concerns about the behaviour of its migrant 
workers, as it was reported in October 2015 authorities had drawn up plans to 
tighten security in the Industrial Area where thousands of low-income migrant 
workers are housed.  Public security offices have been set up in the Labour 
City in the Industrial Area and an awareness campaign has been launched 
among the migrants covering Qatari laws, customs and traditions. Inspections 
were carried out to catch workers violating Qatar’s laws and security forces are 
coordinating their efforts to catch runaway workers171.  That this is reported in 
an English language newspaper freely available online is surprising, as it paints 
a picture of migrants working under very close supervision of the security 
forces in an atmosphere that is similar to incarceration.  This is almost a tacit 
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acceptance that human rights of low-skilled expatriate workers come second to 
the perceived threat posed to Qatari national security by foreigners with 
different customs and traditions.  This attitude is consistent with the QNV2030 
objective of preserving traditional national life within Qatar in the face of 
external pressures.   
In respect of Islamist extremism and transnational terrorism, Qatar appears to 
have been on high alert since before the ISIS attacks in Paris and Beirut in 
November 2015, following bombings of two Shia mosques in Saudi Arabia and 
another in Kuwait City in the preceding summer.  In spite of threats to the 2022 
World Cup on ISIS forums, a foreign policy analyst said it is unlikely Qatar 
would be attacked, because it has a low profile in the ongoing military 
campaign against ISIS and al-Jazeera does not criticise the group.  However, 
he admitted westerners in Doha could be a target as Gulf States are viewed as 
decadent by ISIS; he believed there is definitely reason for Qatar to be on its 
guard172.  There have been rumours of Qatari private individuals providing 
financial support to ISIS173, although hard evidence is difficult to find.  The 
same reporting suggests Qatari private individuals have funded other terrorist 
organisations too.  This could be another explanation why the risk of ISIS 
attack is considered low, although ISIS opportunism in the event of Qatar 
becoming politically unstable, however remote that may be, cannot be ruled 
out.  
5.3.9. Reinforcing Security Structures 
GSDP says the public safety and security sector has a key role in enhancing 
and improving the quality of life and well-being of all citizens. It noted safety 
and security initiatives were being undertaken as a priority to include improved 
crime management through better knowledge management, improved building 
safety, and a high-level coordinated approach to national disaster management 
(2012a).  Part human security initiative and part national security the 
government seems to be strengthening its oversight of many aspects of Qatari 
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life.  However, the inquiries launched into building construction standards after 
the floods at the end of 2015 suggest this oversight is not yet fully effective. 
When states are reinforcing security structures there are invariably 
opportunities for arms sales.  In October 2015 the British Ambassador said 
Typhoon was the right aircraft for Qatar to defend its borders and ensure it can 
respond efficiently to regional crises like Syria and Yemen.  The Ambassador 
said he was proud of the bilateral relations between the UK and Qatar, their 
growing ties, cultural and commercial events and the fact British imports to 
Qatar had increased by 74 per cent in the last year and trade exchanges had 
grown. He described Qatari-British relations as “strong and deep-rooted” and 
based on “trust and mutual respect”174.  However, in January 2016 the UK’s 
new ambassador to Qatar said he was still hopeful the Qataris would purchase 
British Typhoons despite plans to order 24 French jets.  Commentators said 
although Qatar is reducing spending because of declining government 
revenues it does not appear to be cutting defence spending175.  Whatever the 
Ambassador’s hopes, it is likely Qatar will continue to purchase arms from the 
British and the French, again reinforcing its security relationships with the two 
European powers capable of projecting military force into the region and useful 
friends to have in a crisis. 
5.3.10. International Collaboration 
According to GSDP, Qatar makes a significant contribution to the global 
partnership for sustainable development through international cooperation, 
including bilateral and multilateral development assistance, promoting South-
South relations, and supporting countries with complex humanitarian issues, 
such as natural disaster and conflict.  This provides the rationale for proactively 
engaging with numerous regional and international agencies of the UN, 
including hosting of major international conferences in Doha, and for being a 
signatory to international treaties and protocols.  The Qatar Foundation is 
sponsoring large-scale job creation, entrepreneurship, and access to capital 
and markets in countries with very high rates of youth unemployment.  Reach 
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Out to Asia works with local and international communities to support children 
in crisis and less developed countries by giving them access to basic education 
and by promoting and building educational and social infrastructure.  Qatar 
Charity works in international partnerships to support disaster relief and 
emergency response and is regarded as a pioneering Islamic institution 
combining originality, creativity and professionalism in development and 
humanitarian assistance (GSDP 2012a).  Here is Qatar emphasising its 
international aid and sustainability credentials and demanding to be regarded 
as a serious player on the world stage.  Without doubt it is highly visible in 
many charitable and environmental activities, all of which project its image as a 
progressive and stable Gulf State.   
In a more interventionist stance, in October 2015 Qatar’s Foreign Minister said 
his country had not ruled out military intervention in Syria, if Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey proposed it, pointing out Qatar has no geopolitical interests or agendas 
there.   The minister accused the UN Security Council of not providing enough 
protection for the Syrian people which is why Qatar and its allies had become 
involved directly in Syria.  He then defended the Ahrar Al-Sham Islamist militant 
group which Qatar and its allies have been supporting, denying they are allies 
of Al-Qaeda, but rather a Syrian group fighting to liberate their country176.  So, 
Qatar is prepared to be seen to be participating in military operations overseas, 
but again goes to lengths to justify its participation, this time by making up for 
the failings of the UN Security Council and supporting honest Muslims fighting 
against an oppressive regime.  
In a prime example of Qatar acting as a regional diplomatic interlocutor, it was 
announced in December 2015 that Qatar and Turkey had signed fifteen 
cooperation agreements in various fields, including training and education 
between their respective interior ministries.  The signing followed the first 
meeting of the Qatar-Turkish Supreme Strategic Committee in Doha chaired 
jointly by Qatar’s Emir, Sheikh Tamim, and Turkey’s President Erdogan.  The 
Emir said ‘the establishment of the Supreme Strategic Committee represents a 
quality leap in relations between the two countries’, while Turkey considers 
Qatar an important ally and views its relationship with Doha as means to 
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strengthen its relations with the GCC States177.  Qatar has effectively taken the 
lead in GCC collaboration with Turkey, which again raises its international and 
regional profile and standing and reinforces the complex matrix of security 
relationships it values so highly. 
5.4. Reflections on Qatar 
The Emirate of Qatar is perhaps best described as a place of political stability 
and social homogeneity underpinned by enormous wealth.  This gives the 
ruling élite a free hand to lead a contented population towards the vision of a 
progressive and diversified state, founded on the principles of Arab, Islamic and 
national heritage, traditions and customs.  It is a place of largely benign 
autocracy, but the little dissent that exists is not tolerated.  This means there is 
virtually no indigenous internal security problem, although very large numbers 
of poorly treated low-skilled migrant workers retain the capacity to create 
serious disorder should they become sufficiently disgruntled about living and 
working conditions. 
Qatar is making significant strides towards sustainability through economic 
diversification, environmental protection, climate change mitigation, alternative 
technologies and human security measures, all of which contribute to 
enhanced national security.  Its political and economic stability means it can 
focus on these areas because it is not distracted by internal security issues, or 
the need to secure future income streams.  This gives Qatar a major 
developmental advantage compared to its regional neighbour Bahrain.  Yet, 
although human security is a major component of its sustainable development 
agenda, low-skilled expatriate labour does not get a good deal generally, which 
may be storing up domestic stability problems for the future. 
Qatar’s view of its place in the world is striking.  It has deliberately set about 
making itself a regional and international player, particularly in the areas of 
climate change, overseas aid, development and mediation.  The Emirate has 
pursued an intelligent and sophisticated strategy of building economic and 
security relationships with many countries on a bilateral basis.  The diversity of 
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these countries, with sometimes competing national interests, means Qatar is 
supported by a complex web of partners, each of whom has a vested interest in 
its security and stability in the long-term. 
At the heart of everything is the perpetuation of the ruling bargain and absolute 
monarchy, as enshrined in the constitution i.e. regime security.  There is little to 
suggest this will change soon unless the élite miscalculates in areas such as 
the continued compliance of migrant labour, or the effects of greater exposure 
to globalised knowledge and ideas in a population increasingly forced into 
productive work in the private sector.  As an insurance policy, setting a date for 
Consultative Council elections and ensuring they take place freely and fairly to 
produce a legislative body with real powers could be a smart way of pre-
empting potential future criticism and calls for political reform. 
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6. The UAE – A Case Study 
 
 Map 4. The UAE - http://www.stampworldhistory.com/wp- content/uploads/2015/04/United-
Arab-Emirates.png  
 
6.1. Introduction 
The UAE was formed as a six-member federation on 2 December 1971 
following the UK’s decision to withdraw from east of Suez.  The seventh 
emirate, Ras al-Khaimah joined the UAE the following year, after some 
persuasion.  Abu Dhabi became the capital city as it possessed most of the oil 
reserves and its ruler became the UAE’s first president.  The Supreme Council 
of Rulers of the seven emirates retains oversight of the federal government, but 
the presidency remains with Abu Dhabi’s ruler and the vice-presidency with 
Dubai’s, emphasising their relative power compared to the other five (Davidson 
2011).  Davidson notes that today’s seven ruling families are the same who 
negotiated successive treaties with the British in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries when, in exchange for preventing piracy against British interests, the 
British guaranteed protection against external threats and domestic dissent 
(2011). 
A National Federal Council (NFC) of 40 members was established soon after 
the inauguration of the federal state, although it has always been a technocratic 
rather than political institution.  In 2006 the first elections to the NFC were held 
with under 7000 people, i.e. less than one percent of UAE citizens, entitled to 
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vote.  The next elections followed in September 2011 when the electorate 
comprised 129,274 voters of about a million citizens.  However, although the 
Arab Spring was underway, turnout was only 27.75 percent, possibly because 
of anxiety over such events (Ehteshami 2013). 
As has been seen, national and regime security are habitually conflated by the 
Gulf States.  Therefore, the proposition remains that good economic security 
enables successful delivery of the ruling bargain, which assures national 
security by providing political and social stability.  This guarantees the existing 
system of governance remains unchanged and consequent political continuity 
enables high levels of human security and development to be achieved.  There 
is a direct relationship between human security and economic security; a safe 
and secure population is much more likely to be economically productive than 
not.  However, climate change has the potential to affect many aspects of 
human and national security if not addressed effectively.   
In 2010 the UAE published its vision, albeit two years later than Bahrain and 
Qatar.   The UAE’s planning horizon extended to 2021, coinciding with the 
golden jubilee of the Federation, but in 2008 Abu Dhabi produced an economic 
vision with the same time-frame as the Bahrain and Qatar visions.  The UAE’s 
vision has been analysed in the same way as those of Bahrain and Qatar, but 
is augmented in this case study by an analysis of the executive summary of 
Abu Dhabi’s vision, reflecting its position as the clearly dominant emirate since 
Dubai’s economic reverses in 2008, with the assumption that as leader of the 
Federation Abu Dhabi will effectively dictate the development agenda until 
2030.  Only the executive summary has been analysed to permit focus on the 
main issues and prevent the UAE’s vision being submerged in a mass of detail 
specific to Abu Dhabi.  
6.2. United Arab Emirates Vision 2021 (UAEV2021) 
6.2.1. Word Counts 
UAEV2021 has none of the high scores seen in the Bahrain and Qatar visions.  
The highest word count recorded was 21 for ‘national’ and the next highest 
score with 18 counts was ‘citizens’.  ‘Environment’ scored 17 and 
environmental three, but only eight of these referred to the natural environment.  
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‘Economic’ comes fourth with 15 counts, but this is significantly less than the 44 
scored for Bahrain and the 51 for Qatar in similarly sized vision documents.  
The only other words to achieve double digit scores with ten each are 
‘development’ and ‘international’.  Of the single digit scorers both ‘education’ 
and ‘sustainable’ scored nine, but ‘diversification’ scored only once and ‘climate 
change’ was the only word pair to occur with two counts.  Neither ‘political’ nor 
‘reform’ scored at all, which perhaps gives a clue about the future intentions of 
the UAE’s ruling families.   
6.2.2. The Context 
UAEV2021, known as the National Agenda, appears blander than its Bahraini 
and Qatari counterparts and seems to focus more on cultural aspirations and 
national identity than how to achieve specific social or economic outcomes.  It 
is presented jointly by the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the Federation’s 
President and Vice President respectively, which gives it authority.  
Interestingly the rulers of the five minor emirates are not mentioned by name, 
which is probably indicative of the relative weight their opinions hold in directing 
the UAE’s future.  By 2010 Dubai had suffered a significant economic downturn 
in its real estate and prestige projects sectors and had been bailed out by Abu 
Dhabi; this left Abu Dhabi as the main source of economic power in the UAE as 
well as holding the vast majority of its hydrocarbon reserves.  For this reason 
ADEV2030 may be the most authoritative document about the UAE’s future 
trajectory.  However, UAEV2021 merits analysis at it claims to be inclusive of 
all seven emirates in the Federation. 
The document is a well produced piece, again bearing all the hallmarks of 
business consultants.  It runs to 36 pages but a significant number of them 
contain little information, if any at all, being devoted to pictures of Emiratis or 
serving as section dividers.  After two such cover pages there is a page bearing 
photographs and statements of the President and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh 
Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and the Vice President and ruler of Dubai, Sheikh 
Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum.  The President emphasises that work is 
the mark of true citizenship, sincerity and loyalty and reminds citizens they 
share responsibility for guarding UAE sovereignty.  The Vice President says 
there is no challenge that cannot be overcome through strong faith, 
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determination and resolve.  Here then is the basis of the Vision highlighting 
loyalty, responsibility, faith and determination as essential to the UAE’s future 
success.   
There follows a preface signed by the Vice President who personally launched 
the Vision178.  It acknowledges the debt citizens owe to the ‘founding fathers’ of 
the Federation for using UAE resources wisely to create a modern, progressive 
state where all citizens share the benefits of development.  It is claimed this 
has placed the UAE ‘among the most advanced nations in the world’, while 
successfully maintaining its traditional way of life, culture and society.  It says 
the Vision is based on the principles of the founding fathers and Presidential 
guidance and has been adopted by the Federal Supreme Council, suggesting, 
perhaps, the role of the other five rulers in authorship was limited, or that it has 
been presented as a fait accompli by the two more advanced and economically 
powerful emirates. 
The Vice President highlights various challenges: to strong family ties that 
underpin a cohesive society; to the UAE’s economic competitiveness; to 
national identity; and to health, education, the environment and well-being.  To 
overcome these challenges, he says citizens will have to work harder and be 
more innovative, organised and aware of potential risks.  Citizens are reminded 
they are responsible to future generations for what they leave behind.  He 
characterises the founders’ legacy as ‘defined by prosperity, security, stability 
and a life filled with dignity and respect’ and calls upon Allah to help guide the 
current generation.  Although the Preface contains much of what would be 
expected in such an introduction, it is marked by a lack of detail with regard to 
the aims of UAEV2021.  The suggestion is that development will continue, but 
there is little to indicate the UAE’s future will be significantly different, given the 
emphasis on maintaining national identity, culture and traditions alongside 
essential services. 
6.2.3. The Aspiration? 
However, two pages later, and without specific attribution to the President or 
Vice President, there is a striking statement standing alone on a page: ‘we want 
to be among the best countries in the world by 2021’.  Perhaps it was 
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considered inappropriate for this statement to be contained within the preface, 
but finding it seven pages into the Vision is surprising and eye-catching, if 
somewhat disconnected from what has been written before.  As a statement of 
intent it is very powerful, but is not augmented by any further detail.  Its impact 
is therefore lost as two pages later, on what is officially page one, there is the 
Vision Summary which does not follow up the statement; instead the summary 
returns to the comfort zone of ‘a strong and safe union’, ‘knowledgeable and 
innovative Emiratis’, ‘a competitive and resilient economy’, a ‘cohesive society’, 
and a ‘nurturing and sustainable environment’.  This suggests maintenance of 
the status quo, rather than political, social or economic change.  Given the 
hydrocarbon reserves UAE holds, perhaps there was no sense of an impending 
threat requiring radical change before the Federation’s 50th anniversary. 
6.2.4. United in Responsibility 
Without preamble UAEV2021 moves to its first section, ‘United in 
Responsibility’.  The brief introduction talks of ambitious, responsible citizens 
successfully developing a strong socio-economic environment, while 
maintaining traditional lifestyles, moderate Islamic values and cohesive families 
and society.  The first part of the section is called ‘Confident and Socially 
Responsible Emiratis’.  It is interesting this is the first subject under discussion, 
rather than economic diversification or education and skills for the future.  
Admittedly, it encourages citizens to take charge of their ‘path through life’ and 
show professional commitment, motivation, entrepreneurial spirit and self-
reliance, but this is followed immediately by a reminder that every Emirati’s duty 
of loyalty includes moral and social responsibility.  It warns citizens to be alert 
to challenges the UAE faces and to shape the nation through proactivity and 
persistence, but says success must not be viewed solely in terms of wealth or 
social standing; for stability there must be spiritual gratification too.  Prominent 
Emiratis are encouraged to show moral leadership as role models for society.  
This could be interpreted as an attempt at emotional and spiritual blackmail 
from the outset, to ensure duty to the state and loyalty to traditional governance 
is pre-eminent amongst all other citizens’ obligations.  This would discourage 
calls for meaningful reform towards wider participatory politics and decision-
making, which could be viewed as disloyal.  It suggests the rulers believe 
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increased prosperity and spiritual reinforcement will be sufficient to maintain the 
ruling bargain. 
The next part is ‘Cohesive and Prosperous Families’ regarded as the 
cornerstone of society.  The detail encourages Emiratis to have large families 
as the nucleus of society, discourages divorce and reaffirms the positive role of 
strong family ties in national life.  This is taken further to place responsibility on 
all members of extended families for nurturing and educating children and 
enabling them to play a full role in society.  Intergenerational dialogue will pass 
on traditions and culture and maintain national identity.  It emphasises the 
exemplary role of family elders as guardians of tradition and claims tradition will 
be at the heart of empowering Emirati women to ‘gain greater opportunity to 
combine full participation in active life with the joy and fulfilment of 
motherhood’, while protecting them from discrimination in the workplace and 
society.  This builds naturally upon the first part and is primarily concerned with 
maintaining and improving the current fabric of Emirati society, based upon 
familial ties, loyalty, tradition and duty.  Again this would appear to be 
consistent with a future governance model that is not much different from when 
the Vision was written.  Constant reiteration of the values of tradition, national 
identity and loyalty do not allow much space for alternative viewpoints on 
political or social reform and therefore bolster the position of the ruling élite. 
The theme continues in the third part of this section, ‘Strong and Active 
Communities’, which seems at first sight to suggest the creation of strong civil 
society; the summary talks of a well-knit bond of solidarity amongst citizens, but 
with a spirit of openness to residents.  This is expanded upon with a reiteration 
of the centrality of tightly-knit communities to the bedrock of society.  It is 
claimed these communities prevent social exclusion and help youngsters 
develop their full potential within a safe environment, while their Emirati identity 
is strengthened and they engage fully in society.  It says there will be a lively 
social scene comprising charitable works and volunteering to increase social 
awareness and ensure the most vulnerable are integrated into a cohesive 
society.  Outside of their communities Emiratis are encouraged to reinforce 
their national identity and see themselves as part of a citizenry where mutual 
trust is essential and all can learn from each other in a harmonious society 
based on solidarity of purpose.  It extends the harmony to resident expatriates, 
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encouraging dialogue with other cultural groups to enhance mutual 
understanding in society.  It appears to be in favour of a very strong civil 
society, but one that is constrained to actively supporting the traditions, values 
and cohesion of the existing social structure; again there is no room for an 
alternative point of view, let alone political disagreement or opposition. 
The final part of this section is ‘Vibrant Culture’, founded upon progressive and 
moderate Islamic values and a rich Arabic language, celebrating and 
reinforcing national traditions and identity.  It says the UAE’s Arab-Islamic roots 
are ‘treasured as a profound and sacred element’ of national heritage and 
proclaims Islam’s progressive, moderate values will support traditions of 
respect and openness, while religious tolerance ensures mutual understanding 
and respect amongst the UAE’s diverse population.  Furthermore, the core 
tenets of Islam will prevent ‘the homogenising effects of globalisation’ from 
eroding moderate religious values, while Arabic will become a dynamic and 
vibrant language and a symbol of the UAE’s progressive Arab-Islamic values.  
UAEV2021 sees the UAE as a centre of excellence for the study of Arabic and 
promoting the translation of international literary and scientific works into the 
language.  Once more there is reaffirmation of the centrality of tradition, 
heritage and culture to Emirati national identity, to be preserved in the face of 
increasing multiculturalism as ‘a crucial matter of national pride and social 
stability’.  It will be hard to balance the competing pressures of religious 
tolerance and openness with resistance to the modernising and homogenising 
forces of globalisation; there would appear to be a mutual exclusivity at the 
heart of the two agendas, unless what is actually meant is foreigners will be 
free to carry on their lives as they would in their own countries, providing it is 
either invisible to, or does not impact upon Emirati citizens.    
The key messages in the first section of UAEV2021 concern preserving 
national identity through reinforcement of religious, traditional and cultural 
values and the strengthening of familial and societal bonds to reinforce loyalty 
to the state, and therefore implicitly to the Emirs and their families.  There 
appears at this point no suggestion of a reduction in the number of expatriates, 
no real shift of Emiratis into the high-value workforce, no major attempt to 
educate and train Emiratis to do high-value work and, importantly, no 
suggestion of any political, economic or social reforms, or even an extension of 
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civil society outside of a narrow band of activity.  Instead, it would seem that by 
placing ‘United in Responsibility’ as the first section it is regarded as the most 
important; it is primarily about the responsibility the individual has to be loyal to 
the state and to take their place in a society that is determined not to change 
the way it is governed, controlled or regulated.  It is as though by placing this 
section first, the intention is to set the context in which the following sections 
must be read. 
6.2.5. United in Destiny 
The second section’s short introduction describes an integrated and resilient 
federation achieving balanced development throughout the country.  The 
heading ‘Upholding the Legacy of the Founding Fathers’ gives the impression it 
will dwell once more on tradition, heritage and individual duty to the state, but 
its summary talks of ensuring nationwide balanced development as the result of 
an integrated strategy and good cross-government coordination.  The main text 
opens with an honorific to the founding fathers before proposing the Federation 
is the ‘defining point of allegiance for all Emiratis’, thus reiterating the loyalty 
messages propounded in the first section.  The aim is to build a national future 
supported by a common destiny.  It declares the intention of closing the gap 
between citizens’ living standards and promoting social and economic 
development of each of the Emirates to prevent isolation and marginalisation.  
It says this will be achieved by building world-class transport and infrastructure 
to enable utilities and services and encourage development.  This development 
will be sustainable, balanced and efficient, leading to an inclusive society with 
equal opportunities and a growing sense of national unity.  This is very 
aspirational and laudable as with most of what has gone before, but with little 
hint as to how it will be achieved in practice, apart from personal commitment 
and loyalty on the part of individual Emiratis.  While cross-government 
coordination and an integrated strategy were trailed in the summary there is no 
further mention of either, or detail as to how they will be achieved. 
The next part is headed ‘Safe and Secure Nation’ and summarised as the 
government’s responsibility to provide safety, security, economic stability, 
resilience, justice and welfare services, to permit citizens to make a positive 
contribution to society.  This involves protecting citizens from internal threats 
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through protection from crime and maintenance of internal stability, and 
blocking external threats, including mitigating the effects of disasters and 
epidemics.  It aims for all Emiratis to lead a secure and dignified life, with basic 
needs provided, uncertainty removed and able ‘to achieve well-being through 
work and merit’.  It states security will be strengthened by an effective, impartial 
justice system to uphold individual rights, while the government exercises the 
necessary controls and guidance to ensure protection of a stable economy.  
There will be a sustainable welfare system to build capabilities and enable the 
most vulnerable to participate and contribute effectively.  While this ostensibly 
plays well to both human and national security agendas, it reinforces the 
perception that there will be a strong centralised apparatus controlling most 
aspects of life and citizens will be able to achieve all they can, providing they 
conform to the model laid down by the government.  There appears to be no 
suggestion of a move away from the ruling bargain; the government will provide 
in return for political acquiescence. 
The final part of this section is ‘Enhanced International Standing’ which 
confirms the UAE’s desire to improve its international reputation and become a 
role model for other nations.  Specifically, the UAE aims ‘to resist the value-
flattening effects of globalisation’ by maintaining national traditions and 
tolerance, but also wants to enhance its role as a regional business hub with 
international linkages.  It wants to build on its perceived international successes 
in diplomacy, developmental and humanitarian assistance, and improve its 
economic and government spheres to capitalise on competitive advantage.  
UAEV2021 exhorts every citizen to become a champion and promote the 
national reputation abroad.  There exists a potentially paradoxical situation: 
welcoming business and the economic effects of globalisation, while 
concurrently striving to control its impacts on indigenous political and social 
spheres.  Great store is placed on Emiratis remaining content to conform to 
traditional Arab-Islamic governance structures, but there is little 
acknowledgement that this may not be enough for those outside the ruling 
élite’s circle.  Exposure to foreign cultures must pose the danger of erosion of 
national culture and traditions, unless exposure is limited to a privileged few 
which seems implausible given the Vision’s aspirations.  The second section 
therefore follows logically on from the first in that loyalty, tradition and duty 
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remain at the forefront of UAEV2021’s message.  Again there is little to suggest 
significant economic diversification, preparing citizens to take their place in 
high-performing workforces, or a decentralisation of any political decision-
making.  At this point in the Vision it appears to be business as usual. 
6.2.6. United in Knowledge 
 The third section appears to herald a change of tack; ‘United in Knowledge’, is 
defined as ‘a diversified and flexible knowledge-based economy .... powered by 
skilled Emiratis and strengthened by world-class talent’.  Here UAEV2021 
becomes innovative with diversification from hydrocarbons to a knowledge-
based economy.  Emiratis are to be sufficiently educated and trained to take 
their place within high-value businesses, but with expatriate labour still present, 
albeit at the higher end of the skills spectrum.  The first part of the section 
reinforces this perception.  ‘Harness the Full Potential of National Human 
Capital’ aims to maximise citizen participation, encourage entrepreneurs, 
develop public and private sector leaders and attract and retain the best talent.  
Emiratis are urged to build knowledge and apply their talent to contribute to 
national growth.  It is predicted more Emiratis will enter higher education to 
achieve the necessary skills for work in knowledge-based industries, and 
universities will align their curricula to national needs.  Encouraging citizens to 
enter productive work, UAEV2021 promises high achievement for industry 
leaders bringing innovative products to the marketplace, and for senior public 
officials controlling and steering economic change.  Here, at the centre of a 
debate about economic regeneration and reform is the first allusion to a 
centrally directed economy where innovators and entrepreneurs will be 
controlled by government officials.  Yet, there seems no apparent recognition of 
the inherent paradox of free-flowing and vibrant innovative businesses being 
constrained and directed by public officials following a predetermined 
government policy.  It concludes with confirmation that highly skilled expatriates 
will be required in the future and will be attracted and rewarded appropriately.  
Apparently, there is no timeline by which the government aims to have 
‘Emiratised’ the majority of the workforce, signalling perhaps a realisation that 
Emiratis will never be motivated or capable of doing many of the jobs a 
knowledge-based economy requires.  Maximisation of Emirati participation may 
not be that high a percentage of the population after all. 
207 
 
‘Sustainable and Diversified Economy’ talks of adopting new economic models, 
capitalising on partnerships and guaranteeing long-term prosperity.  It states 
the intention to move away from reliance on oil revenues and the desire to 
move into other sectors where the UAE can exploit its competitive advantage.  
It says growth must be matched by a range of sustainable energy sources and 
suggests renewable and alternative options including nuclear power.  
UAEV2021 recognises the requirement for a more flexible economic model and 
the need to be networked to meet the demands of complex international trade.  
It claims sustainable, responsible growth and prosperity will be initiated by 
Emirati entrepreneurs and FDI, and says the economy will be ready to take 
advantage of changing circumstances and stronger international partnerships 
to exploit trade opportunities.  This is all logical and unsurprising; the 
challenges will be to achieve flexibility and agility while being centrally directed 
by government officials; and to protect traditions and culture from external 
influences as Emirati business entities become more entwined in the 
globalised, interconnected, interdependent marketplace that develops as 
enduring international trading partnerships are established. 
The final part is ‘Knowledge-Based and Highly Productive Economy’ and 
describes how innovation, research, science and technology will form the pillars 
of the economy, with entrepreneurs pushing it forward; national economic 
growth will be driven by knowledge, innovation and investment in scientific and 
technological R&D in which the UAE will be a world leader.  All will be achieved 
through modern communications infrastructure, networking UAE businesses to 
give them a global competitive edge.  UAEV2021 says citizens will benefit from 
greater access to digitised services to ‘search online for knowledge’ and fulfil 
their intellectual curiosity.  This is an interesting statement as it implicitly allows 
the unrestricted spread of ideas, which may subvert the government’s need for 
a politically acquiescent population.  Whether general freedom of access to 
information is actually intended is not clear from the document, but it would 
pose significant risks to the absolute monarchy and its ruling bargain.  
Notwithstanding, the Vision says transformation of business is only achievable 
through a suitable environment that promotes entrepreneurs and creativity.  
This environment will be created through help with start-ups and cultivation of 
‘a healthy risk-taking culture’ rewarding those who work hard and are bold and 
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innovative.  To facilitate this, the government says it will establish a regulatory 
framework to enable businesses to compete fairly and there will be increased 
public-private partnerships to promote growth and opportunities.  It concludes 
saying ‘The UAE will become one of the best places in the world to do 
business’. 
The third section is a step change and allows insight into what may be the 
government’s true intent, i.e. a nation with a fully modernised, diversified 
economy competing effectively at the upper end of the high-value business 
sector and able to offer its citizens a high standard of living supported by 
efficient government services.  However, the fact remains of the paradox that 
seems to run through the section: a free market economy able to make 
innovative and entrepreneurial choices with an appetite for healthy risk on the 
one hand; and the suggestion of a directed economy where government 
officials are in control on the other.  Add to this the desire to prevent erosion of 
traditional Arab-Islamic-Emirati values and culture, while allowing ordinary 
citizens to surf the web and access whatever information they choose and it 
can be seen there are real challenges lying in wait. 
6.2.7. United in Prosperity 
The fourth and final section of UAEV2021 is ‘United in Prosperity’ which has 
the strap-line ‘A nurturing and sustainable environment for healthy living’ and 
covers both the natural and social environments in which Emiratis live.  ‘Long 
and Healthy Lives’ says all citizens are entitled to a range of high quality basic 
medical services, but notes there is a desire to build these into world-class 
services to cope with future requirements.  It claims every citizen will be given 
access to improved health and personal care services, alongside increased 
funding of research to counter prevalent and genetic illnesses.  Prevention will 
be achieved through fighting lifestyle illnesses by changing citizens’ habits and 
also by providing better public health and sanitation.  This is entirely consistent 
with what a developed nation should provide its citizens and contributes 
positively towards the upper end of the human security spectrum.  It is 
interesting that the inference, by omission of any reference to payment or 
health insurance, is that medical and health services will be free for citizens.  A 
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reinforcement, perhaps, of the social contract allowing the monarchy to rule 
without popular political participation. 
‘First-Rate Education’ may have sat more comfortably within ‘United in 
Knowledge’.  However, it is included here and seeks to enable every citizen to 
achieve their educational potential and, of course, contribute positively to 
society.  This places on schools the responsibility for preparing well-rounded 
and confident young people, but also specifically requires them to instil the 
values of moderate Islam and the Emirati national identity; each generation will 
emerge as self-directed and responsible citizens ready to contribute to society.  
The government appears to want to control all aspects of people’s lives, even 
to the point of political, cultural and religious indoctrination of children.  
UAEV2021 affirms an ambition of ever-increasing educational targets alongside 
a progressive national curriculum including critical thinking and practical skills 
on a par with the most advanced nations.  The aspiration is for more students 
to enter higher education with many going on to postgraduate study.  Those 
who choose to leave education before university can receive vocational 
training, which from the way it is written does not appear optional.  The aim is 
to provide ‘equality of opportunity and balanced outcomes’ for all students, 
including those with special needs guaranteed fair access to education.  Putting 
the potential indoctrination to one side, this is entirely logical policy, consistent 
with the desire to move to knowledge-based services with greater numbers of 
Emiratis employed; it also contributes to the higher end of the human security 
spectrum.  However, there is again the potential for friction between 
acceptance of the UAE’s political and social status quo and the desire to have 
students educated in critical thinking and with an informed worldview.  The two 
may well be mutually exclusive. 
‘Well-Rounded Lifestyles’ is concerned with ensuring a high quality of life 
supported by world-class public infrastructure, services and leisure resources.  
Public authorities will provide high-quality cultural, sporting and recreational 
activities, in parallel with privately organised events.  High quality government 
services, utilities, communications infrastructure and transport will be 
responsive to citizens needs, available online where practical, and provide 
interconnectivity for business; utilities will deliver reliable supplies of energy and 
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water, both vital to the UAE’s human and national security agendas.  Again the 
stated aim is to make the UAE attractive to business and a good place to live.   
The final part of UAEV2021 concerns a ‘Well-Preserved Natural Environment’.  
The summary proclaims the UAE, surprisingly as it is one of the global major 
per capita polluters, ‘as a leader of the green revolution’ and affirms the 
Federation’s responsibility to safeguard the environment for future generations.  
The Vision declares the UAE’s intent to vigorously support international 
environmental initiatives as part of its worldwide responsibility.  It declares its 
desire to embrace alternative technologies and decrease its carbon footprint to 
reduce the country’s ‘environmental deficit’ and promote responsible behaviour 
by its citizens.  It says it will mitigate the future effects of climate change; the 
environment will be protected from anthropogenic impacts, locally and globally, 
through reducing CO2 emissions and designing regulations to protect fragile 
ecosystems from development.  Citizens will be guarded from natural or man-
made environmental emergencies, guaranteed access to clean air and water, 
and protected from environmental health hazards, all good human security 
measures.  UAEV2021 concludes that anticipation of problems, combined with 
initiative and awareness of national responsibilities is the only way to preserve 
and enhance the Emirati way of life.  This is a strong piece for the Vision to 
finish with, as it leaves the sense that something must be done to preserve the 
environment at all costs.  Perhaps it is the last topic for that very reason.  Proof 
of intention is through action and while Emiratis are amongst the worst polluters 
per head, the reality of the UAE’s intention is perhaps demonstrated by the 
building of Masdar City and its use of alternative technologies to make it 
carbon-neutral179.  The UAE seems strongly committed to the need to mitigate 
the effects of climate change, but its challenge is to deliver on its promises. 
This last section is something of a catch-all, bringing seemingly unrelated 
aspects together under prosperity while ignoring each has a human security 
dimension.  The health measures are predictable but worthy; the education 
measures show an intention to improve citizens’ capabilities, albeit with an 
element of indoctrination included, to enable them to enter productive work 
more widely; the lifestyle measures, while undoubtedly reinforcing traditional 
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 http://www.thenational.ae/business/masdar accessed 17 March 2016. 
211 
 
values, aim to improve public services and infrastructure and specifically 
address energy and water security which have national and human security 
implications; the environmental measures demonstrate a high level 
commitment to improve the UAE’s record and addresses human security issues 
revolving around guaranteed access to clean water, fresh air and minimisation 
of risks to health from environmental degradation or emergency.  This final 
section is therefore about the benefits that achieving the Vision will bring to the 
population as a whole. 
6.2.8. Achieving the Vision 
Although apparently somewhat bland and lacking emphasis on any specific 
development area, on closer scrutiny UAEV2021 reads like a manifesto for 
social engineering with its focus on the behaviours of the citizenry.  Its main 
concerns are preservation of national identity, protection of Arab-Islamic 
values, reinforcing obligations of loyalty, duty and faith, and resistance to the 
socio-cultural forces of globalisation.  The Vision demands a strong civil society 
to nurture its citizens and support traditional governance and the national way 
of life, but sees no scope for it to advocate an alternative political point of view.  
It aims to achieve social cohesion and reduce the chances of marginalisation, 
which in turn reduces the likelihood of dissent.  However, there are some 
inherent tensions in what UAEV2021 proposes.  Education will be one of the 
tools used to promote Arab-Islamic values and culture and the obligations of 
the individual to society, but it will also be vital in the preparation of citizens to 
take their place in a workforce focused on knowledge-based activities.  
Encouragement of critical thinking, innovative and entrepreneurial actions, and 
participation in the digitised interconnected world, with unrestricted access to 
information and opinions, is probably at odds with an expectation of political 
acquiescence in a regime where popular participation in the nation’s affairs is 
actively discouraged. 
UAEV2021 predicts improvements in infrastructure, transport and 
communications, with balanced development across social and economic 
sectors.  It aims to diversify from reliance on oil revenues and move into the 
knowledge-based sector.  Alternative, renewable energy sources will be 
examined and utilised, as in Masdar, and nuclear power is a possibility.  
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Innovation and entrepreneurship will be critical as will moves into the science 
and technology sectors and R&D.  Expatriates will continue to be a significant 
feature of business in the UAE, bringing skills Emiratis do not possess until 
education and training fills the capability gap.  Yet, in this highly flexible and 
fast moving future where the business and economic effects of globalisation 
are welcome, there is repeated mention of centralised control by government 
officials to harness the rate of development and also prevent erosion of 
traditional and cultural norms and values.  There appears no recognition of the 
paradox between a desire for a free market economy and the imperative to 
constrain its impacts on society.  This control will be complemented by a strong 
regulatory framework and the suggestion of a strong internal security 
apparatus. 
Human security measures are in place throughout the Vision.  The aim is to 
close the earnings gap, prevent marginalisation, guarantee access to energy, 
clean air and freshwater, prevent citizens coming to harm from environmental 
hazards and improve healthcare and education; all have positive human 
security effects.  This also positively contributes to the maintenance of national 
security by ensuring the population is kept healthy, happy and safe.  Finally the 
environment is considered too, with a stated intent of reducing CO2 emissions, 
a move to renewable energy sources and a determination to live up to 
international environmental obligations and protect the climate for future 
generations.  One thing missing is any suggestion of a change of governance 
model from absolute monarchy towards a system with greater public 
participation or representation.  Whatever is heralded in areas like the 
economy, education or environment, there is no intention to relinquish absolute 
control of the UAE’s political economy. 
6.3. Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 (ADEV2030) 
6.3.1. Word Counts 
In the executive summary of ADEV2030 the highest word count achieved is 
‘economic’ with a score of 113, which is unsurprising given the document is an 
economic vision statement.  The next highest score is ‘development’ with 43, 
followed by ‘environment’ with sixteen.  The only other words to achieve double 
digits are ‘international’ and ‘oil’ with eleven and ‘human’ scoring ten.  
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‘Sustainable’ scores the highest single digit count with nine, but is not linked 
with ‘technology’ which fails to score once. Of the word pairs only ‘human 
development’ and ‘oil revenues’ occur scoring just once each.  ‘Political reform’ 
is not mentioned, suggesting it is not on the agenda. 
6.3.2. The Context 
Although ADEV2030’s Executive Summary is only nine pages in length, it 
contains greater detail than the other visions analysed, which are more akin to 
‘PowerPoint’ presentations than policy documents.  The Summary of Mandate 
on page one gives the authority to develop a long-term economic vision.  This 
authority was the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, acting on behalf of the ruler, who 
is also President of the UAE.  The Mandate clearly sees the economic vision as 
a cross-government initiative.  It includes the private sector and was formulated 
by a multi-stakeholder task force supported by external institutions.  2030 was 
selected as the target date as it was believed Abu Dhabi could achieve 
sustainable economic diversification by then.  It is therefore made clear from 
the outset that this initiative comes from the ruler himself and the aim is to 
ensure Abu Dhabi moves away from hydrocarbon dependency by diversifying 
its economy in a credible and sustainable fashion; the current basis of Abu 
Dhabi’s wealth will be changed substantially by 2030. 
6.3.3. The Issues 
ADEV2030 launches straight into the issues by reinforcing that the government 
is driving the Vision by executing a 22 year strategy, assisted by the private 
sector.  Progress is to be made as part of a socio-economic policy agenda 
implicitly confirming the élite’s intent to ensure the government retains its 
undisputed place as provider for its population and keeper of political decision-
making powers.  The government’s stated primary objectives are ensuring a 
safe and secure society alongside a dynamic open economy.  So, at the very 
start of the document is an explicit link between strong economic development 
and assured human and national security.  ADEV2030 declares the policy 
agenda is built around nine pillars that will shape Abu Dhabi’s future.  Two of 
these are striking: complete international and domestic security; and a 
significant and ongoing contribution to the Federation.  Once again the 
importance of national security is prominently stated, while assuring the 
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maintenance of the UAE could be seen as the same thing; the implication is 
that Abu Dhabi will use its wealth to ensure the Federation is a cohesive and 
secure entity.  The resulting perception gained is that strong national security is 
a very high priority in this economic vision document.  The executive summary 
does not break out the pillars into more detail, but does explain the four key 
priority areas. 
6.3.4. Economic Development   
Given this is an economic vision it is unsurprising ‘Economic Development’ is 
the first priority area covered.  However, as it is not stated whether the four 
areas have been listed in priority order it is assumed each has equal standing.  
The first statement is that economic diversification underpins all aspects of the 
government’s policy agenda; the government wishes to see high value jobs 
becoming increasingly accessible to nationals with the role of women 
maximised in the workplace.  This suggests entrepreneurs will be encouraged 
to invest through a new permissive regulatory framework brought about by 
legislative reform.  The aim is to embed Abu Dhabi deeper in the global 
economy by targeting FDI and local investment, while enabling the outflow of 
investment capital to international partners.  As do Bahrain and Qatar, and the 
Federation it drives, Abu Dhabi recognises the importance of embracing 
globalisation to enable diversification, but does not explicitly acknowledge 
globalisation will bring things other than investment opportunities, although it 
sees increasing need for nationals to take on productive private sector work 
instead of relying on state-sector jobs or government largesse.  If the private 
sector rather than the government generates wealth as a result of 
diversification, the monarchy will have to tax the private sector to obtain the 
money it needs, unless it draws on its sovereign wealth funds, to provide 
security, health and education services etc.  This prospect is not mentioned 
explicitly, although it may be an implicit part of the legislative reforms. 
6.3.5. Social and Human Resources Development 
‘Social and Human Resources Development’ is covered next, which the policy 
agenda defines as the ‘pre-eminent objective and driving motivation’ behind all 
policies.  It identifies high quality education and health services as the priorities 
for residents and aims to develop the workforce to ensure sufficient, qualified, 
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high quality workers are available for the economy.  It also wants to encourage 
full employment amongst its nationals.  This will necessitate upgrading the 
education and training levels of its citizens, a change in the citizens’ work ethic 
towards seeing private sector work as of acceptable status, and a reduction in 
expatriate workers as nationals become capable of doing high-value jobs.  It 
also confirms Abu Dhabi’s commitment to ethical and safe management of its 
workforce from wherever they originate, through Federal laws and international 
agreements.  The rulers probably see a permanent requirement for expatriates, 
presumably because the indigenous population is too small to sustain a 
diversified economy of the scale to which they aspire. 
6.3.6. Infrastructure Development and Environmental Sustainability 
The next priority area is concerned with developing appropriate national 
infrastructure while preserving the environment.  The government wishes to 
develop well-managed urban environments with world-class transport 
infrastructure to realise economic diversification benefits.  It also reaffirms its 
commitment to security, ostensibly to make Abu Dhabi a safe place to live and 
work.  The piece concludes by observing that an urban structure framework 
plan has been developed to mitigate the potential stresses caused by the 
economic growth envisioned; this will be rolled out across the whole Emirate.  
So, infrastructure development is well covered and security gets a mention.  
Yet, despite the title of this priority area and the early statement about 
preserving the environment there is no further mention of it.  Where a 
statement about environmental protection policies being applied to 
infrastructure development plans might be expected there is none.  While an 
executive summary is exactly that, it is logical to expect some detail to be 
included on how environmental preservation and sustainability will be achieved 
within this key priority area. 
6.3.7. Optimisation of Government Operations 
The final priority is ‘Optimisation of Government Operations’ and covers 
increased efficiency and transparency of government machinery including 
streamlining services, outsourcing to the private sector where appropriate and 
a move towards e-business.  The government states its intention to review and 
improve the legislative framework and processes to guarantee greater 
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efficiency, but does not say how this will be done.  The inference is, therefore, 
that the current law-making system will remain and there is no intention to 
delegate legislative powers to any entity outside the circle of the ruling élite any 
time before 2030.  Government processes could be more effective in future, but 
still as tightly controlled as at present. 
6.3.8. Economic Vision Imperatives 
The section on ‘Economic Vision Imperatives’ starts with a reminder that Abu 
Dhabi’s Policy Agenda is focused on ensuring the economic well-being of the 
Emirate’s residents.  It confirms the desire for a more sustainable, diversified 
economy based on the imperative to move away from hydrocarbon 
dependency and oil price fluctuations.  It declares the need of the burgeoning 
young national population for attractive high-value jobs; the challenge for the 
economy will be creating them.  It recognises the need to improve and upgrade 
the education system to allow nationals and expatriate workers to attain higher 
standards, thus enabling a more productive economy.  As part of 
modernisation, Abu Dhabi will have to accept more globalisation and see its 
international partners as necessary to achieving this successfully.  It claims 
Abu Dhabi’s geo-political status will help harness the processes of 
technological change, innovative R&D, and future competitiveness, but 
recognises it must do more to adopt modern business practices, integrate 
globally and make the Emirate an easier place in which to do business.  This is 
a laudable aspiration and mirrors the visions published by the other states.  
However, it appears to suggest this can be achieved without some change to 
the current system of governance.  There appears to be no recognition that a 
better educated citizen workforce, with greater access to globalised information 
and a potentially more sophisticated worldview will demand a greater say in 
their country’s governance.  Perhaps the recognition exists, but is held close to 
the rulers’ chests and implicitly reflected in the emphasis the Vision places on 
ensuring domestic security. 
6.3.9. Achieving the Vision 
A task force has been set up to bring about ADEV2030 which comprises: the 
Department of Planning and Economy, a government body which sets policy 
and gathers data; the Abu Dhabi Council for Economic Development (ADCED), 
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a public-private advisory body to support the Department for Planning and 
Economy; and the General Secretariat of the Executive Council (GSEC), a 
government body overseeing the development and coordination of all policies 
across government.  Much is made of the role of private sector stakeholders in 
ADCED and how they will influence future policy, but it remains a fact the 
government is heavily involved in directing the economy, especially with 
oversight exercised by the GSEC that serves Abu Dhabi’s equivalent of the 
cabinet chaired by the Crown Prince.  Any progression towards a diversified 
economy fully integrated into the globalised marketplace will be closely 
monitored and controlled by the ruling élite, who will most likely reserve the 
right to prevent any activities that could be a threat to their continued status and 
hold on decision-making. 
ADEV2030’s ‘Objectives and Framework’ covers the process of identifying the 
best economic areas in which to achieve diversification, sustainability and 
distribution throughout the Emirate.  It discusses how to identify strengths to be 
enhanced, weaknesses to be improved and considers legal and regulatory 
instruments that could be reformed to make business easier.  Lastly it 
considers how best to utilise the resources of Abu Dhabi, both human and 
financial, to ensure future growth is enabled and infrastructure is fit for purpose.  
All of this contributes to the creation of a comprehensive action plan that charts 
progress towards objectives and measures overall effect, ensuring the 
development strategy is not based upon false assumptions.  Three benchmark 
countries have been selected for comparison, namely Norway, Ireland and New 
Zealand, all of which it is claimed have direct relevance for Abu Dhabi’s 
economic development.  While there are undoubtedly some economic 
similarities, it is notable all three countries have long-established representative 
democracies with no restrictions on political freedoms, complete open access 
to the globalised information space and free-market economies; Abu Dhabi 
cannot argue similarity.  It is questionable whether that is important to the 
potential success of Abu Dhabi’s economic development.  Internet searches 
reveal as many proponents of the view that democracy is necessary for 
economic success as those who disagree with the premise.  The example of 
China’s economic rise set alongside that of India shows it is achievable in non-
democratic and democratic nations.  However, China also prevents unrestricted 
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access to the internet whereas Abu Dhabi appears not to have that as an 
intention.  So, while lack of political reform may not harm Abu Dhabi’s push 
towards successful economic diversification, the necessary embedding of the 
Emirate’s newly educated workforce in the global information superhighway 
may increase demands for some form of popular participation in the political 
decision-making processes. 
As if to forestall such potential concerns the document includes a short 
paragraph called ‘Leading International Status’ where it aims to benchmark 
itself against thriving transformation economies identified as Norway, Ireland, 
New Zealand and now, Singapore.  Singapore cannot be described as 
democratic in the truest sense, but is economically successful, although it 
occasionally experiences the sort of civil discontent that could come Abu 
Dhabi’s way if its citizens become more politically aware and active180.  
However, it may be that economic transformation without a change in political 
governance is an achievable reality for Abu Dhabi, as long as services continue 
to be provided for the population in the spirit of the ruling bargain and attitudes 
towards traditional forms of governance do not change. 
ADEV2030 explains how it looks at macro- and socio-economic targets and 
goals, including resource development and core policy reforms, to create a 
series of five-year economic plans to manage the economy in the medium term 
and identify necessary adjustments, under oversight of GSEC.  GSEC is 
responsible for ensuring the economic strategy is joined-up with other 
government strategies, emphasising the central role the ruling élite will play in 
directing Abu Dhabi’s economic transformation.  This means the monarchy will 
guarantee its hold on the levers of power is maintained throughout the whole 
process. 
6.3.10. Highlights of the Vision   
In its final section the Executive Summary describes the ‘Highlights’ of 
ADEV2030 stating Abu Dhabi’s core commitment is ‘to build a sustainable and 
diversified high value-added economy by 2030’.  It claims this will be achieved 
through economic transformation, global integration, growing external markets 
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 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2014/10/08/why-singapore-will-not-replicate-hong-kongs-pro-
democracy-protests/ accessed 18 November 2014. 
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and improving productivity and competitiveness.  It reiterates the need to 
spread growth across the Emirate by ensuring its nationals, especially women, 
are prepared to enter the workforce, recognising a skilled expatriate workforce 
will be required to ensure faster growth in regional areas.  While the aspiration 
to improve productivity is certainly there, it is tempered by realism about how 
quickly this can be done, hence the sustained need for foreign labour. 
It recognises none of this will be possible without changes to regulatory 
frameworks; global best practice will be imported and applied, but only after 
application of the local context, suggesting there will not be complete economic 
freedom of action for foreign businesses setting up in the Emirate.  It talks of 
ensuring the necessary infrastructure and human and financial capital is put in 
place to guarantee the business climate is strong enough to support envisaged 
growth and transformation.  ADEV2030 declares Abu Dhabi will be modern, 
transparent, streamlined and globally integrated, with an efficient labour market 
and economic stability.  This would certainly put it amongst the leading 
countries as a place to do business in the 21st Century. 
ADEV2030 describes how the Emirate’s resources and financial markets will be 
improved and growth enabled through strategic sectors, seen as ‘engines of 
growth and diversification’ including: energy; petrochemicals; pharmaceuticals, 
biotech and life sciences; tourism; education; media; financial services; and 
telecommunications.  Some such as petrochemicals are unsurprising, but 
others, including education and media, are not sectors normally associated with 
Abu Dhabi.  This demonstrates real determination to diversify from hydrocarbon 
dependency and extend economic activity into a wider, more sustainable base.  
Also, Abu Dhabi may not see itself as a global education and media provider, 
but may be content with serving the Islamic world, which estimates placed at 
some 1.6 billion people in 2013181, a sizeable market in anyone’s book.  
Therefore while Abu Dhabi may seek to be global in financial services, 
petrochemicals and pharmaceuticals, it may see regional markets as equally 
worthy and more dependable in certain circumstances, especially where 
common cultural and religious values apply. 
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ADEV2030 provides a brief description of targets driving Abu Dhabi’s economic 
development, which it sees as being ambitious and measurable.  It stresses the 
need to combine human, physical and financial capital, operating in concert 
with productivity and competitiveness, picking up on a recurring theme in the 
document.  The targets to be met are economic development and stability, and 
stakeholders are warned these targets will be reached only if everyone does 
their bit, including an average of 7 percent growth in 2008-2015, and 6 percent 
per annum thereafter.  At these rates the document proclaims Abu Dhabi will 
grow faster than its selected benchmarks, but still sustainably.  This is 
expanded upon by stating the non-oil sector will grow faster in GDP terms than 
hydrocarbons, with the aim of reaching balance between oil and non-oil sectors 
by 2028 to show the extra depth instilled in the economy.   
Economic stability will be critical throughout and the aim is to reduce the non-oil 
deficit significantly, but not specifically enumerated, over the period of the 
Vision, while ensuring inflation is kept under control.  Unemployment is also 
targeted with an intention to reduce it to 5 percent of the national population, 
what is described as effectively full employment.  Lastly, the government 
intends to have increased GDP more than five-fold by 2030.  Despite the rising 
population it says this will result in healthy growth in income and wealth for all 
residing in Abu Dhabi.  Also planned to see a five-fold increase are national 
assets which comprise exports and investments; this will be mirrored by the 
creation of consistently high national savings levels from both the public and 
private sectors which can be used for further investment and wealth creation.  
Such specific economic targets are unusual when compared to the other 
visions analysed and could be considered rash given global economic 
unpredictability.  However, their inclusion shows a commitment by the rulers to 
produce quantifiable change in terms of the Emirate’s sustainable development 
and, arguably, could help reassure citizens the future will be stable, safe and 
secure, which bolsters the position of the monarchy. 
The Executive Summary concludes by noting the aspiration that Abu  Dhabi 
should confirm and enhance its status as a ‘globally relevant destination’; a 
position it believes it has already achieved through its wealth and natural 
resources, but which it recognises could be strengthened by improved business 
methods and better economic competitiveness.  Thus the Emirate intends to 
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become ‘a shining example on the international business stage’, an aspiration it 
shares with the remainder of the UAE and with Qatar and Bahrain. 
6.3.11. Diversification, but Business as Usual 
Although only the executive summary, this document is more detailed than its 
counterparts from Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE and explains the 2030 deadline 
as the date at which Abu Dhabi believes it will have achieved sustainable 
economic diversification away from hydrocarbons.  There is much emphasis on 
the role of the private sector in the economic development strategy, but the 
controlling function of government is centrally placed too, especially through the 
oversight exercised by GSEC.  This will ensure socio-economic change and 
development are carefully managed by the monarchy, while retaining their hold 
on power. 
Linked with the emphasis on the government’s authority is repeated reference 
to stability, a safe and secure society, and the maintenance of domestic and 
international security, both for Abu Dhabi and the wider UAE, linked to 
economic development.  Human security issues are not mentioned in detail 
apart from healthcare as a priority.  Perhaps it is an intrinsic part of the 
domestic security strand mentioned so often.  The message of the necessity of 
economic diversification underpins the whole of government agenda with more 
nationals, especially women, represented in the private sector.  Globalisation is 
to be embraced for the inward and outward investment opportunities it will 
provide, but other potential effects of globalisation, as a result of greater foreign 
penetration of the Emirate’s society, are largely ignored. 
ADEV2030 has twin targets of economic development and stability across all 
sectors.  Much is made of the need to upgrade and improve the national 
infrastructure to provide the means by which business can be conducted in a 
globalised commercial environment.  Security is again prominent in all aspects 
of this.  Yet, what is surprising, given the emphasis on sustainability and the 
existence and prominence of Masdar, is the little space given to the natural 
environment in the executive summary.  This absence of focus is reflected in 
the 120 pages comprising the main body of the document where the word 
‘environmental’ occurs only eleven times with ten of those on pages 91 and 92, 
suggesting economic development has distracted the authors from wider 
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sustainability issues, although environmental measures are prominent at 
Federation level.  
Legislative reforms are designed to make Abu Dhabi an easier place to do 
business.  However, there is no mention of the possibility of income or 
corporation tax to fund the services previously paid for by the government out 
of hydrocarbon revenues.  Perhaps the government hopes putting more 
nationals into the private sector will reduce the state sector wage bill sufficiently 
to make the savings necessary to fund the essential services they currently 
provide, without the need for taxation.  Also of note, while legislative reforms 
are discussed there is no mention of changing the way laws are made or 
widening the national decision-making forum. 
Upgrading the education and skills of Abu Dhabi’s citizens is mentioned 
frequently and no doubt there is hope citizens will come to see the private 
sector as an attractive place to work.  However, it is clear the government sees 
a requirement for highly skilled expatriates stretching some way into the future.  
While unskilled labour is not mentioned at all, it is likely expatriates from the 
sub-continent and South-East Asia will continue to do those jobs citizens refuse 
to countenance. 
Finally, there is no apparent recognition that better education and improved 
access to global information could lead to popular demand for changes in the 
political system.  Maybe the rulers hope a combination of good internal 
security, little or no taxation and reinforcement of traditional cultural norms and 
values in the face of globalising pressures will be sufficient to allow the ruling 
bargain to continue unchallenged. 
6.4. Evidence of Transformation 
6.4.1. The Significance of Climate Change 
The UAE publicly supports international efforts to counteract the effects of 
climate change.  Attendees at the World Green Economy Summit in Dubai in 
April 2015 were encouraged to move quickly to limit climate change by the 
director general of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).  He 
told the conference the IPCC believes it is possible to avoid catastrophic 
climate change if action is taken quickly and decisively.  In particular he 
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stressed the use of renewable energy to significantly reduce GHG emissions 
while providing enhanced energy security, more jobs, and a better 
environment.  The conference was opened by the chairman of the Dubai 
Supreme Council of Energy, and organised by the Dubai Electricity and Water 
Authority in parallel with the Water, Energy, Technology and Environment 
Exhibition182.  The UAE appears to have a very clear understanding of how 
climate change mitigation, human security and national security are interrelated 
and interdependent and hosting such conferences demonstrates its 
determination to be at the forefront of discussions and policy making.  
The UAE’s Ministry of Environment and Water (MEW) has designated five 
marine and coastal habitat sites183 as areas having global significance.  They 
were recognised for their unique biodiversity at a workshop in Dubai discussing 
biologically and ecologically significant marine areas in the Arabian Gulf and 
north-west Indian Ocean.  The aim is to protect coastal habitats including 
mangroves, sea-grass, coral reefs and sand flats which support a variety of 
migratory and endangered species such as dugongs, hawksbill turtles and 
dolphins.  The Ministry hosted the workshop attended by representatives from 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, Eritrea, 
Pakistan, India and international and regional organisations184.  Again the UAE 
is seen to be operating at the international level in a matter of global concern.  
Public stewardship of environmental issues significantly enhances the UAE’s 
ecological credentials and can counteract the bad press that comes from being 
one of the world’s largest per capita emitters of GHGs.  That aside, the UAE’s 
commitment to the issue is obviously deep and sincere otherwise it would be 
recognised quickly by others as a facade.   
 In June 2015 the UAE achieved a major milestone with the opening of 
IRENA’s global headquarters in Masdar City, Abu Dhabi.  The government 
sees this as recognition of its commitment to sustainable clean energy and 
renewables.  IRENA’s director general hopes the new headquarters will provide 
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a centre from which to monitor the expansion of renewables globally.  The 
opening consolidates the relationship between IRENA and Masdar and raises 
the UAE’s profile according to the heads of both organisations185. The UAE has 
campaigned strongly to place itself firmly in the centre of the renewables and 
green agenda and this is a significant success, having worked hard for seven 
years to get IRENA into Abu Dhabi despite international concerns about their 
GHG emission levels. 
Abu Dhabi’s Environment Agency (EAD) says it has adopted sustainable 
development as a means of reaching the goals stated in ADEV2030, focused 
on creating a balance between economic and social development on one hand 
and environmental protection on the other (EAD 2011).  While this specifically 
refers to Abu Dhabi it is hard to see how they can achieve this and not include 
the other Emirates in the process, given their close proximity and 
interdependencies.  Meanwhile, UAE Government Strategy 2011-2013 lays 
down its intentions for preserving and protecting the environment.  It says it will 
mitigate and adapt to climate change impacts, comply with international 
environmental obligations, respond effectively to the UAE’s environmental 
challenges, and improve food security.  It will also adopt a range of measures 
including conservation of natural resources, promotion of renewable and 
alternative energy sources, ensuring water sustainability, reducing pollution and 
encouraging eco-friendly mindsets and practices (UAE Government Strategy 
2011-2013).  This plays well into the environmental, energy and food security 
agendas and is strongly supportive of alternative cleaner technologies.  It is a 
clear exposition of intent by the government, but as the UAE has the record of 
being the greatest per capita polluter on the planet there was probably a certain 
amount of pressure felt by the Federation to be seen to be doing more in 
environmental protection terms for the sake of its international reputation.  
However, as a publicly available document against which its performance could 
be measured it must be seen as a statement of commendable aspirations. 
EAD’s 2011-2015 Environment Strategy recognises Abu Dhabi faces 
considerable challenges: the population is predicted to more than double during 
2011-2030; there will be increased demand for building land, energy, water, 
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food and other products; the growing economy will bring with it a greater 
demand for energy, water and other raw materials; GHG emissions are likely to 
increase.  The availability of water is a particular and urgent concern; around 
65 percent of water used is supplied from groundwater, the remainder being 
provided by desalination and recycled water. Groundwater renews slowly, 
causing the supply to diminish, but a growing population will need increased 
water supplies and more reliance will be placed on energy and carbon intensive 
desalination processes.  Mangrove forests and sea-grass will suffer because of 
rising sea levels and water temperatures. There will be more cases of coral 
bleaching as increased temperatures kill algae which give coral its distinct 
colour. Fish stocks are threatened which will increase if marine habitats 
deteriorate and a growing population demands more fish products.  Abu Dhabi 
sees the necessity of a strong and effective environmental regulatory 
framework and partnership between government, NGOs, academia and the 
private sector to ensure economic growth provides the desired benefits without 
damaging Abu Dhabi’s natural heritage and long-term prospects (EAD 2011).  
Published four years after ADEV2030 this strategy shows keen awareness of 
climate change effects and Abu Dhabi’s potential impacts on the natural 
environment.  While the sentiment is obviously heartfelt, what will be crucial is 
taking the next step beyond recognising the problem and actually doing 
something about it. 
Abu Dhabi’s Water Resources Management Strategy 2014-18 follows on 
logically from the 2011 Environment Strategy.  It says agriculture is the largest 
water consumer in the Emirate followed by residential use.  Forecasts show 
demand for desalinated water is expected to almost double by 2030.  Enabling 
economic diversification, whilst reducing commercial, industrial and private 
water use, will continue to be a major priority for Abu Dhabi (EAD 2014b).  
Water security will be a pressing problem which has direct human security 
implications.  The remainder of the strategy gives clear objectives and 
deadlines about water usage, recycling of water with its cultural and religious 
objections, groundwater reserves and salinity. As with most of the official 
strategies reviewed, it is heavy on headlines but lacks detail about how 
objectives will be achieved.  Nonetheless it is an example of published 
government intent which can be monitored and measured by the Emirate’s 
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citizens and others outside their borders.  As such it must be considered to 
show a determination to achieve the goals; if the goals are not achieved the 
Government could suffer an unacceptable loss of face as a result of failure.   
EAD’s Annual Report 2013 focuses on the priorities laid out in Environment 
Strategy 2011-2015.  The highlights include advances in strategic planning; 
establishment of the Marine Water Quality Index; a Wetland conservation 
award recognising the increase in Marine and Terrestrial Protected Areas; the 
establishment of a benchmark for GHGs to help meet its international 
obligations; a 46 percent improvement in particulate emissions in one year; 
widening of the Sustainable Schools Initiative; and improved Health and Safety 
training and equipment (EAD 2014a).  The highlights and the very detailed 
report that follows provide clear evidence, publicly stated and open to 
challenge, of advances and improvements Abu Dhabi has made in its strategy 
to protect and improve the environment and mitigate the effects of climate 
change.  Again, while this is Abu Dhabi’s strategy, it cannot be enacted in 
isolation of the other six emirates because of the inherent interdependencies of 
the Federation, nor without the collaboration of partners within the region and 
other international stakeholders as stated in the 2011 Strategy.  Furthermore, 
given this evidence, it would be difficult to justify a view that Abu Dhabi is not 
taking environmental protection and conservation seriously, although there are 
potentially difficult systemic issues around the rapid development of its urban 
complex, and its burgeoning population that may find employment difficult to 
obtain in the future, unless it is suitably educated and trained and has an 
appetite for productive work. 
In 2015 the World Bank released The Little Green Data Book which said the 
UAE had particle pollution levels much higher than the World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) recommended guidelines.  It said the UAE had the most 
polluted air of any country, which was rejected by the director of air quality at 
MEW.  In September 2015 MEW announced eleven more air quality monitoring 
stations would be built as part of its UAE Air Quality Network programme.  The 
Ministry already operates 46 monitoring stations across the country, so an 
accurate picture of air quality can be compiled.  The aim is to unify air quality 
monitoring across the Federation; most of the new stations would be built in 
Ajman and the Northern Emirates.  The government has also taken other 
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initiatives by launching new projects to improve air quality including regulating 
quarrying and cement and asbestos production.  Sharjah will set up the 
region’s first and the world’s largest waste-to-energy facility to recycle 400,000 
tonnes of waste a year to generate 85 megawatts of energy186&187 as well as 
reducing landfill.  The UAE is working hard to change perceptions about its 
GHG and particulate emissions and these initiatives, reported fully in the press, 
publicly demonstrate the government’s commitment to improving and protecting 
the environment while enhancing the UAE’s international reputation.     
Establishing environmental awareness in people early in life is an effective way 
of preventing behaviours harmful to the environment before they occur.  Dubai 
schoolchildren are encouraged to take care of the environment by an 
awareness campaign as part of the ‘My City, My Environment’ initiative188.  
Recycling cubes will be placed in schools and points will be awarded to 
children on the basis of recycling collected, which can be used to buy a 
humanitarian or environmental reward online189.  Although limited to Dubai 
Municipality, this is an excellent step forward in environmental education and 
linking it to performance-related rewards should ensure children remain 
motivated to participate.  Once positive behaviours have been instilled it is to 
be hoped they will continue throughout life and be passed on to future 
generations.    
The mangrove is the plant that offsets most carbon in the Arabian Peninsula 
according to a National Blue Carbon Project report published in October 2015.  
The director of biodiversity at MEW believes understanding the effects of 
climate change in the UAE might allow more efforts to be devoted to 
discovering how large the mangrove carbon offset is and lead policymakers to 
pass legislation to preserve natural habitats.  Destruction of the mangrove 
carbon sinks that currently mitigate CO2 emissions would release additional 
carbon into the atmosphere.  It is estimated the UAE’s mangroves offset about 
600,000 kilograms of carbon per hectare, equivalent to the annual emissions of 
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120 cars; with about 3,000 hectares of mangroves in the UAE the total offset is 
equivalent to 360,000 vehicles.  EAD and MEW are looking to increase the 
area of UAE’s mangroves to complement other climate change mitigation 
projects190.  The initiative not only recognises the environmental damage done 
by the destruction of habitats such as mangrove swamps, it also sees the 
benefits of preserving and extending their range in terms of the carbon sinks 
they provide.  Again this reflects a high level of environmental awareness in the 
UAE and a publicly stated determination to preserve, maintain and improve the 
environment for future generations.  It is therefore fair to conclude from the 
available evidence that a wide range of environmental considerations and 
initiatives are high up the national policy agenda, although there remains the 
issue of translating policy into execution, but that is evidenced by some of the 
projects already underway. 
6.4.2. Sustainable and Alternative Technologies 
The World Green Economy Summit in Dubai in April 2015 was briefed on a 
report by non-profit environmental organisation, The Climate Group191, that the 
UAE is leading the way in developing the solar energy sector and pushing 
down the cost of renewable energy.  The Dubai Electricity and Water 
Authority’s (DEWA) 200MW solar plant expects to be producing electricity at 
the lowest price in the world by 2017.  The chief executive of The Climate 
Group said the UAE was recognised as the world leader in renewable energy 
and the report cited the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park and 
Dubai’s commitment to investing almost US$3 billion to increase energy 
generation capacity from one to three GW as the reasons.  He said the UAE is 
globally recognised for its low carbon leadership and with the government 
driving green growth plans and incentives there is increased interest from 
companies.  UAE’s green economy is expected to provide 160,000 jobs by 
2030 and boost GDP by 5 per cent; it is credited as the leader in renewables in 
the MENA region, especially solar power, and was described as an exemplary 
international model with strong potential to be a hub of a global energy 
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revolution192.  While this news report was for public and international 
consumption as a positive news story about the UAE, it does show commitment 
to alternative sources of energy and a desire to boost the so-called ‘Green 
Economy’.  Also, and notably, The Climate Group appears to be entirely 
independent, so its glowing report of the UAE’s low-carbon credentials must be 
taken at face value as a statement of the facts available.  This enhances the 
UAE’s international reputation significantly. 
Port operator DP World plans to establish Dubai’s largest solar rooftop project 
in 2016 and will provide energy back into Dubai’s electricity grid.  It is estimated 
between 30MW and 40MW will be generated, about one third of the power 
used by the ports facility, enough to power 30,000 homes for a year.  In May 
2015, DEWA launched Shams Dubai, an initiative to regulate the generation of 
solar energy in buildings and their connection to the grid.  Under the scheme, 
businesses and homeowners will be able to install their own solar panels and 
then feed the energy generated into the grid to reduce their costs193.  The 
underlying aim is to diversify Dubai’s energy generation into alternative 
renewable sources and take full advantage of year round sunshine.  This will 
also reduce dependency on gas and oil-fired generation facilities and the 
emissions associated with them and will augment current production, providing 
increased energy security for the Emirate.      
In November 2015 it was announced Australia and the UAE had finalised an 
agreement for Australia to supply uranium for use in the UAE’s developing 
nuclear power programme through the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, which 
sets out strict conditions for the peaceful use, safeguarding and security of 
Australian uranium194.  The move into nuclear power generation is a step-
change for the UAE which is planning to build four reactors with the first coming 
on-stream in 2017195 and will be the first Gulf Arab state to generate nuclear 
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power196.  It should significantly change the UAE’s GHG emissions levels as it 
produces clean energy, although it will require many expatriates to run the 
power stations unless and until sufficient Emiratis can be trained to do so.  The 
UAE is publicly committed to finding alternative sources of clean, sustainable 
energy and appears determined to be seen as an international leader within the 
sector.  That will increase its international standing as well as improving its 
energy security and assisting its efforts to diversify its economy.      
6.4.3. Political Reform 
Political Reform seems hardly likely in the UAE given the preoccupation in both 
UAEV2021 and ADEV2030 with maintaining centralised control of economic 
transformation and the status quo as far as governance is concerned.  
However, in November 2015 the UAE appointed a woman as president of the 
Federal National Council (FNC), a government advisory body formed to 
represent the general public, making her the Arab world’s first woman to be 
elected to such a role.  In October 2015, almost 79,000 Emirati voters, out of a 
population of around 1.23 million197 citizens, had elected 20 representatives of 
the 40-member FNC. The remaining council members were appointed by the 
seven Emirates198.  The FNC can hardly be considered a democratic institution 
as only half its members are elected and then by only 6.4 percent of UAE’s 
nationals.  While the appointment of a female president to the FNC may be 
ground breaking in the Arab world it does not signify any important changes are 
afoot as the FNC has no real power and does not hold the government to 
account. 
In the first week of February 2016 the Vice President announced the largest 
changes in government structures since the Federation’s creation.  He said 
ministries would be consolidated and new entities established in health and 
education, with most government services being outsourced to the private 
sector.  He noted the need for flexible government capable of handling change.  
The government now has fewer ministries, but more ministers with strategic 
                                                          
196
 http://www.gulfbusiness.com/articles/industry/first-reactor-of-uae-nuclear-power-plant-on-track-
for-2017-start/ accessed 21 March 2016. 
197
 http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/united-arab-emirates-population/ accessed 21 March 
2016. 
198 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/perspective/profiles/2015/11/18/UAE-hails-first-woman-in-Arab-
world-to-head-advisory-body-.html accessed 1 December 2015. 
231 
 
national portfolios, including the new Minister of State for Happiness and the 
Minister of State for Tolerance.  Education, skills and happiness for citizens 
within the context of the family and society are new priorities.   A UAE Youth 
National Council will be established, comprising young people who will serve as 
advisers to the government on youth issues, led by a female Minister of State 
for Youth who will be no older than 22.  The Ministry of Cabinet Affairs has the 
specific task of preparing for the post-oil era and will be renamed the Ministry of 
Cabinet Affairs and the Future.  All education will be combined into one ministry 
responsible for monitoring all stages from nurseries to universities.  There will 
be a greater focus on disease prevention in a restructured Ministry of Health, 
with an independent entity to oversee and manage public hospitals.  The 
Ministry of International Cooperation and Development will merge with the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will handle UAE overseas aid.  The Ministry of 
Labour will become the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratisation and 
incorporate Tanmia, the national human resources and employment authority.  
The Ministry of Community Development is formed from the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and the Marriage Fund and will focus on citizens’ families and 
community issues.  There will be a Ministry of Climate Change and 
Environment to develop and monitor environmental programmes and 
legislation, while the National Council of Tourism and Antiquities will merge with 
the Ministry of Economy and set national targets to boost GNP.  The Council of 
Scientists will be established to review national policies related to science, 
technology and innovation, and the newly named Ministry of Culture and 
Knowledge will focus on protecting the Arabic language and increasing 
knowledge199&200.  Government restructuring is not political reform and could 
conceal a consolidation of real power in ministers, while making the private 
sector responsible for delivery of policies on the ground.  The Ministry of 
Climate Change and Council of Scientists sound progressive, but the Ministry 
of Community Development and the Ministry of Culture and Knowledge could 
indicate retrenchment in tradition and the past.  How advisory the Youth 
National Council is remains to be seen.  A sceptic could regard this as 
‘rearranging the deck chairs’ rather than a positive strategy of reform, but until 
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there is evidence either way the verdict on the effects of restructuring remains 
on hold. 
6.4.4. Economic Diversification 
In 2009 it was estimated Abu Dhabi had about eight percent of the global oil 
reserves, at 98 billion barrels, and approximately 94 percent of the UAE’s 
holdings.  This should last until the end of the 21st Century (Davidson 2009).  
Ulrichsen believed that because of the size of its oil reserves there was no real 
urgency in the UAE to carry out economic diversification and there were also 
general concerns about the levels of education of GCC nationals, as most 
lacked the qualifications to gain employment in the private sector (2011).  
Dubai, lacking oil, had diversified into real estate and other financial and 
services sectors, but the 2008 global economic downturn affected it very badly 
and Abu Dhabi stepped in to bail it out at a cost of US$10 billion201&202.  Dubai 
and the rest of the UAE bounced back and by 2013 commentators were 
reporting good financial health in the Federation203, although Abu Dhabi 
remains the main economic power with a recovering Dubai still in second place.   
Published in 2014, Dubai Plan 2021 is far less detailed than ADEV2030 and 
more like UAEV2021.  It aims to establish Dubai among the world’s greatest 
cities and reinforce its place as a pivotal hub in the global economy, as well as 
a preferred place to live and work for people and visitors alike.  It aims to have 
a resilient and diversified economy, innovative business models, increased 
productivity of labour and capital, and be the favoured investment destination 
for foreign capital.  There is little to surprise here, but it does reflect restored 
confidence within the Emirate and probably a determination to recover its 
former economic strength relative to Abu Dhabi, while contributing to the 
success of the Federation.    
The UAE has continued to show strong economic growth, even though some 
indicators in 2014 indicated a slow-down in certain areas like real estate. 
However, the longer-term outlook for the sector remained positive with almost 
US$200 billion of real-estate projects underway across the Federation, almost 
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two-thirds of all project spending. Passenger volumes continued to grow with 
Dubai seeing a 6.1 percent gain in the first ten months of 2014 and Abu Dhabi 
a 22.6 percent increase. Real growth in the UAE was expected to exceed 4 
percent in 2014 and 2015, more or less in line with broader regional trends 
(BEDB 2014b).  Although this is a Bahraini assessment of the UAE’s economic 
performance in 2014, it is worth noting the positive tenor of the reporting and 
that, despite some cooling in the property sector, significant capital expenditure 
was underway and real growth on a par with regional trends is continuing.  This 
economic growth should create wealth and therefore reinforce stability within 
the UAE, both of which are key contributors to human and national security.  
The UAE Space Agency was created in 2014 by presidential decree to regulate 
and support the industry, including existing satellite programmes and a mission 
to Mars planned for 2020.  In May 2015 the UAE laid out a strategy for the 
Agency to integrate the various components of the Federation's developing 
space industry.  The Agency chairman says the space industry will assist 
economic diversification and create highly skilled jobs for a growing young 
population while confirming the UAE’s status as a ‘space-faring nation’.  There 
are also plans for an academic space programme involving the al-Yah Satellite 
Communications Company204 and the Masdar Institute205, both part of 
Mubadala206, and U.S. aerospace firm Orbital ATK, as well as a space research 
centre.  The probe, named ‘Hope’, is the first Mars mission being attempted by 
any Arab country and around 75 Emirati engineers are currently working on the 
project, which officials hope to double by 2020207&208.    This is a significant 
departure for the UAE into real cutting edge technology, building on their 
current aerospace innovations and developments.  However, it will be 
interesting to see if the educational standards of citizens allow them to take up 
the skilled jobs created and whether the citizens have the appetite to do the 
work.  If not, the programme will be heavily dependent on skilled expatriate 
labour as are many other sectors in the Federation. 
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UAE Government Strategy 2011-2013 aims to promote innovation and R&D, 
strengthen key regulatory frameworks and encourage emerging high value-
added sectors to enhance competitiveness, develop the business environment, 
and ensure consumer protection.  Additionally it will increase efficiency, 
flexibility and productivity within the labour market through development of a 
national workforce and strengthening its role in the economy.  It will also 
encourage SMEs to start up while reducing marginal economic activities.  This 
all suggests a strong determination to move away from oil dependency and 
expand into other sectors while the oil cushion is still there.  The intention to 
develop a national workforce and encourage the creation of SMEs perhaps 
indicates a wish to move from traditional rentierism to a more market oriented 
economy, but this will not happen overnight as there are cultural issues to deal 
with surrounding the general work ethic and acceptability of private sector 
employment. 
The UAE has stated its intention to develop a competitive knowledge-based 
economy and will do this by promoting exports and consolidating the UAE’s 
position in international trade; diversifying trading partners and exports; and 
encouraging high value-added industrial sectors through policy changes.  
Research will be enhanced; talents aligned with national priorities will be 
developed; cooperation with the private sector and international institutions in 
innovation and applied research will be encouraged; and new funding 
opportunities for R&D will be explored (UAE Government Strategy 2011-2013).  
The government’s desire to diversify into other potentially high value areas is 
very clearly stated in its strategy, which stresses the importance of Emiratis in 
this process, reinforcing the perspective the government wants more of them 
working and creating wealth for the Federation. 
The Khalifa Fund for Enterprise Development, Khalifa University, Tawazun 
Economic Council and Mubadala Development Company established the 
Khalifa Innovation Centre in late 2015 to support innovative projects across the 
UAE.  The centre will operate for five years, offering financial and technical 
support to almost 130 projects, each of which is expected to receive up to 
US$82,000.  The initiative is intended to strengthen R&D and provide the link 
between innovation and start-ups with around US$54.5 million invested in 
supporting 1,000 innovative Emiratis.  Support will also be provided to 
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transform practical ideas into projects through incubators in the centre, with up 
to US$272,000 provided for ten projects each year209.  Business incubation and 
entrepreneurial development are key components of economic diversification 
as seen in the cases of Bahrain and Qatar.  Here the UAE is mirroring its two 
regional neighbours by providing the support required to help innovative 
citizens start private sector businesses that can provide employment at the 
same time as moving into new sectors.   
The UAE Annual Economic Report 2013 said there was a substantial 
improvement in the national economy in 2012, with more stability and 
diversification underway, driven by tourism, foreign trade, financial services, 
communications and the recovery of the real estate sector. All non-oil sectors 
reported strong growth which positively reflected in GDP in both oil and non-oil 
sectors.  The UAE Annual Economic Report 2014 continued previous optimism 
stating the policy of economic diversification meant the national economy 
performed strongly in 2013, despite volatile global economic conditions.  Real 
growth was 5.2 percent compared to 4.7 percent in 2012.  The Dubai 
Mercantile Exchange was top of the global stock markets with a growth rate 
exceeding 106 percent and Abu Dhabi stock exchange market grew by 63 
percent.  In December 2015 the UAE Minister of Economy said growth of 3-3.5 
percent is expected in 2016 if there is a minimum increase in the price of oil.  In 
2021 only 30 percent of GDP will come from the hydrocarbons sector, as the 
non-oil economy is progressively expanding due to new businesses210.  The 
Lebanon-based Bank Audi agreed that strength persisted through 2013-14 with 
indicators suggesting continued non-hydrocarbon growth driven by tourism, 
trade, transportation and real estate for 2015 (Bank Audi 2015).  However, in 
January 2016 it noted the UAE’s fiscal position had deteriorated in 2015 with 
the first deficit posted since 2009 as a result of low oil prices and reduced 
revenues, leading to a rise in electricity and water tariffs and deregulation of 
fuel prices in August 2015.  On the bright side, Bank Audi believes low oil 
prices should intensify the drive towards economic diversification in trade, 
finance, transport and tourism (Bank Audi 2016), although the IMF cut the UAE 
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GDP forecast for 2016 from 3.1 to 2.6 percent because of the slowing Chinese 
economy and the prospect of regional spending cuts211.   Despite the adverse 
effects of low oil prices, the UAE continued to grow the non-hydrocarbon 
component of its economy through June 2016, although the Abu Dhabi 
Commercial Bank reduced growth predictions from 2.5 to 2.3 percent212.  
However, with 90 years of oil reserves the UAE has a good cushion on which to 
build a sustainable economy and perhaps preserve the ruling bargain. 
Whatever the effects of low oil prices, they are unlikely to remain low forever 
and the UAE maintains its efforts to portray itself as a progressive and modern 
nation at the leading edge of new technologies and economic diversification.  
During 22-28 November 2015 the UAE Innovation Week took place and 
included awards for innovation, an innovation expo, plans for promotion of eco-
tourism, a conference on water and energy consumption management, an 
engineering exhibition and a higher education and research forum213.  In this 
way the UAE enhances its reputation regionally and internationally and makes 
it more attractive to foreign investors looking for a place to put their money or 
their businesses. 
6.4.5. Education and Skills for Citizens 
It is said Emirati youth is bored, rich and workshy.  Conversely, it is also 
claimed young Emiratis are more active and engaged in work due to the 
improved education system.  95 percent of women graduating from high school 
go to university and 75 percent of men.  Yet, there is still a huge public sector 
and a culture of entitlement resulting from membership of an affluent minority in 
a comfortable and heavily state-subsidised society.  There is also a belief 
Emiratis cannot be fired, but 28 percent of young Emiratis are unemployed214.  
The alleged lack of work ethic is not confined to Emiratis as seen in the cases 
of Bahrain and Qatar, nor is the view that the public sector is where the easy 
jobs are, or private sector work is demanding or unglamorous.  However, if the 
government is to achieve its diversification agenda it must convince young 
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citizens of the need to gain appropriate education and skills and that 
economically productive work in the private sector is of higher value than a 
government sinecure. 
The government claims to give special attention to future generations and aims 
to develop teaching systems, methods and staff to reduce student drop-out 
rates and contribute to the development of skills.  It will develop knowledge, 
instil learning and work values, and prepare students for college life. The 
quality of higher education will also be improved to ensure it produces 
graduates equipped with skills necessary to support national growth (UAE 
Government Strategy 2011-2013:10).  The UAE is clearly determined to ensure 
it has the right skills and educational standards in its citizens to drive the 
development of the Federation forward, ensure diversification is achieved and 
reduce dependency on expatriate workers. 
Developing human resources in the UAE’s emerging space industry is said to 
be as important as developing the sector’s infrastructure.  This can be achieved 
by ensuring strong relationships between industry and education.  Internships, 
scholarships and training are sound ways to ensure a good supply of 
indigenous talent.  Such programmes offer future engineers and scientists 
practical experience, furthering their knowledge and engagement while 
benefitting industry.  The UAE’s National Space Programme offers high-school 
pupils and university students a chance to have their projects launched into 
space.  The programme’s university level competition challenges students to 
build a satellite and the winning team travels to the US to see their satellite sent 
to the International Space Station.    Through practical training at Khalifa 
University’s Spacecraft Platform for Astronautic and Celestial Emulation 
laboratory and field trips to the Mohammed bin Rashid Space Centre, students 
get real experience, enabling them to develop the skills they need to build and 
employ satellites.  Telecoms company Thuraya215 supports the competition by 
providing internships and facilities for testing216.  This is imaginative and 
innovative as it combines government agencies, educational institutions and 
commercial companies in an education and skills development programme.  It 
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will almost certainly be attractive to young Emiratis and the trick will be to 
ensure jobs are created across the spectrum of capability rather than focusing 
on one small group at the top end.  However, this is one niche area and the 
same effort needs to be applied across the range of knowledge-based 
industries and services the UAE hopes to establish or attract. 
6.4.6. Expatriate Dependency 
It is said young Emiratis risk feeling lost in their country as they are 
outnumbered five to one217 by mostly low-skilled expatriates.  Programmes 
designed to encourage young Emiratis to work while reducing dependence on 
migrant workers are said to be of limited value, while expatriate workers are 
said to have a profound effect on the character of the country with national 
identity becoming diluted218. This has been noted before and will persist as long 
as Emiratis are not prepared to enter in large numbers into the private sector or 
take less prestigious jobs.  It is highly doubtful whether the Emirates could now 
function without significant numbers of low-skilled migrants to run its services, 
especially as they perform many roles that citizens would not deign to do. 
It is conceded by some that more needs to be done by the government about 
badly paid and poorly housed expatriate construction workers, typically earning 
between US$130 and US$380 a month, with free food and accommodation, but 
often in cramped conditions.  In March 2015 Asian labourers protested on a site 
near the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, despite a ban on protests.  The labourers’ pay 
had been significantly reduced after a cut in overtime work219.  In Ras al-
Khaimah in April 2015, labourers set fire to a building site and seventeen cars 
after a worker fell to his death, possibly a suicide.  The local police chief said 
investigations were underway and urged labourers to obey the law in resolving 
disputes and warned the public not to spread rumours on social media220.  
While these types of incident are not regular they are reported when they 
occur, although generally there is no sympathy for the expatriates from the 
authorities and very little from citizens.  The government appears to believe 
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police enforcement action is enough to keep the problem in check, but with 
expatriates accounting for 87 percent of a population of around 9.5 million221 
this could be an existential threat for the government should they decide to 
rebel en masse.  The police chief’s comments about the use of social media 
are also interesting as they reflect a growing awareness of the power of 
information not under the control of the authorities. 
The British Museum came under fire in 2015 over plans to loan culturally 
significant artefacts to the Zayed National Museum in the UAE for up to five 
years in return for a major fee.  Human rights groups said the Zayed was being 
built using a system of ‘modern slavery’.  Many thousands had been recruited 
to work on the giant construction project, but it was claimed many were housed 
in slums or deported for complaining about low wages.  The general secretary 
of the International Trade Union Confederation is reported to have said  ‘the 
UAE’s medieval labour laws put the migrant workers there totally under the 
control of their employers, leaving them exposed to death and injury at work, 
and unable to escape the country’222.    The UAE faces continual criticism about 
its treatment of migrant workers.  Accusations of slavery are strong criticisms, 
but this appears not to be single source reporting, rather part of a wider 
campaign against the monarchies to force them to reform their labour laws with 
respect to migrant workers.  Again, it is surprising the authorities do not appear 
to recognise the potential problems they may face, or perhaps, like other Gulf 
States, they cynically expect most migrants to be compliant as they need the 
work desperately for their families to survive.  
6.4.7. Human Security Measures 
The UAE’s approach to human security appears to have been weakening when 
viewed statistically through the lens of the Human Development Index (HDI)223.  
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Its HDI value dropped from 0.831 in 2005 to 0.818 in 2012, a decrease of 2 
percent, although still in the very high human development category, placing 
the UAE 41st of 187 countries and territories.  This is below the average of 
0.905 for countries in the very high human development group and well above 
the average of 0.652 for Arab States, where the closest countries in rank and 
population size are Qatar and Bahrain, ranked 36th and 48th respectively 
(UNDP 2013c).    
The UAE’s 2013 HDI value increased to 0.827, returning to the general upward 
trend that has prevailed since 1980.  This maintains the UAE in the very high 
human development category, positioning it 40th of 187 countries and 
territories.  UAE remains below the average of 0.890 for countries in the very 
high human development group, but is still well above the average of 0.682 for 
Arab States, where the countries closest to the UAE in rank and population size 
remain Qatar and Bahrain, placed 31st and 44th respectively (UNDP 2014c).   
By 2014, the UAE’s HDI score was 0.835, still in the very high human 
development category, and 41st of 188 countries and territories.  UAE is still 
below the average of 0.896 for countries in the very high human development 
group, but well above the average of 0.686 for Arab States, where the countries 
closest to the UAE in rank and population size are still Qatar and Bahrain, 
ranked 32nd and 45th (UNDP 2015c).  In 2014 the UAE maintained its 
approximate ranking in the World, although it improved its HDI value.  Notably it 
maintained its position relative to Qatar and Bahrain which both also dropped 
back one position in the global rankings.  On the three measures laid down by 
UNDP, the UAE is continuing its upward trend and is significantly better than 
the Arab States average, although Iraq, Syria and Libya must pull down the 
average value. 
Abu Dhabi completed a major project in October 2015 designed to ensure a 90-
day supply of water for the capital and the Western Region during an 
emergency.  The US$1.5 billion project pumps desalinated water to a 
freshwater underground aquifer near the Liwa oasis in the Western Region.  
During an emergency up to 40 million gallons of water can be used from the 
reservoir in a single day, for up to 90 days.  EAD believes this will provide 
sufficient water for Abu Dhabi in times of severe water scarcity.   The total 
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desalination capacity of the GCC is 30 million cubic metres a day and in an 
emergency Gulf States have few alternatives and little emergency storage.  
The increased energy efficiency of Abu Dhabi’s new system is expected to 
save around US$63 million in electricity costs over its 80-year design life, 
translating into 346,608 tonnes of GHGs not released into the 
atmosphere224&225.  Abu Dhabi is making great efforts to guarantee water 
security, although it comes at the cost of energy used in desalination, plus the 
attendant risk of pollution from the chemicals used in the process. However, 
EAD claims there are energy, financial and GHG emissions savings as a result 
of the project.  It should be noted this project serves only Abu Dhabi and there 
is no indication of it being expanded at federal level to support the whole 
country. 
UAE Government Strategy 2011-2013 aims to ensure universal access to 
healthcare by ensuring availability of services in all regions and developing a 
health insurance implementation scheme.  World-class healthcare services will 
be achieved by: improving governance and enhancing services; medical 
diagnosis and operations utilising partnerships; accreditation of UAE hospitals 
and other healthcare providers; upgrading standards for health professionals; 
reducing epidemic and health risks; strengthening preventive medicine; and 
preparedness to deal with health epidemics.  Given the probability of increased 
morbidity amongst Gulf populations as the physical effects of climate change 
are felt, this aspirational agenda is particularly timely as it gives plenty of 
opportunity to achieve improved standards of healthcare before the worst 
effects of higher temperatures combined with reduced air quality are felt in the 
region. 
Food security is a major issue for the UAE.  According to a 2011 report the 
contribution of UAE agriculture to GDP was a mere 0.9 percent.  Food 
consumption was growing at the rate of 12 percent per annum and demand for 
staple foods had increased by 30 percent, according to the Ministry of 
Economy226.  The UAE relies heavily on imports for as much as 90 percent of 
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its food requirements according to 2015 estimates227.  It was cited as the 
world’s 15th biggest importer of food by a World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
International Trade Statistics report in 2013, with imports worth US$16 billion, 
constituting 1.1 percent of the world's imports228.  In February 2016, the 
Ministry of Climate Change and Environment endorsed the National Policy for 
Food and Agriculture.  Devised by the FAO, the policy provides for 
environmentally sustainable, efficient and profitable agro-food systems; the 
FAO is assisting in implementing the policy.  In March 2016 the UAE agreed to 
expand its role and cooperation in support of the FAO’s office for the GCC and 
Yemen. The renewed partnership aims to contribute to the elimination of 
hunger and poverty reduction by improving agricultural and fisheries-based 
livelihoods in the Near East and North Africa; strengthening sustainability of 
agricultural and fisheries production in the UAE and sub-region; improving 
nutrition, food safety and food security; and encouraging innovation, technology 
sharing and capacity development in the agricultural sector, in line with the 
leading role the UAE plays in the Gulf and broader Near East229.  The UAE is 
therefore taking positive steps towards ensuring its food security, aside from 
significant investments in agricultural production overseas230, and adopting a 
leading role in improving the food security of its neighbours.   
6.4.8. National and Regime Security 
Apparently young Emiratis trust their government and view allegations in the 
Western press of human rights abuses against dissidents with doubt or 
indifference.  One said: ‘We have amazing resources and amazing leadership. 
We have a happy life’231.  This suggests efficient and sophisticated public 
messaging, along with the provision of goods and services the population 
wants, where perceptions of safety and well-being are reinforced by a 
ubiquitous state security apparatus.  The lack of sympathy displayed to 
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dissidents who allegedly are badly treated is unsurprising, as they do not 
conform to the traditional and cultural norms expected of good citizens. 
After the announcement of the nuclear deal reached with Iran in April 2015, in 
which it agreed to curtail its nuclear programme in return for lifting of sanctions, 
President Obama invited the GCC states to a summit at Camp David to 
reassure them and discuss ways of increasing the US’s security relationships 
with the member countries232.  This will have provided some comfort for the 
GCC which needs to feel safe about Iran as it is believed by them to be the 
potential regional hegemon.  The US will also have wanted to signal to Iran and 
Israel that they do not intend to disengage from the Gulf just because this deal 
is being struck.  The summit therefore had two tracks, deterrence on the one 
hand and confidence building on the other.   
However, the UAE was not easily mollified about what it saw as a significant 
threat.  According to the Foreign Minister, the Federation is fully justified in 
dealing assertively with those who deliberately undermine peace and stability in 
the region. He said the UAE would prefer to have a constructive relationship 
with Tehran, but cannot ignore Iran’s regional ambitions.  As Iran’s nuclear deal 
was being finalised, he accused it of continuing to undermine regional security 
by meddling in other states’ affairs, including creating and taking advantage of 
instability in countries such as Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. To prevent 
Tehran from extending its influence, he said the UAE had chosen to play a 
leading role in supporting the development of the region, politically as well as 
economically: in Yemen, the Emirates and other GCC states facilitated national 
dialogue to enable peaceful transition after President Saleh stepped down; it 
helped Egypt achieve stability after the 2011 revolution; it is in the front line 
against transnational extremist groups; and it donates more aid per capita than 
any other country and encourages sustainable development, education and 
health initiatives. He concluded the UAE’s assertiveness is in the interests of 
the whole region233.  The Foreign Minister’s tour d’ horizon is apparently 
justification for the UAE’s engagement in Yemen by referencing perceived 
Iranian bad behaviour in the region, but also wraps in ISIS and humanitarian 
                                                          
232
 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/04/07/U-S-to-defend-GCC-against-any-
Iranian-threat.html accessed 7 April 2015. 
233
 http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/editorial/an-assertive-uae-serves-the-whole-region accessed 10 
April 2015. 
244 
 
aid as examples of the UAE’s positive contributions to regional peace and 
stability.  It appears to be for domestic consumption as it was published in The 
National, a government mouthpiece, and was not picked up by international 
media. 
In July 2015, the UAE executed a female citizen convicted of terrorism after 
killing an American teacher in December 2014.  She was sentenced to death 
for stabbing the woman in a shopping mall and attempting to bomb an 
American-Egyptian doctor.  She was also convicted of setting up a social media 
account to spread militant ideology with the intention of ridiculing and 
undermining the government, and giving money to al-Qaeda in Yemen for the 
purpose of terrorist attacks.  Police said the woman was radicalised over the 
internet and had not been targeting an American in particular, but was simply 
looking for a foreigner to kill.  Attacks against Westerners are rare in the 
Emirates, but there had been rising concern following Islamist attacks in other 
Gulf States including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.  The UAE’s participation in air 
strikes against ISIS in Syria could have been the cause, as ISIS has urged 
Muslims in the Gulf to attack western expatriates in retaliation. The UAE also 
strongly opposes other Islamist groups including the Muslim Brotherhood234&235.  
This is an interesting insight into the UAE’s internal security strategy.  As well 
as announcing the execution of a convicted terrorist murderer, it shows 
government concern about radicalisation on the internet, the uncontrolled use 
of social media to spread information, their overt opposition to Islamist groups 
and the desire to prevent terrorist financing.  
The UAE does not like to be regarded as a police state236 by the outside world 
and attempts to improve its reputation abroad by having outsiders speak for it.  
In October 2015, former Afghan president Karzai praised the UAE’s openness, 
tolerance and innovation, claiming it serves as an example to the Muslim world.  
He called the UAE a model which fosters inclusive societies, citing its aid to 
Afghanistan including new homes, roads, schools, hospitals, mosques and a 
university in Khost province named for Sheikh Zayed, Founding Father of the 
                                                          
234
 http://www.gulf-times.com/Mobile/Region/216/details/447045/UAE-woman-executed-for-killing-
American-teacher   accessed 13 July 2015. 
235
 http://www.thenational.ae/uae/courts/reem-island-killer-executed   accessed 13 July 2015. 
236
 An accusation made off the record during an informal conversation with an Emirati citizen on 23 
January 2015. 
245 
 
UAE.  Karzai said ‘the UAE is the country that has blended modernity and 
traditional values and has created an open society that is an example to all 
around the world’237.  While that may be the case compared to Afghanistan, 
unfortunately the UAE’s record of repressive internal security, human rights 
abuses against dissidents and lack of government transparency do not meet 
the standards expected in modern Western democracies.    
However, even some Westerners appear to be won over.  Joshua Landis, 
director of the Centre for Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma, 
said during his first visit to Abu Dhabi in October 2015 that the UAE’s model of 
pluralism, cultural acceptance and religious tolerance must prevail over the 
region’s extremist ideology238.  However, and despite his academic credentials 
and expertise, he appears to be very much in the minority, certainly when other 
academics239, 240&241 have been banned from entering the UAE for expressing 
contentious views on Middle-East politics or the internal affairs of GCC states.   
 Activists are routinely arrested and imprisoned in the UAE and face the 
prospect of ill-treatment according to human rights groups such as ADHRB and 
Amnesty International.  For example, Dr. Nasser bin Ghaith, an academic and 
activist, was arrested by security forces in August 2015 and remains 
incarcerated242&243. Prominent human rights defender Ahmed Mansoor has 
faced similar harassment. In October 2015, he was unable to receive the Martin 
Ennals Award for Human Rights Defenders at a ceremony in Geneva due to a 
travel ban244.  Mansoor was arrested in 2011 along with four other activists 
after they petitioned the president for legislative reforms. They were convicted 
by the Federal Supreme Court on charges of insulting the country’s leadership 
and endangering national security and received sentences of two to three 
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years; the next day all five received presidential pardons.  The government 
additionally tried a group of 94 activists en masse in 2013, convicting 69 of the 
defendants for crimes against state security. Many others have been brought 
up on security-related charges for documenting the government’s human rights 
abuses245.  Three sisters were detained in February 2014 as part of the 
campaign against political activists. Their brother is one of the UAE 94 
mentioned above.  They have not been charged and their family has had no 
contact with them246.  The common thread is that each of the people arrested is 
accused of security offences which appear to involve calls for political reform 
and criticising the UAE’s human rights record.  This is the clearest example of 
conflation between regime and national security.  Undoubtedly the continuance 
of a rentier system underpinned by absolute monarchy would be difficult if there 
is any form of popular political participation or representation; so there is a 
threat to regime security.  However, it is difficult to make the leap to seeing 
such reforms as a threat to national security in its conventional sense.     
That is not to say there are no threats to national security.  Forty-one men are 
awaiting trial in the Federal Supreme Court charged with belonging to an illegal 
organisation, Shabab Al Manara.  The group aimed to create an ISIS caliphate 
in the UAE and planned assassinations and bombings at malls and hotels on 
New Year’s Eve 2015247, 248&249.  The trial appears to be ongoing250 although 
was adjourned in February 2016.  Other trials connected to terrorism charges 
involving membership of ISIS, support to Houthis and Hizbollah, or funding 
terrorists appear to be taking place regularly251.  These are very different to the 
human rights and political reform protesters discussed above, but the success 
of security forces in uncovering such people suggests either the security 
structures are highly effective, or the would-be terrorists and their sympathisers 
are inept at their own security, or there are so many plots afoot the police and 
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intelligence services cannot fail to spot some of them.  Unfortunately there is no 
data to confirm which of these options it is.  
A fair summary of the UAE’s conflated national and regime security 
environment seems to be the claim by human rights groups that the security 
forces have perfected the art of silencing critics and created an atmosphere in 
which nearly everyone is afraid to say anything critical of the government.  The 
country operates like a modern police state, with shadowy security forces that 
make people disappear.  They operate extra- judicially and often detain citizens 
without charge or notice to families for months at a time.  In the interests of 
stability above all else, the UAE’s security forces control any dissenting speech 
inside their borders; they seem to answer to no one, save perhaps ‘the 
unelected sheikh who rules the country’252.    
6.4.9. Reinforcing Security Structures 
There is very little discoverable official documentation relating to the UAE’s 
National Security.   Al-Rashedi’s paper (2005) obviously pre-dates the Arab 
Spring, the rise of ISIS and the 2015 nuclear agreements with Iran and is of 
little relevance today.  The lack of discoverable official documentation almost 
certainly reflects the UAE’s obsession with secrecy and its desire to stifle any 
form of opposition.  Without doubt, and as seen above, the internal security 
structures are repressive and powerful, while the UAE’s participation in the 
PENINSULA SHIELD intervention in Bahrain in 2011-12253 show its willingness 
to protect other monarchies from internal dissent.  With regards to its external 
defence it remains a big spender on military hardware254, but almost certainly 
sees its best defence as lying with its American, British and French allies. 
In April 2015 the government of UAE introduced nine months compulsory 
military service for all Emirati males, apparently to reinforce national identity 
and address perceptions of fecklessness and spoilt youth255.  Whether 
conscription will be successful in instilling discipline, national pride and a work 
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ethic in young men remains to be seen.  Also there must be a risk the rich will 
buy themselves out of the scheme as has happened in Western countries in 
the past. 
It was announced in mid-February 2016 that the son of Abu Dhabi’s Crown 
Prince and Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces, had been 
appointed as the new chairman of the UAE’s State Security Department, a 
ministerial-level appointment which was part of the government restructuring 
process described above256.  Official information about the State Security 
Department is difficult to glean, but this appointment very effectively reinforces 
the ruling family’s grip on power and gives little hope to opposition figures of an 
easing of the repression.    
6.4.10. International Collaboration 
The UAE is at the head of a global list of donors to development projects 
abroad.  The OECD said the UAE donated US$4.9 billion, equivalent to 1.17 
percent of GNI, in 2014.  The Deputy Prime Minister said the UAE’s top ranking 
was evidence of the country’s leadership in setting the agenda for international 
development which it can do as it is not hindered by domestic development 
challenges257.  This may not be collaboration with partners and allies, but it is a 
clear indication of the UAE’s desire to be recognised as a global player within 
the humanitarian and development sectors, perhaps as a means of deflecting 
criticism from the repression of dissidents at home. 
In April 2015 the UAE Foreign Minister discussing Operation DECISIVE 
STORM in Yemen said the Houthi coup had forced the UAE to take action to 
defend Yemeni legitimacy.  A geopolitical analyst commented that the UAE 
plays a vital role in policing, helping to demilitarise factions and delivering 
humanitarian assistance258.  The analyst was effusive in his praise of the UAE’s 
military capabilities, which is perhaps unsurprising given he is based in Dubai.  
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However, this again reinforces the perception the UAE is a selfless donor with 
a special capacity for humanitarian and peacekeeping operations overseas. 
The willingness of the UAE to collaborate with international partners was made 
plain in December 2015 when it announced it was ready to commit ground 
troops against ISIS in Syria.  The Minister for Foreign Affairs said the UAE 
would ‘participate in any international effort demanding a ground intervention to 
fight terrorism’259.  Already a member of the US-led coalition against ISIS and 
with ground troops involved in operations in Yemen and taking 
casualties260&261, the readiness of the UAE to take part in military interventions 
abroad with allies and partners is well known and almost certainly part of their 
foreign policy strategy to raise the Federation’s profile and be seen as actors 
on the global stage. 
Following the November 2015 attacks in France, the UAE’s Minister for Foreign 
Affairs said while no request from Paris had been received, the UAE was ready 
to offer assistance, including airstrikes against militants, and reminded people 
the UAE was at the forefront of the war on terror and would continue to be 
so262.  The UAE’s government is obviously determined to be seen as a major 
contributor to coalition operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups.  This 
continues to raise the UAE’s international profile and enhance its reputation 
abroad, countering bad publicity about its repressive internal security regime.  
Collaboration may be taking place with unlikely partners too.  Israel has opened 
a diplomatic office accredited to IRENA and the Director-General of the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry visited towards the end of 2015 for several days.  It is known 
the UAE and Israel have had a discreet relationship for some time despite each 
country’s official stance263.  However, following reporting about the presence of 
Israeli diplomatic representation in Abu Dhabi, the UAE was keen to point out 
this did not represent a change in the relationship between the two countries.  
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Israel is the only country with a representative in the UAE solely accredited to 
IRENA264.  The UAE is obviously very sensitive about the suggestion it has ties 
with Israel, but despite their public pronouncements there are some indications 
discussions have taken place at governmental and non-governmental level. 
6.5. Reflections on the UAE 
The most striking feature in this case study is the automatic conflation of 
national and regime security which underpins every aspect of Emirati life.  For 
the majority of the population this does not appear contentious and is 
reinforced through the continued emphasis placed on loyalty, duty and national 
identity in government messaging such as UAEV2021.  The monarchies 
obviously recognise traditions, heritage and culture help maintain a sense of 
national identity, and that civil society can be used in a controlled way to 
support traditional life without contesting the political space. 
Yet, there appears to be a fundamental paradox at play.  On the one hand the 
ruling élite wishes to counter the homogenising and multicultural pressures of 
globalisation, but on the other the Federation wishes to diversify into globalised 
knowledge-based industries and services where free flowing information and 
data is critical to the success of the enterprise.  Similarly, the government 
wishes to direct and control economic development centrally, while aiming to 
make the UAE the business location of choice for freewheeling entrepreneurs 
and investors.  Add to that the UAE’s determination to be recognised as a 
regional and global player, especially in terms of overseas aid, mediation, 
countering violent extremism and environmental protection, and it would seem 
apparent that some sort of conflict between a rigid and repressive security 
apparatus and a newly educated, informed, digitised and connected population 
is inevitable. 
There is no evidence that political change is on the government’s agenda.  
Environmental protection, alternative technologies, economic diversification 
and international reputation building are key strands of the strategies until 
2030, but the globalising influences of these are to be mitigated by constant 
reinforcement of Arab-Islamic-Emirati values, traditions and heritage in the 
home, society more widely and at school.  The Federation’s wealth, albeit 
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mainly Abu Dhabi’s, will continue to provide citizens with all they need and 
ensure the ruling bargain is maintained.  This is underpinned by a heavy 
national security emphasis and strong security forces unafraid to compromise 
individual human rights in ensuring any threat to the political status quo is 
neutralised.  Unless there is a ‘Black Swan’ event it appears likely the UAE’s 
rentier system of government could continue for many years, providing the 
region with an environmentally committed authoritarian state. 
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7.  Comparisons and Further Reflections 
7.1. Introduction 
It is clear from the case studies that each of the three monarchies faces 
different challenges as they come to terms with the direct and indirect effects of 
climate change, but they also have different drivers impacting upon their 
approaches to human and national security.  All three are committed to 
diversification away from hydrocarbon dependency, espouse strong support for 
environmental protection and improvement, rely on expatriate workers to 
maintain their economies, and eschew any suggestion of significant political 
reform.  However, they each have significantly different political contexts: 
Bahrain’s monarchy, with almost depleted hydrocarbon reserves, arguably 
exists through the generosity of the Saudi ruling family which sustains the al-
Khalifas in power despite significant opposition from the Shia majority; Qatar 
has sufficient gas reserves to provide income for about 90 years, has a 
homogeneous, politically apathetic and acquiescent citizenry, and sees itself as 
a key player on the world stage in terms of conflict resolution; the UAE is 
dominated by Abu Dhabi with Dubai some way back in second place, has five 
poorer emirates that have little political traction, has 90 years of oil revenues to 
come, stresses its green credentials and sees itself as a regional leader on the 
issue, and is essentially an authoritarian state.  These similarities and 
dissimilarities will be explored further below using the ten questions framework 
and the evidence gleaned during compilation of the case studies.  
This thesis contributes to the body of knowledge by providing an assessment of 
the monarchies’ trajectories towards a sustainable future with assured human 
and national security provision, divorced from hydrocarbon dependency.  The 
assessment is based upon analysis of the monarchies’ national vision 
statements and other official documents in the public domain, augmented by 
academic, media, NGO and pressure groups’ commentaries.  It also assesses 
each of the three monarchies’ prospects for regime survival, noting, as has 
been discussed, national and regime security are conflated habitually by the 
monarchies to mean one and the same thing (Ulrichsen 2012b).  Recognising 
this contextual underpinning, the proposition is that good economic security 
enables successful delivery of the ruling bargain, which in turn assures national 
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security by providing political and social stability.  This stability guarantees the 
current system of governance remains in place and the resulting political 
continuity enables high levels of human security and development to be 
achieved.  As a consequence there is an interdependency between human 
security and economic security; a safe and secure population is much more 
likely to be economically productive than not.  However, climate change effects 
cannot be discounted and have significant potential to affect aspects of human 
and national security. 
In the background there is the matter of identity and its place within individual 
monarchies.  Having seen the Gulf States tend not to create a national identity 
as a consequence of hostility to a neighbour (Partrick 2012), it is clear each of 
the monarchies fears erosion of common Arab and Islamic traditions, values 
and culture.  However, in their efforts to diversify economically, each state has 
to create more permissive business and regulatory frameworks to encourage 
FDI and domestic investment.  In parallel there has to be relaxation on access 
to and possession of information, so new businesses attracted to base 
themselves in the monarchies can exploit the globalised interconnected 
market-place that allows knowledge-based industries and services to develop.  
It is this unfettered access to information and ideas that probably concerns the 
security services of each monarchy the most, as their citizens will be exposed 
to alternative political viewpoints, including the concept of popular political 
participation in the nation’s affairs.  None of the monarchies would wish to see 
universal suffrage as the mechanism for deciding who rules the country, 
controls its resources and has the monopoly of the legitimate use of force 
within its borders (Weber 1919).  In the visions of Qatar and the UAE there are 
clear references to the importance of traditional Arab, Islamic  and tribal values 
and culture, and determination to strengthen those aspects of national life to 
counteract the impacts of globalisation.  In Bahrain the situation is more difficult 
due to the Sunni-Shia schism, but BEV2030 expounds the concept of a 
Bahraini national identity through its focus on culture and heritage, to promote 
pride and loyalty in the Kingdom among both Shia and Sunni citizens.  Forty-
five years after independence the monarchies are at a cross-roads; it will be 
interesting to watch the monarchies develop over the next  45 years and see 
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whether  globalisation really does homogenise populations and flatten national 
values, or whether they are successful at maintaining their traditional identities. 
7.2. Similarities and Dissimilarities 
This section looks at the combination of visions and evidence to assess how 
the monarchies have tackled the challenges they face and what degree of 
success each has achieved.  It uses the ten questions framework to provide 
consistency with the three case studies preceding this chapter, but as with the 
case studies there is some degree of overlap between the questions. 
7.2.1. The Significance of Climate Change 
Climate change is clearly not Bahrain’s most pressing issue, despite the 
recognised potential loss of 15 kilometres of coastline as sea levels rise.  Its 
hydrocarbon reserves are all but depleted, so Western decarbonisation policies 
adopted as part of Kyoto and Paris will not significantly affect Bahrain, although 
perhaps it will lose some of the oil revenues Saudi Arabia shares with it from 
the Abu Sa’afah oilfield.  There is little mention of climate change in official 
documents in the public domain, although there is an acknowledgement that 
degradation of Bahrain’s agricultural land and fisheries as a result of climate 
change, combined with already low productivity in both sectors, has diminished 
domestic food production.  There is also recognition that climate change effects 
in other countries can cause supply chain issues for food imports, especially 
where food producing countries decide to limit their exports in favour of feeding 
their own populations.  Extreme weather events, notably heavy rainfall leading 
to flooding, may increase in frequency, but Bahrain’s response is to drain the 
water away rather than conserve it to counteract its pre-existing and increasing 
water scarcity.  Bahrain’s Vision does identify the importance of preserving the 
environment to make the Kingdom a pleasant place in which to live and work 
for now and future generations and also focuses on climate change mitigation 
and environmental sustainability.  These will be delivered through conservation, 
energy efficiency and investment in technologies to reduce GHG emissions, 
minimise pollution and provide sustainable energy.  Unfortunately since 2008 
when the Vision was written Bahrain has faced considerably greater and more 
imminent challenges. 
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Qatar’s Vision is strong on the environment and says while other development 
must take place to make Qatar sustainable, the environmental impact has to be 
considered fully.  It appears implicit that environmental protection is an Islamic 
duty.  QNV2030 identifies the need to raise public awareness, establish a legal 
framework to meet environmental challenges and to encourage 
environmentally friendly technologies.  It sees the need for regional cooperation 
to mitigate the effects of pollution and says it will work with the wider 
international community to mitigate the effects of climate change outside the 
region.  So, in the Vision climate change was identified as a real challenge by 
the ruling élite and they were determined to develop domestic, regional and 
global perspectives and to act responsibly on the international stage. Since 
publication of the Vision, Qatar has demonstrated its willingness to work with 
international partners on the climate change agenda and this is consistent with 
Qatar’s view of its place in the world and its determination to be seen as a 
regional leader on environmental issues. It has also taken positive steps to 
improve domestic environmental conservation, water efficiency and use of 
renewables as part of its climate change mitigation strategy.  However, it too 
was affected by the flooding that struck Bahrain at the end of 2015 and that 
exposed weaknesses in its building controls standards which could be 
indicative of its difficulties in executing the strategy on the ground and ensuring 
those on whom it depends for delivery are legally and policy compliant.  The al-
Thanis see climate change as a major issue of international importance and are 
therefore going to remain engaged and highly active and visible in order to 
reinforce their international reputation and relationships, which they regard as 
critical to their national security. 
UAEV2021 talks of a ‘Well-Preserved Natural Environment’ and, similar to 
Qatar’s aims, declares the government’s intention to support international 
environmental initiatives vigorously, as part of its global responsibility.  It aims 
to adopt alternative technologies, decrease carbon emissions and promote 
responsible behaviour by its citizens.  It plans to mitigate the future effects of 
climate change including protecting the environment from anthropogenic 
impacts, locally and globally, reducing GHG emissions and providing regulatory 
protections for development and fragile ecosystems.  It also says citizens will 
be protected from environmental emergencies, given guaranteed access to 
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clean air and water, and protected from health hazards.  The Executive 
Summary of ADEV2030 also has a priority concerned with developing 
appropriate national infrastructure while preserving the environment.  However, 
although infrastructure development is well covered and security gets a 
mention, there is no further detail on environmental protection or the policies 
that might apply to infrastructure development after the initial statement.  
Similarly, the main body of the document is light on environmental issues too.  
However, the UAE has gone to great lengths to reinforce its environmental 
credentials, including hosting conferences, establishing reserves to protect 
wildlife and habitats, persuading IRENA to establish its global headquarters in 
Masdar City and publishing numerous, publicly accessible strategies concerned 
with sustainable development, water and air quality and environmental 
protection.  It is probable the UAE feels the pressure of being regarded as the 
world’s greatest per capita emitter of GHGs, but there can be little doubt the 
rulers are committed to improving their image through action and, unusually 
perhaps, are prepared to release some of their plans into the public domain 
where they can be scrutinised and it will be recognised if targets are not met. 
The UAE probably has the edge over Qatar in being the regional leader on 
climate change issues, with Bahrain cognisant of the need to do something, but 
totally preoccupied with much more urgent political issues surrounding regime 
survival.  Both Qatar and the UAE have taken public steps to improve their 
environmental reputations and are keen to be involved in international climate 
change mitigation activity; but there is still a long way to go for both, especially 
in persuading their populations to be more environmentally responsible and 
less profligate about the way they use natural resources and the emissions 
they produce.  However, the indications are positive and providing there are no 
serious mishaps to distract them, both Qatar and the UAE appear to be 
committed to supporting international climate strategies. 
7.2.2. Sustainable and Alternative Technologies 
While Bahrain’s Vision is strong on the need to create a sustainable and 
diversified economy it contains nothing specific on a move towards sustainable 
or alternative technologies.  It could perhaps be argued they are implicit to the 
notion of a transformed economy, but that appears to rest on knowledge-based 
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services rather than a desire to find alternative sources of clean energy or 
industrial processes that create less GHG emissions.  However, there have 
been subsequent initiatives to move into more sustainable practices as seen 
with R&D in the agricultural sector including irrigation and hydroponics.  The 
R&D is no doubt driven by pragmatism as these initiatives mitigate concerns 
about water and food security, but the impact of reducing environmental 
damage is positive.  The establishment of alternative energy sources such as 
the solar power plant near Manama and the direction to the Electricity and 
Water Authority to conduct studies into further solar and wind generation 
capacity is also reassuring, although a further check on the Electricity and 
Water Authority website265 still shows it has not been updated since 2011, so 
progress is hard to ascertain.  However, given Bahrain’s lack of oil and gas it 
would be a logical step for them to use renewable solar and wind power to 
generate electricity for domestic use, rather than import hydrocarbons from 
their neighbours. 
Like Bahrain, Qatar’s Vision contains no mentions of sustainable or alternative 
technologies, but does focus on the need for the future economy to be 
sustainable and founded on knowledge-based services and entrepreneurial 
skills.  Qatar, of course, has very significant gas reserves and is a major 
exporter of LNG and GTL, so its concerns over domestic power supplies are 
inconsequential and it sees its hydrocarbon revenues providing the economic 
underpinning to its sustainable economic development plans.  However, 
Qatar’s commitment to sustainability is clear for all to see: it has hosted the 
international Qatar Green Building Conference on cutting edge design and 
technology; Qatari company RasGas has launched projects aimed at reducing 
GHG emissions through new technologies; collaboration with international 
partners on several projects concerned with air pollution and quality is aimed at 
reducing morbidity and Qatar’s carbon footprint; new infrastructure projects are 
now scrutinised to minimise environmental damage; and Qatar hosted a 
robotics competition for young people from around the world.  Again Qatar is 
keen to be seen to be playing a leading role internationally and is likely to 
maintain its very public interest and support for the development of innovative 
sustainable and alternative technologies. 
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The UAE’s Vision does make mention of alternative and sustainable 
technologies saying growth must be matched by a range of sustainable energy 
sources including renewable and alternative options such as nuclear power.  
The UAE declares its desire to embrace alternative technologies and decrease 
its carbon footprint; the reality of that intention is probably best exemplified by 
the building of Masdar City with alternative technologies at its core that make it 
carbon-neutral266.  However, ADEV2030 fails to mention alternative 
technologies which may be considered surprising considering Masdar City lies 
within Abu Dhabi’s boundaries.  Perhaps it was known that UAEV2021 would 
cover alternative technologies sufficiently to warrant leaving it out of Abu 
Dhabi’s Vision.  Since the Visions were written the UAE has launched a 
number of initiatives aimed at generating electricity from solar radiation at a 
considerable scale and starting the process of moving towards the use of 
nuclear energy.  These two significant steps will enhance the UAE’s energy 
security and allow it to reduce its GHG emissions and escape its reputation as 
one of the world’s worst polluters per capita.  Furthermore, the UAE has been 
commended for its low carbon leadership which according to one 
environmental group is globally recognised, providing the UAE with the sort of 
international recognition it seeks to achieve. 
While only the UAE’s Vision makes mention of a move toward sustainable and 
alternative technologies, it is clear all three monarchies are heading in the 
same direction.  Again there is obvious competition between Qatar and the 
UAE for the role of regional green leader and on this occasion they appear to 
be evenly matched across the spectrum of green activities, although the UAE is 
poised to take the lead when its solar and nuclear power generation capabilities 
come on stream fully.  Bahrain is achieving positive progress as well although 
its political instability means it will not be allowed nuclear power by the 
international community any time soon.  However, its solar initiatives could go a 
long way to filling the potential energy deficit Bahrain faces and reduce the 
need to buy oil and gas from its GCC partners.  Whatever the scale of 
alternative technologies achieved, clean energy generation has to be good for 
the region and will contribute to lower GHG emissions. 
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7.2.3. Political Reform 
Political reform is not mentioned in any of the national visions and is obviously 
not on the agendas of the monarchies in any substantive way.  Bahrain may be 
the first country that has to allow some reform as its hydrocarbon revenues are 
the most fragile and it is moving towards dependency on the private sector for 
wealth creation.  Unless private sector corporations willingly fund the rentierist 
system, it is inevitable citizens will be required to pay tax, which could lead to 
demands for a meaningful role in political life for Bahraini nationals.  However, 
Saudi fear of a Shia dominated Bahrain and the impact that would have on 
Saudi Arabia’s Eastern province probably means the al-Khalifas will continue to 
be economically and militarily bolstered by the al-Saud for years to come, 
which will prevent demands for political reform from gaining traction.  
Meanwhile in Qatar, the politically apathetic population seems content with the 
state of affairs there and although a date for Consultative Council elections, 
promised for 2016, has been delayed again until 2019267, there has been no 
apparent discontent at the continued delays.  Similarly, the UAE looks very 
unlikely to reform its political system, with the recent restructuring of the 
government appearing to consolidate power in the hands of the ruling families 
and their appointed ministers.  Even with current relatively low oil prices, 
revenue streams are not an issue for Qatar or the UAE who can sustain their 
ruling bargains comfortably268.  If the three monarchies have a critical political 
vulnerability it is most likely to be the result of increased globalisation and 
interconnectedness giving unrestricted access to ideas and information to their 
citizens.  As well as potentially diluting national identity, increased ideational 
awareness could lead to demands for political empowerment by otherwise 
compliant citizens; should it also affect expatriates resident in the monarchies 
the sustainability of the regimes could be in severe doubt. 
7.2.4. Economic Diversification 
The Visions are very strong on economic diversification and the need to move 
away from hydrocarbon dependency.  Qatar’s Vision, which is perhaps the 
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most rounded of the four analysed, is different in that it explicitly states the role 
that the responsible exploitation of its oil and gas reserves will play in enabling 
Qatar’s business environment to be restructured.  Knowledge-based industries 
and services are seen by all three monarchies as the place to be heading, but 
there is recognition that diversification needs to be wide in order to avoid the 
single output dependency that has essentially characterised the last 45 years.  
All the Visions clearly articulate the need for economies to be diverse, 
sustainable and supported by permissive regulatory frameworks that 
encourage FDI and establishment of new businesses, although in all three 
states there is also an obvious desire to maintain some degree of central 
control over the economy.  How entrepreneurial spirit and innovative, creative 
R&D will be compatible with the restrictions imposed by government 
bureaucracies attempting to maintain control of the direction of economic 
development remains to be seen. 
In Bahrain diversification seems to be well underway and the figures quoted in 
the case study show the non-oil sector is expanding well, albeit supported by a 
healthier than expected oil sector.  Growth has slowed in the last couple of 
years, but is still positive and achieving rates around double that of the UK269 
forecast for 2016.  Of note, economic diversification has not been focused 
solely on knowledge-based services and Bahrain has seen the tourism, 
construction and leisure sectors perform strongly, as well as a vibrant stock 
exchange emerge.  Bahrain has also launched initiatives and incubators to help 
SMEs and start-ups to establish themselves, so as to provide diversity in the 
size of businesses in the Kingdom and persuade its nationals to become 
involved in the private sector rather than relying on public sector jobs.  
Interestingly, political instability in Bahrain seems not to be an impediment, 
perhaps because those who oppose the al-Khalifas also have a vested interest 
in ensuring the economic health and sustainability of the Kingdom. 
Qatar is currently the richest country per capita in the world, but it has said its 
citizens need to be taught innovation and entrepreneurial skills and also they 
need to take their place in a sustainable diversified economy.  Qatar has 
embarked on a programme of major infrastructure projects mainly, but not 
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exclusively, focused around transportation.  Qatar too has established business 
incubation services and made obtaining finance for innovation and start-ups 
easier.  Qatar’s Science and Technology Park is promoting R&D with the 
private sector especially around alternative and green technologies, with a wide 
range of non-oil businesses expected to benefit from major infrastructure 
improvements.  Qatar is seriously committed to economic diversification which 
is made easier by its enormous wealth and compliant population. 
The UAE’s economic diversification is also strongly underway, but as with most 
things is mainly focused in Abu Dhabi and Dubai.  Dubai started the process 
first out of necessity, as it lacked the oil wealth of Abu Dhabi.  As seen in the 
case study, Dubai was badly affected by the 2008 economic downturn and 
bailed out by Abu Dhabi, but since then has bounced back.  Significant real 
estate projects are now underway across the Federation and tourism is growing 
very quickly.  Like Bahrain and Qatar, the UAE is promoting start-ups and 
SMEs and providing incubator support, along with strengthening the regulatory 
framework and working to develop the productivity of the national workforce.  
Trade, finance, transport and tourism are high up the government’s agenda as 
are innovation, R&D and aerospace.  The UAE’s stock exchanges have grown 
and performed well and although the end of 2015 saw the UAE post a deficit 
due to low oil prices, it is expected economic growth will continue as before. 
It appears, therefore, all three monarchies are pursuing an economic 
diversification strategy successfully.  Qatar and the UAE, notwithstanding the 
very low oil price around the turn of 2015-16, have the luxury of a hydrocarbon 
cushion that enables them to fund the development of their non-oil sectors from 
their hydrocarbon revenues.  Bahrain has its Saudi sponsors that fulfil the same 
role, although the Saudis also see oil dependency is not sustainable and aim to 
diversify their economy270&271 too.  What will be interesting to watch for is the 
impact of the increased economic importance of the private sector compared to 
the public sector, especially when the tipping point is reached and private 
sector wealth creation outstrips what the public sector can achieve.  At that 
point taxation will almost certainly become necessary in the monarchies to fund 
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the services the governments currently provide272.  If businesses are prepared 
to accept the full tax burden, a form of the ruling bargain could survive, but if 
individual citizens find themselves paying direct and indirect taxes there could 
be a resulting demand for political enfranchisement and a move away from 
absolute monarchy as a system of government.  
7.2.5. Education and Skills for Citizens 
BEV2030 has a focus on improving education and skills and the creation of well 
paid jobs for its citizens in a newly diversified economy.  It concluded that many 
Bahrainis with university degrees were unable to find work appropriate to their 
qualifications, but also recognised many citizens lacked the necessary 
qualifications to fill the medium to high wage posts in the private sector.  The 
education system was not then good enough to provide citizens with the skills 
and knowledge they needed to fill these roles.  The Vision said Bahrain would 
invest in its human capital through education and training, particularly in the 
applied sciences.  It stated that innovation and entrepreneurial skills would be 
vital to economic sustainability and declared an intention to change the profile 
of the workforce from low-wage expatriates to high-wage Bahrainis who would 
be employees of choice for high-value companies.  As a result, both the state 
and private education sectors have seen expansion in recent years, although 
the private sector has been growing five times faster.  Literacy rates are 
relatively high and have been increasing and the numbers staying on in 
education beyond the compulsory age of 15 years is increasing, although the 
majority are not taking degree level courses.  Universities and other institutions 
have started to offer innovation and entrepreneurial skills training and this is 
mirrored at secondary school level.  Development of entrepreneurial and 
business skills alongside more traditional subjects demonstrates an innovative 
approach and catching students at secondary school will develop a culture of 
private sector work early, rather than a culture of expectation and reliance on 
the public sector for employment. 
Qatar sees education as a key part of the Human Development pillar of its 
Vision, noting citizens will be equipped to undertake increasingly complex 
technical tasks requiring analytical and critical skills, creativity and innovation.  
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The government intends to match labour-market needs and work opportunities 
to individuals’ aspirations and abilities and provide opportunities for learning 
throughout life.  However, one interesting facet of Qatar’s approach to 
education is the inherent linkage seen with Arab-Islamic-Qatari culture, 
traditions and values; this is emphasised repeatedly along with an intention that 
while educational institutions will have some degree of autonomy, they will 
ultimately be under central control to ensure they teach what is consistent with 
the Qatari way of life.  Potentially this is Qatar’s rulers trying to control access 
to information and ideas that may lead to alternative perceptions of how Qatar 
should be governed.  Meanwhile Qatar has taken steps to make it easier for 
citizens to set up their own businesses and is increasingly trying to persuade 
them that the private sector is a good place to work.  Literacy rates are 
improving and more people are getting degrees, although qualifications 
achieved are not always appropriate for the workplace, so there is a need for 
better careers advice at an earlier stage in the education of an individual.  
Qatar has established relationships with prestigious overseas educational 
institutions, while technical and vocational courses have been designed for 
those for whom university is not the best learning environment, with 
entrepreneurial opportunities for young people and women being opened up.  
Qatar is committed to improving the education and skills of its nationals so they 
can be economically productive in the private sector.  However, the monarchy 
is obviously determined to ensure Qatari values are not undermined by new 
ideas and may try to control the information its citizens can access.  There is an 
inherent contradiction between wanting to be part of the globalised knowledge-
based marketplace, while concurrently aiming to limit access to the information 
superhighway. 
UAEV2021 urges Emiratis to build knowledge and apply their talents for the 
national good.  The Vision says more Emiratis will enter higher education to 
achieve the right skills for employment in knowledge-based services, and 
universities will adjust their courses to meet national requirements.  The 
government wishes to enable every citizen to achieve their educational 
potential and make a positive contribution to society.  This gives schools the 
responsibility for preparing well-rounded and confident young people, but also 
specifically requires them to instil the values of moderate Islam and the Emirati 
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national identity; like Qatar, the government wishes to be in control of what is 
taught.  The Vision says there will be dynamic and evolving educational targets 
and a modern national curriculum which includes critical thinking and practical 
skills.  The aspiration is for more students to enter higher education with many 
going on to postgraduate study.  Those who choose to leave education before 
university can receive vocational training; this does not appear optional, which 
is also similar to Qatar.  The Executive Summary of ADEV2030 frequently 
mentions the need to upgrade the educational system to make Abu Dhabi’s 
citizens more capable of productive work, but does not go into any detail about 
how that may be achieved.  In practice efforts have been made to improve 
teaching in schools and universities, but Emiratis appear to prefer government 
posts that are not too demanding, rather than achieve higher qualifications and 
work in the private sector. 
It appears Bahrain is most advanced in educating and skilling its people, 
although that may be due to necessity brought about by depletion of their oil 
and gas reserves.  There is also little to suggest Bahrain has concerns about 
dilution of national identity and values as a result of more education, but that 
could be due to the Sunni-Shia schism that afflicts the Kingdom.  In any event 
educational opportunities appear to be available to both communities.  Qatar 
and the UAE suffer in this instance from their hydrocarbon wealth which has 
created a culture of entitlement, especially amongst men.  A government 
sinecure historically requiring little educational attainment has always been 
preferable to working for a living.  The significant challenge for both 
governments is to overcome that culture and change the mindset of its citizens.  
That could be a generational task as those late in their secondary education 
careers could already be opposed to private sector work.  Finally there is the 
conundrum of the possibility of a better educated citizenry becoming more 
politically aware and demanding enfranchisement and a say in how their 
country is run.  That runs contrary to the wishes of the absolute monarchies 
and is a clear reason for both Qatar and the UAE wishing to control the 
education systems closely.  However, once again it begs the question of 
whether they can become part of the globalised interconnected knowledge-
based market if they are constantly attempting to limit the flow of information 
and ideas their citizens can access. Similarly, will foreign companies be 
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prepared to invest in countries where access to information is controlled by the 
authorities?   Admittedly, that has not obstructed FDI in China and Singapore 
who both control internet access273&274, the latter having been criticised by 
Qatar-based al-Jazeera for doing so275. 
7.2.6. Expatriate Dependency 
All four visions contain a similar message about the monarchies’ dependency 
on expatriate labour, i.e. they wish to reduce the numbers needed by getting 
citizens qualified to do the high value jobs that expatriates currently do.  
However, it is accepted it will take some time to get citizens to the level of skills 
and experience necessary to do these jobs, so highly qualified expatriates will 
be required in the interim.  Generally, the high skilled expatriates cause their 
hosts little or no problems.  At the low-skill and menial end of the labour 
spectrum there appears to be no intent to replace expatriates with citizens, 
although there is a general concern about the dilution of national identities and 
values the presence of large numbers of low and unskilled migrant workers can 
cause.  Without these expatriates the monarchies in their current and 
aspirational forms are unsustainable, so the presence of migrant workers is a 
necessary inconvenience to be borne.  In Bahrain there is little apparent 
evidence that migrant manual workers have caused trouble or been abused.  
However, Qatar is highly sensitive to accusations of sexual and other abuse of 
migrant workers levelled at it, especially concerning allegations around unsafe 
practices while preparing for the 2022 World Cup.  As a country that values its 
international reputation so highly, criticism of its internal human rights record 
with regard to expatriate workers is particularly damaging.  The UAE faces 
similar criticisms especially around low pay and poor quality housing for 
expatriates at the lower end of the skills bracket.  Its security forces are also 
uncompromising in dealing with incidences of civil disobedience or disorder, 
with jail and summary deportation with loss of pay commonplace276.  The UAE 
also feels the sting of external criticism, like Qatar, which tarnishes its carefully 
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built international reputation as an aid donor and general doer of good in the 
world. 
 Whatever the truth regarding the treatment of expatriates, the monarchies 
could not exist in their present form without them.  The 2022 World Cup in 
Qatar is founded on the labour of migrants from South-East Asia and the Indian 
Sub-Continent, while the hospitality and health services of all three states 
would collapse if the expatriate workers who perform a wide variety of roles 
were to pack up and go home.  To a large extent this is a mutual 
interdependency; the monarchies need the workers to run their economies and 
services, and the workers need the money to send home to support their 
families.  However, the monarchies would do well to consider the threat such 
large numbers of expatriates could pose if they were to become even more 
politically and economically disaffected.  At the low skill end they are already 
marginalised in a foreign country; perceived unacceptable treatment could be 
the catalyst that provokes a rebellion. 
7.2.7. Human Security Measures 
The three monarchies are following a generally upward trajectory in terms of 
their HDI scores and have successfully improved or maintained their relative 
global rankings for a number of years; all three states are well above the 
average for Arab countries as a group.  This demonstrates that quality of life, 
health and education is improving in each country as a result of measures 
taken by the governments to improve human security.  This almost certainly 
reflects a government view that good human security means the citizens 
remain content  and popular contentment leads to political acquiescence which 
sustains the social contract in place in each country.  It is therefore in the rulers’ 
interests to ensure their citizens are generally happy with their lot, although in 
the case of Bahrain improving the HDI score does not address the political 
disenfranchisement felt by the Shia, or the economic marginalisation of the 
poorer Shia villages. 
All three countries have issues surrounding food, water and energy security 
with Bahrain comparing the food security situation of nearly three-quarters of its 
population to that of Niger; again it is the Shia who will bear the greatest burden 
which will not reduce their political and economic alienation.  The monarchies 
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lack the arable land, water and agricultural workers to improve their indigenous 
food production, although they are making efforts to optimise what they have 
through infrastructure improvements and R&D.  However, they remain heavily 
dependent on imports with all the supply chain issues that go with sourcing, 
transporting, storing and refrigerating the commodities they require, as well as 
the potential vulnerability of those supply chains to exogenous shock if the 
sources of supply lie in politically unstable countries.  All seek contractual 
relationships with politically stable countries with developed agricultural 
industries, but these could be tempted to extract premium prices from what 
they see as hydrocarbon-rich Gulf States, with the monarchies having little 
choice but to pay.  This would impose further stresses on their reduced 
hydrocarbon revenue streams.  Successful economic diversification is therefore 
necessary for guaranteed food security in the future.   
Water scarcity is a constant issue for countries in the region and while climate 
change predictions suggest a possible very slight increase in annual 
precipitation, it is likely to occur in fewer events, some of which may be 
extreme, and will still be insufficient to replenish aquifers and groundwater 
stocks.  The monarchies acknowledge this and major infrastructure 
improvements are underway and planned in Qatar and Abu Dhabi, with 
desalination still providing a significant amount of the fresh water required.  
Recycling of waste water provides one alternative, but there are infrastructure 
and cultural issues to overcome first.   
Energy security is a less visible issue, although all three countries are aware of 
the increased demand for electrical power as a result of refrigeration and air-
conditioning needs, which will only grow as mean daily temperatures rise 
towards the middle of this century.  As seen, the UAE imports gas from Qatar 
and plans to have nuclear power on-stream in 2017; Qatar uses its own gas to 
fire its power stations; and Bahrain relies on Saudi support.  However, the 
Visions of Bahrain and the UAE identify the need to move into renewable and 
alternative sources of energy generation and Qatar has subsequently 
announced the same intention.  One thing the region does not lack is sunshine, 
which gives an infinite source of power generation providing the necessary 
infrastructure is put in place.  Similarly, wind power is potentially plentiful and is 
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also being considered as part of their plans.  Demand reduction schemes 
would also assist in ensuring energy security does not become a problem. 
Healthcare has been a major area of investment for Bahrain, Qatar and the 
UAE with each of them building new facilities and aiming to ensure universal 
provision.  The private sector is closely involved in building and running some 
of these facilities and the provision of healthcare insurance.  As seen in the 
case studies, there is recognition that world-class healthcare services could be 
a useful component of an economic diversification strategy aimed at bringing in 
people from outside the Gulf to receive high value medical care.  The spin-off of 
such initiatives should feed back into the health services provided to citizens 
and expatriates.  If skilled expatriates know they can access good healthcare 
they are more likely to go to work in the monarchies, which makes their 
economies more sustainable in the long-term. 
Human security in the monarchies will remain a perennial concern because of 
the scarcity of fresh water and their limited indigenous food production 
capacity.  Water production capacity could be affected as rising sea levels 
inundate desalination plants, requiring new plants or alternative infrastructure to 
be built beforehand.  As if a lack of food and water were not enough, the direct 
physical effects of climate change will increase mortality and morbidity in 
vulnerable sections of the population through increasing temperatures and 
poorer air quality; this will place added loading on healthcare services.  
Increased demand for electricity as a result of the direct effects of climate 
change will continue unabated unless there are reduction strategies brought in 
to force in both the commercial and domestic sectors.  Alternative and 
renewable energy sources are potentially plentiful, but again need the strategic 
investment priority to ensure they are built in time.  Human security is nowhere 
near a lost cause in the three states and directly contributes to economic 
security; as mentioned above the proposition is that a safe and secure 
population is much more likely to be economically productive than not.  It is 
therefore in the ruling élites’ interests to ensure their populations are looked 
after. 
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7.2.8. National and Regime Security 
One thing all four visions share in common is an almost complete absence of 
specific mention of national security concerns or strategies.  Qatar identifies its 
oil and gas reserves as central to its national security and ADEV2030 speaks of 
the importance of international and domestic security, linked to economic 
development, for both Abu Dhabi and the whole Federation.  Otherwise, 
national security, like political reform, appears to be outside the scope of the 
discussion, perhaps reflecting the obsession with secrecy prevalent in the 
region and the rulers’ view that it is not a matter for public debate.  However, 
and as seen in the case studies, there are many areas covered by the vision 
statements that have implicit national and regime security themes and here 
again is the obvious conflation of national and regime security to mean one and 
the same thing in the minds of the ruling élites. 
Bahrain’s security is dependent upon the support of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and 
other PENINSULA SHIELD countries.  Without GCC intervention in 2011 the 
al-Khalifas could conceivably have fallen and a Shia republic been declared if 
the uprising had been sufficiently widespread and determined.  That is 
something the Saudis could not tolerate so their security guarantee looks good 
for years to come and Bahrain repays that by supporting Saudi anti-Iran 
rhetoric and actions, and by conducting airstrikes in support of the Saudi-led 
Operation DECISIVE STORM against the Houthis in Yemen.  Bahrain 
augments and reinforces this security relationship with the permanent presence 
of US and, once more, British naval bases on its territory, presumably to deter 
the Iranian regional hegemony it fears.  Bahrain’s internal security remains 
problematic and there are regular arrests and trials of Shia ‘terrorists’ accused 
of plotting to overthrow the state with Iranian or Hezbollah support.  Even an 
ISIS cell has been discovered and broken up.  The Bahraini response to its 
internal security threats, supported by the Saudis and the UAE, is repressive 
and the security forces appear to act autonomously in their repression, which 
makes the prospect of a political settlement highly unlikely, especially following 
an appeal court decision to extend Shia opposition leader Sheikh Ali Salman’s 
prison sentence from four to nine years on 30 May 2016277. 
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Qatar meanwhile goes about its national security in an altogether different way.  
There appears to be little external threat to Qatar and because they are in 
partnership with Iran over gas exploitation there appears no concerns there 
either.  Internal dissent is very limited due to political apathy and what does turn 
up is suppressed very quickly, especially if it involves expatriate workers.  
Qatar’s monarchy is similarly under no threat and has a very sophisticated 
strategy of relationship building based on commerce, military linkages, conflict 
resolution and self-promotion on the world stage.  Qatar’s aim appears to be to 
create large numbers of partners who are stakeholders in its security and well-
being and it has achieved this by building a network that extends from the Asia-
Pacific, through the Gulf, including Iran, and across Europe and the Atlantic to 
the USA.  Currently, even ISIS appears not to take issue with Qatar. 
The UAE has a much more assertive national and regime security strategy than 
either Bahrain or Qatar, which may stem from the al-Nahyans in Abu Dhabi and 
the al-Maktoums in Dubai being aware the five poorer emirates do not 
necessarily share the same agenda or trajectory as their two richer Federation 
partners.  Internal dissent is dealt with harshly and, like Qatar, migrant workers 
are given no leeway in terms of their behaviour.  At the same time as 
repressing its dissident citizens and rounding up suspected terrorist plotters on 
a regular basis, the UAE also engages in a proactive information campaign to 
persuade others of its sound human rights credentials and as a model and 
modern Arab state.  As seen, it has some prominent supporters in this regard, 
but criticism of their internal human rights record probably drowns this out.  The 
UAE also plays its part in military operations in the region and is very active 
against the Houthis in Yemen and as part of the US-led coalition against ISIS, 
again activities designed to show the UAE as a state that takes its international 
obligations to maintain peace seriously.  The UAE’s leadership is repressive 
because it fears for its regime survival, but given the enormous wealth it 
controls, it could soften its approach and concurrently strengthen its support 
through a more benign form of autocracy.  
In national and regime internal security terms Qatar appears to be the most 
stable with little to threaten the regime domestically, while Bahrain’s regime 
survives because of Saudi and GCC support, and the UAE maintains internal 
control through a highly effective and uncompromisingly repressive security 
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apparatus.  External security is maintained by all three through a network of 
often common relationships that include regional and global partners who wish 
to see the Arabian Gulf remain stable, not least because of the oil and gas 
exported from there.  Furthermore, as all three entities and their populations 
see ISIS as antithetical to their best interests, it is unlikely that organisation will 
achieve anything like the Arab Spring might have done in the monarchies if 
reform had not stalled as a result of ISIS’s appearance.  At present, because of 
their evident security strategies and barring a ‘Black Swan’ event, the 
monarchies look set to endure for some years yet. 
7.2.9. Reinforcing Security Structures 
This section follows on logically from discussion of the monarchies’ national 
and regime security strategies.  Again there is nothing substantive in the four 
vision documents although they contain plenty of references and allusions to 
strong tribal and family societies sharing common values and identities, which 
gives strength to their nations.  That is not to be confused with a strong civil 
society involved in all aspects of public life in each state, which is definitely not 
the intention except within severely constrained boundaries.  However, it is a 
fair assumption Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE will be constantly reappraising 
their security requirements and the threats they perceive they face and will 
strengthen their security structures unobtrusively but effectively.  For Bahrain 
there is little to see in terms of enhanced security structures, although 
increasing repression including imprisonment and torture is evident from 
anecdotal evidence.  Qatar appears to be content with strengthening internal 
regulatory structures to improve domestic security and safety, but is also 
obviously in the market for new high-end military hardware including jet 
fighters.  Meanwhile the UAE maintains its repression of its dissidents and 
recently has consolidated security power in the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi’s 
son.  It also continues to buy significant amounts of military hardware, which it 
appears to be willing to use in overseas interventions in support of its strategic 
security partnerships.  It is in the maintenance and strengthening of such 
security relationships where the three states probably see their investment as 
being best placed as collaboration can lead to mutual dependency and 
resulting security guarantees. 
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7.2.10. International Collaboration 
The three states studied take international collaboration seriously for very 
similar reasons, mainly revolving around national security considerations, but 
not exclusively so.  Bahrain has engaged in multiple trade agreements to 
guarantee its food security, relies, as we have seen, on Saudi and Emirati 
support for regime survival, maintains a strong Defence Cooperation 
Agreement with the US and hosts a new British naval facility.  It also 
participates militarily in the coalitions against ISIS and the Houthis and is an 
active member of the GCC.  However, apart from hosting a conference at the 
Arabian Gulf University on climate change in May 2015, which had a strong 
GCC and regional flavour, there is little evidence Bahrain proactively 
collaborates internationally on climate change issues.  This, combined with the 
multiple security relationships Bahrain maintains, reinforces the notion that 
traditional national and regime security threats have far greater prominence in 
the minds of the al-Khalifas, as they are considered to form the most likely 
threat to regime survival. 
As seen in the Qatar case study, international collaboration is a strong theme in 
QNV2030 and Qatar works hard to promote its national interests and establish 
itself as a player on the world stage.  It has an amicable relationship with Iran 
as a result of shared commercial interests, hosts the headquarters of US 
Central Command and also the al-Jazeera news channel.  Qatar sees 
globalisation as unavoidable and knows it must remain economically connected 
to be sustainable, so international trade and financial cooperation is a 
necessity.  It also regards international collaboration on climate change as non-
discretionary and wishes to be seen as a regional leader, as exemplified by its 
hosting of climate change conferences.  Furthermore, Qatar aims to strengthen 
its collaborative international relationships in R&D and cultural, educational and 
scientific matters.  Like Bahrain, it has built a complex network of relationships 
with international partners designed to provide the security guarantees it 
requires.  However, it also works hard to be seen as a global leader in 
sustainable development, charitable activity and conflict prevention and 
mediation.  Qatar recognises its national security guarantees are significantly 
enhanced through political, economic, environmental and security relationships 
with a wide range of partners and is conscientious in maintaining them.   
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The UAE wants to be seen as a modern and progressive state acting 
responsibly on the international stage.  While both UAEV2021 and ADEV2030 
are light on the specifics of international collaboration, it is clear by the UAE’s 
actions and the contents of other strategy documents it releases into the public 
domain that it sees its international relationships as crucial to its success in 
establishing and maintaining that reputation.  The UAE is clearly committed to 
international climate change efforts and has hosted multilateral conferences in 
addition to having successfully campaigned to get the headquarters of IRENA 
to base itself in Masdar City.  It also promotes its own ‘green’ credentials 
constantly on the international circuit, probably in an effort to offset the 
reputational damage it has suffered as one of the world’s largest per capita 
emitters of GHGs.  The UAE is active in other international spheres too and is 
acknowledged as the world leader in aid donations. It also supports wide-
ranging development objectives overseas, efforts in aid of the FAO’s regional 
food security campaign and undertakes a wide range of humanitarian and 
diplomatic activities, all of which bolster its reputation abroad.  Like Qatar it has 
focused on building strong international trading and financial partnerships, 
although it probably fears the spread of new ideas and information into the 
Federation as a result of increased interconnectedness more than does Qatar.  
Like both Bahrain and Qatar it maintains strong external security linkages, 
especially with the US, UK and France, but also is actively involved in GCC 
security structures as seen in the Bahrain intervention in 2011, operations 
against the Houthis and ISIS, and recent rhetoric aimed at Iran. 
 The three monarchies without doubt recognise the importance of international 
collaboration across a wide range of activities to their long-term sustainability.  
International trading and financial partnerships improve their chances of 
successfully diversifying their economies and that leads to greater economic 
security within each country which enables political stability to be maintained.  
The UAE competes with Qatar for the position of regional leader on climate 
change issues and is probably ahead in most respects, while Bahrain is more 
focused on its fragile internal instability resulting from the political and 
economic marginalisation of its majority Shia population.  As mentioned above, 
all three states recognise defence and security relationships with external 
military powers provide guarantees against exogenous threats and they focus 
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considerable effort on maintaining those linkages.  However, as seen in 2011 in 
Bahrain, strong defence relationships with western democracies do not 
necessarily guarantee internal peace and security. 
7.3. Should Climate Change Matter? 
7.3.1. Direct Effects 
It is generally accepted that anthropogenically-caused climate change is real 
and the direct effects predicted by the IPCC across a range of simulations and 
models have the potential to impact severely upon the planet and its 
populations.  As seen, the direct effects in the Arabian Gulf will most probably 
include increased temperatures throughout the year and poorer air quality due 
to GHG emissions, particulates and blowing dust, which will lead to increased 
mortality and morbidity amongst the young, the old and other vulnerable groups 
such as those with chronic respiratory illnesses.  Marginally increased 
precipitation, but in less frequent and sometimes extreme weather events, will 
not compensate for depletion of groundwater reserves and aquifers, while 
rapidly growing populations, higher temperatures and increased domestic and 
industrial demand will aggravate water scarcity.  Higher winds and less 
frequent precipitation will lead to greater desertification, reducing capacity to 
produce food domestically.  Sea temperatures will increase, harming 
biodiversity and fish stocks, while rising sea levels will flood coastal strips, even 
depriving Bahrain of up to 15 kilometres of coastline, and require the expensive 
relocation of commercial and domestic infrastructure and housing, as well as 
the rebuilding of desalination plants upon which the states depend heavily for 
their freshwater supplies.  Furthermore, rising sea levels will cause 
groundwater reserves and aquifers to become salinated, render some land 
unusable for agriculture due to salt contamination and reduce biodiversity on 
land.  Unless current desalination processes are changed, the production of 
freshwater will require extra energy to be used and release potentially harmful 
by-products into the environment, further reducing biodiversity and air quality.  
Higher daily temperatures throughout the year will increase demand for 
refrigeration and air-conditioning, thus increasing demand for electricity and 
releasing more GHGs into the atmosphere, unless clean renewable and 
alternative energy generation methods are adopted.   
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The direct effects of climate change will impact upon human security 
significantly unless major mitigation strategies are embarked upon.  From this 
reprise of likely physical effects discussed in more detail earlier, it can be seen 
that food and water supplies, energy availability and good health and longevity 
are all under direct threat.  The human security of the Gulf populations is 
therefore at risk and if the populations are not safe and secure, their capacity to 
be economically productive will be diminished which, in turn, will impact 
adversely on national and regime security.  However, Bahrain, Qatar and the 
UAE all have the capacity and the time to set their mitigations in place, so can 
avoid the worst effects with judicious planning, although the cost to their 
exchequers of such mitigations is probably difficult to over-estimate.  In 
planning their mitigation strategies the ruling élites will have to factor in the 
need to maintain education and skills provision which also contribute to human 
security by enabling the population to fulfil its economic potential and achieve a 
higher quality of life.  This reinforces political stability and feeds back into 
strong national security. 
7.3.2. Indirect Effects 
The indirect effects of climate change, most notably the international 
agreements such as Kyoto and the 2015 Paris Agreement, also have the 
potential to be problematical for hydrocarbon producing countries as 
decarbonisation targets are set, and hopefully met, in an effort to prevent the 
worst physical effects predicted.  Although Bahrain’s dependency on 
hydrocarbon revenues is all but over, it still receives some income courtesy of 
the Saudis, while Qatar and the UAE continue to earn significant revenue from 
oil and gas and probably have the capacity to do so for many decades.  
However, if decarbonisation becomes widespread and renewable energy 
sources become credible alternatives, the monarchies will see their revenues 
decrease which, as discussed several times before, could place their ruling 
bargains in jeopardy.  Encouragingly, we have seen the three states have been 
making significant efforts to diversify their economies and appear to be 
achieving success.  They recognise the need to diversify into a wide range of 
services and industries and are adapting their regulatory and legislative 
frameworks to attract FDI, while developing entrepreneurial and business skills 
in their citizens in the hope they will enter the private sector and become 
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economically productive in large numbers, which reinforces political stability 
and national security.  Qatar and the UAE have also identified the positive 
benefits that can be achieved in terms of their international reputations by being 
seen to be acting responsibly on climate and environmental issues, so can be 
expected to remain proponents of support for international agreements. 
However, development of a strong private sector through economic 
diversification may well bring other problems for the ruling élites as a result of 
the inevitable globalisation that implies.  These problems are: the potential 
erosion of traditional identities, culture and values if the homogenisation of 
populations really occurs; the spread of information and ideas to better 
educated and more politically aware citizens; and how to fund and maintain the 
existing social contracts without recourse to taxing the citizenry, all of which will 
almost certainly to lead to demands for popular political participation.  From the 
monarchies’ perspective these problems collectively pose an existential threat 
to their ruling bargains and maybe even the monarchies themselves.  The 
ruling élites will have to adopt sophisticated strategies to guarantee their 
regimes survive, including a degree of political reform accompanied by climate 
change mitigation to ensure a potential human security deficit does not impact 
adversely on economic development and diversification. 
7.3.3. Regime Survival? 
Notwithstanding a ‘Black Swan’ event, of which more below, the survival of the 
ruling families in power is almost entirely dependent on how they transition their 
countries away from hydrocarbon dependency into sustainable and diversified 
political economies.  The ruling bargains or social contracts are almost certainly 
not sustainable once the private sector in each country becomes the main 
source of wealth generation, as large international corporations are unlikely to 
subsidise absolute monarchic rule without some very significant guarantees in 
return, which could breach international anti-corruption and transparency norms 
and laws278.  Sovereign wealth funds could take up some of the slack caused 
by hydrocarbon revenue reduction, but as these are probably regarded as the 
monarchies’ money rather than national assets, it must be questionable how 
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long the rulers would be prepared to draw on those funds.  Similarly, taxation of 
citizens and expatriates to fund government expenditure is likely to bring 
reciprocal calls for political reform, so would have to be factored into any 
transformation planning. 
Bahrain is dependent on Saudi support, but, as the Saudis move towards 
economic diversification and decarbonisation effects are felt, it must be 
questionable how long that support can last.  Some commentators believe 
Saudi oil reserves are not as great as previously thought279, which means such 
a decision may be closer than expected.  Admittedly the Saudi fear of another 
Shia state in the Gulf probably trumps economic drivers, but the al-Khalifas will 
have to accept some political reform is required or Shia disaffection could turn 
into an open and very violent revolution the Sunni security forces would not be 
able to contain.  Lacking any real organised opposition movements, Qatar and 
the UAE appear to have nothing to fear as long as they take measured steps 
along a route of controlled transition, but even they must see some form of 
political easement would be seen positively by their populations and could even 
strengthen popular support for the monarchies.  However, while Bahrain 
probably has to make some major political concessions within the next five 
years, it is more likely Qatar and the UAE need to embark on a programme of 
serious political reforms within 10-15 years.  This is not to suggest western 
democracy is the way ahead, but allowing greater citizen participation in the 
political life of the three countries through traditional Arab, Islamic and tribal 
governance structures could be the most culturally appropriate reform to make 
and guarantee the monarchies remain in power. 
Yet, there is always the danger of the ‘Black Swan’ which by its nature is 
unforeseen and takes everyone by surprise; the 2011 Arab Spring was exactly 
that sort of event.  With ISIS in play, as said earlier, there is little to encourage 
serious opposition in the three monarchies because overthrowing the ruling 
families to have them replaced by the ‘Caliphate’ is not something any of the 
Gulf States’ citizens would relish.  However, should ISIS be militarily defeated 
and scattered to the winds in the next couple of years then all bets on the 
monarchies having a relatively long time to achieve political and economic 
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transformation could be off.  Without fear of extremists taking power, opposition 
groups could be tempted into thinking that a rerun of the Arab Spring, and this 
time in the Gulf, is just what is required.  As with all things in the Middle-East, 
instability is the norm which makes predictions hard to make. 
In the end climate change is merely another factor the rulers of Bahrain, Qatar 
and the UAE have to consider as they design their political and economic 
strategies for the future.  Its physical effects on people and territory cannot be 
ignored, nor can the reductions in revenues that will result from international 
climate change agreements.  However, the rulers face more pressing questions 
about the legitimacy of their governance and their rights to absolute and 
authoritarian rule.  As they endeavour to transform their political economies in 
line with their national visions between now and 2030 it will be managing the 
consequences of those changes that present the greatest challenge, not 
climate change per se. 
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8. CONCLUSION 
The central research question of this thesis is whether climate change effects 
should matter in respect of the human and national security policies and 
strategies followed by the three Gulf monarchies in question.  As has been 
seen, the direct physical effects will require active mitigation if each state’s 
population is to be safe and healthy and contribute effectively to the economic 
productivity necessary to make the monarchies’ political economies stable and 
sustainable.  Similarly, the indirect effects, principally reducing revenue streams 
from the export of hydrocarbon products as a result of international climate 
change agreements, will adversely affect the monarchies’ abilities to sustain 
their ruling bargains, unless alternative sources of government revenue can be 
found to make up the shortfall.  Those alternative sources of revenue are likely 
to include income from sovereign wealth funds and other national investments 
overseas; taxation of private sector businesses and corporations operating in 
the newly diversified economies; income derived from operating new public 
sector-owned goods and service industries; and, potentially, direct taxation of 
expatriate workers and maybe even citizens.  However, the question is still 
there: should climate change really matter or is it merely one more dynamic 
that has to be considered and dealt with as the monarchies steer the process of 
economic diversification and mitigate the many exogenous pressures stemming 
from globalisation that potentially seriously threaten their traditional Arab, 
Islamic and tribal identities, cultures and values? 
As baseline documents the four national visions share many similarities; in fact 
none stands substantially apart from the others, although Qatar’s could 
justifiably claim to be more holistic and embrace more areas of government 
activity more thoroughly.  Climate change is recognised as an issue for the 
future, but none of the visions give it significant emphasis.  Environmental 
sustainability is mentioned in all the documents, but varies in the degree to 
which it is discussed, while little mention is made of alternative sustainable 
technologies.  However, all the visions are explicit about the need to move 
away from redistributive economies, reduce their public sectors and move their 
citizens into well-paid and desirable employment within private companies.  
They aim to break away from dependency on hydrocarbon revenues and 
diversify their economies into high value goods and services, especially within 
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the knowledge and financial sectors.  Each vision sees its own government 
remaining as the key controlling entity in directing the development of the newly 
diversified economy, thus retaining and consolidating the monarchies’ hold on 
power in each of the three states.  This thread runs through the evidence of 
transformation in each of the case studies, where it is clear there is no intention 
on the part of any of the rulers to undertake any form of serious political reform.  
Absolute monarchy, and hence regime survival, remains the preferred 
governance model of each of the ruling élites.  
In executing the national visions and supporting strategies, the monarchies are 
adopting similar themes.  Despite relatively little mention of climate change and 
alternative technologies in the vision statements, all three states are pursuing 
policies designed to reduce GHGs through the use of alternative energy 
generation systems.  In addition to being good for the environment in the Gulf 
and contributing to the Paris 2015 goal of limiting the increase in global 
temperature to 1.5-2°C, this has the added advantage of increasing energy and 
human security and reducing dependency on hydrocarbon fuels.  In that vein all 
three states are determined to achieve a high level of economic diversification 
away from hydrocarbon industries and have invested considerable efforts into 
achieving that goal, including educating and skilling their citizens.  However, 
the issue of a culture of entitlement among young male citizens, particularly in 
Qatar and the UAE, has yet to be tackled successfully.  The rulers hope their 
appropriately educated and skilled workforces of the future will allow their 
dependency on migrant workers to be reduced.  Yet, the reality is that at the 
high skill end of the spectrum it will take several years to get citizens up to the 
required levels, while at the opposite end of the spectrum there will be very little 
or no appetite among citizens to do menial or physically demanding work.  
Expatriates will therefore remain in large numbers to guarantee the newly 
diversified economies are sustainable in the long-term. 
As mentioned several times, human security directly contributes to economic 
security and thus national security.  The proposition is that a safe and secure 
population is much more likely to be economically productive than not, so the 
ruling élites must ensure the human security of their populations is catered for 
within government development policies and strategies.  It is clear each of the 
monarchies is endeavouring to do just that, although even without worsening 
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environmental conditions, water and food security will remain perennial 
vulnerabilities for the governments.  Direct climate change effects have the 
potential to cause serious damage to the human security measures in each of 
the states, but the governments have the time to set mitigations in place, given 
the worst effects will be felt from the middle of this century onwards.  
It is clear that national and regime security are the same thing in the minds of 
the rulers and remaining in power is the paramount aim of the monarchies.  
They each adopt a sophisticated and wide ranging collaborative approach to 
security including multiple military alliances and partnerships at regional and 
international level; complex trade and financial relationships; taking on 
regionally and globally significant roles, especially in environmental and 
humanitarian areas, to enhance their national reputations; and the use of harsh 
legal codes and repressive security structures at home.  Little is available in the 
public domain concerning their national security structures and intentions, but it 
is apparent each of them is strengthening their military and security forces and 
using increasingly robust measures to suppress any political dissent. 
Perhaps the most significant question surrounding the future of these Gulf 
states revolves around a combination of factors concerned with the potential for 
increasing political dissent, the allegedly value flattening effects of 
globalisation, the reduction in the ability of the monarchies to sustain their ruling 
bargains, and the associated inevitability of some form of citizen taxation being 
required.  The level of political dissent will vary from country to country:  
Bahrain’s monarchy, maintained by Saudi money, is most at risk because its 
hydrocarbon reserves are almost depleted and the Shia are in a state of almost 
constant revolt.  For the al-Khalifas to remain in power, the repression of the 
majority in perpetuity will be required.  That may deter foreign investors from 
putting their capital into the Kingdom.  Qatar is largely politically homogeneous 
and where political reform has occurred it has been driven by the Emirs.  The 
Qataris are unlikely to want change, unless the al-Thanis can no longer pay 
their way.  The UAE has seven Emirates with significant disparity of wealth and 
active dissidents, although they are constantly repressed.  Each of the poorer 
five Emirati monarchies wants to stay in power, but if they do it will be because 
Abu Dhabi, assisted by a recovering Dubai, subsidises them.  However, 
political oppositions have to be wary of what follows if they depose their 
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monarchs.  None of the citizens of Bahrain, Qatar or the UAE would see an 
uprising that allowed ISIS to gain power as even vaguely attractive, so perhaps 
political dissent will be muted until ISIS is neutralised. 
The increased impact of globalisation on the three states is inevitable as they 
become part of the complex interdependent and interrelated international 
marketplace.  Whether the impact will automatically flatten Arab, Islamic and 
tribal values is something that remains to be seen, although the pervasiveness 
of globalised culture is already apparent in cities in the region.  Perhaps more 
importantly, globalisation and greater connectivity to the outside world will bring 
new ideas and information that will be at odds with the system of governance in 
the countries.  Those ideas could be secular or an extreme form of Islam, both 
of which could pose a threat to the monarchies.  The problem for the rulers is 
how to encourage outsiders to establish their businesses in the states, while at 
the same time preventing what the rulers see as the corrosive effects of a 
globalised world. 
The existing traditional governance structures are a result of the familial bonds, 
treaties and allegiances that exist between the tribal and clan hierarchies 
making up each state.  These loyalties are perpetuated in the traditional way by 
redistributing wealth downwards, which relies on the continued availability of 
funds for the King or Emir to disburse.  When those funds in the form of 
revenue earned from diversified production are going directly into the hands of 
the owners of private sector businesses, the ruler has to find some way to 
make up the shortfall or the ruling bargain will collapse.  This may mean 
taxation of businesses, expatriates and even citizens could become necessary, 
in order to fund public sector services currently provided at a subsidised rate or 
free of charge.  If citizens are involved in economically productive work and 
taxed on their earnings, it must be doubtful they would waive political 
participation in exchange for health, education and infrastructure services, 
because of prevailing traditional, cultural and religious norms.  The rulers may 
well be forced to revisit their system of governance and conduct proactive 
reform if they are to remain as heads of state.   
The problem of looking at the polities of Gulf Arab monarchies through the eyes 
of Western liberal democracy is that it is hard not to assume their populations 
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are motivated by the same desires as those in the West, or their leaders have 
the same drivers and motivations as ours.  There are other pressures too; with 
the Arab Spring neatly subverted by ISIS where is the attraction in political 
opposition now?  For the Shia in Bahrain the entry of ISIS into their country 
would be disastrous, while sleek and comfortable Qataris and Emiratis would 
see their lifestyles change for the worse if Sunni-Islamic extremism became the 
guiding principle to live by.  It may seem inevitable that a reduction in 
hydrocarbon revenues flowing to the monarchies spells the end of rentierism, 
but it does not mean that the traditional system of political governance cannot 
adapt to a new order, where the monarch retains power by permitting 
businesses to operate on his territory and outsourcing government services 
that the private sector pays for, in exchange for an amenable operating 
environment.  The visions collectively appear to see future governance 
structures as largely unchanged.  Success in maintaining the status quo will 
require political skill and sophistication on the part of the ruling élites, but they 
appear determined to remain in power and prepared to adapt to accommodate 
the necessary effects of greater integration into the globalised marketplace, 
while mitigating the less attractive effects on their national populations.  It will 
be their performance that will permit them to carry the day, or not.   
Climate change is another factor the rulers of the monarchies should consider 
as they design their political and economic strategies for the future.  Its direct 
effects on the health and welfare of citizens and their economic productivity 
cannot be ignored and nor can the international climate change agreements 
that will lead to reduced hydrocarbon revenues.  However, there are more 
urgent issues the governments have to face surrounding the sustainability of 
their ruling bargains as they diversify and develop vibrant private-sector 
dominated economies.  Within the next five years Bahrain will be forced to 
make fundamental reforms to its system of governance as the cost of continued 
repression becomes unsustainable and supporting Saudi revenues reduce as 
its economy restructures and diversifies. This will be followed in the subsequent 
ten years by Qatar and the UAE as both economies become private sector 
driven.  A western system of democracy is not necessarily appropriate, but 
greater popular participation in political decisions while maintaining traditional 
culture and values could be the best reform to make and ensure the 
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monarchies continue to rule.  Between now and 2030 managing the wider 
consequences of transformation presents the monarchies’ greatest challenge, 
but the adverse effects of climate change should not be ignored as they will 
increase markedly over the coming decades.  With all that in mind it will be 
fascinating to observe how religiously and socially more conservative Saudi 
Arabia addresses the same issues as it embarks upon the transformation and 
diversification of its own economy. 
As stated in the methodology, this study has relied upon the printed word in 
English, albeit from multiple sources, because the governments in question did 
not cooperate with the research, so élite interviews were not possible with one 
exception that was of little value.  In hindsight, an earlier approach to the 
governments asking where they would like the research to be focused could 
have resulted in practical collaboration.  However, there is no guarantee this 
would have been the case and if it had occurred there is the risk the 
governments would have attempted to steer the research away from 
contentious issues, such as the actions of their internal security services.  
Some significant gaps in knowledge remain, especially around national climate 
policies, national security strategies and the political vision each monarchy has 
for the future governance of its state.  However, until such time as the ruling 
élites increase the transparency of their national policy and decision-making, it 
is likely that examining public domain sources will remain the principal method 
of monitoring developments and attempting to assess the future. 
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Appendix 1 
NATIONAL VISIONS – WORD COUNTS 
Individual Word Scores 
Key Word BEV 2030 QNV 2030 UAEV 2021 ADEV 2030 
Allies 0 0 0 0 
Alternative 0 0 0 0 
Change 3 5 2 1 
Citizens 2 11 18 1 
Climate 1 5 2 2 
Collaboration 1 0 0 1 
Dependency 0 0 0 0 
Development 4 67 10 43 
Diversification 0 5 1 7 
Economic 44 51 15 113 
Education 17 12 9 6 
Employment 7 0 1 4 
Energy 2 1 3 2 
Environment 18 17 17 16 
Environmental 0 24 3 2 
Expatriate 2 11 0 0 
Food 1 0 0 0 
Foreign 8 2 1 2 
Gas 2 7 0 1 
Human 3 11 3 10 
Immigrants 0 0 0 0 
International 7 17 10 11 
Labour 5 1 0 8 
Migrant 0 0 0 0 
National 12 30 21 4 
Oil 15 6 1 11 
Partners 2 0 0 1 
Political 1 8 0 2 
Reform 8 0 0 1 
Revenues 8 0 0 1 
Security 3 6 4 3 
Skills 9 2 2 0 
Sustainability 10 0 0 4 
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Sustainable 6 7 9 9 
Technology 1 0 2 0 
Unsustainable 2 0 0 0 
Water 3 3 2 0 
Workers 1 5 1 0 
 
Word Pair Scores 
Key Word Pairs BEV 2030 QNV 2030 UAEV 2021 ADEV 2030 
Climate Change 0 2 2 0 
Economic Reform 0 0 0 0 
Education [and] 
Skills 
0 0 0 0 
Expatriate Labour 2 0 0 0 
Expatriate 
Workers 
0 3 0 0 
Human 
Development 
0 7 0 1 
Human Security 0 0 0 0 
Oil Revenues 6 0 0 1 
Political Reform 1 0 0 0 
Sustainable 
Technology 
0 0 0 0 
National Security 0 1 0 0 
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Appendix 2 
GLOSSARY 
ADCED   Abu Dhabi Council for Economic Development 
ADEV2030   Abu Dhabi Economic Vision 2030 – Executive Summary 
ADHRB   Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain 
ADNOC   Abu Dhabi National Oil Company 
BCHR    Bahrain Centre for Human Rights 
BEDB    Bahrain Economic Development Board 
BEQ    Bahrain Economic Quarterly 
BEV2030   Bahrain Economic Vision 2030 
BIET    Bahrain Institute of Entrepreneurship and Technology 
BIRD    Bahrain Institute for Rights and Democracy 
CCS    Carbon Capture and Storage (or Sequestration) 
CMC    Central Municipal Council (Qatar) 
CO2    Carbon Dioxide 
DEWA   Dubai Electricity and Water Authority 
EAD    Environment Agency – Abu Dhabi 
EU    European Union 
FAO    Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations 
FDI    Foreign Direct Investment 
FNC    Federal National Council (UAE) 
GCC    Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
GHG    Greenhouse Gas 
GNI    Gross National Income 
GNP    Gross National Product 
GSDP    General Secretariat for Development Planning (Qatar) 
GSEC    General Secretariat of the Executive Council (Abu Dhabi)  
GTL    Gas to Liquid fuels  
GW    Gigawatts 
HDI    Human Development Index 
HEC    Higher Education Council (Bahrain) 
ICT    Information and Communications Technology 
IMF    International Monetary Fund 
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IP    Intellectual Property 
IPCC    Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IRENA   International Renewable Energy Agency (based in UAE) 
ISIS    So-called Islamic State 
Kahramaa   Qatar General Electricity and Water Corporation 
LDC    Less Developed Country 
LNG    Liquid Natural Gas 
MDP&S   Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (Qatar) 
MENA    Middle East and North Africa 
MEW    Ministry of Environment and Water (UAE) 
MOI    Ministry of Interior 
MW    Megawatts 
°C    Degrees Centigrade 
OECD    Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
QGBC   Qatar Green Building Council 
QNFSP   Qatar National Food Security Programme 
QNV2030   Qatar National Vision 2030 
OPEC    Oil Producing and Exporting Countries 
R&D    Research and Development 
SIDS    Small Island Developing States 
SME    Small and Medium Enterprise 
SO2    Sulphur Dioxide 
Tamkeen   Bahrain National Labour Fund 
Tarsheed   Qatari Programme for Conservation and Energy Efficiency UAE
    United Arab Emirates 
UAEV2021   United Arab Emirates Vision 2021 
UK    United Kingdom 
UN    United Nations 
UNDP    United Nations Development Programme 
UNFCCC   United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
US    United States of America 
WHO    World Health Organisation 
WTO    World Trade Organisation 
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